

This is a digital copy of a book that was preserved for generations on library shelves before it was carefully scanned by Google as part of a project to make the world's books discoverable online.

It has survived long enough for the copyright to expire and the book to enter the public domain. A public domain book is one that was never subject to copyright or whose legal copyright term has expired. Whether a book is in the public domain may vary country to country. Public domain books are our gateways to the past, representing a wealth of history, culture and knowledge that's often difficult to discover.

Marks, notations and other marginalia present in the original volume will appear in this file - a reminder of this book's long journey from the publisher to a library and finally to you.

#### Usage guidelines


Google is proud to partner with libraries to digitize public domain materials and make them widely accessible. Public domain books belong to the public and we are merely their custodians. Nevertheless, this work is expensive, so in order to keep providing this resource, we have taken steps to prevent abuse by commercial parties, including placing technical restrictions on automated querying.


We also ask that you:

- + Make non-commercial use of the files We designed Google Book Search for use by individuals, and we request that you use these files for personal, non-commercial purposes.
- + Refrain from automated querying Do not send automated queries of any sort to Google's system: If you are conducting research on machine translation, optical character recognition or other areas where access to a large amount of text is helpful, please contact us. We encourage the use of public domain materials for these purposes and may be able to help.
- + Maintain attribution The Google "watermark" you see on each file is essential for informing people about this project and helping them find additional materials through Google Book Search. Please do not remove it.
- + Keep it legal Whatever your use, remember that you are responsible for ensuring that what you are doing is legal. Do not assume that just because we believe a book is in the public domain for users in the United States, that the work is also in the public domain for users in other countries. Whether a book is still in copyright varies from country to country, and we can't offer guidance on whether any specific use of any specific book is allowed. Please do not assume that a book's appearance in Google Book Search means it can be used in any manner anywhere in the world. Copyright infringement liability can be quite severe.


#### About Google Book Search


Google's mission is to organize the world's information and to make it universally accessible and useful. Google Book Search helps readers discover the world's books while helping authors and publishers reach new audiences. You can search through the full text of this book on the web at http://books.google.com/





-		
		ı
		;





# ACCIDENT BULLETIN,


No. 1.



JULY, AUGUST, AND SEPTEMBER, 1991. .

· INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMMISSION, · · · WASHINGTON, D. C.

WASHINGTON:
GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE.
1902.



180 42 4.1-38

# ACCIDENT BULLETIN,

No. 1,

# SHOWING COLLISIONS AND DERAILMENTS OF TRAINS,

AND

### CASUALTIES TO PERSONS,

**DURING** 

JULY, AUGUST, AND SEPTEMBER, 1901.

INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMMISSION, WASHINGTON, D. C.

WASHINGTON:
GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE.
1902.

#### THE INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMMISSION.

Hon. MARTIN A. KNAPP, of New York, Chairman.

Hon. JUDSON C. CLEMENTS, of Georgia.

Hon. JAMES D. YEOMANS, of Iowa.

Hon. CHARLES A. PROUTY, of Vermont.

Hon. JOSEPH W. FIFER, of Illinois.

EDWARD A. MOSELEY, Secretary.

### RAILROAD ACCIDENTS IN THE UNITED STATES

DURING THE

#### THREE MONTHS ENDING SEPTEMBER 30, 1901.

The facts and figures herein set forth are taken from monthly reports filed with the Interstate Commerce Commission in accordance with the provisions of the act of March 3, 1901 (see page 9), requiring reports of collisions and derailments and of accidents of all kinds causing injury, fatal or otherwise, to passengers or to employees on duty.

The number of persons reported killed in the three months ending September 30, 1901, in collisions, derailments, and miscellaneous train accidents is 240, and of injured 2,622. Accidents of other kinds, including those sustained by employees while at work, and by passengers in getting on or off cars, etc., increase the total number of casualties to 11,212 (725 killed and 10,487 injured). These accidents are classified in the following table. No reports are required of casualties at highway crossings, or to trespassers or persons walking along the track, nor to employees who are not on duty; and the classification does not include trifling accidents which, if tabulated, would needlessly swell the totals.

Table No. 1.—Summary of casualties to persons; July, August, and September, 1901.

		Passen- gers.		Trainmen.		Other persons employed on or around trains.		men, flag- men, and		Other employees.		Total employees.	
	Killed.	Injured.	Killed.	Injured.	Killed.	Injured.	Killed.	Injured.	Killed.	Injured.	Killed.	Injured.	
In collisions In derailments Miscellaneous train accidents, including locomotive boiler ex-	44 13	809 419	81 60	614 274	10 5	84 42	4 0	19 4	8	179 49	103 71	896 369	
plosions	0	9	7	96	0	8	0	4	2	12	9	120	
Total train accidents	57	1,237	148	984	15	134	4	27	16	240	183	1,385	
Coupling or uncoupling cars While doing other work about trains, or while attending	• 0	0	24	408	0	11	6	49	0	6	30	474	
switches Coming in contact with overhead bridges, structures at side of	0	0	10	701	1	46	1	<b>ნ</b> ა	2	108	14	910	
track, etc	2	24	26	241	1	7	0	20	2	15	29	283	
while getting on or off Other causes	<b>42</b> 9	380 485	102 56	1,288 1,047	6 14	55 117	12 30	84 149	15 124	191 2, <b>42</b> 8	135 224	1,568 3,741	
Totals (other than train accidents)	53	889	218	3, 635	22	236	49	357	143	2,748	432	6, 976	
Totals, all classes	110	2, 126	366	4,619	37	870	53	384	159	2, 988	615	8, 361	

The number of passengers killed in collisions and derailments during this quarter—57—is very large, and is equal to more than half of the total shown for twelve months in the Commission's annual report for 1900. The present record is swelled by a single collision in August, in which 28 passengers and 3 employees of the road were killed. This collision, due to a runaway of freight cars on a long and steep grade, can not be satisfactorily classified as to cause, as the officers of the road report that the cars which ran away had been left on a side track, suitably secured by hand brakes; and they have not discovered how the brakes were released.

The next most serious accident in August, causing the death of 9 passengers and 1 trainman, was also due to some cause not discovered. A passenger train while running at moderate speed was derailed with disastrous results, but no defect was found in cars, engine, or track. It is supposed, therefore, that some obstruction may have been maliciously placed on the track.

The number of passengers killed in collisions and derailments in July was 7, and in September 8 were killed from these causes. In one collision, occurring in July, 4 passengers and 5 trainmen were killed and 57 persons were injured. This collision, damaging the railroad company's property to the extent of over \$50,000, was due to forget-fulness on the part of the conductor and engineman of a freight train. These two men were killed in the collision. The conductor had served in that capacity ten months and the engineman eight days. Both had had several years' experience in subordinate positions.

Of the passengers killed in September, 6 are accounted for in a single collision, due to the careless movement of a freight locomotive on a track parallel to one on which a fast passenger train was passing. A misplaced switch was overlooked and the engine ran against the side of the passing passenger cars, overturning them.

The total number of collisions and derailments was 2,249 (1,247 collisions and 1,002 derailments), of which 217 collisions and 90 derailments affected passenger trains. The damage to cars, engines, and roadway by these accidents amounted to \$1,842,224, namely: July, \$600,047; August, \$648,249; September, \$593,928.

Given more in detail, these facts appear as below:

TABLE No. 2.—Reports for July, August, and September, 1901.

	Number.	Loss.
Collisions due to trains separating. Other collisions	189 1,058	\$80, 887 957, 662
Total	1,247	\$1,038,499
Derailments due to defects of roadway, etc.  Derailments due to defects of equipment.  Derailments due to negligence of trainmen, signalmen, etc.  Derailments due to unforeseen obstructions, etc.  Derailments due to malicious obstruction of track, etc.  Derailments due to other causes.	452 73 66 20	114, 661 361, 409 32, 693 74, 477 28, 492 191, 998
Total	1,002	803, 725
Total collisions and derailments	2, 249	\$1,842,224

It will be observed that the average loss by each collison was approximately \$833, and by each derailment \$802. The total amount of damage to property (which does not include damage to merchandise in cars) does not vary much from month to month; yet the individual cases vary greatly. In July, 7 accidents caused an aggregate loss under this head \$127,210. In August, 4 accidents cost \$91,300, two of these aggregating \$70,000. One of these latter was the collision in which 31 persons were killed.

No comparisons can be made with former records, as records have never before been made for periods shorter than one year, and train accidents, as such, have not been reported to the Commission in any shape; but the diminution in "coupler accidents," due to the general use of automatic couplers, may be roughly measured by comparing the present record for three months with one-fourth of the total for one year as shown in former reports. For the year ending June 30, 1900, the Commission reported 282 employees killed in coupling and uncoupling. One-fourth of this number,  $70\frac{1}{2}$ , is more than twice the number now reported for one-quarter of a year.

An examination of the reports of individual cases in this class of accidents shows that an appreciable percentage is made up of cases occurring in what may be called emergency work, such as coupling to a car which has just been in a slight accident, and on account of which the automatic coupler has been taken off the car or is out of order. Such irregular work is practically unavoidable, and the injury record, to the extent that it is produced by cases of this kind, is not to be taken as showing anything to the discredit of either the automatic coupler or the men doing the work.

Another point noticeable in the individual reports is the occurrence of accidents to men who have been only a few months in the service. The cases in which the report says that the injured man has been a brakeman or switchman for less than one year are not, perhaps, to be called numerous, yet their frequent recurrence suggests the need of a

period of carefully managed apprenticeship for the proper training of a brakeman. That a considerable percentage of injuries in this class is due to some defect in the coupler is a matter of common knowledge.

This point was alluded to in the fifteenth annual report of the Commission to Congress. These defects are often very slight, and many of them are due to lack of intelligent care rather than to faults of material or design. A good share of them are to be classed as unpreventable except by the gradual improvement in design of parts and by added experience on the part of the men. This, of course, means that trainmen should exercise particular care for their own safety when any coupler or coupler attachment is in the slightest degree out of order.

"Coupler accidents" and those due to falling from cars, having for years constituted the two most prominent classes in the lists of casualties to trainmen, have received special attention. These classes, therefore, are reported in some detail in the two tables following, Nos. 3 and 4:

Table No. 3.—Causes of accidents to employees in coupling and uncoupling.

Sub-		Cond	luctors.	Braker	nen, etc.	Other e	mployees.
class.		Killed.	Injured.	Killed.	Injured.	Killed.	Injured.
1	Sticking of parts (bent pins, etc.) pre-						
2	venting quick work  Holding up pin by hand (presumably made necessary by defective uncoupling mechanism).  Other causes, apparently due to defective coupler mechanism  Defective draft gear (with automatic		•••••		5	•••••	••••
-	made necessary by defective un-	l		·	•		
	coupling mechanism)	l	3	2	33	1	
3	Other causes, apparently due to defec-			1		,	
	tive coupler mechanism		3	1	25		••••••
4	Defective draft gear (with automatic	1	•				
_	coupler)				. 8		
5	Coupling to an engine or tender				1		
6	Same (with link and pin coupler) Coupling on inside of sharp curve		<u>-</u> -	· · · · · · · ·	5		
7	Coupling on inside of sharp curve	[	1		14		1
8	Foot caught in or between couplers while adjusting coupler	1				i	
^	while adjusting coupler	• • • • • • • •	4		35		1
10	Supped (usually on ice or snow)	!	1	1 1	11		• • • • • • • • •
10.	switch	i		1	5	ļ	
	PWIM: II				41		• • • • • • • • •
11	Caught by overhanging load (on plat- form car)			1	•		
10	Toud shifted	· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·	• • • • • • • • •		2		
12	Load shifted Engaged in operations preliminary to	t .		t e	-		•••••
10	coupling. While coupling safety chains Link and pin coupler	!	•	ا ۱	02		1
14	While counling safety chains			7	5		
15	Link and nin country chame						1
16	Link and hin with automatic	•••••	• • • • • • • • •		1		• • • • • • • • •
17	Link and pin coupler Link and pin, with automatic Coupling damaged cars (presumably an unavoidable risk)			• • • • • • • •	*		• • • • • • • • •
	an unavoidable risk)			વ્ર	8		1
18	Uncoupling without using lever (pre-						_
20	sumably by reason of defective up.						
	coupling mechanism)				20		
19	coupling mechanism) Uncoupling, other causes						
20	Miscellaneous			5	71		3
$\widetilde{21}$	Miscellaneous Not clearly explained		8	10			
_ :-		<del> </del>		:			
	Total		20	30	435		19

Of the accidents here recorded 12 are reported as having occurred in handling passenger cars.

TABLE No. 4.—Causes of accidents to employees classified (C6 and C7) as falling from and getting on or off cars and engines.

			duc- ors.		ake- n, etc.		gine- en.	Fire	emen.		er em-
Sub- class.			Injured.	Killed.	Injured.	Killed.	Injured.	Killed.	Injured.	Killed.	Injured.
1 2 3 4	Fell from roof of box car by reason of— Defect in car Ice or snow Parting of train Derailment, collision, or shock due to abnormal movements of cars	<u> </u>	12	2 1 1	<b>3</b> 9						2
<b>C</b> 6 5	other than those in subclass 3 While setting brakes Fell from—	1	5 1	8 5	92 29		1		. 2	1	12 1
6 7 8 9	Coal car Freight car other than box or coal car Engine or tender Passenger car Engines, tenders, or cars (all kinds)	1	1 1	14	1 1 85 1	1	9	3	80	1	
11 12 (13 14 15	not in motion  Miscellaneous causes  Not clearly explained  Slipped getting on moving trains or cars.  Jumping off moving trains  Jumping from engines or cars anticipat-	2		17 40 6 2	18 402 160 82 43		3 9 2	1	20 8 1	2 6 5 2	4 113 51 33 30
C7 16	ing collision, derailment, or other accident  Fell from engines or cars by reason of defective handholds and sill steps  Getting on or off moving engine		 2	·	22 16 111		2		7	 1	4 4 19
118	Caught in frog, guard rail, or switch  Total	6	1		1, 115	<u></u>	33	5	82	18	283

In Table No. 3, subclasses 2 and 13 may be taken together. No. 13 includes cases due to the common practice of opening knuckles by hand when moving cars are coming dangerously near each other. In cases under No. 7 a certain amount of contributory negligence is indicated, for even an inexperienced man should be able to comprehend the danger in entering between two cars on a curve. The number of injuries in No. 8 affords a striking illustration of the fact that energetic men will habitually take risks when engaged in work which must be done quickly. To adjust a coupler laterally by pushing or kicking it with the foot (often done when the car is in motion) is dangerous, probably, nine times out of ten; and yet the motive of the person who does this thing—to expedite the work of the whole crew—can be spoken of only in terms of commendation. The large number in subclass 21 indicates that many officers making reports should see that details are more clearly given.

In Table No. 4 we find, as in No. 3, a considerable number of cases in which the cause of the accident is not clearly explained; but an inconclusive statement is probably more often justifiable in this class than in the other. In subclass No. 1 of this table the number of injuries seems large. The fact would seem to indicate the necessity of careful and systematic inspection of grab irons, which are doubtless responsible for many of these accidents, by reason of their

being broken or loose. Subclass 4 includes, no doubt, many causes which would be classed as usual hazards of the work. The specific lessons, so far as they appear from circumstances given in the reports, have to do with the danger of giving violent hand signals; of carelessness, when "kicking" cars, in judging distances; of using airbrakes on only a portion of a number being moved, and other well-known practices.

No. 13 covers a class of accidents familiar to all. As everyone knows, there is no remedy for these except that which is in the hands of the employees themselves. While it would be manifestly unjust to sweepingly and unfeelingly class the whole of these accidents as avoidable, on the ground that the practice is unnecessary, it remains true that in most instances this would be the legal status of the case. The same is true of subclass 14.

No. 17 is similar to 13 and 14, but is to be looked at with more consideration, on account of the very common practice, in yards, of jumping on and off the end footboards of switching engines under circumstances where the necessities of the work seem almost to require the men to take a little risk now and then.

Classes 6, 7, 9, and 10 have been introduced so that the totals shown therein may be excluded from the total of all injuries, thereby promoting accuracy in the study of the causes of accidents on and around high freight cars in motion.

The other subclasses, in Tables 3 and 4, will be understood without explanation.

Among the deaths and injuries to employees shown in Table No. 1 (including some which are shown in subclasses in Table No. 4) there are 130 cases that are evidently due to operating trains in which airbrakes were used on only a portion of the cars. Of killed there were 4 and of injured 126, nearly all being brakemen. The total number of collisions and derailments classed as due (1) to rupture or failure of air-brake hose (or other defect in air-brake apparatus, causing automatic application of brakes) and (2) to accidental uncoupling of cars, causing automatic application, is 205, causing damage to the extent of \$88,612. The 130 casualties occurred partly in these collisions and derailments and partly in similar mishaps which were not of sufficient importance, as train accidents, to be reported as such.

The element of danger in a train "partially air-braked" lies in the fact that a quick stoppage of the cars in the front of the train (by air pressure) for any reason, causes the unbraked cars at the rear to crowd forward against those in front with such force that violent shocks are caused. With all cars equally braked, all will stop in unison, or nearly so.

It will be understood that failure or neglect to use air brakes on a sufficient number of cars may result from any one of three causes: (1)

A considerable portion of the cars may be unequipped with air-brake apparatus. (2) A small portion—a very few—of the cars may be unequipped, but may be placed at or near the front end of the train, preventing air connection with all those behind them (under circumstances where, if placed at the rear, they would not introduce a serious element of danger). This practice is due either to negligence or to the belief that the protection to be had from the use of the brakes is not of enough importance to justify the expenditure of time that would be required to change the cars from the front to the rear of the train. (3) On and near steep descending grades the air pipes on a portion of the air-brake cars, in a long train, may be deliberately left uncon nected from the air-brake apparatus of the engine with the avowed purpose of making the train more manageable. Some railroad officers still hold that in consequence of the difficulty of regulating the slack, or the liability of the brake apparatus not being in perfect order, it is safer under some circumstances to regulate the speed wholly or partly by the use of hand brakes. It is gratifying to state, however, that upon roads having the steepest grades this view has been abandoned, and trains are invariably controlled by power brakes.

The above total, 130, includes only those cases which clearly come within this class. There are many other accidents, no doubt, classed as "falling from cars" in which the injuries are partly due to violent movements of cars which would not occur if all the cars in the train were under the full control of the engineman, by means of his air-brake valve.

#### [Public—No. 171.]

AN ACT Requiring common carriers engaged in interstate commerce to make full reports of all accidents to the Interstate Commerce Commission.


Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, It shall be the duty of the general manager, superintendent, or other proper officer of every common carrier engaged in interstate commerce by railroad to make to the Interstate Commerce Commission, at its office in Washington, District of Columbia, a monthly report, under oath, of all collisions of trains or where any train or part of a train accidentally leaves the track, and of all accidents which may occur to its passengers or employees while in the service of such common carrier and actually on duty, which report shall state the nature and causes thereof, and the circumstances connected therewith.

SEC. 2. That any common carrier failing to make such report within thirty days after the end of any month shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor and, upon conviction thereof by a court of competent jurisdiction, shall be punished by a fine of not more than one hundred dollars for each and every offense and for every day during which it shall fail to make such report after the time herein specified for making the same.

SEC. 3. That neither said report nor any part thereof shall be admitted as evidence or used for any purpose against such railroad so making such report in any suit or action for damages growing out of any matter mentioned in said report.

SEC. 4. That the Interstate Commerce Commission is authorized to prescribe for such common carriers a method and form for making the reports in the foregoing section provided.

Approved, March 3, 1901.



# ACCIDENT BULLETIN,

No. 2.

OCTOBER, NOVEMBER, AND DECEMBER, 1901.

INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMMISSION, WASHINGTON, D. C.

WASHINGTON:
GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE.
1902.

• • . • . • i ð

# ACCIDENT BULLETIN,

No. 2,

## SHOWING COLLISIONS AND DERAILMENTS OF TRAINS

AND

### CASUALTIES TO PERSONS,

DURING

OCTOBER, NOVEMBER, AND DECEMBER, 1901.

INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMMISSION,
WASHINGTON, D. C.

WASHINGTON:
GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE.
1902.

### THE INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMMISSION.

Hon. MARTIN A. KNAPP, of New York, Chairman.

Hon. JUDSON C. CLEMENTS, of Georgia.

Hon. JAMES D. YEOMANS, of Iowa.

Hon. CHARLES A. PROUTY, of Vermont.

Hon. JOSEPH W. FIFER, of Illinois.

EDWARD A. MOSELEY, Secretary.

It It. Tustate Commerce Comme mean of Statistics 111/30.

ACCIDENT BULLETIN No. 2.

### RAILROAD ACCIDENTS IN THE UNITED STATES

DURING THE

#### THREE MONTHS ENDING DECEMBER 31, 1901.

The number of persons killed in train accidents during the months of October, November, and December, 1901, as shown in reports made by the railroad companies to the Interstate Commerce Commission, under the "accident law" of March 3, 1901, was 272, and of injured, 2,089. Accidents of other kinds, including those sustained by employees while at work, and by passengers in getting on or off cars, etc., bring the total number of casualties up to 11,048 (813 killed and 10,235 injured). These accidents are classified in the following table. As explained in Bulletin No. 1, these reports deal only with (a) passengers, and (b) employees on duty; and slight injuries of employees are omitted.

Table No. 1.—Summary of casualties to persons; October, November, and December, 1901.

•		ssen- ers.		rain- ien.	son ploy or a	er per- s em- red on round ains.	men m ws	itch- , flag- ien, itch- ien.	OW	er em- yees.		otal oyees.
	Killed.	Injured.	Killed.	Injured.	Killed.	Injured.	Killed.	Injured.	Killed.	Injured.	Killed.	Injured.
In collisions In derailments Miscellaneoustrain accidents, includ-		609	129 56	743 227	7 3	65 44	00	8 6	16 1	54 33	152 60	870 810
ing locomotive boiler explosions	0	11	9	136	0	1	0	4	0	6	9	147
Total in train accidents	51	762	194	1, 106	10	110	0	18	17	93	221	1,327
Coupling or uncoupling cars While doing other work about trains or while attending switches	0	0	32	481	1	10	4	79	1	7	88	577
or while attending switches Coming in contact with overhead bridges, structures at side of track,	0	1	14	805	8	41	4	60	4	74	25	980
etc	2	3	23	292	0	6	0	20	2	6	25	324
Falling from cars, or engines, or while getting on or off	23 9	344 273	128 73	1,578 1,209	9	43 102	9 84	98 125	16 147	154 2, 385	157 262	1,878 3,771
Total (other than train accidents)	34	621	265	4, 365	21	202	51	382	170	2, 576	507	7, 525
Total, all classes	85	1,383	459	5, 471	81	812	51	400	187	2,669	728	8,852

Note.—Columns 11 and 12, "switchmen, flagmen, and watchmen," include switch tenders (not acting as brakemen), lever men, and lamp men; track, bridge, and crossing watchmen and policemen.

The number of passengers reported killed in collisions and derailments during this quarter is large; nearly as large as in the quarter preceding, in which there were three collisions and one derailment that caused 47 fatal accidents to passengers. In the present record there are many serious butting collisions, one in November, between fast passenger trains, causing the death of at least 23 passengers. This collision (the last one in the list given on page 5) was mainly due to forgetfulness on the part of an engineman of long experience. The trains were ordered to meet at a station where it appears there was no telegraph office, so that there was no station signal to be used as a check on the possible forgetfulness of enginemen.

Of the other passengers reported killed in November, 5 met their deaths while riding on freight trains, four rear collisions of freight trains, fatal to passengers, having occurred in that month. In October only 1 passenger was killed in a train accident. In December there were 20, of whom 10 were killed in two butting collisions. In both of these cases conductors and enginemen of experience, and with long records of apparently satisfactory service, ran past the station at which they had been instructed to meet the opposing train. The reports do not indicate that the men had been overworked in either case.

The total number of collisions and derailments was 2,358 (1,481 collisions and 877 derailments), of which 257 collisions and 65 derailments affected passenger trains. The damage to cars, engines, and roadway by these accidents amounted to \$2,075,091, namely: October, \$622,310; November, \$645,565; December, \$807,216.

Given more in detail, these facts appear as below:

TABLE No. 2.—October, November, and December, 1901.

	Number.	Loss.
Collisions due to trains separating. Other collisions	199 1, 282	\$101,611 1,238,202
Total collisions	1, 481	1, 339, 813
Derailments due to defects of roadway, etc  Derailments due to defects of equipment  Derailments due to negligence of trainmen, signalmen, etc  Derailments due to accidental causes  Derailments due to malicious obstruction of tracks, etc  Derailments due to other causes	876 70 54 15	106, 922 295, 861 38, 720 95, 139 14, 414 184, 222
Total	877	735, 278
Total collisions and derailments	2,358	2,075,091

It will be observed that the average loss by each collision was approximately \$904, and by each derailment \$838.

As noted above, the class of accidents which was most disastrous to the lives and limbs of passengers in this quarter was butting collisions—trains meeting head to head, and in many cases at nearly or quite full speed. The total amount of damage caused to cars and roadway by collisions of this class was \$480,771. Of this sum more than five-eighths (\$306,511) is chargeable to 27 collisions, in which 70 persons were killed and 234 injured. To more fully show the character of this important feature of the accident record, the following table has been prepared, showing in brief the causes of these 27 collisions, these being the most notable cases in the record:

Causes of twenty-seven butting collisions.

ecord num- ber.	Train.	Killed.	Injured.	Damage.	Cause.
14 34	Passenger and freightdo			\$2,500 2,500	Conductor and engineman of freight disregarded rule of super ority of trains and occupied maintrack on the time of the passer ger train. These men had been
12 38 17	do	1	9 4	2, 985 3, 000 3, 400	on duty 14 hours, 25 minutes.  Mistake in telegraphic order.
33	Freight and unattached locomotive.			3, 400	looked meeting order. Engineman (employed by a contractor, not by railroad company) misread an order—read
39	Freight trains		6	4,600	for 62. Engineman neglected to observ train-order signal indicating
<b>5a</b>	do	1 ••••••	4	4, 900	"stop." Conductor and engineman "over
15 5e	do	4	4	4, 900 4, 990	looked" opposing train. Operator failed to deliver order. Assumed (without warrant) that wreck would block the road and thus protect against opposin train.
8 11	Passenger trainsdo		9	5, 700 6, 000	Engineman forgot meeting order. Engineman (experienced) started from station 3 minutes ahead of
<b>37</b>	Freight trains	2	8	6, 600	time. Engineman met a certain train assumed it to be another train failed to stop and positively iden
4	Passenger and freight	1		7, 400	tify. Operator delivered an order no correctly written; had been in service 6 months.
7	Freight trains			7, 500	
40	do	2		7, 500	
35	do			8,000	
6	do	4	• • • • • • • • •	8, 200	Mishandling of orders by dispatch er and operator.
13	Passenger and freight		12	9, 200	Operator (of 5 years' experience neglected to deliver order; had
<b>36</b>	Freight trains	1		9, 500	been on duty 10 hours. Order not delivered. Day operato went off duty without notifying night operator that an order was on hand to be delivered.
65	Passenger and freight	4	80	10,000	Train ran past the appointed
5	do		10	10,600	meeting station. Conductor and engineman of freight overlooked on the time table the schedule of the passen ger train.
5b	Freight trainsdo	3 4	1 9	12,000 12,136	Neglected to send out flag. Conductor and engineman failed
67	Passenger and freight	11	•••••	41,800	to carefully read train register Forgot telegraphic order or miscal culated time.
60	Passenger trains	7	17	<b>7</b> 2, <b>200</b>	Left station 5 minutes earlier that
<b>57</b>	do	26	111	35,000	special order authorized. Engineman forgot or misread meeting order.
i	Total, 27 collisions	70	234	\$306,511	-

It is to be observed that in most cases the brief sentences giving the causes of these collisions do not by any means afford a satisfactory explanation of the precise circumstances which resulted in the accident. Some of these paragraphs have been condensed in this office, but most of them state the cause in substantially as full detail as it is given in the railroad company's report to the Commission. The law requires the companies to report the causes of collisions and the circumstances accompanying each; and the Commission, with a view to facilitating the making of reports and to avoid unnecessary clerical labor in gathering facts which are not needed, has directed that the report shall state the cause or causes as reported to the general manager or other chief officer, by the local officer in immediate charge of the division of road where an accident occurs. This requirement, however, is not very well complied with; that is to say, in a case of negligence nearly all collisions are due to negligence—the manager seems to be satisfied with a statement, for example, that a telegraph operator failed to deliver a meeting order; or that a conductor, in consulting the time-table schedule of a superior train, made the mistake of reading the wrong column, or overlooked a word or figure; or again, a statement showing that an engineman forgot that a certain order had been delivered to him, but not showing whether or not the conductor of the train, equally responsible with the engineman, did or neglected to do anything to check or correct the engineman. As reports are made under oath by officers acquainted with the requirements of the law, the Commission is fairly justified in assuming that these incomplete statements are deemed by the men who make them reasonable explanations. In many cases, no doubt, the disciplinary action taken by the division officer throws additional light on the case, sufficient to make the report satisfactory to the general manager. facts concerning dismissals and punishments are not, however, reported to the Commission, except by a very few managers, the custom of years in reporting to State authorities being, no doubt, the guide that is followed in this respect. But the object aimed at in requiring the causes of accidents to be recorded in a Government office is to gather such data as may be ascertainable concerning the remedy that should be applied for the removal of such causes; and to this end the reports to the Commission should be full and explicit. In view of the somewhat experimental nature of the reports, the Commission has not as yet required the amendment and amplification of individual reports (the need of which is here indicated) except in a very few cases; but it seems likely that, if the purpose of the law is to be accomplished, it may become necessary to issue a more detailed code of rules for the description of collisions and their causes. It is obvious that any one of the causes set forth in the foregoing list of 27 cases might lead to as

great loss of life and property as was caused by the worst collision in the list. The simplest error may produce the greatest disaster. The first step, therefore, in any movement looking to the reduction of the railroad-accident record—which record may not unfairly be characterized as a reproach to the country—is to learn and state the causes of accidents in such full detail as may be necessary to make possible a thorough analysis.

The number of fatal "coupling accidents," 38, is considerably larger than in the preceding quarter. This increase, no doubt, may be fairly attributed to the increased dangers incident to colder weather, and in part also to the greater number of freight trains run on the principal lines in the autumn. The following table, No. 3, shows the causes of these accidents in detail:

Table No. 3.—Causes of accidents to employees in coupling and uncoupling cars.

8		Killed.	Injured.	75217 - 3			
2 8				Killed.	Injured.	Killed.	Injured.
8	Sticking of parts (bent pins, etc.) pre-						"
8	venting quick work	• • • • • • •	1	2	3	•••••	
8	made necessary by defective un-					1	
4	coupling mechanism)		1		9		•••••
4	Other causes, apparently due to defect-		1		24		
	coupling mechanism)	• • • • • • •	' 1	1		,	
_ 1	coupler)					•••••	
5	Coupling to an engine or tender			· · · · · · · · ·	6	••••••	
6 7	Same (with link-and-pin coupler)				2		
8 1	Foot caught in or between couplers	• • • • • • •	1	1	30		_
°						<b></b>	
9	while adjusting coupler				! 2		
10	root caught in itog, guard rail, or		ĭ				
1	switch	1		5	12	1	
11	Caught by overhanging load (on plat-		<b>!</b>			1	}
	form car)				6		
12	Load shifted	•••••			2		
13	Engaged in operations preliminary to coupling		9	5	45		j .
14	While counting sefety chains		_	"	3		,
15	Link-and-nin adunlar	1	ľ		27		'
16	Link and pin, with automatic				<u>1</u> 9		
17	Link and pin, with automatic				1		
ł	an unavoidable risk)	• • • • • • •	2		30		
18	Uncoupling without using lever (pre-					<b>i</b>	
	sumably by reason of defective un-					1	i i
30	coupling mechanism). Uncoupling, other causes	• • • • • • •		3	44		
19	Misselfengers			5 4	20 118		
20 21	Miscellaneous Not clearly explained	1	4 3		118	i	
<b>41</b>				10	1-2.2		
-	Total	1	15	35	546	2	18

Of the coupling accidents here recorded, 39 are reported as having occurred in handling passenger cars. Table No. 4 (below) also shows in its principal items considerable increases over the preceding quarter. The most marked change is in subclass 2, representing a cause already alluded to. The much larger number of fatal injuries caused by jumping from moving trains (subclass 14) is also explainable in part, very likely, by the same fact.

TABLE No. 4.—Causes of accidents to employees classified (C6 and C7) as falling from and getting on or off cars and engines.

			duc- ors.		rake- n, etc.	•	gine- ien.	Fire	emen.		er em- y <del>ees</del> .
Sub- class.	Causes.	Killed.	Injured.	Killed.	Injured.	Killed.	Injured.	Killed.	Injured.	Killed.	Injured.
1 2 3 4	Fell from roof of box car by reason of— Defect in car Ice or snow Parting of train Derailment, collision, or shock due		1	2 2	43 36 19	• • • •		• • • •	1		1
C6 5	to abnormal movements of cars other than those in subclass 3 While setting brakes Fell from—		7 2	7 6	114 46	••••	1	1	6	1	7
6 7 8 9	Coal car Freight car other than box or coal car. Engine or tender. Passenger car Engines, tenders, or cars (all kinds)	 	1 2	3 12	2 6 92 5	• • • •	8		28		1 1 4
11 12 (13	not in motion	3 4		14 54 8	22 408 149 94	1	6 10 2		30 7	5 7 3	123 6 30
14 15	Jumping off moving trains	2	12	, 1Î	101						25
C7	cident	• • • •	1		29 47		7		10	••••	1
17 18	Getting on or off moving engine		11	10	186	1	14		14	••••	17
,	Total	9	87	129	1,406	2	50	1	100	16	230

#### [Public—No. 171.]

An Act Requiring common carriers engaged in interstate commerce to make full reports of all accidents to the Interstate Commerce Commission.

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, It shall be the duty of the general manager, superintendent, or other proper officer of every common carrier engaged in interstate commerce by railroad to make to the Interstate Commerce Commission, at its office in Washington, District of Columbia, a monthly report, under oath, of all collisions of trains or where any train or part of a train accidentally leaves the track, and of all accidents which may occur to its passengers or employees while in the service of such common carrier and actually on duty, which report shall state the nature and causes thereof, and the circumstances connected therewith.

SEC. 2. That any common carrier failing to make such report within thirty days after the end of any month shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor and, upon conviction thereof by a court of competent jurisdiction, shall be punished by a fine of not more than one hundred dollars for each and every offense and for every day during which it shall fail to make such report after the time herein specified for making the same.

SEC. 3. That neither said report nor any part thereof shall be admitted as evidence or used for any purpose against such railroad so making such report in any suit or action for damages growing out of any matter mentioned in said report.

SEC. 4. That the Interstate Commerce Commission is authorized to prescribe for such common carriers a method and form for making the reports in the foregoing section provided.

Approved, March 3, 1901.

# ACCIDENT BULLETIN,

No. 3,

## SHOWING COLLISIONS AND DERAILMENTS OF TRAINS

AND

### CASUALTIES TO PERSONS,

**DURING** 

JANUARY, FEBRUARY, AND MARCH, 1902.

INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMMISSION,
WASHINGTON, D. C.

WASHINGTON:
GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE.
1902.

### THE INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMMISSION.

Hon. MARTIN A. KNAPP, of New York, Chairman.

Hon. JUDSON C. CLEMENTS, of Georgia.

Hon. JAMES D. YEOMANS, of Iowa.

Hon. CHARLES A. PROUTY, of Vermont.

Hon. JÖSEPH W. FIFER, of Illinois.

EDWARD A. MOSELEY, Secretary.

is Interest Commune Comme, Bureau of Statustica 117/30

ACCIDENT BULLETIN No. 3.

### RAILROAD ACCIDENTS IN THE UNITED STATES

DURING THE

#### THREE MONTHS ENDING MARCH 31, 1902.

The number of persons killed in train accidents during the months of January, February, and March, 1902, as shown in reports made by the railroad companies to the Interstate Commerce Commission, under the "accident law" of March 3, 1901, was 212, and of injured, 2,111. Accidents of other kinds, including those sustained by employees while on duty, and by passengers in getting on or off cars, etc., bring the total number of casualties up to 10,223 (665 killed and 9,558 injured). These accidents are classified in the following table. These statistics cover only two classes—(1) passengers, and (2) employees on duty.

TABLE No. 1.—Casualties to persons January, February, and March, 1902.

	Passen- gers.		Trainmen.		Other persons employed on or around trains.		'men, flag- men, and		Other employees.		Total employees.	
	Killed.	Injured.	Killed.	Injured.	Killed.	Injured.	Killed.	Injured.	Killed.	Injured.	Killed.	Injured.
In collisions	26 15	501 298	95 35	660 261	1 12	59 71	2 0	10	6	34 15	104 53	763 351
plosions	0	27	12	156	0	1	0	3	2	11	14	171
Total train accidents	41	826	142	1,077	13	131	2	17	14	60	171	1,285
Coupling or uncoupling cars	0	0	31	477 702	$\frac{\overline{2}}{2}$	8 33	2	54 42	0	11 79	35 25	550 856
Coming in contact with overhead bridges or structures at side of track.	1	2	20	239	0	0	0	19	1	6	21	264
Falling from cars or engines, or while getting on or off. Other causes	8 3	254 177	97	1, 530 1, 155	6 6	46 85	7 25	100 78	14 119	142 2, 208	124 236	1,818 3,526
Total (other than train accidents)	12	433	221	4, 103	16	172	36	293	168	2, 446	441	7,014
Total all classes	53	1, 259	363	5, 180	29	<b>80</b> 3	38	310	182	2,506	612	8, 299

Note.—The columns headed "Switchmen, flagmen, and watchmen" include switch tenders (not yard brakemen), levermen, and lampmen; track, bridge, and crossing watchmen and policemen.

The number of passengers reported killed in collisions and derailments is not so great as in either of the last two quarters, but it is still large, two accidents having caused the death of 29 passengers (and the injury of 182). One of these, in January, was a rear collision of passenger trains, and the other, in March, was the derailment of a passenger train running at full speed, followed by a fire. The collision was due to the carelessness or incompetency of the engineman of the rear train, who disregarded two fixed signals which showed warnings designed to protect the preceding standing train. This engineman had filled one position or another in train service for about twelve years, but he had been engineman on this line (where the collision occurred) for a period of only five months, and had been in charge of a passenger train on this line for only a very few trips. The line is one on which trains follow one another (in the morning and in the evening) at very short intervals—two or three minutes—yet it appears, from the report of the state railroad commissioners, who investigated the accident, that this engineman was inexperienced, lacked reasonable presence of mind when he failed to see the signals, and unmistakably violated a well-known rule. The state railroad commissioners also characterized the engineman as of "unascertained capacity," and they declare, therefore, that the railroad company was grossly negligent.

The report of the derailment says that the cause is unknown. The accident occurred in the night, and it is conjectured that there may have been an obstruction on the track.

As in the last preceding quarter, there were a number of passengers killed in rear collisions of freight trains, the passengers being in the cabooses. Seven passengers were thus killed.

The total number of collisions and derailments was 2,058 (1,220 collisions and 838 derailments), of which 221 collisions and 84 derailments affected passenger trains. The damage to cars, engines, and roadway by these accidents amounted to \$1,914,258, namely; January, \$651,751; February, \$657,969; March, \$604,538.

Given more in detail these facts appear as below:

TABLE No. 2.—January, February, and March, 1902.

	Number.	Loss.
Collisions due to trains separating	194 1,026	\$80, 149 924, 875
Total collisions	1, 220	1,005,024
Derailments due to defects of roadway, etc.  Derailments due to defects of equipment.  Derailments due to negligence of trainmen, signalmen, etc.  Derailments due to accidental causes.  Derailments due to malicious obstruction of tracks, etc.  Perailments due to other causes.	369 55 55 10	101, 884 266, 032 34, 078 223, 203 6, 935 277, 602
Total	838	909, 234
Total collisions and derailments	2,058	1, 914, 258

It will be observed that the average loss by each collision was approximately \$824, and by each derailment \$1,085.

In Bulletin No. 2, containing statistics of a number of particularly disastrous butting collisions, a tabular statement was given showing the magnitude and causes of the most important accidents of the quarter coming within that class. In the quarter now under review, rear collisions are the most prominent, and a table is therefore given of 41 of the most serious cases in that class; that is, of all involving over \$2,000 damage each. The list also includes one other, in which four passengers were killed, and one due to a "failure in block working." In all, there were, it will be seen, three collisions due to this last-named cause, and a fourth due to failure of an automatic block signal.

Causes of forty-one rear collisions.

Passenger and freight  do  reight trains  do  do  do  assenger and freight	1	3 2 8		controllable speed.  Block signal set at clear when block section was not clear.  Special passenger overtook freight
Passenger and freight do Freight trainsdodododo	1	2	2,000	Block signal set at clear when block section was not clear.  Special passenger overtook freight
do	1	8		Special passenger overtook freight
reight trains do do  do  rassenger and freight		<b>8</b>	0.000	weather thick, flagman "could no be seen."
reight trains do do  do  rassenger and freight		¦	2,000	
dodododo			2,000	Improper flagging.
dodododo			2,072	Flagman failed to go back far enough
assenger and freight.			2, 033	"Engineman exercised poor judg ment."
assenger and freight.		1	2,100	
Santaba and		, ,	2,200	Improper flagging.
TPIPTITPAINE	•	_	2,200	Fast running and improper flagging.
Freight trainsdo			2, 200	Approached yard at uncontrollable speed.
do	! 1	1	2,393	Neglected to flag.
do				
do	' • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •		2,600	Engineman failed to keep a good lookout.
do	1	1	2,800	Engineman (and brakeman) asleep or engine. Fireman did not watch fo signal.
. do	1	2	2.900	Runaway on steep grade.
Passenger trains		7	2,400	Failed to flag.
do		8	2, 400	Misplaced switch (at station); switch obscured by steam.
do		17	2, 465	Failed to flag.
Freight trains		4	2,500	Do.
do	8	1		station in a blizzard.
do		<i></i>		Failed to flag.
do	•••••	1	8, 100	proached station too fast.
do	1	1		Failed to flag.
do			8,300	Too high speed; failure to flag.
Passenger trains	1	6	8,500	Neglected 5-minute time interval and also approached station too fast.
reight trains	1	1	8,500	Improper flagging.
do	' · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·			Train approached station too fast; en gineman had been on duty 18
ا				hours.
First class (not pas- senger) train and	1	5		
reight trains	1	2	4,000	Do.
do	• • • • • • •			Engineman "claims" did not se
do	3	7	5,000	flagman. Runaway on steep grade of 37 cars only 8 air-braked. Crew had bee
	do	do	do	do

Causes of forty-one rear collisions—Continued.

Record num- ber.	Train.	Killed.	Injured.	Damage to cars and engines and road-way.	Cause.
40	Passenger and freight		1	<b>\$</b> 5,000	Too high speed; failure to flag; conductor and engineman at fault each had 1 year's experience; flag-
23	do	2	5	5,500	man 3 months.  Freight overtook passenger train which by reason of leaky boiler was losing time and was not protected
15	A freight and a work train.	2	3	6,000	by flag. Conductor of work train overlooked regular train on time table.
1	Passenger trains	17	150	9, 800	Engineman ran past block signal indicating "stop."
19	Freight trains		1	10,900	Conductor neglected to display tail lights and flagman neglected to go back with stop signal.
18	Passenger trains		12	13,000	Flagman (at night) failed to go back far enough; thought an approaching train was a yard engine.
<b>43</b> a	Freight trains			14,000	Too high speed on descending grade; train of 40 cars, all had air brakes, but only 12 of them were connected up; 3 brakemen had 15 months', 10 months', and 2 months' experience, respectively.
	Total, 41 collisions.	43	255	160, 247	

As in the list given in the last bulletin, the causes are stated very briefly, yet the statements in most cases give substantially all that is contained in the railroad company's report. The observations made in that bulletin in regard to the incompleteness and insufficiency of the explanations of causes given by the railroad companies will apply with equal force to the present case, though it is true that where the time-interval system is the regulation depended on for the prevention of rear collisions, and where delays to trains consequently necessitate "flagging," the diagnosis of a collision is often much simpler than in the case of butting collisions. "The flagman failed to go back far enough," or "the following engineman failed to properly control the speed of his train," or both of these, figure as principal causes in a great many cases.

It will be obvious that some of the explanations do not bear much relation to the rules which were violated. For example, the fact that a snowstorm was raging does not explain a collision, for the regulations prescribe measures for insuring the safety of trains under such circumstances. It is regrettable to observe that in two of the most costly collisions in this list, one of them causing the death of three trainmen, the failure to use a sufficient number of air brakes appears to have been a principal cause of the disaster. Excessive hours of work also figures in one of these; and again in another and less costly case.

Neither this list nor that of butting collisions, before published, ontains anything exceptional. The causes of these costly cases are f the same general character as those of the hundreds of less costly

The \$160,247 charged against these 41 cases is equal to about 42 per cent of the total cost (\$380,948) charged against all of the 385 rear collisions of the quarter; but as far as the question of causes or remedies is concerned, the minor cases are little if any different from the others. And of course the publishing of these tables in this way does not mean that this kind of collisions is prominent in one quarter of the year and that kind in another, except that exceptional fatality attended one or a few cases, as stated, in these particular In number of cases, gross money loss (not including damages for personal injuries), and variety of causes, all the bulletins are pretty much alike, and the list of butting collisions in the last bulletin could, in its essential features, be pretty nearly duplicated in this and in the next, except in the number of casualties to passengers. Reports mentioning men who have been on duty very long hours, or whose experience in train work is less—sometimes much less—than one year, and stating that only a few air brakes were used (where more would have prevented the accident) are as frequent among the great number of cases not cited as in the lists published. In the quarter now reported the seven most costly butting collisions are charged with damage to cars, engines, and roadway, amounting to \$125,758, or nearly \$18,000 each.

The list of "coupling accidents" does not vary greatly from the preceding quarters. The causes of these, in detail, are given in Table No. 3.

Table No. 3.—Causes of accidents to employees in coupling and uncoupling.

Sub-		Cond	uctors.	Braker	men, etc.	Other e	mployees
lass.		Killed.	Injured.	Killed.	Injured.	Killed.	Injured.
1	Sticking o. parts (bent pins, etc.) pre-			ı			
2	wenting quick work.  Holding up pin by hand (presumably made necessary by defective un-		1	1	5		
	coupling mechanism)		2		37		•••••
3	Other causes, apparently due to defec- tive coupler mechanism  Defective draft gear (with automatic		1		13		
4	Defective draft gear (with automatic coupler)				1		• • • • • • •
5 6	coupler) Coupling to an engine or tender Same (with link and pin coupler)				25 2		
7 8	Coupling on inside of sharp curve Foot caught in or between couplers		•••••	1	23		
9	while adjusting coupler		1	<b>2</b>	21 7		
10	Foot caught in frog, guard rail, or			4	10		
11	Caught by overhanging load (on plat- form car)	1	,	1	7		
12 13				••••	3		
14	coupling While coupling safety chains	i	2	13	32 16		• • • • • • • •
15	i Link and bin coubler				41		· !
16 17	Link and pin, with automatic Coupling damaged cars (presumably			1	6		•••••
18	an unavoidable risk)	1		1	14		••••••
	sumably by reason of defective un- coupling mechanism) Uncoupling, other causes		1	3	9		•••••
19 20	Uncoupling, other causes		11	6	195		•••••
21	Not clearly explained		1				• • • • • • • •
	Total		22	35	517		1

TABLE No. 4.—Causes of accidents to employees classified (C6 and C7) as falling from and getting on or off cars and engines.

			duc- rs.		ake- ı, etc.		gine- en.	Fire	emen.		er em- yees.
Sub- class.	Causes.	Killed.	Injured.	Killed.	Injured.	Killed.	Injured.	Killed.	Injured.	Killed.	Injured.
1 2 3 4	Fell from roof of box car by reason of— Defect in car. Ice or snow. Parting of train Derailment, collision, or shock due to abnormal movements of cars		1 3 4	8	2 36 22			••••	1	1	••••
C6 5	other than those in subclass 3 While setting brakes Fell from—		8 3	4 10	85 83		1		2	1	6 1
6 7 8 9	Ooal car Freight car other than box or coal car. Engine or tender Passenger car		8 1	6	4 2 74 5		18	2	46		1 2
11 12 (13 14 15	Engines, tenders, or cars (all kinds) not in motion. Miscellaneous causes Not clearly explained. Slipped getting on moving trains or cars. Jumping off moving trains. Jumping from engines or cars anticipat-	····· 1	1 40 8 9 10	2 24 86 8 4	63 428 66 102 84		20 3 2 1	1	36 13 2 1 2	 4 2 2 1	7 72 5 9
C7 16	ing collision, derailment, or other accident		2		21 45		8	1	14	1	1
17 18	defective handholds and sill steps Getting on or off moving engine Caught in frog, guard rail, or switch	l	20 20	6	229 5	••••	42		44	i 	26
	Total	2	112	104	1,806		95	4	163	14	142

#### [Public—No. 171.]

AN ACT Requiring common carriers engaged in interstate commerce to make full reports of all accidents to the Interstate Commerce Commission.

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, It shall be the duty of the general manager, superintendent, or other proper officer of every common carrier engaged in interstate commerce by railroad to make to the Interstate Commerce Commission, at its office in Washington, District of Columbia, a monthly report, under oath, of all collisions of trains or where any train or part of a train accidentally leaves the track, and of all accidents which may occur to its passengers or employees while in the service of such common carrier and actually on duty, which report shall state the nature and causes thereof, and the circumstances connected therewith.

SEC. 2. That any common carrier failing to make such report within thirty days after the end of any month shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor and, upon conviction thereof by a court of competent jurisdiction, shall be punished by a fine of not more than one hundred dollars for each and every offense and for every day during which it shall fail to make such report after the time herein specified for making the same.

SEC. 3. That neither said report nor any part thereof shall be admitted as evidence or used for any purpose against such railroad so making such report in any suit or action for damages growing out of any matter mentioned in said report.

SEC. 4. That the Interstate Commerce Commission is authorized to prescribe for such common carriers a method and form for making the reports in the foregoing section provided.

Approved, March 3, 1901.

# ACCIDENT BULLETIN,

No. 4.


APRIL, MAY, AND JUNE, 1902,

AND THE

YEAR ENDING JUNE 30, 1902.

INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMMISSION, WASHINGTON, D. C.

WASHINGTON:
GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE.
1902.



## ACCIDENT BULLETIN,

No. 4,

## SHOWING COLLISIONS AND DERAILMENTS OF TRAINS

AND

## CASUALTIES TO PERSONS,

**DURING** 

APRIL, MAY, AND JUNE, 1902,

WITH

TABLES FOR THE YEAR ENDING JUNE 30, 1902.

INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMMISSION, WASHINGTON, D. C.

WASHINGTON:
GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE.
1902.

### THE INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMMISSION.

Hon. MARTIN A. KNAPP, of New York, Chairman.

Hon. JUDSON C. CLEMENTS, of Georgia.

Hon. JAMES D. YEOMANS, of Iowa.

Hon. CHARLES A. PROUTY, of Vermont.

Hon. JOSEPH W. FIFER, of Illinois.

EDWARD A. MOSELEY, Secretary.

haterilate ions use e loning.

vara of Slater tres

30.

ACCIDENT BULLETIN No. 4.

## RAILROAD ACCIDENTS IN THE UNITED STATES

DURING THE

THREE MONTHS ENDING JUNE 30, 1902.

The number of persons killed in train accidents during the months of April, May, and June, 1902, as shown in reports made by the rail-road companies to the Interstate Commerce Commission, under the "accident law" of March 3, 1901, was 140, and of injured 1,810. Accidents of other kinds, including those sustained by employees while at work, and by passengers in getting on or off the cars, etc., bring the total number of casualities up to 10,136 (616 killed and 9,520 injured). These accidents are classified in the following table. These reports deal only with (a) passengers, and (b) employees on duty:

TABLE No. 1.—Casualties to persons, April, May, and June, 1902.

	4	.sen- ers.	Trainmen.		Other persons employed on or around trains.		Switch- men, flagmen, and watch- men.				Total employees.	
•	Killed.	Injured.	Killed.	Injured.	Killed.	Injured.	Killed.	Injured.	Killed.	Injured.	Killed.	Injured.
Collisions Derailments Miscellaneous train accidents (ex-	13 5	379 335	61 42	439 278	1 3	57 48	0	7 3	4 0	33 21	66 45	536 35 <b>0</b>
cluding the above), including locomotive-boiler explosions	0	47	9	150	0	2	0	1	2	10	11	<b>16</b> 3
Total train accidents	18	761	112	867	4	107	0	11	6	64	122	1,049
Coupling or uncoupling cars While doing other work about trains or while attending	0	0	33	450	1	5	6	48	0	9	40	512
switches	0	. <b>0</b>	11	672	0	55	4	28	4	65	19	<b>820</b> 
tracks, etc	2	9	27	186	0	2	2	4	0	7	29	199
while getting on or off Other causes	26 9	272 279		1, 308 1, 149	8	48 100	28   28	85 92	22 141	167 2, 670	121 230	1,608 4,011
Total (other than train accidents)	37	560	207	3, 765	20	210	45	257	167	2, 918	439	7, 150
Total, all classes	55	1, 321	319	4,632	24	317	45	268	173	2, 982	561	8, 199

Note.—Accidents to employees resulting in slight injuries which do not prevent the employee injured from performing his accustomed service for more than three days, in the aggregate, during the ten days immediately following the accident, are not reported. The items in the column headed "Switchmen, flagmen, and watchmen," include switch tenders (not acting as brakemen), lever men, and lamp men; track, bridge, and crossing watchmen, and policemen.

- The number of passengers reported killed in collisions and derailments shows a gratifying decrease as compared with the records given in the first, second, and third bulletins.

The butting collision numbered 18, in the detail list below (the twenty-first item) resulted in the death of four passengers. The number of employees killed in train accidents is also much smaller than in either of the three quarters preceding.

The total number of collisions and derailments was 2,010 (1,094 collisions and 916 derailments), of which 157 collisions and 101 derailments affected passenger trains. The damage to cars, engines, and roadway by these accidents amounted to \$1,813,833, namely: April, \$624,536; May, \$595,395; June, \$593,902. Given more in detail, these facts appear as below:

TABLE No. 2.—April, May, and June, 1902.

	Number.	Loss.
Collisions due to trains separating. Other collisions.	192 902	\$128, 892 773, 455
Total collisions	1,094	902, 347
Derailments due to defects of roadway, etc  Derailments due to defects of equipment.  Derailments due to negligence of trainmen, signalmen, etc.  Derailments due to unforeseen obstruction, etc.  Derailments due to malicious obstruction of tracks, etc.  Derailments due to other causes.	412 57 64 12	120, 739 371, 997 30, 750 153, 659 13, 405 220, 936
Total	916	911, 486
Total collisions and derailments	2,010	1, 813, 833

Note.—Collisions and derailments which cause no death or personal injury and which cause not over \$150 damage to the property of the railroad are not included.

It will be observed that the average loss by each collision was approximately \$824, and by each derailment approximately \$995.

In preceding bulletins tables have been given showing in some detail the causes of the more serious collisions, butting collisions being thus emphasized in Bulletin No. 2, and rear collisions in No. 3. In each table the importance of the accident was measured by the reported financial loss; and the limit, except for a few items, was \$2,000, none smaller than that being included in the list. In the present bulletin there is shown (page 5) a similar list, in which are given collisions of all classes, including "miscellaneous;" and to offset the enlargement of the list, due to the inclusion of three classes instead of one, the minimum cost limit is raised from \$2,000 to \$5.000. The number of cases is 26, including six involving losses of less than \$5,000 each. In "Miscellaneous" are included those cases which are due to the breakage or other failure of a coupling followed by a collision of the separated parts of the train.

#### Causes of twenty-six most costly collisions (all classes included).

[Note.—R. stands for rear collision; B., butting collision; M., miscellaneous; P., passenger train F., freight and miscellaneous trains.]

-	num-		rain.			e to gines, Iway.	
Item.	Record r	Class.	Kind of train.	Killed.	Injured.	Damage to cars, engines, and roadway.	Cause.
1	25	R.	F. and F	2	1	\$400	Engineman failed to properly control speed; had been on duty 22 hours, with
2	26	В.	F. and F	o	0	1, 200	5 hours' rest within that time. Conductor misread order; engineman took his word for it. Experience of conductor,
3	10	R.	F. and F	2	6	2,100	46 days; of engineman, 16 days. Freight approached station at uncontrollable speed in dense fog; the persons killed were passengers in the train stand-
4	7	R.	F. and F	0	0	2, <b>86</b> 8	ing at the station. Engineman fell asleep approaching station; had been on duty 7 hours, succeeding a paried of 20 hours' rest
5	11	R.	F. and F	0	0	4, 200	ing a period of 20 hours' rest. Engineman miscalculated distance necessary in which to stop his train; on duty 7 hours and 30 minutes, following 3
6	24	В.	P. and F	2	34	4,800	hours' rest following 21 hours on duty. Inferior train encroached on time of superior; conductor and engineman, both with fairly good records, deliberately "took chances" of using about 5 minutes of superior train's time.
7	2	B.	P. and P	<b>o</b> '	8	5,000	Misplaced switch; and engineman failed
8	6	R.	F. and F	0	1	5,000	to keep vigilant lookout.  Approached station too fast; damage due
9	8	В.	P. and F	2	14	5, 200	largely to fire.  Conductor and engineman of freight  "took chances" on reaching a certain
10	19	В.	F. and F	0	2	5, 400	station before passenger train left there. Error of train dispatcher; a man of 16 years'
11	1	R.	F. and F	0	<b>3</b> j	5, 800	experience; had been on duty 5 hours.  Failure of air pump; too high speed in view of imperfect condition of air brakes.  Conductor of foremost train knew that by reason of this his train was in special danger of being run into at the rear, yet did not apprise his flagman of the fact.
12 13	22	В. В.	F. and F	0	<b>0 6</b>	5, 815 5, 859	1 train ran past meeting point. Conductor and engineman of work train, in reading time-table, overlooked passen-
14	3	B.	F. and F	o	5	7,000	ger train. Train left station without orders while
15	21	M.		2	2	7,500	train-order signal was against it. Freight train, at night, collided with cars which had run out from a side track. These cars had been placed on side track by a man of 1 day's experience, he having been intrusted with this duty by a
16	12	В.	P. and F	2	17	8,000	foreman of 3 months' experience. On 4-track railroad. Eastbound freight using cross-over sent out man to flag westbound trains on two tracks, but he flagged only one.
17	20	R.	F. and F	1	3	8,000	Engineman approached station too fast; claimed air-brake pipe leading to cars had been closed; but there are indications that the real cause was that he slept on his engine; his past record as an engineman was not good.
18	23	B.	F. and F	0	0	8,000	Conductor and engineman overlooked or- ders which had been given to them.
19 20	9 14	R. B.	F. and F	0	9	8, 800 9, 000	Engineman failed to notice flag.  1 engineman, running without train, over- looked an order; conductor tried to sig- nal him to stop, but did not do so soon
21	15	В.	P. and F	5	4		enough. Conductor of passenger train misinter- preted order, and engineman apparently took conductor's interpretation. Four passengers killed. Operator wrongfully
22	18	В.	F. and F	1	3	9, 800	
23	5	M.	P. and F	0	1	12,850	the block section was not clear. Freight train ran into passenger train of another road at right-angle crossing. No fixed signals at crossing. Conflicting testimony as to which train was most blameworthy.

Causes of twenty-six most costly collisions (all classes included) — Continued.

Item.	Record number.	Class.	Kind of train.	Killed.	Injured.	Damage to cars, engines, and roadway.	Cause.
24	17	В.	P. and P	4	27	\$18,700	Conductor and engineman of 1 train over- looked orders which had been delivered to them.
25	16	В.	P. and P	6	37	31,000	West-bound train was standing on side track (2 a. m.), and there is no explanation except that the switch had been left misplaced, though after the collision it was found set straight.
26	13	R.	P. and F	0	4	87,000	Men in charge of a freight waiting on a side track for 3 passenger trains, started out after 2 of them had passed, and their train was run into at the rear by the third passenger train. Most of the wreck was destroyed by fire.
			Total.	30	187	\$228, 597	

The explanations, it will be seen, are very similar to those given in the two lists previously published. Most of them illustrate the same general features, though there are many details which differ sufficiently to repay The aggregation of a large number of costly and fatal careful perusal. cases within the same length of time is the salient feature in which this list differs from the preceding ones. As before, some of the explanations are inadequate. It is noticeable that in two cases, both on very prominent railroads, a conductor and an engineman are reported as having deliberately "taken chances." Accidents in which the responsibility rests on men of very limited experience again appear among these costly cases, and there is one case in which an engineman had been on duty twenty-two hours. One engineman who fell asleep on his engine had been on duty only seven hours, so that on the face of the report there can be no fault found with his working hours; but it is a fair question whether very long working hours, combined with the irregularity which often is inseparable from the freight-train service, do not introduce a serious element of danger by leading to, if not encouraging, the taking of rest at times when the duty is to keep awake. Thus, a freight-train run of 175 miles may be scheduled at fifteen hours, with eighteen to twentyfour hours' rest between runs, but on so long a run the chances of delay are, of course, greater than on a shorter one; and even when there is no lengthening of the working hours by delays on the road the irregularity of hours is constant. The resting hours as well as the working hours are too long, and the lengthening of the time "off" to a period longer than is required for rest (while yet it is not long enough for two natural rest periods) does not remove the objection to excessive working hours.

The causes of "coupling accidents" are classified in Table No. 3. Of the 552 persons represented in this table as killed or injured, 37 are reported as having had less than one year's experience. Of the 7,589 persons killed or injured in accidents of all kinds except train accidents, 276 had had less than one year's experience.

TABLE No. 3.—Causes of accidents to employees in coupling and uncoupling.

Sub-	:	Cond	uctors.	Brake	men, etc.	Other e	mployees
class.		Killed.	Injured.	Killed.	Injured.	Killed.	Injured.
1	Sticking of parts (bent pins, etc.) pre-				•		
2	venting quick work		• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •		20	•••••	• • • • • • •
	made necessary by defective un-					ŀ	
	coupling mechanism) Other causes, apparently due to defective coupler and mechanism		• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •	•••••	45		
3	ive counter and mechanism			<u> </u>	7	1	
4	Defective draft gear (with automatic	•••••			•		
•	coupler)				3		
5	Coupling to an engine or tender Same (with link-and-pin coupler)			1	20	• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •	
6	Same (with link-and-pin coupler)		•••••	••••••	8	•••••	   • • • • • • • • •
7	Coupling on inside of sharp curve		1	1	28		
8	Foot caught in or between couplers while adjusting coupler.		1	1	27	1	
9	Slipped (usually on ice or snow)		•		6		
10	Foot caught in frog, guard rail, or						
	gwitch	1		5	5		
11	Caught by overhanging load (on plat-				_		
	form car)		• • • • • • • • •		4		
12			• • • • • • • • •	• • • • • • •	3		
13	Engaged in operations preliminary to coupling		1	10	49		
14	While coupling safety chains		i	10	8		
15	Link-and-pin coupler		i	1	23		
16	Link and pin, with automatic		_			!	• • • • • • • •
17	Coupling damaged cars (presumably						
	an unavoidable risk)	1		1	15		
18	Uncoupling without using lever (pre-						
	sumably by reason of defective un-			2	10		
19	coupling mechanism)	•••••	• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •	Z	19	•••••	• • • • • • • • •
20	Miscellaneous		3	10	145	1	
21	Miscellaneous Not clearly explained		3	6	53		
	Total	1 2	11	38	492	1	

TABLE No. 4.—Causes of accidents to employees classified (C6 and C7) as falling from and getting on or off cars and engines.

			duc- ors.		ake- n, etc.		gine- ien.	Fire	emen		er em- yees.
Sub- class.	Causes.	Killed.	Injured.	Killed.	Injured.	Killed.	Injured.	Killed.	Injured.	Killed.	Injured.
C6 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 18 14 15	Fell from roof of box car by reason of— Defect in car Ice or snow. Parting of train Derailment, collision, or shock due to abnormal movements of cars other than those in subclass 3. While setting brakes Fell from— Coal car Freight car other than box or coal car. Engine or tender Passenger car Engines, tenders, or cars (all kinds) not in motion Miscellaneous causes. Not clearly explained Slipped getting on moving trains or cars. Jumping off moving trains Jumping from engines or cars anticipa-	1	2 4 30 1	6 2 6 1 6 27 10 3	6 1 29 24 63 6 6 44 2 67 329 85 129 146		5	4	29 35 1 8 1	1 7 4 2 7	2 2 2 2 1 7 1 11 62 13 17 27
C7 16	ting collision, derailment, or other accident.  Fell from engines or cars by reason of defective hand holds and sill steps  Getting on or off moving engine	i	4 5 14	1 6	19 36 197	2	2 17	1	11 1 29	1	3 2 16
(18	Caught in frog, guard rail, or switch  Total	7	94	85	1191	2	41	5	115	22	167

#### YEARLY TABLES.

This bulletin completes the publication of the accident records under the law of March 3, 1901, for one year, and the following table (A) gives the aggregate for twelve months of the items which are given in Table No. 1. The total number of casualties shown in Table A is 42,619 (2,819 killed and 39,800 injured):

Table A.—Summary of cusualties to persons, year ending June 30, 1902.

	Pass	engers.	Trai	nmen.	employ	persons yed on or d trains.	
	Killed.	Injured.	Killed.	Injured.	Killed.	Injured.	
Collisions	130 37	2, 298 1, 194	366 193	2, 456 1, 040	19 23	265 205	
sions		94	87	538		12	
Total train accidents	167	8,586	596	4,034	. 42	482	
Coupling or uncoupling cars			120	1,816	4	34	
attending switches		1	52	2,880	6	175	
structures at side of tracks, etc	7	38	96	958	1	15	
on or off	99 30	1, 250 1, 214	408 235	5, 654 4, 560	29 39	192 404	
Total (other than train accidents)	136	2,503	911	15, 868	79	820	
Total all classes	303	6, 089	1,507	19, 902	121	1,302	
		men, flag- atchmen.	Other e	mployees.	Total employees.		
	Killed.	Injured.	Killed.	Injured.	Killed.	Injured.	
Collisions	6	44 17	34 13	300 118	425 229	3, 065 1, 380	
above), including locomotive boiler explosions		12	6	39	43	601	
Total train accidents	6	73	53	457	697	5, 046	
Coupling or uncoupling cars	18	230	1	33	143	2, 113	
While doing other work about trains, or while attending switches	11	185	14	326	83	3, 566	
Coming in contact with overhead bridges, structures at side of tracks, etc	2	63	5	34	104	1,070	
on or off	33	367	67	654	537	6, 867	
Other causes	117	444	561	9,641	952	15, 049	
Total (other than train accidents)	181	1, 289	648	10,688	1,819	28, 665	
Total all classes.	187	1, 362	701	11, 145	2,516	33, 711	

Comparisons of the principal totals with those for the two years preceding and with 1893 (years ending June 30) may be made from the following table, the figures for 1901, 1900, and 1893 being taken from the statistician's tables, made up from the railroad companies' annual reports. It is to be borne in mind that the number of men employed

by the railroads has been constantly increasing. It is much larger in 1902 than in 1893; but precise figures for the later year have not yet been compiled.

TABLE B.

	1902.		1	901.	1	900.	1893.		
	Killed.	Injured.	Killed.	Injured.	Killed.	Injured.	Killed.	Injured.	
Passengersin train accidents Other causes	167 136	3, 586 2, 503	110 172	2, 338 2, 650	93 156	1, 999 2, 129	100 199	1,703 1,526	
Total	303	6,089	282	4, 988	249	4, 128	299	3, 229	
Employees in train accidents In coupling accidents Overhead obstructions,	697 143	5, 046 2, 113	586 198	3, 773 2, 768	539 282	3, 288 5, 229	525 433	3, 008 11, 277	
etc.a. Falling from cars, etc Other causes b	104 587 1,035	1,070 6,867 18,615	56 599 1, 236	509 6,371 27,721	56 529 1,144	436 4, 425 26, 265	73 644 1,052	444 3,780 13,220	
Total	2,516	33, 711	2,675	41, 142	2,550	39, 643	2,727	31, 729	
Total passengers and employees	2, 819	39, 800	2,957	46, 130	2,799	43, 771	3, 026	34, 958	

a In 1902 this item includes fixed obstructions at the side of the track as well as overhead.

A comparison of the coupling accidents recorded in the foregoing table for 1902, with the same for 1893 shows the remarkable and gratifying results of the safety-appliance act of 1893, which requires the use of automatic couplers and which went into full effect on August 1, 1900. The number of employees killed shows a diminution of sixty-eight per cent, and this notwithstanding the fact that there is now engaged in this work a much larger number of men than in 1893. The diminution in the number injured is still greater, being no less than 81 per cent.

The following tables, C, D, and E, show, respectively, for the twelve months ending June 30, 1902, the facts which appear in Tables 2, 3, and 4 of the quarterly returns.

Table C.—Collisions and derailments; damage to cars, engines, and roadway.

	Number.	Loss.
Collisions due to trains separating. Other collisions.	774 4, 268	\$391, 489 3, 894, 194
Total	5,042	4, 285, 683
Derailments due to defects of roadway, etc.  Derailments due to defects of equipment.  Derailments due to negligence of trainmen, signalmen, etc.  Derailments due to unforeseen obstructions, etc.  Derailments due to malicious obstruction of track, etc.  Derailments due to other causes.	1,609 255 239 57	443, 706 1, 295, 299 136, 241 546, 478 63, 246 874, 753
Total	3, 633	3, 359, 723
Total collisions and derailments	8,675	7, 645, 406

b The diminution in the number of employees killed and injured by miscellaneous causes in 1902, as compared with 1901, is due, partly or wholly, to the inclusion in 1901 of employees in shops and on boats, wharves, and other places remote from the railroad, which are not included in the accident bulletins.

#### SPECIAL INFORMATION CONTAINED IN PRECEDING BULLETINS.

- Each accident bulletin contains tables showing the number of passengers, trainmen, and other persons killed and injured, and these figures are classified according to cause (see Table No. 1); also tables showing cost of the different classes of train accidents. The causes of accidents to employees in coupling and uncoupling and in falling from cars, etc., are further classified in Tables No. 3 and No. 4. Each bulletin is for three months, and No. 1 was for the quarter ending September 30, 1901. The bulletin for the quarter ending June 30 contains, in addition to the quarterly statistics, tables showing the same information for the whole et the fiscal year ending on that date.
- Bulletin No. 1 contains brief notes on the most serious collisions in that quarter, 57 passengers having been killed. There are notes on the causes of coupler accidents, explanatory of Table No. 3. Table No. 4 is supplemented by similar notes. In this quarter special mention was made of 130 casualties (4 killed, 126 injured) due to operating trains in which air brakes were used on only a portion of the cars, and the danger of running trains partially air braked is commented on
- Bulletin No. 2 contains a detailed list showing the cost and causes of the 27 messerious butting collisions in that quarter. In these collisions 70 persons were killed and 234 were injured, and the damage to cars, engines, and roadway amounted to \$306,511. The incompleteness of the statements of causes, as sentin by the railroads, is commented on.
- Bulletin No. 3 contains a list similar to that just mentioned, but showing rear instead of butting collisions. As in the first list, only the most serious accidents are considered; and of these there were 41, costing \$160,247. The number of persons killed was 43, and of injured 255.
- Bulletin No. 4 contains a third list of collisions, this one including all classes; but i includes only a few in which the damage was less than \$5,000. The totals of this list are, killed 30, injured 187, cost \$228,597. Collisions occurring where the trainmen had worked very long hours are commented on. In this bullet a table is given showing the deaths and injuries due to trains parting. The aggregate of damage shown in this table is \$492,781; persons killed 14, injured 386. The table shows that nearly all of the coupler failures which resulted in collision or derailmen were reported as due to "cause unknown."

## ACCIDENT BULLETIN,

No. 5,

## SHOWING COLLISIONS AND DERAILMENTS OF TRAINS

AND

## CASUALTIES TO PERSONS,

**DURING** 

JULY, AUGUST, AND SEPTEMBER, 1902.

WASHINGTON, D. C.

WASHINGTON:
GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE.
1903.

## THE INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMMISSION.

Hon. MARTIN A. KNAPP, of New York, Chairman.

Hon. JUDSON C. CLEMENTS, of Georgia.

Hon. JAMES D. YEOMANS, of Iowa.

Hon. CHARLES A. PROUTY, of Vermont.

Hon. JOSEPH W. FIFER, of Illinois.

EDWARD A. MOSELEY, Secretary.

#### ACCIDENT BULLETIN No. 5.

## RAILROAD ACCIDENTS IN THE UNITED STATES

DURING THE

#### THREE MONTHS ENDING SEPTEMBER 30, 1902.

The number of persons killed in train accidents during the months of July, August, and September, 1902, as shown in reports made by the railroad companies to the Interstate Commerce Commission, under the "accident law" of March 3, 1901, was 263, and of injured 2,613. Accidents of other kinds, including those sustained by employees while at work, and by passengers in getting on or off the cars, etc., bring the total number of casualties up to 12,007 (845 killed and 11,162 injured). These accidents are classified in the following table. These reports deal only with (a) passengers and (b) employees on duty.

Table No. 1.—Summary of casualties to persons, July, August, and September, 1902.

•	Passen- gers.		Trai	nmen.	Other persons employed on or around trains.		Switch- men, flagmen, and watch- men.		Other employees.		Total employees.	
	Killed.	Injured.	Killed.	Injured.	Killed.	Injured.	Killed.	Injured.	Killed.	Injured.	Killed.	Injured.
Collisions Derailments Miscellaneous train accidents (ex-	12 29	757 <b>447</b>	108 53	601 328	14 5	85 43	3 0	13 5	11 5	83 37	136 63	782 413
cluding the above), including locomotive boiler explosions	0	25	22	178	0	3	0	2	1	: 6	23	189
Total train accidents	41	1, 229	183	1, 107	19	131	3	20	17	126	222	1,384
Coupling or uncoupling cars While doing other work about trains or while attending	0	0	42	517	1	6	7	55	2	6	52	584
switches ('oming in contact with overhead bridges, structures at side of	0	0	25	986	3	43	0	55	. 4	151	32	1,235
tracks, etc	2	19	24	209	0	5	1	13	2	6	27	233
while getting on or off Other causes	29 7	359 362	113 81	1,461 1,147	6	36 8 <b>3</b>	8 29	105 79	34 156	163 2, 683	161 272	1,765 3,992
Total (other than train accidents)	38	740	285	4, 320	16	173	45	307	198	3,009	544	7,809
Total, all classes	79	1,969	468	5, 427	35	304	48	327	215	3, 135	766	9, 193

Note.—Accidents to employees resulting in slight injuries which do not prevent the employee injured from performing his accustomed service for more than three days, in the aggregate, during the ten days immediately following the accident, are not reported. The items in the column headed "Switchmen, flagmen, and watchmen," include switch tenders (not acting as brakemen), lever men, and lamp men; track, bridge, and crossing watchmen, and policemen.

### THE INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMMISSION.

Hon. MARTIN A. KNAPP, of New York, Chairman.

Hon. JUDSON C. CLEMENTS, of Georgia.

Hon. JAMES D. YEOMANS, of Iowa.

Hon. CHARLES A. PROUTY, of Vermont.

Hon. JOSEPH W. FIFER, of Illinois.

EDWARD A. MOSELEY, Secretary.

#### ACCIDENT BULLETIN No. 5.

## RAILROAD ACCIDENTS IN THE UNITED STATES

DURING THE

#### THREE MONTHS ENDING SEPTEMBER 30, 1902.

The number of persons killed in train accidents during the months of July, August, and September, 1902, as shown in reports made by the railroad companies to the Interstate Commerce Commission, under the "accident law" of March 3, 1901, was 263, and of injured 2,613. Accidents of other kinds, including those sustained by employees while at work, and by passengers in getting on or off the cars, etc., bring the total number of casualties up to 12,007 (845 killed and 11,162 injured). These accidents are classified in the following table. These reports deal only with (a) passengers and (b) employees on duty.

Table No. 1.—Summary of casualties to persons, July, August, and September, 1902.

•	Passen- gers.		Trai	nmen.	Other persons employed on or around trains.		Switch- men, flagmen, and watch- men.		Other employees.		Total employees.	
	Killed.	Injured.	Killed.	Injured.	Killed.	Injured.	Killed.	Injured.	Killed.	Injured.	Killed.	Injured.
Collisions Derailments Miscellaneous train accidents (ex-	12 29	757 447	108 53	601 328	14 5	85 43	3	13	11 5	83 37	136 63	782 413
cluding the above), including locomotive boiler explosions	0	25	22	178	0	3	0	2	1	6	23	189
Total train accidents	41	1,229	183	1, 107	19	131	3	20	17	126	222	1,384
Coupling or uncoupling cars While doing other work about trains or while attending	0	0	42	517	1		7	55	2	6	52	584
switches	0	0	25	986	3	43	0	55	4	151	32	1,235
tracks, etc	2	19	24	209	0	5	1	13	2	6	27	233
while getting on or off Other causes	29 7	359 362		1,461 1,147	6	36 83	8 29	105 79	34 156	163 2, 683	161 272	1,76b 3,992
Total (other than train accidents)	38	740	285	4, 320	16	173	45	307	198	3,009	544	7, 809
Total, all classes	79	1, 969	468	5, 427	35	304	48	327	215	3, 135	766	9, 193

Note.—Accidents to employees resulting in slight injuries which do not prevent the employee injured from performing his accustomed service for more than three days, in the aggregate, during the ten days immediately following the accident, are not reported. The items in the column headed "Switchmen, flagmen, and watchmen," include switch tenders (not acting as brakemen), lever men, and lamp men; track, bridge, and crossing watchmen, and policemen.

Many items in the foregoing table show a marked increase over the same items in the last preceding bulletin, and many, also, are larger than in the same quarter of the preceding year—the quarter reported in Accident Bulletin No. 1. The present record includes a derailment in which 21 passengers were killed, and a collision of work trains in which 13 employees were killed (these accidents are more particularly referred to in connection with a table which appears on another page); but, except in connection with these two items, there is no apparent reason for an increase in the totals, other than the well-known fact that during the three months now under consideration the traffic of a large majority of the railroads has been heavier than ever before. It is a matter of common observation that new men have been engaged. for service in train and yard work in larger proportionate numbers than for many years before. Evidence tending to confirm this may be found in the list of coupling accidents given in detail on a following page, where, among those killed, 6 had had less than one year's experience (3 of them one month or less), and where 23 of the injured were thus classed, 7 of these having worked less than five weeks. Similar notes of short terms of service occur in the other classes of injuries.

The total number of collisions and derailments was 2,448 (1,434 collisions and 1,014 derailments), of which 51 collisions and 92 derailments affected passenger trains. The damage to cars, engines, and roadway by these accidents amounted to \$2,189,512, namely: July, \$716,164: August, \$757,663; September, \$715,685. Given more in detail, these facts appear as below:

TABLE No. 2.—Collisions and derailments.

	Number.	Loss.	Persons killed.	Persons injured.
Collisions, rear	251 691	\$349, 305 437, 772 \$36, 956 126, 595	39 66 34 9	471 616 263 196
Total collisions	1, 434	1, 250, 628	148	1,539
Derailments due to defects of roadway, etc	420 75 86	133, 185 356, 655 62, 110 80, 852 28, 215 277, 867	12 7 8 24 4 37	181 113 41 167 45 813
Total	1,014	938, 884	92	860
Total collisions and derailments	2,448	2, 189, 512	240	2, 399

Note.—Collisions and derailments which cause no death or personal injury and which cause not over \$150 damage to the property of the railroad are not reported.

Following the same style employed in setting forth some of the collisions in bulletins 2, 3, and 4, a table is given below of the most disastrous train accidents occurring in the quarter now under review.

In this table are included not only collisions of all classes, but derailments as well. The number of collisions and derailments in which passengers were killed, or in consequence of which the damage to cars, engines, and the roadway exceeded \$5,000, was 69. Of these, onethird (15 collisions and 8 derailments) are briefly described in the table, the table being brought within readable compass by excluding all of the cases in which no passenger was killed, and in which the cost is reported at less than \$10,000. Besides the 23 cases tabulated, there were, among the 69 accidents, 5 collisions due to errors of train dis-.patchers or dispatchers' assistants; damage, \$28,155; killed, 3; injured, 15; 3 derailments in consequence of malicious misplacement of switches or other mischief; damage, \$22,500; killed, 3; injured, 16; and one collision of freight trains due to careless conduct of men who slept on duty. In this last-named case a freight train was sidetracked to wait for another train, and the whole of the crew, having been on duty twenty-four hours, fell asleep. On awakening, these men thought. or assumed, that the two trains which they were expecting had passed them, when, in fact, one of the two was yet to come. In one collision, due apparently to a train breaking in two, a brakeman was killed whose age was reported at only 18 years.

The most disastrous accident of the quarter was the derailment, which appears in the list as No. 69, item f, causing the death of 21 This was an excursion train, and the cause of the passengers. derailment is reported as undiscoverable. The published reports of this accident state that all of the passengers killed were riding on the platforms of the cars. The 13 persons killed in the collision numbered 19, item d, were workmen on gravel trains. This collision appears to have been due to a suspension of block-signal rules, and the circumstances indicate laxity in the maintenance of proper safeguards. Number 9, item w (collision), indicates the absence or nonuse of a safety switch to prevent the escape, at the lower end of a switching yard, of cars which elude the control of the brakeman. Number 17, item u, represents the derailment of a train which was running at a very high speed. The engine, cars, and track were in the best condition, so far as could be known. The train was scheduled to run very fast for over 100 miles, and there is no explanation of the disaster, except that the speed was excessive. The engineman who was running the engine was killed in the wreck, as was the fireman also. most of the other cases among the 23 tabulated, the cause is explained more or less clearly in the table itself. Besides item f, one other derailment is reported as due to "cause unknown;" and the forgetting of telegraphic orders, by the men who had the orders in their pockets or immediately before their eyes, accounts for four collisions, averaging over \$17,000 each.

Finally, accident No. 50, item m, a collision where the block system was in force, is remarkable as showing negligence on the part of four This negligence neutralized the safeguards of the block system; though it is to be observed that the starting of trains from a side track where the outlet switch is situated in advance of the starting signal is a modification of the system which is not approved by the best authorities. In this collision train A, running southward from H to P, was followed closely by train B, the latter being authorized to occupy the same block section with the leading train, under orders to run with speed under full control. The signalman at H told P to hold northbound trains for southbound train B, and claims that P answered "o. k." It does not appear, however, that the "o. k." was recorded; and according to the rule it should have been given in full-"o. K.; I will hold the block for train B." The signalman at P said once that he received no such order from H; at another time he claimed that he thought train A was behind train B. When the northbound train was ready to start, the signalman at P told the conductor and engineman that they could go as soon as train A arrived. The conductor and engineman acted on this oral statement, without waiting for the block signal to be cleared, their train being north of the block signal station, on a side track. Trains C and B collided, but each engineman had full view of the opposing train for half a mile, and the man on train C saw the other train, stopped, and sounded his whistle; but the southbound engineman appears to have been entirely oblivious of the northbound train until his engine struck it.

Causes of twenty-three most serious train accidents.

[Note.—R. stands for rear collision; B., butting collision; M., miscellaneous; D., derailment; P., passenger train; F., freight and miscellaneous trains.]

Item	Record No.	Class.	Kind of train.	Killed.	Injured.	Damage to cars, en- gines, and roadway.	Cause.
a b	11 42	D. R.	P P. and F	3 5	30 1	\$755 800	Loose wheel and spreading of track.  Passenger train ran into rear of freight train in fog; persons killed (drovers) were in caboose of freight train. Engineman (of 15 years' experience) at fault for not controlling speed.
c	37	<b>D.</b>	Р	4	17	2,500	Cyclone separated cars from locomotive and forced them off the track.
d	19	В.	Two work trains.	13	17	3,700	Conductor trusted another conductor to hold all trains and prevent their entering specified section of track, but this instruction or request was not correctly understood.
	43 69	,	F. and F	23	23 96	4, 485 8, 189	Freight train approached station too fast. Cause undiscovered; cars, engine, and track free from evidence of defect; speed 35 miles an hour; 5-degree curve.
g	16   15	D. D.	F	0	3 2	10,000	Runaway; damage mostly from fire.
				Į	2	10,700	Runaway; cars broke loose from train and became uncontrollable on steep grade.
i	· <b>20</b>	<b>M</b> .	Pand F	0	2	10,900	Fireman ran engine out from side track without first sending a flagman to protect the movement; conductor and engineman apparently cognizant of his action.

### Causes of twenty-three most serious train accidents—Continued.

-							
Item.	Record No.	Class.	Kind of train.	Killed.	Injured.	Damage to cars, en- gines, and roadway.	Cause.
j	5	В.	F and F	1	5	\$11,148	Telegraph operator received message reading "11.55;" copied it "11.05," but in repeating, wrote "11.55." Operator's experience, two years.
k	46	В.	Pand F	3	2	11,200	Freight train (engine detached) left standing on grade with brakes not set;
1	56	M.	Pand P	2	4	11,800	escaped control. Inferior train started from station without orders when, according to rule, orders should have been asked for. Conductor's experience, one month; engineman's, one year. Both forgot that the other train was soon due.
m	50	В.	Fand F	4	4	12,000	
n	82	R.	F. and F	1	1	14,000	Train passed block signal indicating stop; also flagman of forward train failed to protect his train by flag.
0	2	В.	P. and P	1	69	14,000	
P	6	В.	F. and F	3	2	14, 918	
q.	26	В.	F. and F	1	4	16,000	
r	35	R.	P. and P	2	2	17,000	Engineman approaching station neglected to properly regulate the speed.
8	64	D.	Р	2	10	17,000	Passenger train running at about 60 miles an hour ran past misplaced switch and was derailed by entering side track too fast; red (danger) light on the misplaced switch was visible one-half mile away. Switch left in wrong position by freight conductor after he had used it a short time before, Engineman at fault (who was killed), sounded whistle a few seconds before, which indicates that he was not asleep. Had 9 hours rest before going on duty.
t	18 17	D. D.	P	1 2	33 4	18,500 23,300	Unknown.  Excessive speed: (estimated 66 miles an hour) on curve of 7° 7′; outer rail ele-
v	21	· D.	F. and F	4	o	25, 000	vated 7‡ inches. Conductor and engineman forgot a meet-
W	9	M.	Passenger train and runaway freight cars.	4	25	50, 500	ing order. Freight cars escaped control while being switched in yard, due principally to failure of brake chain; loss largely due to fire caused or spread by illuminating gas.
		• !	Total .	81	356	308, 395	

The next table, No. 3, coupling accidents, given in its usual form, is supplemented by a list showing in brief language the cause of each one of the coupling accidents of the quarter.

TABLE No. 3.—Causes af accidents to employees in coupling and uncoupling.

Sub-		Cond	uctors.	Braker	nen, etc.	Other e	mployees
class.		Killed.	Injured.	Killed.	Injured.	Killed.	Injured.
1	Sticking of parts (bent pins, etc.) pre-						
•	venting quick work				16		<b></b>
2	Holding up pin by hand (presumably						
	made necessary by defective un- coupling mechanism)	<u> </u>	3		E.A.	i	
8	Other severe appearantly due to defeat	!	٥		54		• • • • • • • • •
o .	Other causes, apparently due to defect- ive coupler and mechanism.  Defective draft gear (with automatic	1			17	1	
4	Defective draft gear (with automatic				17		• • • • • • • • •
-	coupler)	ļ			6	1	 
5	Coupling to an engine or tender			1	11		
ě	Same (with link-and-pin coupler)				16		
7	Coupling on inside of sharp curve			2	26		
8	Foot caught in or between counters	}					
_	while adjusting coupler	1			35	1	
9	Slipped (usually on ice or snow)	1		1	15		
10	while adjusting coupler	1					
	BW1CO	1		· 3	8	1	
11	Caught by overhanging load (on plat-		1	1		į.	
1	form car		1	1	5		
12	Load shifted				2		
13	Engaged in operations preliminary to	i .	_				
	coupling		3	14	70		
14	While coupling safety chains		1	8	11		
15	Link-and-pin coupler	¦		1	18		
16	Link and pin, with automatic		• • • • • • • • •		3	• • • • • • • •	
17	Coupling damaged cars (presumably	l		'	10	•	
10	an unavoidable risk)	¦	• • • • • • • • •		12		
18	Uncoupling without using lever (presumably by reason of defective un-	1		1			
•	sumably by reason of defective un-		3	2	10		
19	coupling mechanism)	ı • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •	3	2	19		• • • • • • • •
20	Missollaneous		8	10	166		
20 21	Miscellaneous Not clearly explained	• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •	2	111	57		1
<b>41</b>	THE CLEARLY CAPIBILICU			**			
1	Total	1	21	49	557	2	
	# OM61	•	21	1 29	007	2	
		. (				,	

The reader who has examined Table No. 3 in the bulletins that have been issued will have observed that "operations preliminary to coupling" is a class in which appears a considerable percentage of the deaths each quarter; and also that a considerable share of the accidents are due to defective uncoupling mechanism and to the fact that engines and tenders are not in all cases equipped with automatic couplers. With a view to showing the extent to which these conditions prevail, as well as to give the clearest practicable exhibit of the situation generally, the coupling accidents of the quarter under review are shown in detail in the following table. This subject is also discussed at some length in the sixteenth annual report of the Commission (December, 1902).

### List of employees reported as killed in coupling or uncoupling cars.

#### JULY, 1902.

	•			
Record No.	Circumstances and cause.	Daylight (D.) or darkness (N.).	Age.	Experience if less than 1 year.
18 24 30	Between cars, adjusting knucklesdo Stepped between cars to open knuckle; caught between drawbars and deadwood.	D. N.	27 29 40	
52 68 70 78 88	Uncoupling, fell off engine tank; run over.  Caught between couplers.  Caught between bumpers.  Coupling presumably; run over.  Walking alongside of train preparatory to coupling, caught be-	D. N. D. D.	22 86 22 25 23	5 months.
93 96	tween car and post of platform.  Arranging the knuckle; head caught between buffers  Stepped between cars to open knuckle; caught between extension ends of cars.	D. D.	23 28	
110 130 132 164 166 176 177 374 180	Adjusting knuckle; caught between two cars  Caught between cars while coupling  Caught between bad order cars, chain coupling  Caught between cars while coupling  Wheel passed over leg  On curve; kicked coupler over with foot  Trying to uncouple cars while in motion; foot caught by wheel.  Train in motion, stepped in to adjust drawbar  Went to make coupling when train broke apart; wheel caught foot.	N. D. D. D. N.	38 23 38 40 25 24 27	
6 <del>91</del>		D.		
3 5 17 27	Went between cars to uncouple safety chains; slack ran out  Between cars fixing coupler; cars came together, catching him.  Head caught between drawheads while coupling  Coupling missed; went in to open couplers; caught between cars.	N.	32 34 27	1 week.
32 75 123 140	Supposed to have been between cars coupling when train set back.  Failed to uncouple cars and jumped out from between cars, and was caught between car and platform.  Trying to adjust knuckle; caught between couplers.  Couplers failed to work, and car was knocked away about 20	N. N. D.	23 25 28	'
156 181	feet; while fixing coupler car ran back and caught him.  Caught between cars while coupling same	D. N.	23 42	1 month.
185 209	Went between engine and car to uncouple; caught between buffers.  Went between cars to adjust knuckles; caught between drawheads.	N. N.	48   27	
210 215 220	Train parted; went between to couple; train ran over him  Trying to open knuckle; fell between cars  Coupling engine to log car, using link on account of engine being higher than log car, caught between car and engine.	D.	26	
	SEPTEMBER, 1902.			
18 54 74 106 110 121 124 133 146 186 192 202	Walking alongside train lifting lever, foot caught in frog.  Lever disconnected, stepped in; caught foot in guard rail.  Cutting off cars, caught foot in split switch  Went between cars; head caught.  Extending log caught neck between car and engine.  Cutting car loose, fell off end of flat car; car passed over him.  Adjusting couplers; caught between buffers.  Caught between cars while chaining them.  Attempted to pass between drawbars.  Sharp curve, couplers passed each other, catching him.  Caught between cars.  Caught between buffers.  Operating rod out of repair, went between cars; foot caught in	N. D. D. D. D. D. D.	25 30 47 43 25 19 35 30 24 21 24	5 months. 1 month.
212 554	frog	N. D. D.	30 50 35	

List of injuries to employees reported as occurring in coupling or uncoupling cars—Cont'd.

JULY, 1902—Continued.

1.	2.	<b>3</b> .	4.	5.	6.
Record No.	Injury.	Cause as reported.	Daylight (D.) or darkness (N.).	Age.	(See note.
114 115	Foot mashed Finger mashed	Coupling; arm caught when cars came	N. D.	23 30	
116	Leg squeezed		D.	26	
117	Finger broken	of engine.  Caught between lock-pin lever and buffer.	D.	21	
118 119	Finger crushed Body crushed	Locking pin came out	D. D.	24 21	
120 121	Foot bruised	Shovingdrawhead over with foot; slipped Struck on side of head; dazed; put arm	D. D.	31 21	
122	Thumb burst open	on rail; run over. Coupling; caught hand between pin and knuckle.	N.	25	s.
123	Foot sprained	Closing knuckle; stepped in frog	D.	23	s.
124 125	ringers masned	Uncoupling; slipped	D. D.	38 26	S.
126	Finger injured	Coupling; caught between couplers	N.	27	
127 128	Hand injured	Pushing buffer back with stick; slipped	N. D.	23 22	8 months.
129	Hand injured	Coupling; caught between couplers  Pushing buffer back with stick; slipped  Caught between cars while coupling  Caught between vestibule of car and knuckle while coupling.  Raised pin by chain; caught between pin		30	-
1		and end sill of car.	N. N.	29	S.
,	Thumb injured	Uncoupling bad-order cars in motion; cars coupled with chain. Uncoupling lever disconnected; pulling	D.	25 35	S.
!	•	pin by hand; caught between couplers.			8.
135		Lifting rod would not work; took hold of pin by hand.	D.	48	S.
136 1 <b>3</b> 7	Clavicle broken Hand injured	Caught between bumpers Lifting lever would not work; holding up with hand.	N. D.	24 22	s.
138 139	Foot injured Fingers mashed; body squeezed.	Pushing knuckle over with foot	D. D.	37 22	
140	Thumb crushed	No lever lifted pin by hand	Ŋ.	23	•
141 142	Finger crushed	Uncoupling; slack ran out; caught finger. Attempted to kick coupler over	D. D.	21 35	
143		Uncoupling; slack ran out; caught finger. Attempted to kick coupler over. Coupling; finger caught between drawbars.		21	
144		Coupling; caught between end sill and lever.	D.	22	
145		Uncoupling; lever slipped, striking his arm.	I	21	
146 147	Fracture of rib	Uncoupling; hand caught behind lever Coupling: caught between lever and caboose.	D. D.	21 20	
148		Coupling with chain; caught between bumpers.	D.	30	
149		Coupling; caught between lever and end sill of car.	D.	21	
150		Uncoupling; caught between lever and end sill of car.	D.	26	
151		Lever would not work; caught between sill and drawbar.	N.	23	4 months
152	_	Taking chain off crippled car; engine backed.	N.	26	
153		Uncoupling; caught between lever and end sill of car.	D.	29	
154		Chain broken; reached over; caught between bumpers.		23	
155	Finger mashed	Holding lock pin up; caught between drawhead and deadwood.	N.	22	
156 157	Fingers bruised	Coupling with chain; using link on curve.	D.	30	
157	Hand crushed	Opening knuckle; had hold of lever; caught by projecting lumber on car.	D.	••••	
158 159	Knee injured Foot mashed	Coupling; apron on car fell on leg Coupling; pushing drawbar over with	D. D.	33 30	
. 160	Finger mashed	foot. Coupling: failed to make first time; went	D.	24	

List of injuries to employees reported as occurring in coupling or uncoupling cars—Cont'd.

JULY, 1902—Continued.

1.	2.	3.	4.	5.	6,
				<del></del>	
Record No.	Injury.	Cause as reported.	Daylight (D.) or darkness (N.).	Age.	(See note.)
161	Finger bruised	Uncoupling; lever broken; took hold of tumbler with hand.	D.	22	
162 163	Ruptured Fingers mashed	Uncoupling; pulling lever to cut off car. Caught between end of lock pin and deadwood; bad-order cars.	D. D.	<u> </u>	
165 167	Foot mashed Fingers mashed	Opening knuckle; cars ran down on him. Coupling narrow - gauge cars; using crooked link.		24	
168	Finger mashed	Caught between latch and coupler on pilot.	D.	31	
169 170	Foot crushed	Foot caught in guard rail Opening knuckle; arm caught between couplers.	N. D.	82 21	
171	Hand mashed	Caught between dead blocks while try- ing to adjust knuckle.	D.	20	
172 173	Armand hand bruised Foot bruised	Coupling safety chains  Engine to couple to bad-order car; went	D.	22 22	
174 175	Hand mashed		D. N.	26 24	
179	Foot bruised	to lift pin.	D.	30	
181 183	Finger mashed Hip bruised	Uncoupling; raising pin by hand Stepped between cars while in motion to	D. D.		s.
184	Finger mashed	raise lever.  Reaching in to get bolt just as coupling was made.	D.	29	
185 186	Finger cut off Body bruised	Coupling; caught between bumpers Opening knuckle; squeezed by project-	D. N.		
187	Hand bruised	ing load. Caught between lever and end sill of car.		25	
188 189	Fingers pinched Finger bruised	Chain detached; reaching for pin Knuckle being out, making coupling by hand.	D. D.	26 28	
190	Fingers mashed	Uncoupling by hand; caught between pin and deadwood.	D.	41	6 days.
191 84	Finger bruised Fingers mashed	Coupling; load shifted	D. N.	25	
	,	AUGUST, 1902.	•	•	-
1 2	Bruised	Opening knuckle	D. D.	30 21	8. S.
4	Finger mashed	wood and drawbar.	D.	21	8.
6	Arm bruised	Coupling on curve; had arm caught Uncoupling; slack ran out, caught hand.	D. D.	22 30	S.
7 8	Thumb injured	Coupling	D.		8. 8.
9	Footinjured	Coupling: Caught between main and guard rails; flange of wheel ran against foot.	D.	(?)	S.
10 11	Fingers mashed Finger caught	While lifting pin	D. D.	24 21	s.
12	Hand bruised	in, and was caught. Uncoupling: reaching over and taking	ı	25	
13 14			D.	25	
15	Finger mashed	Caught between drawbars	N.	28	
16	Finger and thumb mashed.	Caught between bumpers	D.	26	
18 19		Uncoupling; had to take hold of knuckle pin. Cutting off cars; was thrown and dragged	ļ	28 32	
20	knee and mashing left arm. Back and chest in-	Squeezed between cars	N.	25	
	jured.				
21	Left hand mashed	In opening knuckles	D. D.	22 25	s.
22	Arm, wrist, and elbow pinched.	Raising latch in coupler; got finger			ļ ·

# List of injuries to employees reported as occurring in coupling or uncoupling cars—Cont'd. AUGUST, 1902—Continued.

1.	2.	3.	4.	5.	6.
Record No.	Injury.	Cause as reported.	Daylight (D.) or darkness (N.).	Age.	(See note.
24	Hand crushed	Lumber shifted.	N.	38	-
25 26	Hand mashed	Coupling cars  Caught under uncoupling lever by fellow-brakeman stepping on lever while	N. D.	23	
27		uncoupling. Couplers missed; went in to open; was caught.	N.	33	<b>S.</b>
28	Foot badly squeezed	Tried to shove drawbar with foot	D.	35	
29 30	Finger crushed Thumb bruised and	Coupling	D. D.	24	
31 33	cut. Back contused Finger bruised	Cutting off cars; was struck by step	N.	35	
34	do	Uncoupling: raising pin lifter	D.	34 22	
85	Finger broken and bruised.	Lifting pin with fingers	Ď.	38	
36	Finger split open	Tried to pull pin	<u>.</u>	•••••	
37 <sup>)</sup> 38	Foot jammed Finger caught	Caught foot while pushing drawbar over. Knuckle would not open; caught be-	D. D.	23 21	
39	Hand crushed	tween pin and deadwood.  Putting in pin to make safe coupling,	D.	35	
40		slack ran in; caught between plat- forms of cars.			
40 41	Toes mashed	Opening knuckle which was broken; it fell on foot.  Chain disconnected raising pin by hand	D.	05	0
42	Arm bruised	Chain disconnected, raising pin by hand. Injured in some way unknown while coupling.	D. N.	35 24	8
43		On car holding up pin with hand, caught between drawbers.	!	26	
44		Chain to lift lever broken, caught between deadwoods.	ì	••••	ı
45		Coupling engine to train, caught under pilot.		22	8.
46 47	Thumb orushed	Opening knuckle, caught hand	D.	32	9 months
48	Finger mashed	Chain disconnected, attempted to lift	D. D.	28	8 months
49		pin by hand. Attempted to shove drawbar over with foot, on curve.	D.	26	
50		Standing on footboard of engine, attempted to close knuckle with foot.	N.	28	
51 52	do	Attempting to uncouple safety chains Coupling, rolled between car and platform.	N. N.	22 33	
53 54	Finger bruised'	Coupling cars	D.	23	s.
55	Leg and ankle cut	Holding up lock pin by hand, caught between pin and deadwood. Coupling, wheel catching him			
20	and bruised. +		i		
56 57	Hand crushed	Caught between couplers while coupling. Attempted to pull drawbars open	, D. D.	26	1 week.
58	Hand injured	While uncoupling car from train	<b>Ď</b> .	25	
59	do	Caught fingers in chain	D.	52	
60 61		Uncoupling on curve, lift rod slipped under running board of tank. Riding on footboard of engine, bad-order		24	
01		car having no drawbar came too close to engine catching him	N.	! <b>24</b> !	
62	Toe mashed	Kicking knuckle open with foot	D.	43	
63	Fingers mashed	Lifting pin on bad-order cars, cars came together.	D.	52	
64		Projecting load on lumber car; caught between lever and lumber on car.	D.	27	
65 66		Coupling with link and pin, pin jumped out of drawhead.  Opening knuckle, cars came together	D.	26	
67	Hand mashed off	Slipped on rail, hand caught between	N. N.	31 35	
68	Foot injured	Attempted to shove coupler over with foot.	D.	23	
69	Foot bruised	Caught in guard rail	D.	30	8.
70 71	Foot cut off	Slipped off brake beam and fell	D.	27	
72	Finger contused	Opening jaw on coupler	D. D.	28	
73	Fingers cut off	do	l b.	18	

List of injuries to employees reported as occurring in coupling or uncoupling cars—Cont'd.

AUGUST, 1902—Continued.

Finge Foot Foot Foot Foot Foot Foot Foot Finge F	2.	3.	4.	5.	6.
Finge Foot   Foot   Foot   Foot   Finge Foot of Finge	Injury.	Cause as reported.	Daylight (D.) or darkness (N.).		(See note.)
Foot I Finge Finge Body Finge Body Legs bod Finge Body 100 Legs Body 100 Finge Body 100 Toe ja	ger bruised	Chain disconnected; was pulling pin by hand.	D.	53	
Foot bruing Finge Body Finge Body Legs bod Finge Body 100 Finge	e crushed	Attempting to shove knuckle with foot Attempting to shove drawbar over with	N. D.	31 34	
brui Finge Body 82 Finge 83 Finge 84 Finge 85 Hand 86 Head 87 Hand Finge 89 Body 90 Legs bod 91 Leg contu 92 Rib fr 93 Hand 94 Finge 95 Contu 97 Foot of Finge 99 Body 100 Toe ja 101 Body 102 Hand 104 Body 105 Heel 106 Thum 107 Finge 108 Body 109 Arm a 110 Chest 111 Thum 112 Hand 113 Body 114 Finge 115 Knee	ger bruised	foot.  Holding lever up to couple, caught between lever and stirrup.	N.	22	
80 Finge Body 82 Finge 83 Finge 85 Hand 86 Head 87 Hand Finge 89 Body 90 Legs bod 91 Leg compared 95 Leg b 96 Contumer Foot of Finge 99 Body 100 Toe jame 101 Body 102 Finge 105 Hand 104 Body 105 Heck 110 Chest 111 Thum 112 Hand 113 Body 114 Finge 115 Knee 116 Skull	ot crushed; arm	While uncoupling, fell under wheels	N.	32	7 months.
84 Finge 85 Hand 86 Head 87 Hand 88 Finge 89 Body 90 Legs bod 91 Leg c 92 Rib fr 93 Hand 94 Finge 95 Leg b 96 Contu- 97 Foot c 98 Finge 99 Body 100 Toe ja 101 Body 102do 103 Hand 104 Body 105 Heel 106 Thum 107 Finge 108 Body 109 Arm 110 Chest 111 Thum 112 Hand 113 Body 114 Finge 115 Knee	ger cutdy squeezed	Coupling, caught in some way	N. D.	36   22	2 months.
84 Finge 85 Hand 86 Head 87 Hand 89 Body 90 Legs bod 91 Leg contu- 93 Hand 94 Finge 95 Contu- 97 Foot of 98 Finge 99 Body 100 Toe ja 101 Body 102do 103 Hand 104 Body 105 Heel 106 Thum Finge 108 Body 109 Arm a 110 Chest 111 Thum 112 Hand 113 Body 114 Finge 115 Knee	gers bruised	Uncoupling, took hold of tumbling lever with hand, hand lever gone.	D.	30	
85 Hand 86 Head 87 Hand 88 Finge 89 Body 90 Legs bod 91 Leg c 92 Rib fr 93 Hand 94 Finge 95 Leg b 96 Contu 97 Foot c 98 Finge 99 Body 100 Toe ja 101 Body 102do 103 Hand 104 Body 105 Hecl 106 Thum 107 Finge 108 Body 109 Arm a 110 Chest 111 Thum 112 Hand 113 Body 114 Finge 115 Knee	nger cut off	Lift pin broken, pulling pin by hand, caught between drawbar and deadwood.	D.	34	
85 Hand 86 Head 87 Hand 88 Finge 89 Body 90   Legs bod 91   Leg cr 92 Rib fr 93   Hand 94 Finge 95   Leg b 96   Contu- 97 Foot of 98   Finge 99 Body 100 Toe ja 101 Body 102do 103 Hand 104 Body 105 Heel 106 Thum 107 Finge 108 Body 109 Arm a 110 Chest 111 Thum 112 Hand 113 Body 114 Finge 115 Knee	gers mashed	Trying to open knuckle, slack ran in	N.	35	
Stull   Skull   Skul	nd mashed	Coupling, lifting lever too long, caught	D.	29	
Stull   Skull   Skul	ad contused	between lever and end sill of tank. Coupling engine to car, caught between	N.	28	
Finge   Body   Legs   bod   Legs   bod     Leg c	ad contused	ash pan of engine and engine pit.		<b></b> ,	
89   Body 90   Legs   bod  91   Leg cr 92   Rib fr 93   Hand 94   Finge 95   Leg b 96   Contu- 97   Foot of 98   Finge 99   Body 100   Toe ja 101   Body 102  do  103   Hand 104   Body 105   Hecl 106   Thum 107   Finge 108   Body 109   Arm a 110   Chest 111   Thum 112   Hand 113   Body 114   Finge 115   Knee	nd mashed	Adjusting coupler, cars came together	N.	23	
90   Legs   bodd 91   Leg cr 92   Rib fr 93   Hand 94   Finge 95   Leg b 96   Contumer   Foot of Finge   98   Body   Toe is   100   Toe is   101   Body   Heel   105   Hand   106   Thum   107   Finge   108   Body   109   Arm   110   Chest   111   Thum   112   Hand   113   Body   114   Finge   115   Skull	ger mashed	Opening knuckle, cars came together	D.	27	
91   Leg colored   92   Rib fr   93   Hand   94   Finge   95   Leg b   96   Contumer   Foot of Finge   Body   100   Toe js   Body   102  do   103   Hand   104   Body   105   Heel   106   Thum   Finge   108   Body   109   Arm   110   Chest   111   Thum   112   Hand   113   Body   114   Finge   Knee   116   Skull   Skull		Caught between cars while coupling	D. N.	- 37 57	
92 Rib fr 93 Hand 94 Finge 95 Leg b 96 Contu 97 Foot of 98 Finge 99 Body 100 Toe ja 101 Body 102do  103 Hand 104 Body 105 Hecl 106 Thum 107 Finge 108 Body 109 Arm a 110 Chest 111 Thum 112 Hand 113 Body 114 Finge 115 Knee	es contused and ody bruised.	Defective coupler; stooping over to see what was the matter and wheel caught foot.	۸.	Ji	
93   Hand 94   Finge 95   Leg b 96   Contu- 97   Foot of 98   Finge 99   Body 100   Toe ja 101   Body 102  do  103   Hand 104   Body 105   Heel i 106   Thum 107   Finge 108   Body 109   Arm a 110   Chest 111   Thum 112   Hand 113   Body 114   Finge 115   Knee	; cut	Went to uncouple cars before air hose was cut and hose coupling struck his leg.	D.	21	
95   Leg b  96   Contu- 97   Foot of 98   Finge 99   Body 100   Toe ja 101   Body 102  do  103   Hand 104   Body 105   Heel 106   Thum 107   Finge 108   Body 109   Arm a  110   Chest 111   Thum 112   Hand 113   Body 114   Finge 115   Knee		Squeezed between tender and buffers Opening knuckles, caught between draw- bars.	D. D.	47 42	•
96   Contu- 97   Foot of 98   Finge 99   Body 100   Toe ja 101   Body 102  do  103   Hand 104   Body 105   Hecl 106   Thum 107   Finge 108   Body 109   Arm a 110   Chest 111   Thum 112   Hand 113   Body 114   Finge 115   Knee	nger crushed		D.	21	
97 Foot of Finge 99 Body 100 Toe ja Body 102do 103 Hand 104 Body 105 Heel 1 106 Thum Finge 108 Body 109 Arm a 110 Chest 111 Thum 112 Hand 113 Body 114 Finge Knee 115 Skull	g bruised	Standing on break beam, shock when coupling was made caused him to fall.	,	43	
98   Finge 99   Body 100   Toe ja 101   Body 102  do 103   Hand 104   Body 105   Heel 106   Thum 107   Finge 108   Body 109   Arm a 110   Chest 111   Thum 112   Hand 113   Body 114   Finge 115   Knee		Pushing drawbar over with foot	<b>D.</b>	23	1
99   Body 100   Toe ja 101   Body 102  do 103   Hand 104   Body 105   Heel i 106   Thum 107   Finge 108   Body 109   Arm a 110   Chest 111   Thum 112   Hand 113   Body 114   Finge Knee	ot crushed	Caught between lever and holder	D. D.	$\frac{28}{29}$	
100   Toe ja 101   Body 102  do 103   Hand 104   Body 105   Heel is 106   Thum 107   Finge 108   Body 109   Arm a 110   Chest 111   Thum 112   Hand 113   Body 114   Finge 115   Skull	dy bruised	Squeezed between dirt boards	Ď.	30	
101   Body 102  do 103   Hand 104   Body 105   Heel 106   Thum 107   Finge 108   Body 109   Arm a 110   Chest 111   Thum 112   Hand 113   Body 114   Finge 115   Knee	e jammed	Drawbar fell on foot	N.	31	1
103   Hand 104   Body 105   Hecl   106   Thum 107   Finge 108   Body 109   Arm a 110   Chest 111   Thum 112   Hand 113   Body 114   Finge 115   Skull	dy bruised	Drawbar out, caught between cars	D.	23	
104 Body 105 Heel 106 Thum 107 Finge 108 Body 109 Arm 110 Chest 111 Thum 112 Hand 113 Body 114 Finge 115 Knee	.go	No footboard, stepped on iron rods, missed.	D.	22	· S.
105 Hecl : 106 Thum 107 Finge 108 Body 109 Arm : 110 Chest 111 Thum 112 Hand 113 Body 114 Finge 115 Knee	nd bruised	Chain disconnected, raising pin by hand.	D.	31	
107   Finge 108   Body 109   Arm a 110   Chest 111   Thum 112   Hand 113   Body 114   Finge 115   Skull	dy bruisedel mashed	Chain broken, caught between cars Coupling missed, jumping out, wheel caught foot.	D. D.	27	
109 Arm a  110 Chest  111 Thum 112 Hand 113 Body 114 Finge 115 Knee	umb bruised  igers lacerated	Coupling log cars Opening knuckle, caught between couplers.	D. N.	22	i i 
110   Chest  111   Thum 112   Hand 113   Body 114   Finge 115   Knee	dy bruised	Caught between deadwoods while coupling.	D.	26	
111 Thum 112 Hand 113 Body 114 Finge 115 Knee	m and leg mashed.	Opening lip of coupler, caught between drawheads.	D.	21	I
112   Hand 113   Body 114   Finge 115   Knee	est crushed	Coupling on inside of sharp curve, caught.	D.	25 	_
113   Body 114   Finge 115   Knee 116   Skull	umb bruised	Caught between lever and end sill of car.	<u>N</u> .	26	Ì
114   Finge 115   Knee 116   Skull	nd jammed	Pulling pin in bad order car, slack ran in.	р. Р	••••	
115   Knee 116   Skull	ny jammed	Stumbled and caught between drawheads	D.	· · · · · ·	
116 Skull	ee cut	Coupling coach to engine	,	<b>23</b>	
	ull fractured and eack strained.	fell. Uncoupling, lost hold and fell between cars while in motion.	D.	32	
117 Back	ck bruised	Missed hold and fell while uncoupling		28	ام
	nger bruised	Caught between pin and engine	D.	<b>30</b> 29	S. Imonth
	.do	Caught hand behind coupling pin Caught hand behind pin		28	S.1month.
	.do	Caught hand benind pin Caught between uncoupling lever and car		27	
122   Foot	ot bruised	Attempted to open knuckle with foot	D.	28	
124 Hand	nd bruised	Chaining one car to another, slack ran in.		85	ļ
125   Hand	nd and foot cut off.	Uncoupling, hand slipped off lever, fell between cars.	D.	••••	1

List of injuries to employees reported as occurring in coupling or uncoupling cars—Cont'd.

AUGUST, 1902—Continued.

1.	2.	<b>3.</b>	4.	5.	6.
Record No.	Injury.	Cause as reported.	Daylight (D.) or darkness (N.).	Age.	(See note.
126 127	Hand injured Finger contused	Caught between lever and deadwood Rod broken off, holding coupler up by hand.	D. D.	84	
128	Body bruised	Making coupling, fell under cars be- tween rails.	D.	37	
129	Finger lacerated	Opening knuckle	D.	21	
	Finger bruised	Caught behind uncoupling lever	D.	23	
131	do	drawbar.	N.	22	6 months
132	Fingers pinched	Uncoupling on curve, caught between lever and end sill.	D.	24	
133	Fingers crushed	Uncoupling on curve, caught lever and tank of engine.	D.	21	
134	Arm crushed	Caught between coupler and end of car	N.	21	
135	Hand crushed	Caught between coupler and end of car Caught between lever and end of car	D.	22	
136	ringer crushed	Caught between end gate of car and stake of other car.	D.	27	
138	Finger bursted	Caught between lever and end of car	D.	28	,
139 141	do	Opening knuckles saught between	D. N.	or or	
142	Body bruised	Opening knuckles, caught between couplers.		35	
	-	Adjusting couplers, caught between ends of cars.	D.	29	
143	Finger crushed	Caught behind pin while uncoupling	D.	22	_
145	Fingers cut and	Uncoupling coach, brake wheel recoiled. Coupling cars	N. N.	27 27	s.
146 147	bruised. Finger crushed Body squeezed	Caught between sill and coupling pin Coupling with chain, caught between	D. D.	31 29	
148	Arm crushed	cars. Caught between cars while counling	D.	30	
149	Fingers injured	Caught between cars while couplingdo	Ď.	28	
150	Heel injured	Caught under wheel while making coupling.	D.	34	
151	Body bruised	Uncoupling, struck by car on opposite track.	N.	24	
152 153	1	Caught between lever and end sill of car. Opening knuckle; stepped on stone and		82 32	
154	Body bruised	Uncoupling cars in motion; foot slipped. Uncoupling engine from train	D.	26	8.
155 157	Finger lacerated	Caught between lever and and of car	D. D.	22 24	2 months
158	do	Caught between lever and end of tank	D.	22	8.
159	do	Caught between lever and end of car	D.	29	8.
100	ao	Cut cars; leaned out too far	ν.	24 27	<b>8.</b>
161 162	Wrist crushed		D. D.	30	s. s.
163	Hand contused	Caught between end sill and lever	D.	21	8.
164	Thumb bruised	Caught between lever and sill of car	D.	57	S.
165	Thumb crushed	Caught between lever and tender of engine.	D.	25	8.
166 167	Hip bruised Finger crushed	Coupling; slipped and fell under cars Raising knuckle pin; caught between	N. D.	20 26	S. S.
168	Finger contused	pin and coupler. Caught between lever and end sill of car.	D.	34	8.
169	Hand bruised	Caught between pin and end sill of car	Ď.	32	S.
170	Hand lacerated	Caught between lever and end sill of car.	D.	48	S.
171 172	Finger bruised	Caught between lever and car	D. D.	84 26	
173	Body bruised	Coupling; squeezed between cars	N.	23	S.
174	Finger crushed	Caught between coupler and end sill of car.	D.	22	
175	Fingers lacerated		N.	27	1 month
176 177		Kicked knuckle open with foot	D. D.	25 23	,
178	Fingers bruised	cars. On curve; caught between lever and coach.	D.	24	′
179	đo	On curve; caught between lever and sill of car.	D.	25	
180	Hand bruised		D. N.	32 28	
182	ZELIZE WILLIAM CONTROL				

List of injuries to employees reported as occurring in coupling or uncoupling cars—Cont'd.

Rib fractured   Struck in chest by coupling lever   D.   So			AUGUST, 1902—Continued.			
Rib fractured   Struck in chest by coupling lever   D.   34   186   Finger crushed   Opening knuckle; slipped, hand caught   D.   27   187   188   Finger mashed   Caught between lever and end slil of car.   D.   24   189     Caught between lever and end slil of car.   D.   27   28   189     Caught between lever and end slil of car.   D.   27   28   189     Caught between lever and end slil of car.   D.   27   28   189     Caught between lever and end slil of car.   D.   28   28   189     Caught between lever and end slil of car.   D.   27   28   189     Caught between lever and end slil of car.   D.   28   29   29   29   29   29   29   29	1.	2.	3.	4.	5.	6.
Finger crushed.   Opening knuckie; slipped, hand caught   D.   27	Record No.	Injury.	Cause as reported.	(D.) or darkness	Age.	(See note.
187 Thumb lacerated. Caught between lever and rest. D. 23 188 Finger mashed Lever stuck; raised pin by hand, slack property of the propert			Opening knuckle; slipped, hand caught	D. D.		
189			Caught between lever and rest Lever stuck; raised pin by hand, slack			
192   Thumb broken   Uncoupling; stepped on piece of coke   N.   23   9 months   193   194   194   195			Caught between lever and end sill of car. On curve; caught between lever and end			
188   Hand bruised   Caught between lever and end sill of car.   D.   42		Ankle sprained Thumb broken	Uncoupling; stepped on piece of coke Unchaining cars; hand caught between			9 months.
194 do. Caught between lever and end of car. N. 26 196 Finger mashed Lifter pin disconnected; lifted pin by N. 35 197 Body bruised Caught between lever and end of lord n. N. 30 198 Finger mashed Lifter pin disconnected; lifted pin by N. 35 199 Arm crushed Opening knew justing; tried to replace D. 23 201 do Department of the pin by hand; caught between D. 23 202 Finger mashed Took hold of pin with fingers N. 22 203	193	Hand bruised	Caught between lever and end sill of car.	D.		
Finger mashed	194	do	Caught between lever and end of car	N.		
196   Finger mashed			Lifter pin disconnected; lifted pin by	N.		
199   Arm crushed   Opening knuckle; caught by bumper.   D.   23   23   201  do   Latch-pin key missing; tried to replace   D.   30   208  do   Latch-pin key missing; tried to replace   D.   21   21   22   208  do   Latch-pin key missing; tried to replace   D.   21   22   22   23   24   25   26   26   27   27   28   28   28   28   28   28		Body bruised Finger mashed	Lifted latch pin by hand; caught between	N. D.		
Took hold of pin with fingers   N.   22   22   23   24   25   27   28   29   29   29   29   29   29   29			Opening knuckle; caught by bumper Latch-pin key missing; tried to replace	D. D.		
204			Took hold of pin with fingers			
206			Knuckle fell out and struck him Lift rod disconnected; went in to pull pin by hand; knuckle came out and struck	D.		
Dimpers	206	Thumb mashed	Opening knuckle; caught between coup-	D.	21	
211 Fingers mashed Caught between lift rod and casting D. 22 212 Hand bruised Lifted pin with hand; caught between pin and draft timbers.  213 Fingers mashed Opening knuckle; caught finger, slack ran out.  214 Thumb mashed Chain broken; lifting pin by hand D. 22 215 Hand bruised Caught between end of main rod and pilot beam.  218 Finger mashed Caught between lever and end of car N. 219 219 Fingers mashed Caught between lever and end sill of car D. 22 220 Finger cut off Slack ran in D.			Using hand to lift rod; caught between bumpers.			•
Thumb mashed	211	Fingers mashed	Caught between lift rod and casting Lifted pin with hand; caught between	D.	32	
216   Hand bruised   Cpening knuckle; slack ran in   D.   22	213		Opening knuckle; caught finger, slack ran out.			
Finger mashed	216	Finger mashed	Opening knuckle; slack ran in	D.	22	
Finger mashed   Caught between lever and end sill of car.   D.   24   5 months			pilot beam.	N.		P
Finger bruised	219	Fingers mashed	Caught between lever and end sill of car.	D.	24	5 months.
Finger mashed	222	Finger cut off	Slack ran in	• D.	• • • • •	
Finger mashed Caught between deadwood and knuckle. D. 25 Hand cut and mashed Caught between drawheads	224	Foot crushed	Making coupling: caught in frog	D.		
Finger mashed Caught between deadwood and knuckle. D. 25 Hand cut and mashed Finger mashed Caught between drawheads D. 24 Finger mashed Caught between drawheads D. 24 Finger mashed Caught between drawheads D. 24 Caught while coupling with link and pin. N. 24 Foot sprained Caught between lever and end sill of car. D. 27 Lever chain missing; stepped in between D. 24 to cut, stepped in hole. Uncoupling cars while moving; slipped N. 23 The coupling moving cars; caught between deadwoods. Uncoupling moving cars; caught between deadwoods. Uncoupling engine from train; slipped N. 38 Caught between deadwood blocks D. 58 Arm crushed Caught between deadwood blocks D. 58 Finger mashed Reaching over bumping blocks to uncouple. Reaching in to throw lever D. 30 Opening knuckle; caught between drawbars. Coupling engine; lump of coal fell on N. 35 S.		Finger masned	Trying to close knuckie		21	<del></del>
Hand cut and mashed Finger mashed			SEPTEMBER, 1902.			
Finger mashed Caught while coupling with link and pin. Thank mashed Caught between lever and end sill of car. Lever chain missing; stepped in between to cut, stepped in hole.  Body cut and bruised Uncoupling cars while moving; slipped and fell. Uncoupling moving cars; caught between deadwoods.  Body crushed Uncoupling engine from train; slipped N. 29 tween deadwood blocks D. 58 Reaching over bumping blocks to uncouple.  Finger mashed Reaching in to throw lever D. 30 Opening knuckle; caught between drawbars.  Caught while coupling with link and pin. N. 24 D. 27 D. 27 D. 28 D. 24 tween deadwood slipped N. 29 tween deadwoods.  In a coupling engine from train; slipped N. 29 tween deadwood blocks D. 58				D.		
Foot sprained  Body cut and bruised  Body crushed			Caught while coupling with link and pin	D.		
10 Body cut and bruised Uncoupling cars while moving; slipped and fell.  11 Arm bruised Uncoupling moving cars; caught between deadwoods.  12 Body crushed Uncoupling moving cars; caught between deadwoods.  13 Body crushed Uncoupling moving cars; caught between deadwoods.  14 Arm cut off Caught between deadwood blocks D.  15 Arm crushed Reaching over bumping blocks to uncouple.  16 Finger mashed Reaching in to throw lever D.  17 D.  18 Body crushed D.  19 Finger mashed Reaching in to throw lever D.  19 D.  20 Head cut Coupling engine; lump of coal fell on head.	5	Hand mashed	Caught between lever and end sill of car. Lever chain missing; stepped in between	D.	27	
11 Arm bruised	10	Body cut and bruised	Uncoupling cars while moving; slipped	N.	23	5 months.
Body crushed	11	Arm bruised	Uncoupling moving cars; caught be-	N.	29	
Couple.  Finger mashed  Pringers crushed  Opening knuckle; caught between drawbars.  Coupling engine; lump of coal fell on head.  Coupling engine; lump of coal fell on head.	14	Arm cut off	Uncoupling engine from train; slipped Caught between deadwood blocks	D.		
19 Fingers crushed Opening knuckle; caught between draw- bars. 20 Head cut Coupling engine; lump of coal fell on N. 35 S. head.			couple.  Reaching in to throw lever		30	
head.	19	Fingers crushed	Opening knuckle; caught between drawbars.	D.	45	a
		i	head.		35 26	n.

List of injuries to employees reported as occurring in coupling or uncoupling cars—Cont'd.

SEPTEMBER, 1902—Continued.

· 1.	2.	<b>3.</b>	4.	5.	6.
Record No.	Injury.	Cause as reported.	Daylight (D.) or darkness (N.).	Age.	(See note.)
22	Hand mashed	Opening knuckle; stumbled, with hand on coupler as cars came together.	D.	322	
23 24	Collar bone broken Foot cut	Caught between end sills	D. N.		
25	Finger mashed	nail in it. Adjusting couplers on curve; caught	N.	25	•
26	Thumb bruised	between couplers.  Adjusting couplers on curve; caught between knuckle of one and jaw of	D.	28	
27	Thumb and finger mashed.	other. Opening knuckle, slipped; caught hold of drawbar.	N.	22	
28 29	Finger mashed	Pin disconnected; slack ran in Engine backed train, catching him be- tween cars.	D. N.	23 29	
30	Arm bruised		D.	25	
31	Finger cut off	Caught between lever and car	Ď.	22	1 month.
32	Body bruised	do	D.	35 i	
33		Pin-lifter chain broken; attempted to pull pin by hand.	D.	25	
34	Finger crushed	by hand.	D.	29	
35 36	Arm crushed	Adjusting couplers; caught between them.	N.	30	
36 37	Finger crushed	Caught between lever and drawbar Went in to pull pin; caught	N. D.	29 24	
38	Finger cut off	Caught between pin and deadwood	N.	25	
39	Fingers cut off	Pin stuck; tried to push it down with fingers.	D.	28	
40	_	Coupling; caught between cars and plat- form.	D.	25	
41 <b>4</b> 2	Foot bruised	Caught between cars and building  Took pin out of coupler; knuckle fell on foot.	D. D.	31 31	
43	Hand bruised	Opening knuckles: slock pen in	D.	23	
44 45	Foot crushed	Pushing drawbar over with foot; caught. Switching bad-order cars; went in between to lift pin by hand.	D. D.	23	
46	Finger mashed	Using nand to raise pin; caught between	D.	29	
47		knuckles. Uncoupling car with hand; no lever; caught.	D.	28	
48	Face cut	Struck face against lever pin	N.	45	s.
49 50	Foot pinched Elbow bruised	Struck face against lever pin	D. D.	22 32	8.
51				27	
53	Hand crushed	Uncoupling; slipped off brakebeam Opening knuckle; slack ran in Adjusting drawbars; caught Pushing knuckle with foot. Drawhead lever fell on finger when	N.	24	
55	Finger crushed	Adjusting drawbars; caught	Ď.	25	
56	Toe cut off	Pushing knuckle with foot	D.	34	
57		COMPINE CHING TOWNS INCE	1	24	
58	Body squeezed	Trying to hook safety chains on curve Making coupling; link and pin	D.	33	
59 80	Two ingers cut off	making coupling; link and pin	D.	28	
60 61	Finger broken	do	D.	26 27	
<b>6</b> 2	Thigh contused	do	ח	26	
63	Hand contused	Making coupling; link and pin	Ď.	23	
64 65	Thumb fractured Thigh contused	Making coupling; link and pindo	D. D.	22 31	
66 67		ing coupling. Coupling; wheel run over foot Reaching over for lever; caught between		23 21	
68 69	Arm crushed	deadwood and drawhead.  Lever bent: uncoupling by hand  Reached between cars to straighten key	N. D.	26 94	4 months
		of coupler; caught between deadwoods.	17.	<b>4%</b>	o montus.
70	Fingers crushed	Opening knuckle; slipped between cars	D.	32	
71 72	Body squeezed	Adjusting couplers; slack ran in	D.		
73	Hand cut off	Caught between draft irons	N. N.	28 27	
75	Arm mashed	Adjusting knuckle; caught between bumpers.	Ď.	25	
		Holding lock pin up when cars came to-			

List of injuries to employees reported as occurring in coupling or uncoupling cars—Cont'd.

SEPTEMBER, 1902—Continued.

1.	2.	8.	4.	<b>5.</b>	6.
Record No.	Injury.	Cause as reported.	Daylight (D.) or darkness (N.).	Age.	(See note.)
77	Finger broken	Caught between drawhead and dead-	D.	23	
78	Finger fractured	woods. Lift chain broken, raised pin by hand; pinched.	D.	30	
79	Body bruised	Lever would not raise pin, using hand; caught between drawbars.	D.	<b>3</b> 6	
80	Arm broken	Uncoupling engine from car		23	
83	Finger injured	Uncoupling safety chains; slack ran out.	D.	34	s.
84 85	Body bruised	Stumbled over something between tracks. Opening knuckle; cars came together	N. N.	23 22	
86	Finger bruised	Caught between lever and end sill of car.	Ď.	30	
87	Ankle sprained	Holding up uncoupling lever; stepped on end of tie.	Ň.	23	
88	Body squeezed	Opening knuckle; caught between cars	D.	30	
89	Finger mashed	Caught between lever and end sill	D.	22	
90 91	Thumb mashed	Opening knuckles cought between coup	D. N.	21	
92	Fingers mashed	Opening knuckle; caught between couplers. Chain disconvented; pulling pin by hand	_	23	
93	Foot mashed	Chain disconnected; pulling pin by hand. Pushing coupler into position	D. D.	22 26	
94	Hand crushed	Caught between lever and end sill	Ď.	22	
95	Body crushed	Couplers passed each on curve; caught	N.	25	
96	Testicles injured	between engine and end of car. Hands slipped from lever; lever struck	D.	35	
97	Elbow crushed	him. Reaching over bumpers to uncouple;	D.	48	
98	Ankle sprained	caught between couplers. Running along side of train to uncouple;	D.	23	
99	Ankle bruised	slipped on tie. Pilot coupler slipped	D.	24	
100	Chest injured	Lift chain broken; slack ran in	D.	30	
101	Body crushed	Opening knuckle; caught between coup-	D.	22	
102	Legand groin housed	lers. Opening knuckle: stumbled on reil	D.	90	
103	Ankle sprained	Making coupling: foot turned under him	D.	30 28	
104	Arm crushed	Opening knuckle; stumbled on rail  Making coupling; foot turned under him. Unhooking safety chains; caught between couplers.	Ď.	41	
107		tween couplers. Holding pin up by hand; caught between couplers.		23	
108	Hand mashed	Opening knuckles; caught between couplers. Caught between lever and end of car	<b>D.</b>	23	
109	Hand bruised	Caught between lever and end of car	D.	27	
		Knuckle broke; piece struck him Running alongside of car to cut; fell in ditch.		37 26	
113	Chest bruised	Coupling: caught by lift lever	N.	27	s.
114 115	Finger bruised Thumb cut and	Coupling; caught by lift lever	Ñ. D.	36 27	2.
	bruised.	deadwood.			
116	Body bruised	Pulling pin and jerked from car	Ŋ.		
11/ 118 -	Finger ismmed	deadwood. Pulling pin and jerked from car Caught around safety latch Coupling; caught hand	N. D.	25 25	
110	Finger jammed	Caught between pin and "dolly varden".	D.	$\widetilde{21}$	2 weeks
119		caught between pin and don't varuen.	17.		/Q \
i	-				<b>(</b> S.).
120	-				(67.).
120 122	Body squeezed Body bruised	Trying to uncouple chain	D. D.		(5.).
120 122 123	Body squeezed Body bruised	Trying to uncouple chain	D. D.	56 26	(6.).
120 122	Body squeezed Body bruised	Trying to uncouple chain	D. D.		(67.).
120 122 123 125 126	Body squeezed Body bruised Fingers mashed Finger contused Foot bruised	Trying to uncouple chain	D. D. D. D.	56 26 35 26	(6).).
120 122 123 125 126	Body squeezed Body bruised Fingers mashed Finger contused Foot bruised	Trying to uncouple chain	D. D. D. D.	56 26 35 26 23	(D.).
120 122 123 125 126	Body squeezed Body bruised Fingers mashed Finger contused Foot bruised	Trying to uncouple chain	D. D. D. D.	56 26 35 26 23	(D.).
120 122 123 125 126 127 128 129 130	Body squeezed Body bruised Fingers mashed Finger contused Foot bruised Body bruised Thumb crushed Toe crushed Thumb mashed	Trying to uncouple chain.  Coupling engine to tender.  Did not take hand off bumpers when engine came back.  Caught between lever and end sill.  Trying to cut off engine; pilot caught him.  Train backed; he was between cars.  Adjusting coupler; caught.  Pushing drawbar over; caught.  Pin disconnected: slack ran in	D. D. D. D. D. D. D. D. D.	56 26 35 26 23	(6.).
120 122 123 125 126 127 128 129 130 131	Body squeezed	Trying to uncouple chain. Coupling engine to tender. Did not take hand off bumpers when engine came back. Caught between lever and end sill. Trying to cut off engine; pilot caught him. Train backed; he was between cars. Adjusting coupler; caught. Pushing drawbar over; caught Pin disconnected; slack ran in Glove caught in lever; thrown to ground.	D. D. D. D. D. D. D. N.	56 26 35 26 23 32	(6.).
120 122 123 125 126 127 128 129 130 131 132	Body squeezed Body bruised Fingers mashed Finger contused Foot bruised Body bruised Thumb crushed Toe crushed Thumb mashed Body bruised Body bruised Loe crushed Loe crushed Loe crushed Loe crushed Loe crushed Loe crushed	Trying to uncouple chain. Coupling engine to tender. Did not take hand off bumpers when engine came back. Caught between lever and end sill. Trying to cut off engine; pilot caught him. Train backed; he was between cars. Adjusting coupler; caught. Pushing drawbar over; caught Pin disconnected; slack ran in Glove caught in lever; thrown to ground. Caught between bumpers	D. D. D. D. D. D. N. N. N.	56 26 35 26 23 32 42 30	
120 122 123 125 126 127 128 129 130 131 132	Body squeezed	Trying to uncouple chain.  Coupling engine to tender.  Did not take hand off bumpers when engine came back.  Caught between lever and end sill.  Trying to cut off engine; pilot caught him.  Train backed; he was between cars.  Adjusting coupler; caught.  Pushing drawbar over; caught.  Pin disconnected; slack ran in.  Glove caught in lever; thrown to ground.  Caught between bumpers.  Cutting cars; caught.  Pulling knuckle open; engine struck.	D. D. D. D. D. D. N. D. N. D. D. D. D. N. D. D. D. N. D. D. D. D. N. D. D. D. N. D. D. D. D. D. D. N. D.	56 26 35 26 23 32	1 month.
120 122 123 125 126 127 128 129 130 131 132 134	Body squeezed Body bruised Fingers mashed Finger contused Foot bruised Body bruised Thumb crushed Toe crushed Thumb mashed Body bruised do do	Trying to uncouple chain. Coupling engine to tender. Did not take hand off bumpers when engine came back. Caught between lever and end sill. Trying to cut off engine; pilot caught him. Train backed; he was between cars. Adjusting coupler; caught. Pushing drawbar over; caught Pin disconnected; slack ran in Glove caught in lever; thrown to ground. Caught between bumpers Cutting cars; caught. Pulling knuckle open; engine struck cars; caught. Adjusting knuckle while cars were	D. D. D. D. D. D. N. D.	56 26 35 26 23 32 42 30 26	
120 122 123 125 126 127 128 129 130 131 132 134 135	Body squeezed Body bruised Fingers mashed Finger contused Foot bruised Body bruised Thumb crushed Toe crushed Thumb mashed Body bruiseddodododododododododadd Armand hand bruised	Trying to uncouple chain.  Coupling engine to tender.  Did not take hand off bumpers when engine came back.  Caught between lever and end sill.  Trying to cut off engine; pilot caught him.  Train backed; he was between cars.  Adjusting coupler; caught.  Pushing drawbar over; caught.  Pin disconnected; slack ran in.  Glove caught in lever; thrown to ground.  Caught between bumpers.  Cutting cars; caught.  Pulling knuckle open; engine struck cars; caught.	D. D. D. D. D. D. N. D.	56 26 35 26 23 32 42 30 26 23	

List of injuries to employees reported as occurring in coupling or uncoupling cars—Cont'd.

SEPTEMBER, 1902—Continued.

1.	· <b>2.</b>	• 3.	4.	5.	6.
ecord No.	Injury.	Cause as reported.	Daylight (D.) or darkness (N.).	1 1	(See note.
139	Leg squeezed	Coupling on curve; caught between tank	D.	24	
140	Foot squeezed		D.	35	•
141	Finger crushed	drawheads. Caught between trip lever and deadwood.	D.	24	
142	Heel injured	Kicked drawhead over with foot; caught between drawheads.	Ď.	26	
143	Ankle sprained		N.	23	
144	Finger cut		D.	25	
145	Fingers cut	Chaining up had order cars	N.	31	
147	Finger bruised	Caught between lever and end sill	N.	22	
148	Finger lacerated	Caught between lever and end sill	D.	22	
149	Body injured	Caught between car and telegraph pole.	' <b>D</b> .	26	
150	Hand bruised	Caught below drawbar	<b>D</b> .	22	_
151		fell on him.	1	35	8.
152	Body bruised	Caught between side of car and platform.	; <b>D</b> .	22	
153	Arm bruised	bumpers.	!	24	
154	Leg bruised	Standing on front of engine; when coupling was made was caught.	N.	24	
155	Hand bruised	Adjusting lever; caught between lever and end sill.	D.	24	
156		do		24	:
157		do		24	
158	Finger bruised	do	Ð.	23	
159	Heel bruised	Trying to open knuckle; caught	N.	22	
160	Thumb bruised	Uncoupling; caught behind the pin	<b>D</b> .	23	
161 162	Finger mashed	Caught behind coupler lever	D.	22 31	
163	Hand bruised	lever and end sill. Lifting uncoupling lever: slack ran out	D	36	
164	Finger burst	Holding up uncoupling lever; caught between lever and side sill. Opening knuckle; caught	N.	26	
165	Fingers crushed off	Opening knuckle; caught	D.	21	_
166	Hand injured	Pin fell on hand while coupling	D.	<b>22</b>	
167	Finger lacerated	Closing knuckle: slack ran in	. N.	23	<u>8</u> .
168	Body bruised	Turning knuckle; slack ran in	$\mathbf{D}$ .	40	8.
169	Body squeezed	Cutting on curve; caught	D.	39	
170	Thumb mashed	Coupling on curve; caught	D. D.	37	ļ
i	i	drawhead.			
172	Foot crushed	Opening knuckle with foot	<b>D</b> .	23	
173	Wrist wrenched	Uncoupling; caught in brake wheel	, N.	38	}
	_	Uncoupling; caught between car and coupler.	ı	27	
175	do	Attempted to straighten couplers; slack ran in.	D.	83	
176	Body squeezed	Stepped in to lift pin; slack ran in	Ŋ.	23	
177	ringer mashed	Caught between lever and tank	<b>D</b> .	28	į
170	Fings amshed	Making chain coupling	D.	19	1
180	Hand injured	Caught between lever and tank	D. N.	26 23	8.
181	Thumb injured	Caught between lever and end of car	D.	33	S.
182	Finger injured	Attempted to cut engine loose	D.	23	S.
183	Hand injured	Caught between lever and bumper	D.	39	š.
184	Finger injured	Caught between knuckle pin and rail of car.	D.	31	8.
185	Finger contused	Caught between lever and tender of engine.	N.	23	s.
187		Coupler lever bent; drawing pin by hand.	N.	23	1
188		Pushing coupler over with foot; caught	N.	25	
189		between coupler and deadwood. Tried to lift pin by hand		29	
	Body bruised	Reaching over to turn angle cock; slack	D.	44	! 
191	Fingers crushed	ran in. Caught between lever and tender	. D.	33	
193	Leg crushed		D.	23	1
	Rody henjed	Struck by corner of car	D.	84	8.
					-
		Lever would not raise pin; using hand; shack ran in,	<b>D.</b>	22	-

List of injuries to employees reported as occurring in coupling or uncoupling cars—Cont'd.

SEPTEMBER, 1902—Continued.

1.	2.	<b>3.</b>	4.	5.	6.
Record No.	Injury.	Cause as reported.	Daylight (D.) or darkness (N.).	Age.	(See note.)
197	Body crushed	Went between cars; struck by projecting lumber,	D.	28	1
198	Finger crushed		D.	23	ı
	Body bruised	Caught between drawbars	N.	33	r
200	Thumb and finger pinched.	Making coupling			<b>8.</b>
201		Uncoupling; caught between drawheads.	N.	1	ſ
203	Body squeezed	Coupling on sharp curve: link and pin	N.		
204	Toes mashed	Coupling on sharp curve; link and pin Making coupling; stepped on cinder	D.	29	1
205	Hand mashed	Holding up knuckle pin	! D	28	<sup>1</sup> S.
206	Fingers crushed	Did not release lever quickly	$\bar{\mathbf{D}}$ .	25	
207	Body pinched	Coupling	N.	23	
208	Body bruised	On short curve; chain broken; holding up pin by hand.	D.	35	
209	Foot sprained	Caught between guard rail and main rail.		21	1
210	Knee bruised	Knuckle flew out; striking him	D.	40	}
211	Body bruised	Coupling; caught between car and wood pile.	D.	25	
213	Body mashed	Crossing between cars; caught between drawheads.	N.	22	
214	Body bruised	Coupling with link; caught between bumpers.	N.	30	s.
215	Fingers mashed		D.	22	
216	Hand crushed	Coupling	İ		
217	Fingers crushed	Chaining cars: caught between couplers.			
771	Foot mashed	Chaining cars; caught between couplers. Pushing drawbar over with foot	D.		
564	Thumb cut off	Coupling	l D.		
1111	Thumb cut off	Uncoupling; lost hold and fell, cars passing over him.	Ñ.	3	3 months.

It will be observed that some of the explanations of cause and circumstances are not full and complete. In the more serious cases, which are thus imperfectly reported, inquiry has been made and corrected reports have been asked for. Not all of these inquiries have elicited satisfactory answers. It has been found, however, that incomplete reports which on their face seem to show that a man was attempting the absurdity of coupling automatic couplers by hand, usually refer to cases of coupling to tenders which have only a link coupling, or adjusting couplers in front of moving cars, or cases erroneously reported as "coupling" when in fact the man was trying to correct something that was wrong about an uncoupling mechanism.

TABLE No. 4.—Causes of accidents to employees classified (C6 and C7) as falling from and getting on or off cars and engines.

			on- ctors.		rake- n, etc.		gine- en.	Fire	e <b>me</b> n.		yees.
Sub- class.	Causes.	Killed.	Injured.	Killed.	Injured.	Killed.	Injured.	Killed.	Injured.	Killed.	Injured.
	Fell from roof of box car by reason of— Defect in car. Ice or snow. Parting of train. Derailment, collision, or shock due to abnormal movements of cars other than those in subclass 3.	1	<u>i</u>	7	16 16		1		2	5	17
C6 5 6 7 8 9 10	While setting brakes. Fell from— Coal car Freight car other than box or coal car. Engine or tender. Passenger car. Engines, tenders, or cars (all kinds) not in motion.	••••	3	6	66 10 51 3	1	11 26	3	28 45	2	1 1 1 1 1 5
11 12 13 14 15	Miscellaneous causes	1	16 5 9 21	4   24   45   4   3	290 77 110 184		$ \begin{array}{c} 1 \\ 2 \\ 2 \end{array} $	2	2 3 3 4	7 6 7 2	63 8 22 21
C7 16 17 18	cident	i	1 11	1 16	17 44 184 4	···i	87		13 38	4	19
	Total	3	79	114	1, 293	4	86	6	144	34	163

#### [Ptblic-No. 171.]

AN ACT requiring common carriers engaged in interstate commerce to make full reports of all accidents to the Interstate Commerce Commission.

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, It shall be the duty of the general manager, superintendent, or other proper officer of every common carrier engaged in interstate commerce by railroad to make the Interstate Commerce Commission, at its office in Washington, District of Columbia, a monthly report, under oath, of all collisions of trains or where any train or part of a train accidentally leaves the track, and of all accidents which may occur to its passengers or employees while in the service of such common carrier and actually on duty, which report shall state the nature and causes thereof, and the circumstances connected therewith.

SEC. 2. That any common carrier failing to make such report within thirty days after the end of any month shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor and, upon conviction thereof by a court of competent jurisdiction, shall be punished by a fine of not more than one hundred dollars for each and every offense and for every day during which it shall fail to make such report after the time herein specified for making the same.

SEC. 3. That neither said report nor any part therof shall be admitted as evidence or used for any purpose against such railroad so making such report in any suit or action for damages growing out of any matter mentioned in said report.

SEC. 4. That the Interstate Commerce Commission is authorized to prescribe for such common carriers a method and form for making the reports in the foregoing section provided.

Approved, March 3, 1901.

# ACCIDENT BULLETIN,

No. 6.

OCTOBER, NOVEMBER, AND DECEMBER, 1902.

. INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMMISSION, WASHINGTON, D. C.

WASHINGTON:
GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE.
1903.

#### SPECIAL INFORMATION CONTAINED IN PRECEDING BULLETINS.

- Each accident bulletin contains tables showing the number of passengers, trainment and other persons killed and injured, and these figures are classified according to cause (see Table No. 1); also tables showing cost of the different classes of train accidents. The causes of accidents to employees in coupling and uncoupling and in falling from cars, etc., are further classified in Tables No. 3 and No. 4 Each bulletin is for three months, and No. 1 was for the quarter ending September 30, 1901. The bulletin for the quarter ending June 30 contains, in addition to the quarterly statistics, tables showing the same information for the whole the fiscal year ending on that date.
- Bulletin No. 1 contains brief notes on the most serious collisions in that quarter is passengers having been killed. There are notes on the causes of coupler and dents, explanatory of Table No. 3. Table No. 4 is supplemented by similar notes. In this quarter special mention was made of 130 casualties (4 killed, 12 injured) due to operating trains in which air brakes were used on only a portion of the cars; and the danger of running trains partially air braked is commented of
- Bulletin No. 2 contains a detailed list showing the cost and causes of the 27 mes serious butting collisions in that quarter. In these collisions 70 persons were killed and 234 were injured, and the damage to cars, engines, and roadwa amounted to \$306,511. The incompleteness of the statements of causes, as set in by the railroads, is commented on.
- Bulletin No. 3 contains a list similar to that just mentioned, but showing rear instead of butting collisions. As in the first list, only the most serious accidents are considered; and of these there were 41, costing \$160,247. The number of personal killed was 43, and of injured 255.
- Bulletin No. 4 contains a third list of collisions, this one including all classes; but includes only a few in which the damage was less than \$5,000. The total-this list are, killed 30, injured 187, cost \$228,597. Collisions occurring when the trainmen had worked very long hours are commented on. In this bullet a table is given showing the deaths and injuries due to trains parting. The aggregate of damage shown in this table is \$492,781; persons killed 14, injure 386. The table shows that nearly all of the coupler failures which resulted in collision or derailment were reported as due to "cause unknown."
- Bulletin No. 5 contains a table of the most serious train accidents in the quarter Derailments as well as collisions are included, but cases causing damages of least than \$10,000 each are not included, except where the cause of the accident called notice. The 23 accidents shown in this table killed 81 persons and injured 3 and the aggregate damage reported was, for the 23 cases, \$308,395. The cause of a few of the accidents are set forth in some detail. A table is given in the bulletin showing the cause (as reported) of each coupling accident in the quarter the table fills 12 pages.

# ACCIDENT BULLETIN,

No. 6,

# SHOWING COLLISIONS AND DERAILMENTS OF TRAINS

AND

# CASUALTIES TO PERSONS

**DURING** 

OCTOBER, NOVEMBER, AND DECEMBER, 1902.

INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMMISSION,
WASHINGTON, D. C.

WASHINGTON:
GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE.
1903.

### THE INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMMISSION.

Hon. MARTIN A. KNAPP, of New York, Chairman.

Hon. JUDSON C. CLEMENTS, of Georgia.

Hon. JAMES D. YEOMANS, of Iowa.

Hon. CHARLES A. PROUTY, of Vermont.

Hon. JOSEPH W. FIFER, of Illinois.

EDWARD A. MOSELEY, Secretary.

#### ACCIDENT BULLETIN No. 6.

# RAILROAD ACCIDENTS IN THE UNITED STATES

DURING THE

#### THREE MONTHS ENDING DECEMBER 31, 1902.

The number of persons killed in train accidents during the months of September, October, and December, 1902, as shown in reports made by the railroad companies to the Interstate Commerce Commission, under the "accident law" of March 3, 1901, was 266, and of injured 2.788. Accidents of other kinds, including those sustained by employees while at work, and by passengers in getting on or off the cars, etc., bring the total number of casualties up to 12,811 (938 killed and 11.873 injured). These accidents are classified in the following table. These reports deal only with (a) passengers, and (b) employees on duty:

Table No. 1.—Summary of casualties to persons, October, November, and December, 1902.

		assen- gers.	Trai	Trainmen.		Other persons employed on or around trains.		vitch ders, ssing ders, and itch- ien.	Other employees.		Total em- ployees.	
	Killed.	Injured.	Killed.	Injured.	Killed.	Injured.	Killed.	Injured.	Killed.	Injured.	Killed.	Injured.
Collisions Derailments Miscellaneous train accidents (excluding the above), in-	38 2	840 240	119 56	880 317	6 2	79 41	2	15 11	11 8	77 36	138 67	1,051 405
cluding locomotive boiler explosions	• • • •	17	20	220		1		2	1	12	21	235
Total train accidents	40	1,097	195	1,417	8	121	3	28	20	125	226	1,691
Coupling or uncoupling cars While doing other work about trains or while attending	••••		55	611	2	6	5	87	1	9	63	713
switches	••••	J	32	1,265	4	55	7	59	2	175	45	1,554
side of track, etc	1	5	18	243		2	2	18	1	5	21	268
while getting on or off Other causes	34 9	371 301	152 92	1,858 1,129	6 7	31 81	5 35	119 96	26 176	135 2, 424	189 310	2, 148 3, 730
Total (other than train accidents)	44	677	349	5, 106	19	175	54	379	206	2, 748	628	8, 408
Total, all classes	84	1,774	544	6,523	27	296	57	407	226	2, 873	854	10, 099

NOTE.—Accidents to employees resulting in slight injuries which do not prevent the employee injured from performing his accustomed service for more than three days, in the aggregate, during the ten days immediately following the accident, are not reported. The items in the column headed "Switch tenders, crossing tenders, and watchmen," include switch tenders (not acting as brakemen), lever men, and lamp men; track, bridge, and crossing watchmen, and policemen.

It again becomes necessary to record very large numbers in this table, as was the case with Bulletin No. 5; and a comparison of this quarter with the same quarter of last year (Bulletin 6 with Bulletin 2) shows large increases in most items, except passengers and employees killed in train accidents. The only accident in this bulletin that is prominent by reason of a large number of fatal casualties is the rear collision of passenger trains recorded in the fourteenth item (No. 50) of the table of causes which appears below. In this collision 27 passengers were killed. It occurred on a straight line, quite level, on a clear night.

The engineman did not obey the red lights. The leading train was at a standstill short of the station; the engineman approaching sounded the whistle, indicating that he saw the red hand lantern swung by the brakeman, but he did not slacken speed; he evidently assumed that the train ahead was moving or was standing at or beyond the station. The engineman is reported as one of twenty-one years' experience, with a record which was good up to this time. This disaster affords an unusually striking illustration of one important difference between the time-interval and the space-interval principles of regulating trains. The report indicates that the engineman's terrible act was due to error as to just where the danger light was; a chief merit of the space-interval or block system is that the danger light is always in the same known location.

The total number of collisions and derailments was 2,759 (1,680 collisions and 1,079 derailments), of which 282 collisions and 99 derailments affected passenger trains. The damage to cars, engines, and roadway by these accidents amounted to \$2,462,056, namely: October, \$834,258; November, \$732,781; December, \$895,017. Given more in detail, these facts appear as below:

TABLE No. 2.—Collisions and derailments.

	Number.	Loss.	Persons killed.	Persons injured.
Collisions, rear	511	<b>\$4</b> 81,013	69	645
Collisions, butting	265	546, 731	64	<b>6</b> 69
Collisions, trains separating	791	370, 147	25	363
Collisions, miscellaneous	113	126, 557	18	215
Total collisions	1,680	1, 524, 448	176	1,891
Derailments due to defects of roadway, etc	220	165, 698	9	170
Derailments due to defects of equipment	434	351,710	7	109
Derailments due to negligence of trainmen, signalmen, etc.	81	61,516	7	104
Derailments due to unforeseen obstruction, etc	58	75, 353	12	65
Derailments due to malicious obstruction of track, etc	15	22, 490	2	17
Derailments due to other causes	271	260, 841	32	180
Total derailments	1,079	937, 608	69	645
Total collisions and derailments	2,759	2,462,056	245	2,536

The table of prominent train accidents given below in this bulletin is made on very nearly the same basis that was adopted in Bulletin

No. 5, namely: To include (a) all cases in which the damage is reported at \$10,000 or over; (b) notable cases in which passengers are killed, and (c) cases doing damage less than \$10,000, and down to \$2,000, wherever the circumstances or the cause may be of particular interest. The number in the \$10,000 class—17—is the same as in Bulletin No. 5. The facts themselves, as shown in the table, in the column headed "cause," afford, in most cases, a sufficiently instructive comment on these collisions.

The most disastrous one (No. 50) has already been referred to. Four of these accidents were due wholly or chiefly to an engineman's falling asleep, and in three others the men at fault had been on duty very long hours. In three cases (Items 3, 10, and 13) there was a lack of experience. Items 5, 6, 22, and 25 indicate very defective discipline or training. Item 31 seems to indicate a moral deficiency.

#### Causes of thirty-four prominent train accidents.

[Note.—R. stands for rear collision; B., butting collision; M., miscellaneous; D., derailment; P., passenger train; F., freight and miscellaneous trains.]

tem.	Record No.	Class.	Kind of train.	Killed.	Injured.	Damage to engrines, cars, and road-way.	Cause.
1	15	R.	F. and F	2	0	<b>\$</b> 994	Local freight standing at station; 12 hours late; no flag out; weather foggy; men on duty 25 hours 30
2	67	D.	F	0	1	319	minutes.  Derailing switch; engineman asleep; he had been off duty 14 hours, but had attended a funeral instead of taking rest.
3	2	R.	P. and F	0	3	2, 166	Flagman failed to go back far enough; a man of 7 months' experience, but only 2 weeks' experience on this division.
5	66 10	D. B.	F. and F	1 2	0 5	2, 240 8, 000	Derailing switch: engineman asleep; he was killed. Engineman saw a "dead" engine on side track and by mistake took it for the head of a train which he was to meet.
6	24	M.	F. and F	0	0	3, 900	Crossing collision; engineman "lost his bearings;"
7	32	R.	P. and F	2	8	4,000	on duty 17 hours.  Train switching on main track during dense fog; flagging neglected; conductor and engineman on
8	57	В.	F. and F	0	1	4,050	duty 23 hours. Engineman fell asleep; on duty 8 hours succeeding 12 hours' rest. Fireman (14 months' experience) also at fault.
9	11	M.	P. and F	2	17	4,372	Crossing collision: no fixed signals: trainman (experienced) neglected to flag. The killed were passengers.
10	3	R.	P. and F	2	2	5, 175	Flagman went back, but failed to signal the oncoming train; seems to have thought his train had gone on to the other main track; a man of 3
11	44	D.	P	0	14	5, 224	Broken rail; internal flaw; speed of train, 70 miles an hour: weight of engine, 93 tons; rails, 80 pounds per yard nearly new.
12	38	В.	F. and F	 	1	1	Telegraph wire broken; dispatcher sent order by roundabout telephone line, but neglected to issue duplicate order on his own side of the break; a
13	55	B.	F. and F	1	1	6,700	a good record on other roads.  Operator failed to deliver order, and failed to notify dispatcher; conductor and engineman failed to get clearance card; dispatcher failed to note lack of signature to order. Operator's experience 3 years, but in this place only 3 days, dispatcher, 6 months experience at this point; several years elsewhere.  Engineman did not heed red lights. (See p. 4.)
14	50	R.	P. and P	27	15	6,889	elsewhere. Engineman did not heed red lights. (See p. 4.)

# Causes of thirty-four prominent train accidents—Continued.

Item.	Record No.	Class.	Kind of train.	Killed.	Damage to engines, cars, and road-way.	Cause.
15	37	В.	P. and F	1	7,000	Occurred at 5 o'clock, foggy morning; brakeman with red light failed to stop passenger train; had no torpedoes; did not think to throw lantern into cab. Conductor and eugineman held responsible
16	1	R.	P. and P	1 2	9,000	for not having provided torpedoes.  Engineman disregarded distant signal indicating "caution;" man of good record and experience;
17	36	В.	P. and F	0   1	9,980	weather clear; signal equipment complete.  Operator failed to deliver meeting order; cleared signal (ignoring presence of order) only 21 minutes after he had received it.
18	52	R.	F. and F	0	0   10,000	
19	48	D.	P	1	7 10,600	Switch misplaced: left so by section foreman; experienced and with a good record.
20	51	R.	F. and F	0	0 10,800	Runaway train on steep grade; conductor and 3 trainmen neglected to promptly use hand brakes; 40 cars in train; air brakes in use on 25.
21	6	R.	F. and F	1	0 11,350	Train passed automatic block signal indicating "stop." Engineman was asleep and fireman neglected to observe signals. Engineman and fireman of the second of 2 engines drawing the train failed to detect the error, though rule required leading engineman to sound the whistle at each block signal.
22	40	<b>B.</b>	F.and F	0	5   12,400	
23	69	D.	P	1	8 12,430	
24	72	D.	F	1	2 12,500	
25	58	В.	F.and F	1	5   12,600	11.40 p. m.; engineman lost his location; experience 15 years, but in service on this division only 44 months.
<b>2</b> 6	56	В.	F. and F	7	0 13,838	Conductor and engineman of northbound train over- looked orders.
27 28	19 25	В. М.	F. and F F. and F	2	2 13, 962 2 15, 957	Conductor and engineman forgot orders. Runaway cars: brakeman (in yard) failed to set brakes.
29	30	D.	F	0	0 ; 17,000	Open draw; draw properly signaled; engineman of 17 years' experience, on duty 4 hours.
<b>3</b> 0	22	М.	P. and F	2	2 17,800	Freight train broke in two; rear portion collided with front portion; passenger train on adjacent main track ran into wreck.
31	9	В.	P. and P	1 2	20,651	
32	7	В.	P. and P	2 2	25, 800	Conductor and engineman started on a run of several miles to reach a meeting station without allowing a reasonable and sufficient time. Both men re-
<b>3</b> 3	21	M.	P. and F	1	5 30,000	ported as experienced and with good records.  Collision of a train with a string of 7 freight cars which had run down from a side track. Brakes on these cars had been loosened "by some unknown miscreant."
34	71	D.		2		Passenger train derailed by accidental obstruction; wreck took fire and combustible portions were consumed. The obstruction was a platform car, which, standing on a side track, had been violently jammed by a freight train backing into the siding, and was crushed and pushed afoul of the main track.
	<u> </u>		Total	04  2	17 361,612	

It is well recognized that the block-system or space-interval method of regulating the movement of railroad trains, the method that is required by law throughout Great Britain and Ireland, is a safer method than the time interval; and the fact has been touched upon in the annual reports of the Commission as well as in these bulletins. The records of the causes of rear collisions, which have been published, tend strongly to confirm this. At the same time it is everywhere understood that the block system itself depends on adequate care and discipline, and that defects in administration or inspection, or in apparatus, or negligence of enginemen or signalmen, sometimes lead to collisions where the block system is used. The fact that two or more serious collisions in the quarter under review occurred through failures of this kind emphasizes this matter, and a list has therefore been made of all the collisions occurring in this quarter which fall within this class. The list follows:

Rear collisions on railroads where the block system is in use.

Item.	Class.a	('ause.
8.	1	Engineman ran past home and distant automatic signal standing against him. Weather clear. Engineman's record good.
b	2	Tower man "claimed" had authority from the station in rear to give clear block.
	3	Engineman and fireman failed to see signal.
ď	, 3	Do.
e	$\tilde{2}$	Ran past "red block."
c d e f g h	3	Operator gave fulse clear signal; 2 employees killed.
g	3	Operator gave false clear signal; experience 10 months.
ĥ	3	Engineman of switching freight disregarded automatic block signal (on 6-track line).  Trains on three tracks were damaged.
1	<b>3</b>	Signal man wrongfully gave clear block signal.
j	, <b>3</b>	Automatic signal against the train; engineman failed to proceed cautiously.
k	3	Operator wrongfully gave clear signal.
1	1	Operator wrongfully cleared block signal; experience 11 months.
m	1	Automatic block signal—designed to turn from clear to "danger" immediately before engine reaches it. In this case there was a blinding snow storm and the engineman assumed that the signal light (6.15 p. m.) showing red, was turned to red by his engine, but he did not see it move, and it was in fact motionless, having been set at "danger" by the preceding train. An error of judgment as to brake power, after he saw the tail lights of the preceding train, also contributed to the accident.
n	1	Occurred 11 p. m.: fast passenger train; 12 persons injured. Engineman disregarded automatic block signal; appears to have governed himself by the indication of another block signal, adjacent, not pertaining to the track on which he was running.
0	2	Incomplete report.
P	3	Engineman ran past automatic block signal indicating "stop." He had worked long and irregular hours, viz: On duty 84 hours, off 14 hours, on 14, off 44, on 94, off 44, on 3 hours (at time of accident).

a Class 1 includes cases where both trains are passenger trains; Class 2, a freight train and s. passenger train; Class 3, both freight.

This list includes only those cases where the absolute block system was in use, or where it appears to have been the intention to have it in use. In addition to these, the reports show a number of collisions due to a lack of care in regulating the speed where a permissive block signal had been given. The train had entered a block section under a signal indicating that the section was occupied by a preceding train, and that, according to the rule, the speed should be regulated so as to avoid running into the train ahead.

There are also numerous collisions where the report makes no mention of the block system, but which occurred on lines of railroad that are supposed to be worked under the block system; many or all of these are, no doubt, due chiefly to failure to obey the permissive rule, requiring speed to be kept strictly within control.

A third class of collisions, of which instances frequently occur, includes cases in, or at the approach to, a yard. Roads which ostensibly use the block system are found frequently, and perhaps usually, to report these collisions in precisely the same manner as they are reported by roads which do not use the block system. This appears to indicate that the block system proper is used in connection with, or is modified by, a rule requiring trains to be brought under control on the approach to a yard (usually to all yards or stations on a division); and the engineman is to do this without being warned by a block signal or by any fixed signal.

It is matter for deep regret that again the number of coupling accidents reported is large as compared with the number for the preceding quarter, and very large as compared with the corresponding quarter of 1901. It is quite possible that the reports made by the railroad companies for the first few months of the operation of the accident-report law were incomplete. In the matter of collisions, and to some extent as regards other accidents, it was found that some roads had deliberately omitted from their reports certain accidents which, when their attention was called to the fact, they said they understood could be rightfully omitted, because the train affected was engaged in traffic wholly intrastate. It was claimed that such traffic was not subject to a Federal law. Care was taken to correct this erroneous view, and the accidents in question were included in supplemental reports.

It is probable, however, that many such cases were never discovered. A company which has omitted collisions and subsequently corrects its practice in this respect will, presumably, correct its practice in regard to reporting coupling accidents, though at the same time it may not go back and revise its reports of those classes of accidents concerning which the Commission has made no complaint.

The amendment to the safety-appliance law, which was passed at the last session of Congress, will correct erroneous views held by many railroad officers as to what trains and train operations are and what are not subject to a Federal regulating statute. This law (see page 11) deals only with couplers and air brakes, but the principle laid down—that a Federal law regulating interstate commerce affects all of the train and car movements on a railroad line over which interstate shipments are carried or interstate passengers travel—is of wider application; particularly when the purpose of Congress is to obtain information.

The increase in the number of coupling accidents is undoubtedly to be accounted for largely and perhaps chiefly by the enormous increase in freight traffic and the consequent necessity of employing additional men. This fact was mentioned in the last bulletin. New men ought to be at first employed at such places and in such departments of the work as are the least dangerous to those who are inexperienced; but, in the stress of work occasioned by the congestion of coal traffic and by blockades at many places this rule has evidently been ignored. This tends to increase the number of casualties. The increase in freight traffic, putting unusual burdens on all departments of train and yard work, including the department of car inspection, also results, no doubt, in a less efficient condition of cars. Couplers and other parts are not so well cared for and maintained.

It is also to be noted that the swelling of the accident records by reason of the inexperience of new men may, and probably does, go on after the increase in the volume of traffic has reached its climax; for the enlargement of the number of train crews, yard crews, etc., has usually been inadequate at best. It has been observed that certain companies have engaged new men as fast as practicable, and in every way have striven to provide forces adequate to perform the work; but that these efforts were only partly successful, as is evident from the constant pressure on all the trainmen, old and new, to work as many hours daily as possible. It has therefore been necessary to continue adding new men after the capacity of the railroad and of its stock of locomotives and cars has been fully taxed and the increase in tonnage therefore stopped.

It will be observed that other accidents to trainmen have also increased largely, so that there is no ground (other than the lack of perfect maintenance due to congested traffic before referred to) for assuming that the coupling accident record indicates any increase in the risks or dangers of coupling work, or any change for the worse in the condition or quality of couplers.

The law just passed by Congress (March 2, 1903) facilitating in a marked degree the enforcement of the safety-appliance act, and putting engines, cabooses, and cars—all vehicles in ordinary railroad traffic—on a uniform basis as regards this act, will, it is confidently believed, produce a decided improvement in conditions.

Table No. 3, next following, is given in its usual form, but is supplemented by Table 3a, which describes more in detail the causes of casualties due to defective uncoupling mechanism.

578 A-03---2

Table No. 3.—Details of Table 1—Causes of accidents to employees in coupling and uncoupling cars.

Sub-	•	Cond	luctors.	Braker	men, etc.	Other e	mployees.
class.	Causes.	Killed.	Injured.	Killed.	Injured.	Killed.	Injured.
1	Sticking of parts (bent pins, etc.) pre-						
_	venting quick work	`. <b></b>	l <b></b> .	2	23		• • • • • • • • • •
2	Holding up pin by hand (presumably		(				
!	made necessary by defective un-			•	<b>E</b> 0		
٠ م	coupling mechanism)			1	56	• • • • • • •	
3	coupling mechanism) Other causes, apparently due to defective uncoupling mechanism		! !		11		
4	Defective draft gear (with automatic				11		
*	Counter)		Į		8		
5	coupler)Coupling to an engine or tender				81		
6	Same (with link-and-pin coupler)	, • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •			2		
7	Coupling on inside of sharp curve		3	3	29		
. 8	Foot caught in or between couplers		_				
	while adjusting coupler	!			28		
9	Slipped, usually on ice or snow		1	3	25		
10	Slipped, usually on ice or snow	1		١			
	switch. Caught by overhanging load (on platform car).	• • • • • • • •		6	6		
11	Caught by overhanging load (on plat-		•				
	iorm car)	'	• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •	3	4		
12	LOAG BUILLEG		1		3	•••••	
13	Engaged in operations preliminary to	· 1	<u>.</u> .	10	86	<b>i</b> ' i	•
14	Coupling	1	. 1	10	6	1	
15	Link-and-pin coupler	• • • • • • • •	•	î	45	•	
16	Link and pin, with automatic		1	, <u> </u>	14		
17	Coupling damaged cars (presumably		-			}	
	an unavoidable risk)	1		<b>. 4</b>	16		
18	Uncoupling without using lever (pre- sumably by reason of defective un-	,	1				
	sumably by reason of defective un-	;	i				
,	coupling mechanism)	! • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •	1	2			
19	coupling mechanism)		j	1			
20	Miscellaneous Not clearly explained		2	1 12	184	• • • • • • •	5
21	Not clearly explained	,	3	13	57		1
	Total	1	13	61	691	1	
-	10ut		. 10	)	091		•
		•	l .	1			•

The total number of accidents recorded in the above table is 776 (63 killed and 713 injured). Table 3a below discloses the causes of 36 per cent of these casualties. The first seven items in Table 3a embrace obvious defects in the apparatus.

Table 3a.—Details of items 2, 3, 7, 18, 19 and 20 of Table 3.—Accidents occurring while using uncoupling mechanisms.

		Cond	uctors.	Trai	nmen.	Other e	mployees.	To	otal.
	Cause.	Killed.	Injured.	Killed.	Injured.	Killed.	Injured.	Killed.	Injured.
1	Lifting locking pin or	•		•					
	block with hand				_	• • • • • • •	)		63
2	Lift chain missing	·	• • • • • • • • •		1	1	, ,		1
3	Lift lever missing		• • • • • • • • •		3				3
4	Broken lever	} <i></i>		<u>-</u> -	11				11
5	Broken chain		• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •	] 3	28		1	3	29
6	Defective lever		• • • • • • • • •	1	27	• • • • • • •		1 1	27
7	Defective or discon- nected chain	1			~~		1		•
	nected chain		• • • • • • • • •	1	22	• • • • • • •		, ,	22
8	Caught between car	l '	•	İ	70			l 1	61
i	and lever		1	,	(00)		·		01
9	Caught between next				75		•	!!	36
	car and lever		• • • • • • • • •				1		00 E
10	Lever on wrong side	¦;	• • • • • • • • •	1	Ð E	• • • • • • • •	, <b></b>	1 1	€) E
11	Struck by lever	`'	• • • • • • • • •	¦			· • • • • • • • • •		1
12	Caught finger in chain.	•••••	• • • • • • • • •		1		,	• • • • • • • •	1
13	Running alongside	'							
	moving cars while	i							
	switching; and hold-	l I		•	6	1	ı	•	0
	ing up lever	• • • • • • • •	ł	1	8	• • • • • • • •	• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •	\	9
	Total		2	7	263		3	7	273

TABLE No. 4.—Details of Table 1.—Causes of accidents to employees classified as falling from and getting on or off cars and engines.

			duct- rs.		ake- ., etc.		rine- en.	Fire	men.		er em- yees.
Sub- class.	· Causes.	Killed.	Injured.	Killed.	Injured.	Killed.	Injured.	Killed.	Injured.	Killed.	Injured.
1 2 3 4	Fell from roof of box car by reason of— Defect in car Ice or snow. Parting of train Derailment, collision, or shock due to abnormal movements of cars			2 2	5 26 23				2		i
C6 5	other than those in subclass 3 While setting brakes Fell from—		7 8	6 11	128 111		2		1	2	6
6 7 8 9	Coal car Freight car other than box or coal car. Engine or tender Passenger car Engines, tenders, or cars (all kinds)	1	8 1	1 12 1	8 4 90 1	i	11	8	54		4 2 2
11 12 13 14 15	not in motion  Miscellaneous causes  Not clearly explained  Slipped getting on moving trains or cars.  Jumping off moving trains.  Jumping from engines or cars anticipating collision, derailment, or other ac-	2 4	5 4 26 39	18 56 10 4	84 224 67 154 298	1	12 1 1	1	52 1	8 4 6 5	11 30 4 24 32
C7	Fell from engines or cars by reason of	 	8	2	29 73	 	9		13 2		••••
17 18	defective handholds and sill steps Getting on or off moving engine Caught in frog, guard rail, or switch	2	25	15	269 2		45	2	66	6	14
	Total	9	145	140	1,596	2	81	12	191	26	130

#### AMENDMENT TO SAFETY APPLIANCE LAW.

AN ACT to amend an act entitled "An act to promote the safety of employees and travelers upon railroads by compelling common carriers engaged in interstate commerce to equip their cars with automatic couplers and continuous brakes and their locomotives with driving-wheel brakes, and for other purposes," approved March second, eighteen hundred and ninety-three, and amended April first, eighteen hundred and ninety-six.

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That the provisions and requirements of the act entitled "An act to promote the safety of employees and travelers upon railroads by compelling common carriers engaged in interstate commerce to equip their cars with automatic couplers and continuous brakes, and their locomotives with driving-wheel brakes, and for other purposes," approved March second, eighteen hundred and ninety-three, and amended April first, eighteen hundred and ninety-six, shall be held to apply to common carriers by railroads in the Territories and the District of Columbia and shall apply in all cases, whether or not the couplers brought together are of the same kind, make, or type; and the provisions and requirements hereof and of said acts relating to train brakes, automatic couplers, grab irons, and the height of drawbars shall be held to apply to all trains, locomotives, tenders, cars, and similar vehicles used on any railroad engaged in interstate commerce, and in the Territories and the District of Columbia, and to all other locomotives, tenders, cars, and similar vehicles used in connection therewith, excepting those trains, cars, and locomotives exempted by the provisions of section six of said act of March second, eighteen hundred and ninety-three, as amended by the act of April first, eighteen hundred and ninety-six, or which are used upon street railways.

SEC. 2. That whenever, as provided in said act, any train is operated with power or train brakes, not less than fifty per centum of the cars in such train shall have their brakes used and operated by the engineer of the locomotive drawing such train; and all power-braked cars in such train which are associated together with said fifty per centum shall have their brakes so used and operated; and, to more fully carry into effect the objects of said act, the Interstate Commerce Commission may, from time to time, after full hearing, increase the minimum percentage of cars in any train required to be operated with power or train brakes which must have their brakes used and operated as aforesaid; and failure to comply with any such requirement of

the said Interstate Commerce Commission shall be subject to the like penalty as

failure to comply with any requirement of this section.

SEC. 3. That the provisions of this act shall not take effect until September first, nineteen hundred and three. Nothing in this act shall be held or construed to relieve any common carrier, the Interstate Commerce Commission, or any United States district attorney from any of the provisions, powers, duties, liabilities, or requirements of said act of March second, eighteen hundred and ninety-three, as amended by the act of April first, eighteen hundred and ninety-six; and all of the provisions, powers, duties, requirements, and liabilities of said act of March second, eighteen hundred and ninety-three, as amended by the act of April first, eighteen hundred and ninety-six, shall, except as specifically amended by this act, apply to this act.

Public, No. 133, approved, March 2, 1903.

#### [Public—No. 171.]

AN ACT requiring common carriers engaged in interstate commerce to make full reports of all accidents to the Interstate Commerce Commission.

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, It shall be the duty of the general manager, superintendent, or other proper officer of every common carrier engaged in interstate commerce by railroad to make to the Interstate Commerce Commission, at its office in Washington, District of Columbia, a monthly report, under oath, of all collisions of trains or where any train or part of a train accidentally leaves the track, and of all accidents which may occur to its passengers or employees while in the service of such common carrier and actually on duty, which report shall state the nature and causes thereof, and the circumstances connected therewith.

SEC. 2. That any common carrier failing to make such report within thirty days after the end of any month shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor and, upon conviction thereof by a court of competent jurisdiction, shall be punished by a fine of not more than one hundred dollars for each and every offense and for every day during which it shall fail to make such report after the time herein specified for

making the same.

SEC. 3. That neither said report nor any part thereof shall be admitted as evidence or used for any purpose against such railroad so making such report in any suit or

action for damages growing out of any matter mentioned in said report.

SEC. 4. That the Interstate Commerce Commission is authorized to prescribe for such common carriers a method and form for making the reports in the foregoing section provided.

Approved, March 3, 1901.

#### SPECIAL INFORMATION CONTAINED IN PRECEDING BULLETINS.

Each accident bulletin contains tables showing the number of passengers, trainmen, and other persons killed and injured, and these figures are classified according to cause (see Table No. 1); also tables showing cost of the different classes of train accidents. The causes of accidents to employees in coupling and uncoupling and in falling from cars, etc., are further classified in Tables No. 3 and No. 4. Each bulletin is for three months, and No. 1 was for the quarter ending September 30, 1901. The bulletin for the quarter ending June 80 contains, in addition to the quarterly statistics, tables showing the same information for the whole of the fiscal year ending on that date.

Bulletin No. 1 contains brief notes on the most serious collisions in that quarter, 57 passengers having been killed. There are notes on the causes of coupler accidents, explanatory of Table No. 3. Table No. 4 is supplemented by similar notes. In this quarter special mention was made of 130 casualties (4 killed, 126 injured) due to operating trains in which air brakes were used on only a portion of the cars; and the danger of running trains partially air-braked is commented on.

Bulletin No. 2 contains a detailed list showing the cost and causes of the 27 most serious butting collisions in that quarter. In these collisions 70 persons were killed and 234 were injured, and the damage to cars, engines, and roadway amounted to \$306,511. The incompleteness of the statements of causes, as sent in by the railroads, is commented on.

Bulletin No. 3 contains a list similar to that just mentioned, but showing rear instead of butting collisions. As in the first list, only the most serious accidents are considered; and of these there were 41, costing \$160,247. The number of persons killed was 43, and of injured 255.

Bulletin No. 4 contains a third list of collisions, this one including all classes; but it includes only a few in which the damage was less than \$5,000. The totals of this list are, killed 30, injured 187, cost \$228,597. Collisions occurring where the trainmen had worked very long hours are commented on. In this bulletin a table is given showing the deaths and injuries due to trains parting. The aggregate of damage shown in this table is \$492,781; persons killed 14, injured 386. The table shows that nearly all of the coupler failures which resulted in a collision or derailment were reported as due to "cause unknown."

Bulletin No. 5 contains a table of the most serious train accidents in the quarter. Derailments as well as collisions are included, but cases causing damages of less than \$10,000 each are not included, except where the cause of the accident calls for notice. The 23 accidents shown in this table killed 81 persons and injured 356, and the aggregate damage reported was, for the 23 cases, \$308,395. The causes of a few of the accidents are set forth in some detail. A table is given in this bulletin showing the cause (as reported) of each coupling accident in the quarter. The table fills 12 pages.

Bulletin No. 6 contains a list of the 34 most serious accidents in the quarter, with notes on the cause of each. One of these was a rear collision, killing 27 passengers. There is also a table giving notes on the causes of the 16 rear collisions which occurred in this quarter on railroads where the block system is in use. Comment is made on the large increase in the number of accidents to men in coupling, as compared with previous quarters; this is accompanied by a reprint of the amendment to the Safety Appliance law which was passed in March, 1903.

1

# ACCIDENT BULLETIN,

No. 7,

SHOWING

# COLLISIONS AND DERAILMENTS OF TRAINS

AND

## CASUALTIES TO PERSONS

DURING

JANUARY, FEBRUARY, AND MARCH, 1903.

INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMMISSION, WASHINGTON, D. C.

WASHINGTON:
GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE.
1903.

### THE INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMMISSION.

Hon. MARTIN A. KNAPP, of New York, Chairman.

Hon. JUDSON C. CLEMENTS, of Georgia.

Hon. JAMES D. YEOMANS, of Iowa.

Hon. CHARLES A. PROUTY, of Vermont.

Hon. JOSEPH W. FIFER, of Illinois.

EDWARD A. MOSELEY, Secretary.

(2)

12-102

#### ACCIDENT BULLETIN No. 7.

### RAILROAD ACCIDENTS IN THE UNITED STATES

DURING THE

### THREE MONTHS ENDING MARCH 31, 1903.

The number of persons killed in train accidents during the months of January, February, and March, 1903, as shown in reports made by the railroad companies to the Interstate Commerce Commission, under the "accident law" of March 3, 1901, was 300, and of injured 2,834. Accidents of other kinds, including those sustained by employees while at work, and by passengers in getting on or off the cars, etc., bring the total number of casualties up to \$27 killed, and 11,481 injured. These accidents are classified in the following table. These reports deal only with (a) passengers and (b) employees on duty.

TABLE No. 1.—Summary of casualties to persons—January, February, and March, 1903.

	Pass	engers.	Trai	nmen.	perso ploye are	her ns em- d on or ound ins.	ers, ci tende	h tend- rossing rs, and hmen.		her oyees.		otal oyees.
	Killed.	Injured.	Killed.	Injured.	Killed.	Injured.	Killed.	Injured.	Killed.	Injured.	Killed.	Injured.
Collisions Derailments Miscellaneous train accidents (excluding the above), including loco-	<b>46</b> 6	763 325	131 60	964 358	10 6	80 67	3	11 7	21 3	74 25	165 69	1, 029 457
motive boiler explosions		13	13	242		8	1	3		9	14	257
Total train accidents	52	1,091	204	1,464	16	15C	4	21	21	108	248	1,743
Coupling or uncoupling care. While doing other work about trains, or while attending switches			64 22	656	2	9 57	9	62 67	5	8 164	76 35	735 1,534
overhead bridges, struc- tures at side of track, etc Falling from cars or engines,	1	1	22	235		4	1	12	2	7	25	258
or while getting on or off Other causes	33 8	297 220	121 102	1,826 1,203	6 9	36 76	15 30	100 92	13 153	161 2, 108	155 294	2, 123 3, 479
Total (other train accidents)	42	518	331	5, 166	18	182	61	333	175	2, 448	585	8, 129
Total, all classes	94	1,609	535	6, 630	34	332	65	354	199	2,556	833	9,872

Note.—Accidents to employees resulting in slight injuries which do not prevent the employee injured from performing his accustomed service for more than three days, in the aggregate, during the ten days immediately following the accident, are not reported. The items in the column headed "Switch tenders, crossing tenders, and watchmen," include switch tenders (not acting as brakemen), lever men, and lamp men; track, bridge, and crossing watchmen, and policemen.

The increase in numbers in all of the principal items of the record, which accompanies the enormous increase in railroad traffic throughout nearly all parts of the country, and which characterized the last Bulletin, appears again in this one. The more prominent accidents are again shown in a list by themselves (page 7).\* Of the accidents shown in this list, three were particularly disastrous: Items 5, 15, and 34 (numbers 9, 1, and 16). In these three collisions 43 persons were killed and 129 injured. Item 5 (12 employees killed) represents a cause which is very common, but the case has two obvious peculiarities which should be mentioned. First, the large company of laborers was carried in what is perhaps the most dangerous part of the train, instead of in a car at the rear end of the train, as is quite generally customary. Second, the use of flags, torpedoes, and fusees was depended upon to protect a train from rear collision at a time when, in consequence of the presence of deep snow on the ground, the use of the block system was demanded by considerations of more than ordinary gravity. Deep snow makes difficult walking for the flagman, and often interferes with the effectiveness of torpedoes; and if snow is blown about by the wind or disturbed by the moving train the engineman may have his view of the flagman's flag or lantern obstructed.

Item 15 represents one of the most remarkable collisions that has ever occurred in this country. The visual signals (automatic semaphore block signals), with which the road is equipped for the prevention of collisions, were in this case concededly adequate and in good working order, but the engineman appears to have been oblivious to all signals for a period of two, three, or more minutes; and as the train was running very fast, this length of time sufficed for him to pass three or four warning red lights, and therefore to collide with the passenger train in advance, causing a terrible wreck. The engineman was fatally injured, dying within a few hours; so that there is no explanation of his lamentable neglect, except an unconfirmed newspaper statement that before he died he said that his attention had been drawn away from the signals by some trouble with an injector. To attend to an injector, or to anything, to the neglect of the signals is, of course, under such circumstances, the grossest negligence. The condition of the engine

<sup>\*</sup>The list of these accidents will be designated as "Class A," and to insure a measure of uniformity in the records, the rule of classification which has been followed in Bulletins 5 and 6 will be made permanent. The accidents to be included in "Class A" are (1) all cases in which the damage is reported at \$10,000 or over; (2) notable cases in which passengers are killed, and (8) cases doing damage less than \$10,000, and down to \$2,000, wherever the circumstances or the cause may be of particular interest.

after the collision tends to indicate that the engineman neither shut off steam nor applied the brakes. This man appears to have been in good mental and physical health, so far as could be known. He had had ample experience, and his record is reported as good. The fireman is not held by the superintendent to be chargeable with any responsibility in the case; his duty, it is said, was at his fire.

Item 34 represents a notable disaster, in which the horrors of a butting collision between two passenger trains in the dead of night, both trains moving at high speed, were intensified by fire. The pecuniary loss is greater than it would have been but for the fire. The report of this collision gives a statement of the cause, from which the following paragraph is made up:

Two passenger trains, bound east and west, respectively, collided near C. From A east the stations are as follows: A, B, C, D, etc. The east-bound train was given orders at A to meet the west-bound train at C. This order for the west-bound train was placed at D (being No. 6), together with another order (No. 7) concerning a freight train to be passed at B. The operator at D, hearing the west-bound train approaching, and knowing what conductor was in charge of it, transmitted to the dispatcher this conductor's signature to both these orders, and obtained his approval ("complete") of said orders before the train had stopped at his station. After doing this he claims to have placed both orders—one on top of the other—on his counter, where the conductor could sign and take them. He then went out to the train to dispatch and receive the United States mail. This action was in violation of the regulations, which require an operator to obtain the signature of the conductor to an order before transmitting the signature to the train dispatcher to secure the dispatcher's "complete." The delivery of the order is required to be made by the operator in person, to whom the conductor must read the order for comparison with the copy retained by the operator. Immediately on stopping at D, the conductor of the west-bound train went to the office, signed and took one of the orders (No. 7)—that in regard to passing the freight train—but claims to have seen nothing of the other order (No. 6). He left the office before the operator returned, delivered to the engineman a copy of the order which he had taken, and the train was immediately started. The rule not only requires that the conductor read his order aloud to the operator for comparison, but also prohibits conductors from tearing off orders in the absence of the operator.

The operator, as stated in the report, was new to his place, but he is said to have had a good record in his previous position. His misconduct appears to have been of a kind, however, which experience alone affords no security against. The same may be said of the act of the conductor. This man was the oldest conductor on that division of the railroad.

The total number of collisions and derailments was 2,831 (1,650 collisions and 1,181 derailments), of which 291 collisions and 125 derailments affected passenger trains. The damage to cars, engines, and roadway by these accidents amounted to \$2,491,046,

namely: January, \$894,639; February, \$723,614; March, \$872,793. Given more in detail, these facts appear as below:

TABLE	No.	2.—Collisions	and	derailments.
-------	-----	---------------	-----	--------------

•	Num- ber.	Loss.	Persons killed.	Persons injured.
Collisions:	,			
Rest	550	<b>\$</b> 544, 197	111	635
Butting	262	539, 374	56	647
Trains separating		315, 274	34	286
Miscellaneous	122	87, 668	10	214
Total	1,650	1, 486, 513	211	1,782
Derailments:	1			
Due to defects of roadway, etc	245	200,734	20	304
Due to defects of equipment		335, 221	4	85
Due to negligence of trainmen, signalmen, etc		<b>62</b> , 976	5	95
Due to unforeseen obstruction, etc		74, 329	20	<b>-</b> 78
Due to malicious obstruction of track, etc	1	54,043	9	44
Due to other causes	322	277, 230	17	176
Total	1, 181	1,004,533	75	782
Total collisions and derailments	2,831	2, 491, 046	286	2,564

In the table following ("Class A" accidents), the number of items, thirty-four, is the same as in the table for the quarter last preceding, but the losses, both of life and of property, are larger. Besides the three notable cases already mentioned, a number of others show details which are of particular interest. In Items 1, 4, 8, 12, 13, and 29, misconduct or negligence is chargeable to men lacking in experience; in Items 1 and 6, the man or men at fault had been on duty an excessive number of hours, and in Items 10, 11, 19, 20, 22, 24, 28, 29, and 30, collisions are reported in consequence of errors which in all probability could not have occurred had the block system been in use.

One of the most complicated difficulties found in running trains without the block system is illustrated in the case of the collision shown in Item 3. The report of this collision says, concerning the cause:

Train No. 3, south bound, ran into rear of train No. 203, south bound, badly damaging the engine of No. 3 and a business car on rear of train No. 203. Accident was caused by improper flagging and lack of precaution on part of the train dispatcher. Both trains were moving at the time of the collision, No. 203 running at a speed estimated at 35 to 40 miles an hour, and No. 3 at 50 miles an hour. No. 203, with nine cars, was delayed and fell back on the time of train No. 3. The latter train had five cars. Both trains are of the same class, and rules permit a delayed train, when falling back on the time of a train of the same class, to proceed on its own schedule until overtaken. No. 203 left the initial point on the district twenty-two minutes in advance of No. 8, but on account of having a heavier train and some trouble with a hot driving box on the engine, and being delayed by a freight train, No. 3 gradually gained on it. The trains passed the last open telegraph office north of the point of collision, seven minutes apart. There was a dense fog prevailing at the time and the conductor and flagman of No. 203 failed to use the necessary precaution; they neglected to drop off a fusee; neither did the dispatcher on duty notify the conductor and engineman of No. 8 that they were closing up on the train ahead.

#### Causes of thirty-four prominent train accidents (Class A).

[Nors.—B. stands for rear collision; B., butting collision; M., miscellaneous collisions; D., detailment; P., passenger train; F., freight and miscellaneous trains.]

				Damage to en- grines, cata, and road- way.	Cause.
1	86	B.	F. and F	0 \$286	journal, was not protected by flag; this train had started from the last preceding station without the conductor and without the rear brakeman; engineman who ran without conductor has 8 months' experience,
2	7 ·	E.	P. and F 7	7 1,700	flagman 7 months; all on duty 19 hours 10 minutes.  A passenger train ran into a freight; personal injuries aggravated by fire in stoves in cars. A brakeman neglected to flag passenger train, had been a train brakeman 16 months.
3	2	ž.	P, and P 0	2 2,000	Occurred at 4 a. m.; dense fog, train of 9 cars traveling at about 35 or 40 miles an hour was run into, at the rear, by train of 5 cars running 50 miles an hour; time interval at telegraph station, 6 miles back, was 7 minutes; flagman dtd not drop off fusees; dispatcher of 6 months' experience did not notify second train that it was near to the first.
•	40	R.	F, and F   2	2   2,000	On steep descending grade; train cluded control, engineman at fault was killed; his experience, 4 months; conductor's, 2 years; three brakemen's, 16 months, 15 months, and 9 months, respectively.
5	<b>9</b>	R.	F and F. 12 1	4 2,500	Foremost train was pushing a rotary snowplow; men killed were shovelers riding in freight car behind engine of second train. Snowplow train did not signal by torpedoes or fusees, and had not given suitable notice to following train
6	39	R.	F. and F 0	0 2,500	Brakeman failed to flag; bad been on duty 23 hours 35 minutes.
7	10	R.	F. and F 2	0 2,600	Occurred 3 a. m.; engineman at fault (who was killed) appears to have been asleep; the fireman also was killed.
A	4	R.	P. and F 4	3 3,095	Occurred 4 a. m; passenger train ran into two locomotives compled together; clear block signal wrongfully given. Signalman's attention being momentarily withdrawn from his signal levers, a messenger boy, without authority, cleared the signal. Signalman's age, 19 years 10 months.
<b>y</b> (	33	D.	F 2	2 4,000	Train ran away (3 miles) on 2,5 per cent grade, excessive braking caused whole train of 17 cars to ally; only 6 cars air-braked.
10	61	В,	P. and F 0	8 4,650	A freight train was placed on a side track and kept there 9 hours 15 minutes to give opportunity to crew to rest. At the end of this period they started out, after passenger train No. 1 had passed, "thinking" No. 5 also had passed, and collided with No. 5. Conductor and engineman did not confer directly, but through a brakeman, and a misunderstanding arose as to identity of the respective passenger trains.
11	\$H	R.	F and F 2	5,500	Occurred 2 s. m., dense fog; by special order the pre- scribed time interval had been lengthened from 5 min- utes to 15 minutes, but in a distance of 9 miles a freight traveling 20 to 40 miles on bour overtook another freight traveling about 10 miles an hour
12	44	B.	F. and F 0	2 5,600	North-bound train ran past the meeting point; conductor is reported as having only one year's experience in train work and only 7 months' as conductor. Engineman's
13	17	D.	P and F 0		experience, as such, reported as 8 days.  Freight train was on main track, unprotected, when passenger was due, experience of conductor, 3½ months; of engineman, 3 months.
14	I2	R.	F. and F 1 (	6, 163	Permissive block signaling; empty sugineran into detrick car standing at water station; engineman of empty en- gine looked beyond standing train and saw and acted
15	1	R.	P and P 23   8	5 7,000	on the clear eighal for the next block section.  Collision on long tangent; night, engineman, running very fast, disregarded distant and home block signals. also three red lanterns at different points. This engineman was killed. His eyesight was perfect one year before the accident. The road has no perfedical examination or test of enginement. (See mag. 4.)
16	8	M.	P. sed P S	4 7,400	ination or test of enginemen. (See page 4) Collision occurred 667 feet beyond block signal, engineman approached this signal too fast and failed to see it soon enough, the arm being obscured by snow and steam; rails were frosty.

### Causes of thirty-four prominent train accidents (Class A)—Continued.

Item.	Record No.	Class.	Kind of train.	Killed.	Injured.	Damage to engines, cars, and road-way.	Cause.
·17	29	D.	F	0	0	8, 350	Broken flange; indication of an old defect; speed 20 to 30 miles an hour; rated capacity of car 70,000 pounds; contained 77,800 pounds.
18	24	M.	F	0	0	8,682	Train broke in two; rear portion ran into the forward
19	5	R.	F. and P	0	3	9, 200	portion; 74 cars in train; 23 cars air-braked.  Light engine ran into rear of passenger train standing at station; sleeping car destroyed; had been running too fast, shortening time interval from 10 minutes to
20	47	В.	P. and F	2	2	9,510	7 minutes; approached station not under control; engineman suspended 30 days. Occurred 7 p. m.; men on passenger train failed to identify freight train standing on side track; engineman and fireman of passenger train killed; conductor, baggageman, and brakeman saw on side track engine No.
21 22	27 22	D. B.	P. and F	0 5	0	10,000 10,400	168, but say that they thought it was 169. Supposed loose guard rail. Engineman of empty engine overlooked passenger train on time-table; this man was killed.
23 24	70 15	D. B.	P. and P	0	0	10, 450 11, 718	Broken flange.  Conductor and engineman of west-bound train "over-looked" east-bound. Both men of experience with fair records.
25	46	D.	F	0	0	14,000	Broken arch bar in truck.
26	67	D.	P	0	15	14, 100	Defective switch rod; damage mostly from fire.
27	31	D.	P	2	1	14,500	Washout; drift jam in river; watchman passed along the road 3 hours before accident.
28	76	В.	P. and F	2	19	15,000	Engineman of empty engine disregarded telegraphic order; this man was killed.
29	19	В.	F. and F	<b>0</b> 	2	16, 496	Conductor and engineman east bound overlooked tele- graphic order; conductor's experience, 2 months, but with good record as brakeman.
30	18	В.	P. and F	<b>2</b>	21	17,000	Conductor and engineman of freight overlooked passeuger train; engineman was killed.
31	32	D.	P	0	6	19, 100	Occurred at 1 a. m.; switch maliciously misplaced; lamp fixed so as to indicate all right.
32	53	R.	P. and P	3	13	33, 892	Engineman failed to observe signals and to control speed.
33	41	B.	P. and F	3 4	9	37,900	Night; west-bound passenger train ran 6 miles on east-
34	16	В.	P. and P	8	30	79, 450	bound track; signalman at west end of this section had permitted freight to start eastward; appears to have given this clear signal when he set up the route through cross-over for expected passenger train. Signalman's age, 25 years; experience, 2 years.  Occurred 3 a. m.; operator failed to deliver a telegraphic order; operator's experience at this place, 2 months; elsewhere, 5 years; conductor (with good record) also
	:		Total	88	275	402, 541	disregarded rule. See page 5.

TABLE No. 3.—Causes of accidents to employees in coupling and uncoupling cars.

Sab-		Con	ductors.	Brake	men, etc.	Other e	mployees.
class.		Killed.	Injured.	Killed.	Injured.	Killed.	Injured.
1	Sticking of parts (bent pins, etc.) pre-					 	
	venting quick work			1 . 1	11		
* !	Holding up pin by hand (presumably made necessary by defective un-						
3	coupling mechanism)		2		66		
3	Other causes, apparently due to defective coupler mechanism	1	1	2	8		ļ
4	Defective draft gear (with automatic				. 4		
5	Coupling to an engine or tender				16		
6	Same (with link-and-pin coupler)	·			3		
7	Coupling on inside of sharp curve		3	1	28		
8 '	Foot caught in or between couplers while sidjusting coupler				<b>3</b> 0		
9	Slipped (usually on ice or snow)			3	81		
10	Foot caught in frog, guard rail, or						
11	switch Caught by overhanging load (on plat- form car)		1	8	7		
12	Load shifted				9		
13	Engaged in operations preliminary to		2		99	1	***************************************
14	While coupling safety chains	_		20 1	8		
15	Link-and-pin coupler				18		
	Link and nin with antomatic				9		
17	Coupling damaged cars (presumably an		•		•		
	unavoidable risk)		1	7	12		
18	Uncoupling without using lever (pre-			•			
	sumably by reason of defective un-			,	44		
19	coupling mechanism)		3 3	1 3	77		
20	Uncoupling, other causes		6	3	102 126		
21	Miscellaneous		3	19	53	1	,
-1	MANUAL PROPERTY OF THE PROPERT						· · · · · · · · · ·
	Total	4	35	70	691	2	1

Table No. 4.—Causes of accidents to employees classified (C6 and C7) as falling from and getting on or off cars and engines.

					rake- en, etc.	- 16		Fin	Firemen.		er em yees.
ab- ass.	Causes.	Killed.	Killed. Injured.		Injured.	Killed.	Injured.	Killed.	Injured.	Killed.	Injured.
 ر_	Fell from roof of box car by reason of—		•			1	1	1	· <del>-</del>	 ! ,	
1	Defect in car				-, 7			1		;	
2	Ice or snow		2	1 3	41	1	2	,			4
3	Parting of train		'	. 4	22			:\\	3		
<b>!</b> •	Derailment, collision, or shock due to		l		1	i	1	1			
1	abnormal movements of cars other		· _	••	1	ļ ,			_		_
5	than those in subclass 3 While setting brakes		7	11		 		!	4	1	1
5	While setting brakes		3	9	96			<sub>1</sub>		≀ 1 ု	
١.	Fell from—		'	_		1				!	
6	Coal car Freight car other than box or coal car Engine or tender			. 3	12			!'		·	
7	Freight car other than box or coal car		2	1		<u>'</u>		; <u>-</u> -,		<sup> </sup>	
8	Engine or tender		! 2	12	† 77	, 1	10	1	45		
9								' <sub>-</sub>		!'	
10	Engines, tenders, or cars (all kinds) not		١ _	_			•	_ 1			_
١	Engines, tenders, or cars (all kinds) not in motion	2	. 3	, 5	74		23	1 2	72	!	1
11	Miscellaneous causes		7	15	136	!		, <sup>i</sup>	1	1	2
12	Not clearly explained	2	6	34	100	`- <b></b> -'		'		<u>  1</u>	_ (
(13	Miscellaneous causes  Not clearly explained  Slipped getting on moving trains or cars  Immains of moving trains	1	18	12	154		1	jl	1	7	1:
14								!	1	1	3.
15	Jumping from engines or cars anticipating collision, derailment, or other accident		١.	1	i	ļ ì		1			
<b>₹.</b> _ ˈ	collision, derailment, or other accident		4	,	. 27	i	10		17		
]16	Fell from engines or cars by reason of de-	Į.	İ	1	[	ř		1	I	٠.	
l	iech ag mendinolog end ein erche		Z		. 21					<sup>'</sup>	1
17	Getting on or off moving engineCaught in frog, guard rail, or switch	1	18	13	303		45		62	1	3
(18	Caught in frog, guard rail, or switch	<sub> </sub>		<b>!</b> -	<b>  3</b>	,					
	Total	6	104	131	1,561	2	91	3	206	13	16

#### [PUBLIC-No. 171.]

AN ACT requiring common carriers engaged in interstate commerce to make full reports of all accidents to the Interstate Commerce Commission.

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, It shall be the duty of the general manager, superintendent, or other proper officer of every common carrier engaged in interstate commerce by railroad to make to the Interstate Commerce Commission, at its office in Washington, District of Columbia, a monthly report, under oath, of all collisions of trains or where any train or part of a train accidentally leaves the track, and of all accidents which may occur to its passengers or employees while in the service of such common carrier and actually on duty, which report shall state the nature and causes thereof, and the circumstances connected therewith.

SEC. 2. That any common carrier failing to make such report within thirty days after the end of any month shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor and, upon conviction thereof by a court of competent jurisdiction, shall be punished by a fine of not more than one hundred dollars for each and every offense and for every day during which it shall fail to make such report after the time herein specified for making the same.

Sec. 8. That neither said report nor any part thereof shall be admitted as evidence or used for any purpose against such railroad so making such report in any suit or action for damages growing out of any matter mentioned in said

report.

SEC. 4. That the Interstate Commerce Commission is authorized to prescribe for such common carriers a method and form for making the reports in the foregoing section provided.

Approved, March 8, 1901.

12-102

# ACCIDENT BULLETIN,

No. 8,

# SHOWING COLLISIONS AND DERAILMENTS OF TRAINS

AND

# CASUALTIES TO PERSONS

DURING


APRIL, MAY, AND JUNE, 1903,

WITH

TABLES FOR THE YEAR ENDING JUNE 30, 1903.

WASHINGTON, D. C.

WASHINGTON:
GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE.
1903.



# ACCIDENT BULLETIN,

No. 8.

# APRIL, MAY, AND JUNE, 1903,

AND THE

YEAR ENDING JUNE 30, 1903.

INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMMISSION, WASHINGTON, D. C.

WASHINGTON:
GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE.
1903.

### THE INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMMISSION.

Hon. MARTIN A. KNAPP, of New York, Chairman.

Hon. JUDSON C. CLEMENTS, of Georgia.

Hon. JAMES D. YEOMANS, of Iowa.

Hon. CHARLES A. PROUTY, of Vermont.

Hon. JOSEPH W. FIFER, of Illinois.

EDWARD A. MOSELEY, Secretary.

#### ACCIDENT BULLETIN No. 8.

# RAILROAD ACCIDENTS IN THE UNITED STATES,

#### DURING THE

## THREE MONTHS ENDING JUNE 30, 1903.

The number of persons killed in train accidents during the months of April, May, and June, 1903, as shown in reports made by the rail-road companies to the Interstate Commerce Commission, under the "accident law" of March 3, 1901, was 230, and of injured 2,629. Accidents of other kinds, including those sustained by employees while at work and by passengers in getting on or off the cars, etc., bring the total number of casualties up to 12,305 (844 killed and 11,461 injured). These accidents are classified in the following table. These reports deal only with (a) passengers and (b) employees on duty.

TABLE No. 1.—Casualties to persons—April, May, and June, 1903.

	Passen- gers. Trainmen.		emp on arc	ther rooms oloyed n or ound ains.	ten cro ten wa	ritch iders, esing iders, itch- ien.		er em- oyees.	Total employees.			
•	Killed.	Injured.	Killed.	Injured.	Killed.	Injured.	Killed.	Injured.	Killed.	Injured.	Killed.	Injured.
Collisions Derailments Miscellaneous train accidents (excluding the above), in- cluding locomotive-boiler ex-	22 7	541 446	93 56	734 383	4 3	65 36	1 0	9	24 6	111	122 65	919 489
plocions	2	20	10	242	1	4	0	4	1	14	12	264
Total train accidents	81	1,007	159	1,359	8	105	1	16	31	142	199	1,622
Coupling or uncoupling cars While doing other work about trains or while attending	0	0	52	653	1	8	7	83	2	12	62	756
switches Coming in contact with over- head bridges, structures at	0	0	24	977	2	<b>38</b>	3	56	8	145	87	1,215
side of track, etc	0	7	20	206	0	3	0	16	0	6	20	233
while getting on or off Other causes	23 10	308 299	135 84	1,684 1,149	0 10	89 70	6 27	90 73	82 168	181 2,728	178 289	1,994 4,020
Total (other than train accidents)	33	614	315	4,671	13	158	43	317	210	3,072	581	8, 218
Total all classes	64	1,621	474	6,030	21	263	44	333	241	8, 214	780	9,840

Note.—Accidents to employees resulting in slight injuries which do not prevent the employee injured from performing his accustomed service for more than three days, in the aggregate, during the ten days immediately following the accident, are not reported. The items in the column headed "Switch tenders, crossing tenders, and watchmen," include switch tenders (not acting as brakemen), lever men, and lamp men, track, bridge, and crossing watchmen, and policemen.

The total number of passengers and employees killed in this quarter, 844, is 83 less than in the quarter last preceding, and the number killed in train accidents, 230, as against 300, shows a still more gratifying decrease; but it is necessary, nevertheless, to record in the present report 23 fatalities as due to three butting collisions. The number of employees killed in coupling and uncoupling cars, 62, is 14 less than in the preceding quarter.

The total number of collisions and derailments was 2,605 (1,403 collisions and 1,202 derailments), of which 201 collisions and 126 derailments affected passenger trains. The damage to cars, engines, and roadway by these accidents amounted to \$2,476,934, namely; April, \$810,272; May, \$852,379; June, \$814,283. Given more in detail, these facts appear as below:

	Num- ber.	Loss.	Persons killed.	Persons injured.
Collisions:	381	<b>\$</b> 340, 729	24	408
Butting	258	598, 728	79	616
Trains separating		109, 573	10	60
Miscellaneous	539	328, 423	31	376
Total	1, 403	1, 377, 453	144	1, 460
Derailments:				<del></del> 
Due to defect of roadway, etc	201	137, 101	7	164
Due to defect of equipment	537	458, 739	6	107
Due to negligence of trainmen, signalmen, etc	62	44, 305	4	78
Due to unforeseen obstruction, etc	64	86, 922	16	152
Due to malicious obstruction of track, etc	20	52, 542	4	81
Due to other causes	318	<b>320,</b> 597	35	303
Total	1,202	1, 100, 206	72	885
Total collisions and derailments	2,605	2, 477, 659	216	2, 345

Note.—Collisions and derailments which cause no death or personal injury and which cause not over \$150 damage to the property of the railroad are not included.

The list of "Class A" accidents given below is made up on the same basis as in preceding bulletins.<sup>a</sup> The three butting collisions already referred to are Nos. 25, 43, and 5; items 7, 39, and 43. In the case of the most costly one, No. 5, both the flagging system and the block system were employed as safeguards, but both failed or were not properly managed. The other two cases may be called typical of a large number, and their causes as reported are given below. These cases are called typical for the reason, among others, that the elements of the cause are complicated or obscure, or both complicated and obscure; but in No. 25 attention should be called to an element which is rather unusual—the failure of the hand-motion signal. The con-

a" Class A" includes (1) all accidents in which the damage is reported at \$10,000 or over, (2) notable cases in which passengers are killed, and (3) cases doing damage less than \$10,000, and down to \$2,000, wherever the circumstances or the cause may be of particular interest.

ductor gave a signal intended to mean "stop," but it was taken by the engineman to mean "go ahead," a fact which indicates either a bad code of signals or great carelessness in giving the signals.

No. 25.—The negligence of the conductor and engineman who caused this collision is described in the report made by the company, as follows:

The stations on this part of the road from west to east are V, M, S, B, etc. The collision occurred a short distance east of M. Train No. 2, east bound, was delayed about two hours at V. During this time the operator at M received, for train No. 2, three orders—one about 8 o'clock directing No. 2 to meet No. 3 at B; one about 10 o'clock, superseding the first, making the meeting point at S; one at 10.43 o'clock, superseding the second, making the meeting point at M instead of S. This last order was different from the other two in that it read, at the end, "Train No. 2 gets this order at M." Conductor of train No. 2 says he read and understood the three orders when received, and handed the copies to the engineer, simply saying "S ——" (the name of the place mentioned in second order), which is the first station east of M, he having mistaken the second order for the last. The engineer failed to read the orders to the conductor to see that the conductor and himself understood them alike, as required by the rule. After the train started the conductor looked at his orders again, discovered his mistake, and signaled with the air signal to stop; then went out on car platform and gave stop signal with his hand, which the engineer took for signal to go ahead and proceeded at full speed. Before conductor could get to valve to set air brake the collision occurred. Both trains were running at the rate of about 30 miles an hour.

No. 43.—This collision occurred at X. The freight train received an order at W, 17 miles east of point of accident, at 1.47 a. m., to the effect that second No. 2 would run one hour and thirty minutes late. The railroad company's report says:

As the entire crew on the head end of the train were killed outright we have no means of ascertaining their understanding of the order, but the conductor, and no doubt the engineman likewise, read the order as No. 2 instead of second No. 2. As a safeguard against errors of this nature, the rules require the conductor to show his orders to the flagman and the engineman to the fireman, who are required to read, understand, and keep them in mind. In this instance the conductor failed to fulfill the requirements of this rule, as he did not show the order to the flagman. The indications are that the engineman was also derelict in this respect. The flagman was on the engine at the first station east of X (8 miles) and asked the engineman what orders he had. The engineman replied, "One hour and thirty minutes on No. 2." This answer was made in the presence and hearing of the fireman and head brakeman, so it is evident neither of these men had seen the order, as it is fair to assume they would have corrected the engineman.

On returning to the caboose the flagman made inquiry of the conductor regarding the orders, and was informed identically the same as he had been by the engineman, to the effect they had one hour and thirty minutes on No. 2.

How these men came to make such an error is beyond human understanding. The order was clear and simple, plainly written, and the usual standard form of "run-late" order. The conductor was unable to offer any explanation of how he came to be misled. The only solution is that possibly the engineman and conductor had been figuring where they would go for No. 2 and, on receiving the order, their minds were so concentrated on No. 2 that they were not impressed with the word

"second." The order had been in their possession one hour at the time of accident. No. 2 was practically on time—about three minutes late. The accident occurred on a curve and at the mouth of a deep cut, so the approach of the trains could not be discovered in time to make any effort to stop; the collision, therefore, took place at high speed, No. 2 moving 40 miles per hour, the freight train probably 25 miles per hour.

Both the conductor and engineman were young men, each about 27 years of age, in good health, and physically sound. The crew had been on duty fourteen hours and twenty-five minutes. The conductor and both brakemen had eleven hours' rest, and the engineman and fireman had been off duty twenty hours prior to going out on this trip.

Conductor had been in service six years, promoted to conductor in August, 1901; record good. Engineman had been in service four years, promoted to engineman November, 1902; record perfect.

Causes of forty-three prominent train accidents (Class A).

[Norg.—R. stands for rear collision; B., butting collision; M., miscellaneous collisions; D., derailment; P., passenger train; F., freight and miscellaneous trains.]

						llamage toen- ginee, cars, and road- way.	Cause.
					_	!	
					D		Passenger train broke in two; 2 passengers standing on car platform fell off and were killed; cause of
					D	\$2,200	failure of coupling unexplained.  Occurred 4 a. m. Engineman fell asleep and failed to regulate speed as directed by caution card; had
						-	been on duty 15 hours; in 3 years had been sus pended 5 times.
					2	2,300	Occurred 3 a. m. Runner of light engine disregarded block signal, fireman was killed.
5	56 28	D R	P F. and F	0	4 2	2,700 8,000	Tender rocked; tender had no splash boards in tank Signalman allowed 2 trains in same block section engineman ran at excessive speed; conductor failed to notice this fault. Conductor's experience,
•	38	M	P. and F	2	6	3,600	months, signalman's (on this road), 6 months.  Freight backed into side of passenger train; hand signal wrongly given by brakeman of 6 weeks experience.
7	25	В	P. and P	2	88	4,000	Conductor and engineman of east-bound train failed to read and understand telegraphic orders. (See
8	9	В	F. and F	1	8	5,368	further explanation in text on a preceding page.  Engineman disregarded stop signal at station; had fallen asleep. Fireman neglected to warn him conductor tried ineffectually to warn engineman.
9	10	В	F. and F	0	0	6,600	Error of train dispatcher. Duplicate order system not in use. Dispatcher 47 years old, experienced
10	8 60	B D	F. and F	0 5	1 38	5,894 6,058	Error of train dispatcher; gave "lap order." Washout; daylight.
11 12	86	Ď	P	ŏ	ő	6, 525	Washout; dispatcher failed to notify train to ran cautiously, dispatcher's experience, 8 months as operator, 5 months as dispatcher.
13	4	R	P. and P	0	5	6,700	Signalman at A gave clear signal to second train when first had been stopped just short of signal cabin at B, signalman's experience, 13 nights Flagman of foremost train was back 1,000 feet
14	28	U	F and F	0	8	6,900	foggy night.  Engineman, westbound, failed to stop at meeting station; was suspended 30 days. Fireman (experience, 2 years) suspended 2 weeks for not asking to see dispatcher's orders. Conductor and real brakeman tried ineffectually to stop the train; for ward brakeman not acquainted with the road.
15	29	В	F. and F	0	6	8, 500	Mistake of operator in copying telegraphic order wrote "78 204" instead of "7th 204." Operator's age, 18; experience, 6 days as operator, 15 months as apprentice. The company advises that since the collision a rule has been made requiring that, in dispatchers' orders, words like "seventh" be spelled out in full. It is to be observed, however that in this case the substitution of "78" (which was the number of a passenger train) for "7th" made the order irregular, because if train 78 had been meant the figures would have been preceded by "no."

### Causes of forty-three prominent train accidents (Class A)—Continued.

	No.				_:	cars, road-	
Item.	Record	Class.	Kind of train.	Killed.	Injured	Damage 1 gines, and 1 way.	Cause.
16	42	В	P. and P	0	45	\$9,000	Operator gave conductor clearance card and neglect- ed to give him telegraphic order; operator's experi-
17	18	D	P	2	5	9, 638	ence (at this place), 8 months, Occurred 3 a. m. Misplaced switch; switch left in wrong position by brakeman of freight. Before the derailment a passenger train had run through the switch in the opposite (trailing) direction with switch light showing red.
18	50	В	F. and F	3	1	9,775	Engineman of light engine forgot regular train; he
19	40	D	P	0	84	10, 835	was killed. Unknown. Track of 80-pound rails, rock ballast, in good condition; curvature, 24°; speed, 85 miles an hour.
20	39	D B	P	2	12	10,400	Unknown.
21	4		P. and F			10,600	Conductor and engineman of freight misread tele- graphic order. It read "2d 26," and they read it "26."
22	7	В	F. and F	2	10	10,900	Station agent (32 years' experience) failed to deliver telegraphic order. Signal stands normally in "stop" position; agent cleared it with order lying before him on desk.
23	45	В	P. and P	9	18	11,444	Pilot forgot meeting order; no other person on train acquainted with road.
24	54	M	F. and F	0	0	11,969	Runaway of 26 cars of ore; cars, detached from en- gine, had been left unattended; hand brakes set on 10 cars; air in air-brake cylinders leaked out.
25 26	49	B	F. and F	0	9	12,300 12,800	Operator neglected to deliver telegraphic order.  Train broke in two; cars much damaged by auto-
27	22	D	P	0	14	18, 600	matic setting of brakes.  Derailment due to some part of engine or car dropping to the roadbed.
28	27	В	F. and F	1	5	14, 200	Engineman, north bound, started from station on time of south bound; was "under the impression" that he was to meet south-bound train at a station farther on.
29	31	M	P. and F	1	28	14, 250	Passenger train struck by unattended light engine; it is believed that the engine had been started by a certain brakeman, who soon after disappeared.
30	16	D	P	5	2	14, 251	Broken rail: rail, 67-pound, not badly worn; curvature, 4°; speed, 35 miles an hour; general condition of track, good; weight on engine driving wheels, 100,000 pounds.
31	61	' <b>D</b>	P	1	9	14,800	Loosened switch; switch believed to have been maliciously tampered with.
33		D B	P.and F	8	0 4	15, 000 15, 066	Broken flange.  Passenger train was several hours late; conductor and engineman of switching crew, who had been at work at a rolling mill all day, entered main line at 7 p. m. without examining register; engineman "thought" he had heard the passenger train pass.
<b>3</b> -	65 5 46		P. and F	0	8 7	16,800 17,800	Unknown. Conductor and engineman of north-bound freight calculated to meet south-bound passenger train No. 7 at A, but at A they received an order against another south-bound train and thereupon started out, forgetting train No. 7.
3.	6 <b>62</b> 7 <b>32</b>	M M	F	0	8	11, 400 25, 000	Unknown. Occurred at 11 p. m. Passenger train struck car which had been blown out of side track by high wind.
3	B   13	M	P	0	1	25, 900	Passenger train ran into officers' car which had been carelessly pushed from side track on to main line.  Fire set by heater in officers' car.
3:	9 ' 43	В	P. and F	7	7	29, 400	Occurred 8 a. m. Trains running at full speed; conductor and engineman of freight had an order concerning "2d No. 2," but read it "No. 2."
4	0 67	D	F	0	0	29,772	Runaway of 78 loaded cars. Cars had been left at 5 p.m. with hand brakes set on 30 of them; runaway occurred next morning at 4 o'clock; brakes must have been released by some person or persons
4	1 30	В	F. and F	7	2	31,000	unknown.  Operator fell asleep and failed to deliver telegraphic order; conductor and engineman neglected to ask for clearance card.

Causes of forty-three prominent train accidents (Class A)—Continued.

Item.	Record No.	Class.	Kind of train.	Killed.	Injured.	Damage to engrines, cars, and road-way.	Cause.
<b>42</b>	24	В	P. and P	7	45 14	\$32,000 73,000	Engineman, south bound, misread telegraphic order; conductor neglected to have order read aloud in his presence by engineman.  Occurred 3a. m. East-bound passenger collided with side of a west-bound freight which was entering side track; brakeman of freight had gone forward with red light, but passenger engineman did not see this signal; block signalman in tower a short distance west of point of collision reported that freight had cleared main track when, by reason of darkness, fog, and distance, he did not know. Signalman's experience, 1 year.
			Total .	69	421	581, 234	

Items 3, 5, and 13 in Class A represent cases due to failure to observe block signals or to "failure in block working." In items 2, 8, and 41 men fell asleep on duty, and item 33 brings out a kind of carelessness which has not before appeared in the records.

In view of the prominence of butting collisions in the quarter under review a second table has been prepared (see below) showing all of this class of accidents (regardless of the cost limit) which are reported as due to mistakes of conductors and enginemen in reading orders or to forgetting orders; mistakes of telegraph operators and train dispatchers in writing, transmitting, or delivering orders, and mistakes of conductors and enginemen in regard to the right to the track. "Overlooked a train" means that in reading the time-table the schedule of a train—a column of figures—was overlooked. Sometimes this explanation appears to be given when the true explanation would be that the person at fault trusted to memory and did not examine the time-table. Where "Conductor and engineman forgot" a train or an order it is evident that they did not cooperate in their duties, as is everywhere required by the regulations; but in some of the cases where an engineman alone forgot, the engine was being run without a train and the engineman alone was charged with the responsibility of keeping out of the way of other trains. This table contains 36 items; deaths, 33; injuries, 260.

## Butting collisions caused by mistakes in connection with time-tables or telegraph or orders.

#### APRIL

Reference to table, Clara A. Item—	Number.	Kind of train.	Killed.	Injured.	Cost.	Caraca.
21 22 10 9	4	P. and F		15 10	\$10,600 19,900	See Class A. Do.
10	8			1	5.894	Do.
9	10	F. and F	0 0 1	0	5, 600	Da.
	11	F. and F	ì	3	8,000	Engineman forgot order.
•••••	66	P. and F	0			
•••••	67	P. and F	0	8		
•••••	68	F. and F	. 0	4	3,500	disseigned for not taking all treesattions
	69	P. and F	, 0	2	1,066	Disputcher gave wrong engine named in an orien
•••••	70	F. and F F. and F	•	1	3,900	Dispatcher gave wrong engine number in an order Operator left signal thear and went to dinner train passed while he was absent.
•••••	71	F. and F	; 1	•	1,010	Conductor and engineman east bozzi overlanken west- bound train.

#### MAY.

42	24	P. and P. and	P;	2	45	\$32,000	See Class A.
7	25	P. and	P	2	<b>' 33</b>	4, 000	Do.
	26	P. and	<b>F</b>	0			Operator failed to deliver order; operator's experience at this place, 3 months.  See Class A.  Do.  Do.  Conductor and engineman of freight overlanked passenger train
28	27	F. and	P	1	5	14, 200	See Class A.
14	28	F. and		0	ž	6, 900	Do.
14 15	29	F and		Ď	6	8,500	Do.
	72	P. and	<b>P</b>	Ŏ	Ŏ	1,481	Conductor and engineman of freight overlanked passenger train.
	73	P. and	P	0	2	1.700	Engineman overlooked passet get train.
•••	74	P. and	<b>F</b>	0	1	250	Operator repeated order incorrectly; dispatcher failed to detect error.
	75	P. and	<b>     </b>	0	5	300	Order incorrectly copied and not delivered.
		F. and			4	1,550	Agent, 30 years' expensence, inited to deliver order his first failure of this kind.
1	77	P. and	F'	0	0	400	Conductor and engineers an overlooked meeting order
	78	F. and	F	0	4		Misunderstanding of erders.
	79	F. and		Ŏ	Ĩ	3, 100	

#### JUNE

16 42 P. and P 0 45 \$9,000 In Class A. 39 43 P. and F 7 7 29,400 Do. 23 45 P. and P 9 18 11,444 Do. 25 46 P. and F 0 7 17,800 Do. 47 P. and P 1 5 5,000 Unexplained. 25 49 P. and P 0 9 12,300 In Class A. 18 50 P. and P 3 1 9,775  80 P. and P 3 1 9,775  P. and P 1 3 2,485 Conductor and engineman overlooked order. 81 P. and P 1 4 3,600 Conductor and engineman failed to identify was met.  82 P. and P 0 0 1,100 Operator failed to deliver order. (Operator months.)	y a train that
---	----------------

TABLE No. 3.—Details of Table 1—Causes of accidents to employees in coupling and uncoupling cars.

Sub-		Cond	luctors.	Braker	nen, etc.	Other e	mployees.
class.	Causes.	Killed.	Injured.	Killed.	Injured.	Killed.	Injured.
1	Sticking of parts (bent pins, etc.), pre-						
2	venting quick work.  Holding up pin by hand (presumably		2		18		
	made necessary by defective un-			j		<u> </u>	•
3	coupling mechanism)				29		
3	Other causes, apparently due to defect- ive uncoupling mechanism				9		
4	Defective draft gear, with automatic			******	9		• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •
-	coupler		l	1	2		1 2
5	couplerCoupling to an engine or tender Same (with link-and-pin coupler)		i	$\bar{1}$	27		_
6	Same (with link-and-pin coupler)				9		
7	COMPANIA VALLED OF DIRECT OF THE POST OF T		1	1	35		
8	Foot caught in or between couplers	1				l	
(	while adjusting coupler		1		84		
9	Slipped, usually on ice or snow	1		2	18		
10	Foot caught in frog, guard rail, or	_		_	_	_	İ
	switch	1	2	6	7	1	
11	Caught by overhanging load (on plat-	1	1				in .
10	form car)			2	18		
12	Load shifted				1		
13	Engaged in operations preliminary to coupling.	1	7	10	118	ļ	2
14	While coupling safety chains			10	110		
15	Link-and-pin-coupler	• • • • • • •	ĺ	<b>.</b>	17		
16	Link and pin, with automatic				9		
17	Coupling damaged cars (presumably	1					
	an unavoidable risk)	2	1 3	8	23	1	
18	Uncoupling without using lever (pre-		1	1		1	
	sumably by reason of defective un-	Ī		1		1	i
	coupling mechanism).	1	2		65	1	 
19	coupling mechanism). Uncoupling, other causes		12	5	126		3
20	Miscellaneous	l	1 5	6	96		4
21	Not clearly explained		2	12	38		1
	<b></b>		4-	·		·	<del></del>
	Total	5	41	55	703	2	12

TABLE No. 4.—Details of Table 1—Causes of accidents to employees classified (C6 and C7) as falling from and getting on or off cars and engines.

			duc- ors.		rake- n, etc.		gine- ien.	Fire	emen.		er em- yees.
Sub- class.	Causes.	Killed.	Injured.	Killed.	Injured.	Killed.	Injured.	Killed.	Injured.	Killed.	Injured.
C6 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 C7 16 17	Fell from roof of box car by reason of— Defect in car Ice or snow. Parting of train Derailment, collision, or shock due to abnormal movements of cars other than those in subclass 8. While setting brakes Fell from— Coal car Freight car other than box or coal car. Engine or tender. Passenger car Engines, tenders, or cars (all kinds) not in motion Miscellaneous causes. Not clearly explained. Slipped getting on moving trains or cars. Jumping off moving trains Jumping from engines or cars anticipating collision, derailment, or other accident. Fell from engines or cars by reason of defective handholds and sill steps. Getting on or off moving engine	1 1  5 1 2	12 2 5 4 5 2 27 24 2 3 21	1 14 1 11 11 8 50 9 7	84 184 56 178 257	2	1 7 7 8 1 34	10	3 39 53 1 14	11 2 1 10 4	1 15 21 23 3 41 43 4 1 24
[18	Caught in frog, guard rail, or switch  Total	13	107	114	1, 482	2	58	12	166	32	181

#### YEARLY TABLES.

This bulletin completes the publication of the accident records under the law of March 3, 1901, for two years, and the following table (A) gives the aggregate, for the year ending June 30, 1903, of the items which are given in Table No. 1 of the quarterly returns. The total number of casualities shown in Table A is 49,531 (3,554 killed and 45,977 injured).

TABLE A .- Summary of casualties to persons, year ending June 30, 1903.

•	Passen- gers.		Trai	Trainmen.		Other persons employed on or around trains.		ritch oders, seing oders, atch- en.			Total em- ployees.	
	Killed.	Injured.	Killed.	Injured.	Killed.	Injural.	Killed.	Injured.	Killed.	Injured.	Killed.	Injured.
Collisions  Derailments  Miscellaneous train accidents (excluding the above), in- cluding locomotive-boiler ex-		2,891 1,456	451 225	3,079 1,386	<b>34</b> 16	309 157	9	48 26	<b>6</b> 7 22	345 115	561 264	3,781 1,714
plodons	<b>' 2</b>	75	65	882	1	<b>11</b>	1	11	3	41	70	945
Total train accidents	164	4, 424	741	5, 347	51	507	11	85	92	501	895	6,440
Coupling and uncoupling cars While doing other work about trains, or while attending	 !		213	2,437		29	28	287	7	35	253	2,788
switches Coming in contact with overhead bridges, structures at	'		103	4,474	111	198	. 16	236	` <b>19</b> 	625	. 149	5,538
side of track, etc	4	22	84	896		14	4	59	5	24	93	992
Falling from cars or engines, or while getting on or off Other causes	119	1, <b>83</b> 5 1, 182	521   <b>359</b>	6, 829 4, 628	18 32	142 , 310	34 121		105 653	640 9, 943	678 1,165	8,025 15,221
Total (other than train accidents)	157	2,549	1, 290	19, 263	66	688	203	1,336	789	11,277	2, <b>33</b> 8	32, 564
Total (all classes)	321	6, 973	2,021	24, 610	117	1, 195	214	1, 421	681	11,778	3, 233	39,004

In Table B, following, comparisons may be made of the totals of the principal classes of casualties. For the large increase in the totals and in nearly all of the items an explanation is to be found in the well-known and widespread increase of railroad traffic which has taken place and which has been made apparent by the published reports of railroad earnings. This tendency was remarked upon in Accident Bulletin No. 5, the first for the fiscal year now under review. It is also to be noted that the course pursued by the Commission in insisting on full reports of all accidents has been productive of good results, and, as noted in Bulletin No. 6, railroad companies are much more careful to include all accidents in their reports to the Commission than they were when the law requiring reports of accidents went into effect. There has been a steady and continuous improvement in this respect, and it is undoubtedly true that much of the increase shown in the above comparative summary is due to the fact that accidents are now much more fully reported than they man during the preceding year.

withstanding this great increase, it is gratifying to note that the list of fatal accidents to passengers in train accidents is no larger than last year. The only other item which does not show an increase is "overhead obstructions." It is not unlikely that the decrease in this class of accidents has been brought about by the increased use of air brakes, doing away, to some extent, with the necessity of requiring trainmen to ride on the tops of box cars.

In advance of the annual reports it appears that the number of men employed in the train service on June 30, 1903, was about 12 per cent larger than on June 30, 1902. This is the total for the whole country. On the roads of densest traffic, where the liability to accident is greater than on roads of light traffic, the increase has been more than 12 per cent. The enormous expansion of freight traffic has led to the employment of new men so rapidly that the percentage of inexperienced men in the service was in the year under review larger than before for many years.

Table B.—Casualties to passengers and employees, years ending June 30, 1902 and 1903.

	1	903.	1	902.
	Killed.	Injured.	Killed.	Injured.
Passengers:		-		
In train accidents	164	4, 424	167	3, 586
Other causes	157	2, 549	136	2,503
Total	321	6, 973	303	6,089
Employees:				
In train accidents	895	6, 440	697	5,046
In coupling accidents		2,788	143	2, 113
Overhead obstructions, etc	93	992	104	1,070
Falling from cars, etc	678	8,025	537	6, 867
Other causes		20,759	1,035	18, 615
Total	3, 233	39,004	2, 516	33, 711
Total passengers and employees	8,554	45, 977	2,819	39, 800

The following tables, C, D, and E, show, respectively, for twelve months, the facts which appear in tables 2, 3, and 4 of the quarterly returns.

TABLE C.—Collisions and derailments; damage to cars, engines, and roadway, year ending June 30.

	19	903.	19	02.
	Number.	Loss.	Number.	Loss.
Collisions: Due to trains separating Other causes	948 5, 219	\$487,530 5,128,216	774 4, 268	\$391, 489 8, 894, 194
Total	6, 167	5, 615, 746	5,042	4, 285, 683
Derailments:  Due to defects of roadway, etc.  Due to defects of equipment.  Due to negligence of trainmen, signalmen, etc.  Due to unforeseen obstructions, etc.  Due to malicious obstruction of track, etc.  Due to other causes.	297 277	636, 718 1, 502, 325 230, 907 317, 456 157, 290 1, 136, 535	547 1,609 255 239 57 926	443, 706 1, 295, 299 136, 241 546, 478 63, 246 874, 758
Total	4,476	3, 981, 231	3, 633	3, 359, 728
Total collisions and derailments	10,643	9, 596, 977	8, 675	7,645,406

TABLE D.—Causes of accidents to employees in coupling and uncoupling cars, year ending June 30, 1903.

Sub-		Cond	luctors.	Brake	men, etc.	Other e	mployees
class.		Killed.	Injured.	Killed.	Injured.	Killed.	Injured.
1	Sticking of parts (bent pins, etc.) pre-		_				
48	venting quick work.		2	; <b>8</b> ,	68		1
2	Holding up pin by hand (presumably made necessary by defective un-	ſ		1			]
	coupling mechanism)		5	1	206		<b>,</b>
3	Other causes, apparently due to defec-		•		200	• • • • • • •	' 1
•	tive coupler mechanism		1	2	45		
4	Defective draft gear (with automatic		_				1
	coupler)			1	15		!
5	Coupling to an engine or tender		1	. 2	85		
6	Coupling to an engine or tender (with	1		} •			
_ !	link-and-pin coupler)				20		
7	Coupling on inside of sharp curve		7	7	118	•••••	
8	Foot caught in or between couplers	j		t I	***	•	1
•	while adjusting coupler		3	9	127 89	•••••	
9 10	Slipped (usually on ice or snow)		7	, 9	- O3/	• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •	
10	switch	2	3	23	28	1	
11	Caught by overhanging load (on plat-	-	•	1 2	20	•	i
	form car)		1	6	31		
12	Load shifted	1	Ī		13		
13	Engaged in operations preliminary to		_	1		'	
	coupling	1 5	12	54	873		
14	While coupling safety chains		6	6	39	1	
15	Link-and-pin coupler		8	2	98	[	
16	Link and pin, with automatic	1	2	}	356		
17	Coupling damaged cars (presumably			ا مه		1 1	
10	an unavoidable risk)	2	•	19	63	1 1	
18	sumably by reason of defective un-	i .					
	coupling mechanism)	<b> </b>	. 9	5	179		
19		1	15	9	239 570		
<b>2</b> 0	Miscellaneous		21	82 55	572 200	1	1
21	Not clearly explained	• • • • • • • • •	10	00			
	Total	11	110	285	2,642	7	8

Table E.—Causes of accidents to employees classified (C6 and C7) as falling from and getting on or off cars and engines, year ending June 30, 1903.

			duc- ors.		rake- n, etc.		gine- ien.	Fin	emen.		erem- yees.
Sub- class.	Causes.	Killed.	Injured.	Killed.	Injured.	Killed.	Injured.	Killed.	Injured.	Killed.	Injured.
1 2 8 4	Fell from roof of box car by reason of— Defect in car Ice or snow. Parting of train Derailment, collision, or shock due		3 8	1 5 8	83 68 76	1	2	••••	7	• • • •	1 5 1
C6 5	to abnormal movements of cars other than those in subclass 3 While setting brakes Fell from— Coal car	1 1	32 16	38 23 3	596 852 29		8	••••	14	19 1	45 2
6 7 8 9	Freight carother than box or coal car. Engine or tender. Passenger car Engines, tenders, or cars (all kinds)	1 1	2 3 18 2	2 41 1	17 286 9	5	1 89	22	166	1 2	1 6 11 4
11 12 [13 14	not in motion  Miscellaneous causes.  Not clearly explained  Slipped getting on moving trains or cars.  Jumping off moving trains.	2 2 12 2	18 83 17 80	10 65 185 35	300 596	8	68 1	5 -4	222 3 4 4	3 12 11 30	53 142 21 105
C7 16	Jumping from engines or cars anticipating collision, derailment, or other accident.  Fell from engines or cars by reason of defective handholds and sill steps	1	114 9 15	1 3	1,066 102 234		3 83 1		6 57 2		181 15 2
17 18	Getting on or off moving engine	81	75 435	1	1,026 9 5,982	10	161 816	2  33	707	14	685

#### [Public—No. 171.]

AN ACT requiring common carriers engaged in interstate commerce to make full reports of all accidents to the Interstate Commerce Commission.

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, It shall be the duty of the general manager, superintendent, or other proper officer of every common carrier engaged in interstate commerce by railroad to make to the Interstate Commerce Commission, at its office in Washington, District of Columbia, a monthly report, under oath, of all collisions of trains or where any train or part of a train accidentally leaves the track, and of all accidents which may occur to its passengers or employees while in the service of such common carrier and actually on duty, which report shall state the nature and causes thereof, and the circumstances connected therewith.

SEC. 2. That any common carrier failing to make such report within thirty days after the end of any month shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor and, upon conviction thereof by a court of competent jurisdiction, shall be punished by a fine of not more than one hundred dollars for each and every offense and for every day during which it shall fail to make such report after the time herein specified for making the same.

SEC. 3. That neither said report nor any part thereof shall be admitted as evidence or used for any purpose against such railroad so making such report in any suit or

action for damages growing out of any matter mentioned in said report.

SEC. 4. That the Interstate Commerce Commission is authorized to prescribe for such common carriers a method and form for making the reports in the foregoing section provided.

Approved, March 3, 1901.

#### SPECIAL INFORMATION CONTAINED IN PRECEDING BULLETING

- Each accident bulletin contains tables showing the number of passengers and employees killed and injured, and these figures are classified according to caucase (see Table No. 1); also tables showing cost of the different classes of train accidents. The causes of accidents to employees in coupling and uncoupling and in falling from cars, etc., are further classified in Tables No. 3 and No. 4. Each bulletin is for three months, and No. 1 was for the quarter ending September 30, 1901. The bulletin for the quarter ending June 30 contains, in addition to the quarterly statistics, tables showing the same information for the whole of the fiscal year ending on that date.
- Bulletin No. 1 contains brief notes on the most serious collisions in that quarter, 57 passengers having been killed. There are notes on the cause of oxpler accidents, explanatory of Table No. 3. Table No. 4 is supplemented by similar notes. In this quarter special mention was made of 130 casualties 4 killed. 126 injured, due to operating trains in which air brakes were used on only a portion of the cars; and the danger of running trains partially air-braked is commented on.
- Bulletin No. 2 contains a detailed list showing the cost and causes of the 27 most serious butting collisions in that quarter. In these collisions 70 persons were killed and 234 were injured, and the damage to cars, engines, and roadway amounted to \$306,511. The incompleteness of the statements of causes, as sent in by the railroads, is commented on.
- Bulletin No. 3 contains a list similar to that just mentioned, but showing rear instead of butting collisions. As in the first list, only the most serious accidents are considered; and of these there were 41, costing \$160.247. The number of persons killed was 43, and of injured 255.
- Bulletin No. 4 contains a third list of collisions, this one including all classes; but it includes only a few in which the damage was less than \$5.000. The totals of this list are: Killed, 30; injured, 187; cost, \$228,597. Collisions occurring where the trainmen had worked very long hours are commented on. In this bulletin a table is given showing the deaths and injuries due to trains parting. The aggregate of damage shown in this table is \$492,781; persons killed, 14; injured, 386. The table shows that nearly all of the coupler failures which resulted in a collision or derailment were reported as due to "cause unknown."
- Bulletin No. 5 contains a table of the most serious train accidents in the quarter. Derailments as well as collisions are included, but cases causing damages of less than \$10,000 each are not included, except where the cause of the accident calls for notice. The 23 accidents shown in this table killed 81 persons and injured 356, and the aggregate damage reported was, for the 23 cases, \$308,395. The causes of a few of the accidents are set forth in some detail. A table is given in this bulletin showing the cause (as reported) of each coupling accident in the quarter. The table fills 12 pages.
- Bulletin No. 6 contains a list of the 34 most serious accidents in the quarter, with notes on the cause of each. One of these was a rear collision, killing 27 passengers. There is also a table giving notes on the causes of the 16 rear collisions which occurred in this quarter on railroads where the block system is in use. Comment is made on the large increase in the number of accidents to men in coupling, as compared with previous quarters; this is accompanied by a reprint of the amendment to the safety-appliance law which was passed in March, 1903.
- Bulletin No. 7 (January, February, and March, 1903) contains the usual list of the most serious accidents (Class A). In collisions 46 passengers were killed, and the bulletin gives in detail the causes of a rear collision in which 23 persons were killed, and of a butting collision in which 8 persons were killed. In the butting collision the damage to cars and engines was \$79,450. A note is also given on the cause of a rear collision due to the inadequacy of the time-interval rule.



# ACCIDENT BULLETIN,

No. 9,

# SHOWING COLLISIONS AND DERAILMENTS OF TRAINS

AND

# CASUALTIES TO PERSONS

**DURING** 

JULY, AUGUST, AND SEPTEMBER, 1903.

INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMMISSION, WASHINGTON, D. C.

WASHINGTON:
GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE.
1904.

## THE INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMMISSION.

Hon. MARTIN A. KNAPP, of New York, Chairman.

Hon. JUDSON C. CLEMENTS, of Georgia.

Hon. JAMES D. YEOMANS, of Iowa.

Hon. CHARLES A. PROUTY, of Vermont.

Hon. JOSEPH W. FIFER, of Illinois.

EDWARD A. MOSELEY, Secretary.

#### ACCIDENT BULLETIN No. 9.

# RAILROAD ACCIDENTS IN THE UNITED STATES

DURING THE

#### THREE MONTHS ENDING SEPTEMBER 30, 1903.

The number of persons killed in train accidents during the months of July, August, and September, 1903, as shown in reports made by the railroad companies to the Interstate Commerce Commission, under the "accident law" of March 3, 1901, was 280, and of injured 3,582. Accidents of other kinds, including those sustained by employees while at work, and by passengers in getting on or off the cars, etc., bring the total number of casualties up to 15,187 (1,025 killed and 14,162 injured). These accidents are classified in the following table. These reports deal only with (a) passengers and (b) employees on duty.

TABLE No. 1.—Casualities to persons—July, August, and September, 1903.

	Passen- gers.		Trai	nmen.		inmen y <b>ard</b> s.	trai (sv	ard nmen vitch- ing ews).	Other employees.		Total em- ployees.	
•	Killed.	Injured.	Killed.	Injured.	Killed.	Injured.	Killed.	Injured.	Killed.	Injured.	Killed.	Injured.
Collisions Derailments Miscellaneous train accidents (excluding the above), in- cluding locomotive-boiler ex-	50 10	1,172 422	61 76	580 331	15 8	164 46	10 7	66 59	22 6	188 84	108 92	998 520
plosions	••••	74	13	266	2	67	5	30	• • • •	33	20	896
Total train accidents	60	1,668	150	1,177	20	277	22	155	28	805	220	1,914
Coupling or uncoupling cars While doing other work about trains or while attending			18	232	24	278	<b>2</b> 6	382	2	20	70	912
switches Coming in contact with over- head bridges, structures at			18	1,130	15	570	8	418	19	456	60	<sup>'</sup> 2, 57 <b>4</b> 
side of track, etc	2	13	28	178	3	55	1	66	1	16	33	815
Falling from cars or engines, or while getting on or off Other causes	40 7	485 522	92 50	923 188	39 34	638 90	85 17	590 94	48 218	270 2,966	214 319	2, 421 3, 338
Total (other than train accidents)	49	1,020	206	2, 651	115	1,631	87	1,550	288	3,728	696	9, 560
Total all classes	109	2, 688	856	3,828	135	1,908	109	1,705	316	4, 033	916	11,474

NOTE.—Accidents to employees resulting in slight injuries which do not prevent the employee injured from performing his accustomed service for more than three days, in the aggregate, during the ten days immediately following the accident are not reported.

The number of employees killed in train accidents in this quarter, 220, is about the same as in the corresponding quarter of the preceding year; but in the number of passengers thus killed, 60, there is a large increase. Thirty-seven passengers were killed in two collisions (Record numbers 5 and 33 in the table of causes, page 5).

The number of employees killed in coupling and uncoupling cars also continues large. The probable causes of the increase in this class of accidents, as compared with 1901-2, have been mentioned in preceding bulletins. The numbers killed have been—

 Quarter ending—
 52

 September 30, 1902
 52

 December 31, 1903
 63

 March 31, 1903
 76

 June 30, 1903
 62

 September 30, 1903
 70

The total number of collisions and derailments was 3,063 (1,765 collisions and 1,298 derailments), of which 251 collisions and 140 derailments affected passenger trains. The damage to cars, engines, and roadway by these accidents amounted to \$2,470,375, namely: July, \$858,914; August, \$750,187; September, \$861,274. Given more in detail, these facts appear as below:

TABLE No. 2.—Collisions and derailments.

	Num- ber.	Loss.	Persons killed.	Persons injured.
Collisiona:		!		
Rear	486	\$480,929	53	606
Butting	279	457, 549	<b>59</b>	859
Trains separating	287	187, 264	5	115
Miscellaneous	713	888, 577	41	590
Total	1,765	1, 464, 319	158	2,170
Derailments:				<del></del>
Due to defects of roadway, etc	211	151,868	7	168
Due to defects of equipment		529, 026	25	219
Due to negligence of trainmen, signalmen, etc	103	76,007	14	110
Due to unforeseen obstruction, etc	106	118, 662	23	121
Due to malicious obstruction of track, etc	13	20,019	1	38
Due to miscellaneous causes	253	224, 447	82	291
Total	1, 298	1, 120, 029	102	942
Total collisions and derailments	3, 063	2,584,848	260	3, 112

Note.—Collisions and derailments which cause no death or personal injury and which cause not over \$150 damage to the property of the railroad are not reported.

Following is the usual list of Class A train accidents; all in which the damage is reported at \$10,000 or over; notable cases in which passengers are killed; and those doing damage less than \$10,000 and down to \$2,000, wherever the circumstances or the cause may be of particular interest:

## Causes of twenty-nine prominent train accidents (Class A).

[Norg.—R. stands for rear collision; R., butting collision; M., miscellaneous collisions; D., derailment; P., passenger train; F., freight and miscellaneous trains.]

	<del></del>			,			
Item.	Record No.	Class.	Kind of train.	Killed.	Injured.	Damage then- gines, cars, and road- way.	Cause.
1	22	R.	P.and F	2	4	\$1,580	Freight detained at station; inexperienced flagman went back with signal; returned to a point near caboose and went to sleep on track. Engineman and fireman of approaching train might have seen
2	21 13	R. D.	P. and P	1 2	20	2, 000 5, 200	tail lights of freight 2 miles away.  Clear block signal given while the preceding train was still in block section. Signalman 20 years old.  Passenger train, running 60 miles an hour, overran
							home and distant signal at crossing; engineman and fireman killed.
4   5	8	М. В.	P. and P F. and F	1	14	5, 513	Collision at crossing; unsettled dispute between the roads as to responsibility.
6	3	B.	P. and F	1	4	5, 745 5, 875	Engineman fell asleep; fireman unfamiliar with road.  Passenger train ran 8 minutes ahead of time. Con-
7	43	D.	F	2	1	6, 100	ductor and engineman said to have good records.  Train became uncontrollable on steep descending grade; brakes inspected at summit and found satisfactory; track was wet. Trainmen reported as not
8	33	R.	F. and F	22	15	6, 200	chargeable with misconduct.  3 a. m. Two trains carrying circus; engineman failed to keep air brakes charged with proper pressure.  (See further explantion in text below.)
9	41	D.	P	. <b>2</b>	1	6, 500	Excessive speed on curve of 7° 24'; outer rail elevated 71 inches. No passengers on train.
10	66	R	F. and F	0	0	6, 800	
11	31	В	F. and F	0	2	7, 566	Operator failed to deliver telegraphic order; operator in service at this place 7 days; other places 2 years; age 23.
12	59	M	F. and F	1	2	8, 700	Collision at crossing. 4 a. m.; signal set at "stop," but did not show red; defective counter-weight.
13	68	В	F. and F	0	3	10,000	Dispatcher sent telegraphic order reading 5.20 p. m. Operator copied it 5.30; dispatcher claims that when the order was repeated this error was corrected, but this the operator denies.
14 15	51 2	D B	P.and P	0	0 129	10, 226 10, 480	Brakebeam dropped. Improper flagging by eastbound train. Conductor, brakeman, engineman, and fireman dismissed for negligence.
16	23	R	F. and F	0	0	10, 500	Improper flagging; brakemar, returned to his caboose and was killed; 22 years old; 8 months' experience.
17 18	54 78	D B	F.and F	0	27 5	10,500 10,500	Front truck wheel of engine broke.  Train while waiting on side track lost right to road by becoming 12 hours late; conductor and engineman started out, forgetting this limitation.
19 20	52 34	D D	F	0	5	12,000 12,313	Broken flange.  10 p. m. Bridge washed out by flood caused by "waterspout." Flood five times greater than capacity of waterway beneath track.
21 22	46 9	D M	Pand F	3	3	13,000 18,700	Washout.  Work train on 44 per cent grade became uncontrollable and ran into the side of passenger train.
23	18	D	F	0	1	15,000	Train became uncontrollable on steep grade; engineman "lost his air."
24	5	В	P. and F	22	25	16, 896	Conductor of freight misread telegraphic order; it read 20 minutes; he read it 1 hour and 20 minutes.  Engineman took conductor's word and did not read order.
25	46	D	Mail	5	0	18, 100	Entire crew (all the persons on the train) killed. Too high speed on curve. Train fell 75 feet. Engineman not long in the service of this road but
26	29	В	F.aud F	4	4	18, 109	knew the line and had had experience elsewhere.  Operator made mistake in copying telegraphic order.  Dispatcher failed to discover error on repetition; two enginemen disregarded automatic block signal.
27 28	64	R B	F.and F P.and P	1 0	1	20,000 30,600	Careless running. Conductor and engineman west bound misread telegraphic order.
29	4	В	P.and F	4	60	33, 770	Conductor and engineman of one train misread orders. They had a "19" order against "Second No. 1;" but read it "No. 1;" engineman was killed. Being on Form 19 the order was not read by the
			Total	80	335	333, 423	operator to the conductor and engineman.

One accident in the foregoing list (the second) was a collision due to failure in block working, and one other (the tenth) was a collision which occurred on a line equipped with automatic block signals, but while a train was running "permissively." All the other collisions occurred where the block system was not in use. Two of them, the eighth and the twenty-fourth items in the list resulted, between them, in the death of 44 persons and the injury of 40. Item 24 is a pronounced illustration of how concurrent errors of a conductor and an engineman may quickly produce disastrous results. Seventeen passengers and 5 employees and other persons were killed, in this case, in consequence of a lack of care in reading a telegraphic order on the part of the conductor, combined with the neglect on the part of the engineman of his plain duty to read the order himself and not trust to any other person's reading. On many railroads there is a rule requiring the conductor and the engineman, each, after reading a telegraphic order, to read it to an assistant (brakeman or fireman). rule appears not to have been adopted on the road where this collision occurred.

Item 8, a collision killing 22 persons, appears to have been due to gross negligence of an engineman. The specific charge, in the report made by the railroad company, is that he failed to have his train charged with air; but it is further stated that on approaching the station where the preceding train was standing, and while still a mile off, he failed to see a fusee signal which had been displayed on the track to stop him, and did not shut off steam until warned by his fireman, who had seen the fusee. As the hour was about 3 o'clock in the morning, and as the engineman had not been sleeping during the time allowed him for rest in the preceding day, there is strong ground for the inference that he was asleep at his post. On being aroused by his fireman, this engineman sounded the whistle as a signal for the application of hand brakes; but it appears that the cars of the train, most of them platform cars fitted for carrying large wagons, had no brake wheels in position by which the brakes could be put on by hand. The safety of the train, therefore, so far as the means of stopping it was concerned, depended wholly on the power brake; and this failed by reason of the negligence of the engineman. The air-brake apparatus was found to be in perfect order after the collision, and it was in good working order when the train began its trip before the collision.

The engineman who was at fault in this case had been running this engine only about ten days. He had been in the service of the company about eighteen months. The officers of the road believe that after the last stop was made before the collision (about one hour before) the engineman put his air-brake valve in such a position as to shut off the flow of air from the main reservoir to the pipe leading through the train; and with the supply thus cut off, the air would slowly leak from the train pipe, making the brakes inoperative.

Item 25 (Record No. 48, a derailment) is the fourth disaster to a "fast mail" train which the records have disclosed recently. In one of these cases the superintendent's report specifically states that reckless speed was one of the causes; the circumstances, as given, tend to support the conclusion that in the other three it was the sole cause.

The twenty-ninth accident, a butting collision, disastrous both to persons and to property, affords an illustration of the need of reading all telegraphic orders aloud, in the presence of two or more persons, if the orders are to be depended upon for the safety of life and limb.

This case differs from Item 24 in that there was no requirement that the order should be read aloud in the presence of the telegraph operator, or be signed for. The rule requiring these safeguards was relaxed, as is customary, because the order did not restrict the rights of the train to which it was sent; that is to say, it permitted this train to go farther than it would have gone if the order had not been issued. But it permitted it to go farther only as against a certain opposing train; and the reading into the order of the name or designation of another train, of which the dispatcher issuing the order had no thought, had the effect, of course, of nullifying all the calculations of the dispatcher and of the men in charge of the opposing train or trains.

TABLE No. 3.—Details of Table 1—Causes of accidents to employees in coupling and uncoupling cars,

Sub-	Causes.		rain- ien.	me	ain- n in rds.	Yard trainmen (switch- ing crews).		Otho plo	er em- yees.
C I Marie		Killed.	Injured.	Killed.	Injured.	Killed.	Injured.	Killed.	Injured.
1	Sticking of parts (bent pins, etc.), preventing quick work		9		8		8		• • • • •
2	Holding up pin by hand (presumably made necessary by defective uncoupling mechanism) Other causes, apparently due to defective uncou-		14	1	11	••••	22	• • • •	
4 5	pling mechanism  Defective draft gear, with automatic coupler  Coupling to an engine or tender	• • • •	1		4				
6 7	Same (with link-and-pin coupler)		1	••••	4 8		1 16		
9	Foot caught in or between couplers while adjust- ing coupler.  Slipped, usually on ice or snow	1	14 3 2	2	14 3	2	25 11	<u>i</u>	2
10 11 12	Foot caught in frog, guard rail, or switch	1	4	. 1 !	5 3 3	5	3 4	• • • •	
13 14 15			85 4 4	1	38 1 6	1	43 5 9		3 1
16 17	Link and pin, with automatic coupler  Coupling damaged car (presumably an unavoidable risk)		2 7	2	2 14	3	5 17		 გ
18	Uncoupling without using lever (presumably by reason of defective uncoupling mechanism)		16	2	30	2	35		-
19 20 21	Uncoupling, other causes  Miscellaneous  Not clearly explained	4 2 3	44 39 14	6 6	51 38 21	1 3 5	80	i	8 3 1
	Total	18	232	24	278	26	882	2	20

TABLE No. 4.—Details of Table 1—Causes of accidents to employees classified (C6 and C7) as falling from and getting on or off cars and engines.

Sub-	Causes.		rain- nen.	me	ain- en in rds.	Yard trainmen (switch- ing crews).		Otho plo	er em- yees.
class.		Killed.	Injured.	Killed.	Injured.	Killed.	Injured.	Killed.	Injured.
$\begin{bmatrix} 1 \\ 2 \end{bmatrix}$	Fell from roof of box car by reason of— Defect in car Ice or snow		4	•••	1		8		
3 4	Parting of train	2	11		8		7		1
C6 5	subclass 3	9	79 35	5 3	55 <b>8</b> 6		<b>80</b> <b>3</b> 5	9	27 5
6 7	Coal car		1 5	l	1		8		3
8 9	Engine or tender. Passenger car.	10	88 4	2	62	7	82	1	6
10 11	Engines, tenders, or cars (all kinds) not in motion  Miscellaneous causes	13	64 112		46 80	3	24 64		24 35
12  13  14	Not clearly explained.  Slipped getting on moving trains or cars  Jumping off moving trains	37	113	13   3   3	35 63 99	, 6 1	27 62 108	6	44
$\mathbf{C7} \begin{vmatrix} 15 \\ 16 \end{vmatrix}$	Jumping from engines or cars anticipating colli- sion, derailment, or other accident	8	85		12	   	18		2
17 18	hand holds and sill steps.  Getting on or off moving engine.  Caught in frog, guard rail, or switch	1 7	27 172 1	5	22 117	1 7	20 106 1		1 36
-	Total	<b> </b>	·[	39	<b>63</b> 8	35	590	48	270

#### [Public—No. 171.]

AN ACT requiring common carriers engaged in interstate commerce to make full reports of all accidents to the Interstate Commerce Commission.

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, It shall be the duty of the general manager, superintendent, or other proper officer of every common carrier engaged in interstate commerce by railroad to make to the Interstate Commerce Commission, at its office in Washington, District of Columbia, a monthly report, under oath, of all collisions of trains or where any train or part of a train accidentally leaves the track, and of all accidents which may occur to its passengers or employees while in the service of such common carrier and actually on duty, which report shall state the nature and causes thereof, and the circumstances connected therewith.

SEC. 2. That any common carrier failing to make such report within thirty days after the end of any month shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor and, upon conviction thereof by a court of competent jurisdiction, shall be punished by a fine of not more than one hundred dollars for each and every offense and for every day during which it shall fail to make such report after the time herein specified for making the same.

SEC. 3. That neither said report nor any part thereof shall be admitted as evidence or used for any purpose against such railroad so making such report in any suit or

action for damages growing out any matter mentioned in said report.

SEC. 4. That the Interstate Commerce Commission is authorized to prescribe for such common carriers a method and form for making the reports in the foregoing section provided.

Approved, March 3, 1901.

#### SPECIAL INFORMATION CONTAINED IN PRECEDING BULLETINS.

Each accident bulletin contains tables showing the number of passengers and employees killed and injured, and these figures are classified according to cause (see Table No. 1); also tables showing cost of the different classes of train accidents. The causes of accidents to employees in coupling and uncoupling and in falling from cars, etc., are further classified in Tables No. 3 and No. 4. Each bulletin is for three months, and No. 1 was for the quarter ending September 30, 1901. The bulletin for the quarter ending June 30 contains, in addition to the quarterly statistics, tables showing the same information for the whole of the fiscal year ending on that date.

Bulletin No. 1 contains brief notes on the most serious collisions in that quarter, 57 passengers having been killed. There are notes on the causes of complex accidents, explanatory of Table No. 3. Table No. 4 is supplemented by similar notes. In this quarter special mention was made of 130 casualties '4 killed, 128 injured, due to operating trains in which air brakes were used on only a portion of the cars; and the danger of running trains partially air-braked is commented on.

Bulletin No. 2 contains a detailed list showing the cost and causes of the 27 most serious butting collisions in that quarter. In these collisions 70 persons were killed and 234 were injured, and the damage to cars, engines, and roadway amounted to \$306,511. The incompleteness of the statements of causes, as sent in by the railroads, is commented on.

Bulletin No. 3 contains a list similar to that just mentioned, but showing rear instead of butting collisions. As in the first list, only the most serious accidents are considered; and of these there were 41, costing \$160,247. The number of persons killed was 43, and of injured 255.

Bulletin No. 4 contains a third list of collisions, this one including all classes; but it includes only a few in which the damage was less than \$5,000. The totals of this list are: Killed, 30; injured, 187; coet, \$228,597. Collisions occurring where the trainmen had worked very long hours are commented on. In this bulletin a table is given showing the deaths and injuries due to trains parting. The aggregate of damage shown in this table is \$492,781; persons killed, 14; injured, 386. The table shows that nearly all of the coupler failures which resulted in a collision or derailment were reported as due to "cause unknown."

Bulletin No. 5 contains a table of the most serious train accidents in the quarter. Derailments as well as collisions are included, but cases causing damages of less than \$10,000 each are not included, except where the cause of the accident calls for notice. The 23 accidents shown in this table killed 81 persons and injured 356, and the aggregate damage reported was, for the 23 cases, \$308,395. The causes of a few of the accidents are set forth in some detail. A table is given in this bulletin showing the cause (as reported) of each coupling accident in the quarter. The table fills 12 pages.

Bulletin No. 6 contains a list of the 34 most serious accidents in the quarter, with notes on the cause of each. One of these was a rear collision, killing 27 passengers. There is also a table giving notes on the causes of the 16 rear collisions which occurred in this quarter on railroads where the block system is in use. Comment is made on the large increase in the number of accidents to men in coupling, as compared with previous quarters; this is accompanied by a reprint of the amendment to the safty-appliance law which was passed in March, 1903.

Bulletin No. 7 (January, February, and March, 1903) contains the usual list of the most serious accidents (Class A). In collisions 46 passengers were killed, and the bulletin gives in detail the causes of a rear collision in which 23 persons were killed, and of a butting collision in which 8 persons were killed. In the butting collision the damage to cars and engines was \$79,450. A note is also given on the cause of a rear collision due to the inadequacy of the time-interval rule.

Bulletin No. 8 contains the usual statistics, including annual statistics to June 30, 1903, and the usual list of particulars of causes of the most serious accidents (Class A); and explains in detail the causes of two butting collisions. In one of these collisions a conductor gave a hand-signal to stop, which was taken by the engineman to mean go-ahead. In another case the men in charge of a train read "No. 2" when the order was written "second No. 2." This bulletin contains a list of all of the collisions of the quarter, of whatever magnitude, which were caused by mistakes in connection with time-tables or telegraphic orders.


# ACCIDENT BULLETIN,

No. 10.

OCTOBER, NOVEMBER, AND DECEMBER, 1903.

INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMMISSION, WASHINGTON, D. C.

WASHINGTON
GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
1904



# ACCIDENT BULLETIN,

No. 10,

# SHOWING COLLISIONS AND DERAILMENTS OF TRAINS

AND

# CASUALTIES TO PERSONS

DURING

OCTOBER, NOVEMBER, AND DECEMBER, 1903.

INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMMISSION, WASHINGTON, D. C.

WASHINGTON
GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
1904

### THE INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMMISSION.

Hon. MARTIN A. KNAPP, of New York, Chairman.

Hon. JUDSON C. CLEMENTS, of Georgia.

Hon. JAMES D. YEOMANS, of Iowa.

Hon. CHARLES A. PROUTY, of Vermont.

Hon. JOSEPH W. FIFER, of Illinois.

EDWARD A. MOSELEY, Secretary.

#### ACCIDENT BULLETIN No. 10.

# RAILROAD ACCIDENTS IN THE UNITED STATES

DURING THE

#### THREE MONTHS ENDING DECEMBER 31, 1903.

The number of persons killed in train accidents during the months of October, November, and December, 1903, as shown in reports made by the railroad companies to the Interstate Commerce Commission, under the "accident law" of March 3, 1901, was 446, and of injured 3,178. Accidents of other kinds, including those sustained by employees while at work, and by passengers in getting on or off the cars, etc., bring the total number of casualties up to 14,485 (1,166 killed and 13,319 injured). These accidents are classified in the following table. These reports deal only with (a) passengers and (b) employees on duty.

Table No. 1.—Summary of casualties to persons—October, November, and December, 1903.

	Passen- gers.		Trai	nmen.	m	rain- en in ards.	trai (sw	ard nmen vitch- ing ews).	Other employees.		Total employees.	
	Killed.	Injured.	Killed.	Injured.	Killed.	Injured.	Killed.	Injured.	Killed.	Injured.	Killed.	Injured.
Collisions  Derailments  Miscellaneous train accidents (excluding the above), in- cluding locomotive-boiler ex-	73 74	789 344	110 66	634 279	. 14 · 8	201 54	10 3	91 45		232 65	189 83	1, 158 443
plosions	• • • •	15	17	232	5	120	4	55	1	22	27	429
Total train accidents	147	1,148	193	1,145	27	375	17	191	62	319	299	2,030
Coupling or uncoupling			19	259	32	238	24	407	3	22	78	926
switches Coming in contact with over- head bridges, structures at	* • • •		10	1,256	13	637	10	474	19	441	52	2,811
ride of track, etc	1	7	18	149	4	67	2	83	6	8	30	307
Falling from cars or engines, or while getting on or off Other causes	21 6	406 376	79 31	882 136	52 36	640 115	50 25	694 121	29 230	262 2,458	210 322	2, 478 2, 830
Total (other than train accidents)	28	789	157	2,682	137	1,697	111	1,779	287	3, 194	692	9, 352
Total all classes	175	1,937	350	3,827	164	${2,072}$	128	1.970	349	3, 513	991	11,382

Note.—Accidents to employees resulting in slight injuries which do not prevent the employee injured from performing his accustomed service for more than three days, in the aggregate, during the ten days immediately following the accident are not reported.

The derailment which is numbered 4 in the table of causes below was the worst passenger-train accident, measuring by the number of fatalities, that has occurred in this country for fifteen years; and the present record contains six other accidents which caused 106 deaths and 196 injuries, so that this quarter's totals are larger than any

before reported. The casualties to passengers in train accidents during the time since the accident law went into effect have been as follows:

Passengers killed and injured in train accidents.

Quarter ending with—	Bulletin number.	Killed.	Injured.
Sept., 1901. Dec., 1901. Mar., 1902. June, 1902. Sept., 1902. Dec., 1903. June, 1903. Sept., 1903. Sept., 1903. Dec., 1903.	2 8 4 5 6 7 8	57 51 41 18 41 40 52 31 60 147	1,237 762 826 761 1,229 1,097 1,091 1,669 1,148

The number killed in the quarter now under review, the last in this list (147), is more than three times the average number killed during the nine preceding quarters, which average is 434. It appears that only four other train accidents have occurred in this country which have caused as many as 65 deaths each. These four are recorded as follows:

Year.	Locality.	Killed.
1887	Mud Run, Pa Chatsworth, Ill Ashtabula, Ohio Camp Hill, Pa	85 80

Some notes on the causes of the notable collisions and derailments recorded in this bulletin will be found following the table of Class A accidents (below).

The total number of collisions and derailments was 3,011 (1,832 collisions and 1,179 derailments), of which 287 collisions and 119 derailments affected passenger trains. The damage to cars, engines, and roadway by these accidents amounted to \$2,527,000. Given more in detail, these facts appear as below:

TABLE No. 2.—Collisions and derailments.

	Num- ber.	Loss.	Persons killed.	Persons injured.
Collisions, rear Collisions, butting Collisions, trains separating Collisions, miscellaneous	296 287	\$469, 713 527, 075 154, 549 340, 012	88 126 10 38	522 771 99 555
Total	1,832	1, 491, 349	262	1,947
Derailments due to defects of roadway, etc.  Derailments due to defects of equipment.  Derailments due to negligence of trainmen, signalmen, etc.  Derailments due to unforeseen obstruction, etc.  Derailments due to malicious obstruction of track, etc.  Derailments due to miscellaneous causes.	570 98 66	126, 656 461, 520 98, 913 89, 641 57, 121 201, 800	10 14 11 79 6 37	123 141 137 91 73 227
Total	1,179	1, 035, 651	157	787
Total collisions and derailments	3,011	2, 527, 000	419	2, 734

NOTE.—Collisions and derailments which cause no death or personal injury and which cause not over \$150 damage to the property of the railroad are not reported.

Following is the usual list of Class A train accidents; all in which the damage is reported at \$10,000 or over; notable cases in which passengers are killed; and those doing damage less than \$10,000 and down to \$2,000, wherever the circumstances or the cause may be of particular interest:

Causes of thirty-two prominent train accidents (Class A).

[Nors.—R. stands for rear collision; B., butting collision; M., miscellaneous collisions; D., derail-ment; P., passenger train, F., freight and miscellaneous trains.]

COLLISIONS.

					003	3210101101
_ [						
- 1						
No.	Cl					
1						
- 1						
- 1						
	_					
1	R	F. and F 17	35	<b>997</b> 5	2	Collision of work trains; laborers in caboose killed;
- 1					i	failure of brakeman to stop train by flag; this brakeman (38 years old) was a yardman, but had
ŀ					1	passed examination for appointment as road flag-
i	_	<b>_</b>   .	١			man.
2,	В	F. and F	2	2,100	- 11	Engineman disregarded meeting order; operator at meeting point had copy of order, but failed to stop
						train; engineman's experience as such, 9 months;
- 1		l. I.				operator's experience, 12 days.
3	м	P 0	4	5, 100	17	Passenger train ran over misplaced switch and col-
-	i					lided with cars on side track; switch left wrong by fireman, to whom brakeman had wrongfully
		1 1				delegated the duty; fireman's experience, 9 months;
	-	1	ا م. ا			had been on duty 20 hours.
- 4	В	P. and F 1	16	5, 335	58	Misplaced switch and false signal at interlocking; interlocking had been disconnected for repairs
	4	1 !				repairman and 3 signalmen disregarded rule to use
_	_	l l.	Ι.Ι			hand signals under such circumstances.
5	В	F. and F 2	1	7,000	10	Engineman slept and ran post train-order signal; on duty 9 hours 45 minutes, after 3 hours' rest, con-
		1				ductor in caboose, engaged in making report, did
						not observe signal.
6	ı R.	P. and P 32	88	7, 100	27	Two coaches crushed and destroyed by fire, started presumably by oil lamps; flagman of train stand-
		;				ing at station failed to signal approaching train;
_ '	١ ـ	l	ايا			engineman of latter falled to keep good lookout.
7	B	F. and F 2	2	7,700	12	Conductor misread name of station in telegraphic order; engineman (who was killed) is claimed by
		1 1				conductor to have read it in the same way; operator
		l i		]		to whom order was read by conductor claims that
		l I				it was read correctly; order was legibly written; conductor's experience as such, 2 months; engine-
		1 1	١. ا			man's experience on this line, I month, flagman's,
	l _			!	_	8 months; fireman's, 1 month.
8	В	P. and P 16	25	8, 200	5	Collision of extra passenger train with switching train in yard, conductor and engineman of pas-
			'		i l	senger train disregarded rule to run through yard
_	_	l	١			with speed under control.
9	В	Fand F 16	20	8,464	37	Work train continued to occupy main track after expiration of time specified in dispatcher's order
10	В	Fand F 0	3	9,200	65	Train became uncontrollable on descending grade;
	_		1			after leaving a cur the men in charge had neg-
						lected to connect air hose, and power brake was therefore ineffective.
11	В	Pand P 2	31	10, 230	54	Engineman (who was killed) forgot meeting order
	_	• ,,				and ran 8,000 feet beyond meeting station; en-
		l .				gineman had neglected to sound the required whistle signal on approaching meeting point, and
		ľ				conductor neglected to apply air brake, as he
			_		]	should have done when such signal was omitted.
12	В	Pand F, 1	7	10, 427	61	Freight train waited on side track for train No. 14, and men in charge slept; another train passed and
		l i	'	'		they assumed that it was No. 14.
13	M	F 0	2	10,770	18	On descending grade, train broke in two, doing
	l	1				alight damage; both parts of train were stopped by automatic application of brakes, but not enough
	1	<u> </u>				hand brakes were set to hold the train, the air
		<u> </u>	_			leaked off, and the cars run away. (See text below.)
14	В	F and F 1	2	12,000	16	Engineman, who was to meet two trains, met one
	}	1	1			and forgot about the other, all members of crew blamed for not remonstrating when engineman
		I I	١.,			started from station on the time of the other Unin.
	-	-				

## Causes of thirty-two prominent train accidents (Class A)—Continued.

#### ${\bf COLLISIONS-Continued.}$

No.	Class.	Kind of train.	Killed.	Injured.	Damage to engines, cars, and road-way.	Reference to record.	Cause.
15	M	F and F	3	4	<b>\$</b> 12,080	39	Collision at crossing; rule required both trains to
16	В	P and P	18	57	15,720	56	stop before crossing; both disobeyed. Engineman ran past station at which he should have stopped for a dispatcher's order; station agent says train-order signal was set to indicate stop; engineman says it indicated all clear; immediately after passage of train (5.30 p. m.) light in signal was found to have been extinguished by wind.
17	R	P. and F	1	11	17,000	48	Fifteen cars of freight train, left standing on steep grade, ran back into head of following passenger train; cars when left were held by air brakes on 4 and hand brake on 1 (caboose); conductor's ex- perience, 2 years; damage largely caused by fire started from ruptured gas pipe or tank.
18	В	P. and F	4	5	18,000	8	Conductor and engineman of freight misread time- table.
19	В	P. and P	3	6	20,800	3	Conductor and engineman, running 4 hours late, overlooked opposing train.
20 21	BB	P. and F F. and F	6	12 5	21, 400 26, 900	59 34	Engineman of freight misread telegraphic order. Mistake of operator in writing order and recklessness of conductor and two enginemen; damage largely due to fire and explosion. (See explanation in text below.)
	Tota	al collisions	126	288	236, 501		

#### DERAILMENTS.

2	<b>i)</b>	P	7	• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •			
2				21	\$21, 134	74	Passenger train obliged to take sidetrack, because of delay to freight, entered too fast, flagman of freight having neglected to signal the passenger to reduce speed.
}	D	F	1	2	4,000	40	Broken wheel; wheel overheated by hand brake being left on too long by brakeman of one year's experience. Of 33 cars in train only 6 had power brakes working.
3	D	F.	1	2	7,000	43	Train became uncontrollable on descending grade (11 per cent). Of 40 cars in train 30 had power brakes in operation. Rule requires speed to be regulated by hand brakes, but engineman had used air brakes for this purpose and lacked power to apply brakes to make stop.
4	D	P	65   . 	4	9, 800	73	Track obstructed by timbers which had fallen from an open car, because load was not securely fastened; car inspectors failed to detect defective stakes. See details in text below.
5	D	P F	1	33	10,000	20	Broken journal.
6	D	_	0	0	13,000	22	Broke through burning trestle bridge; dense fog obstructed view of bridge.
7	D	P	0	27	15,000	23	Rails maliciously loosened. Criminal was caught, tried, and sentenced to life imprisonment.
8	D	P	1	4	17,500	44	Broke through burning trestle bridge; bridge had been ignited by camp fire made by tramps.
9	D	<b>P</b> ,	3	34	18,700	72	Misplaced switch; engineman, running at high speed, disregarded distant and home signals warning him to stop before reaching switch.
10	D	P	1	7	21,818	26	Failure of Howe truss bridge. Cause of failure reported unknown. Timbers in bridge mostly six years old.
11	D	P	3	12	43, 300	76	Cause unknown; supposed to be defective track. Of the damage \$37,300 was due to fire which started from coal heater in wrecked passenger car.
	Tota	derailments.	83	146	181, 252		
	-	l collisions ad derail- ents	209	434	417, 753		

The accidents referred to on page 3, in connection with derailment No. 4, are (in the order of the magnitude of their death lists) collisions 6, 16, 1, 8, and 9, and derailment No. 1. These seven accidents constitute the most noticeable factor in making this quarter's lists more disastrous than any thus far recorded. Derailment No. 4 happened to an eastbound passenger train, running at about 40 or 45 miles an hour. It struck an obstruction, consisting of heavy timbers 21 feet long, derailing the entire train except the two rear cars. The timbers had fallen from a car in a westbound train on the adjacent track by reason of stake ties parting and stakes breaking. The timbers (a full carload) were loaded at a lumber yard, and the cause of the accident is reported as "carelessness on the part of employees of the lumber yard in not selecting stakes of good quality and size to make the load secure, and failure of car inspectors to detect this defect." The timbers were loaded by the shipper, and the load was inspected by the agent of the railroad company at the shipping station. It was also inspected by two successive conductors, who were in charge of the train which hauled the car to the first division point, and by the car inspector at this division point. This inspector has been in the employ of the company, in the capacity of car inspector, for sixteen years. Before the car left this place the load was inspected by the assistant yard master, and by the brakeman, who was charged with the duty of putting the car into the train for its trip over the next division; and, finally, by the conductor of this last train. The car was a platform car and the load was 5 feet 10 inches high. The stakes at the sides, set in pockets of the ordinary pattern, were connected across the top of the load by ties consisting of boards, each board being nailed to the side of a stake on one side of the car, and in the same manner to a stake on the opposite side. The passengers who were killed were nearly all of them scalded by steam which escaped from the dome of the engine, which, as a result of the wreck, was left in such a position as to emit steam into the leading passenger car, which was the smoking car. The passengers in the other cars escaped injury.

In view of the exceptional nature of this accident, it will be of interest to note that in the quarter under review there were five other derailments, which were caused by objects on the track which had fallen from cars, as follows:

		Killed,	Injured.	Loss.
77 78 79 80 81	Car door	1 0 0 0	1 1 4 0	\$2,770 150 1,000 \$25

Collision No. 6, resulting in the death of 32 passengers, was due to negligence on the part of the men in charge of both of the trains involved, combined with fire; the destruction of the two passenger

cars of the foremost train by fire, which presumably started from their oil lamps, having been, according to the railroad company's report, a principal element contributing to the large loss of life and large property damage. The foremost train, an accommodation, was standing at a station, and had been so standing two or three minutes. It was behind time, and the following train, an express, was already due. Notwithstanding these facts the flagman did not go back to give a warning signal until after he had assisted the passengers to alight, and he was then able to go only about 200 feet before the express was upon him. The engineman of the express could have seen the local train's red lights (on the rear car) at a point 2,800 feet in the rear. Presumably, the flagman's knowledge of this fact affords a partial explanation of his neglect. On the other hand, the omission of the engineman of the express to apply the brakes and reduce the speed of his train appears to be taken by the officers of the road to prove that he was not keeping a good lookout, and therefore did not observe the red light of the standing train as soon as he should have observed it. The flagman of the standing train testifies that the engineman of the express did not give the whistle signal, which should have been sounded as an acknowledgment that he saw the flagman's light. This flagman had been in the service of the company five The conductor in charge of this train, who should have seen that the flagman promptly performed his duty, has been in the service fifteen years, and his record is reported as good. The engineman of the express has been in the service twenty-six years, and his record is reported as first class.

Collision No. 16 occurred at a time when a violent storm of wind and snow prevailed. Of the men whose contradictory testimony is noted in the table above, the station agent has been in the service of the company thirty-five years, the engineman twenty-six years, and the fireman three years, and all are reported as having clear records. The statements of these men were given not only to the officers of the road, but also before a coroner. If the signal was in the "stop" position, the fact that the light had been extinguished afforded no excuse to an engineman for disregarding it, as it would be his duty in such a case to reduce his speed, or, if necessary, to come to a full stop, in order to learn the reason why the light was not burning or to be able to see the signal by the light of the locomotive headlight. The agent testified that the same light had been extinguished by the wind before on the same evening, and that the light of another lamp of the same style had also been blown out.

The causes of collisions 1 and 8 are explained in the table as fully as it is possible to explain them from the reports which have been received. The 17 persons killed in the first mentioned were all employees, being laborers on a work train, while the 16 killed in the

other were all passengers. The fact that such terrible results may be produced by such simple lapses must be taken to indicate either a grave defect in the methods of managing trains or serious deficiencies in the qualifications of the man or men at fault.

The men responsible for collision No. 9 were the conductor and engineman in charge of the work train. They had been in the service of the company five years; the conductor was 28 years old and the engineman 36. By way of explanation of his error the engineman said that his engine was not working properly, and that in looking for the trouble more time was consumed than he was aware of. The supply of water in the tender had also run low and he was anxious to reach a water station. In this case, as in No. 1, the victims were all employees on a work train.

Collision No. 21 was the result of an error in a train order. train dispatcher issued an order that train No. 31 would meet train third, No. 52, engine 745, and train No. 34, engine 755, at G. This order was transmitted simultaneously to operators at L. and H. operator at L. delivered copies to third No. 52 and No. 34, in proper shape; but the operator at H. delivered to No. 31 an order directing that train to meet No. 34 at G., but omitting any mention of train third No. 52. The dispatcher and the operator at L. state that the operator at H. repeated the order back to the dispatcher correctly. It is supposed that this operator took the order correctly, but that he wrote it down in bad shape, and that in recopying the order (recopying is contrary to the rule) he omitted train third No. 52. He has had three years' experience as operator, and had been on duty about eight hours when he took this order. The collision would have been avoided if the conductor and the two enginemen of train No. 31 had done their duty. At G. they took the siding and were met by train third No. 52, with engine 745. They assumed that this was train No. 34 and that a mistake had been made in the number of the engine shown on their order. Without taking proper steps to ascertain if such was really the case, and in violation of the rule, they started out and met No. 34 at high speed. The two enginemen paid the penalty of their error with their lives. One of them had four years' experience as engineer, the other one and one-half years. The conductor has had thirteen years' experience in that capacity.

Concerning collision No. 13, the superintendent reports that he did not blame the trainmen. The train consisted of 53 cars, and it was going down a steep grade (2 per cent) at midnight. It broke in two behind the eleventh car. The whole train being air-braked, both portions were automatically stopped (how far apart is not stated). The conductor was the only man at the rear of the train, and he went back to flag a following train. The two brakemen were on the front part, and before they could get back to the rear portion and set enough

hand brakes to hold it the air leaked off and the 42 cars of the rear part ran forward into the 11 cars of the front part, making a wreck costing \$10,770.

It is hardly necessary to observe that the events recorded in this distressing record have been topics of much discussion in the daily press during the months covered by the report; nor should it be necessary to call attention to the fact that the casualties and losses here set forth have an important bearing in connection with the proposition to extend the use of the block system, which was embodied in the Seventeenth Annual Report of the Commission. Derailment No. 4 has, indeed, no place in a discussion of the block system; but the other derailment (No. 1) and all of the five prominent collisions occurred under circumstances which have been repeated in hundreds of collisions, and these circumstances are the result of defects for which the block system is universally looked upon as the remedy. That is to say, the block system, while not doing away with every element which contributed to the causes of these collisions, does introduce principles of a different character and does promote habits of obedience and precision which have been found to greatly reduce the death and damage record.

TABLE No. 3.—Details of Table 1—Causes of accidents to employees in coupling and uncoupling cars.

Sub-	Causes.	Train men.		Train men in yards.		Yard train men (switch- ing crews).		Other employees.	
class.		Killed.	Injured.	Killed.	Injured.	Killed.	Injured.	Killed.	Injured.
1	Sticking of parts (bent pins, etc.), preventing quick work		10	1	7	1	18	;	1
2	Holding up pin by hand (presumably made necessary by defective uncoupling mechanism)		16		25		25		
3 4	Other causes, apparently due to defective uncoupling mechanism	1	3 2		5 8	1	4	••••	2
5 6	Coupling to an engine or tender	2	12	1	11 2		15 3	1	2
7	Coupling on inside of sharp curve.  Foot caught in or between couplers while adjusting	1	8	1	5	3	29		1
9	coupler	1	13 14	2	13 7	2			1
10 11	Foot caught in frog, guard rail, or switch	2	1 4	1	2 2	5	5 3		2
12	Load shifted.		2		1	· !	1		• • • • •
13 14	Engaged in operations preliminary to coupling While coupling safety chains	5	28	8	29	3	45 1	1	3
15	Link-and-pin coupler		4		1		9		• • • • • •
16	Link and pin, with automatic	• • • •	4		2		2		• • • • • •
17	Coupling damaged cars (presumably an unavoidable risk)	1	8	1	17	5	23	]	•
18	Uncoupling without using lever (presumably by reason of defective uncoupling mechanism)		8	1	5	1	19		•
19	Uncoupling, other causes	2	48	1	39	1	73		1
20 21	Miscellaneous	1	49 25	5 15	46 16	2	68 <b>26</b>	··i	2 1
	Total	19	259	32	288	24	407	8	22

TABLE No. 4.—Details of Table 1—Causes of accidents to employees classified (C6 and C7) as falling from and getting on or off cars and engines.

Sub- class.	Causes.	Train- men.		Trainmen in yards.		Yard trainmen (switch- ing crews).		Other employees.	
		Killed.	Injured.	Killed.	Injured.	Killed.	Injured.	Killed.	Injured.
1 2 3 4	Fell from roof of box car by reason of— Defect in car Ice or snow Parting of train Derailment, collision, or shock due to abnormal movements of cars other than those in	2	6 11 9	1	4 7 8	1 1	3 10 13		3
C6 5	subclass 3	1	55 27	5 4	50 27	5 5	83 52	2	10 1
6 7 8 9	Coal car Freight car other than box or coal car Engine or tender Passenger car Engines, tenders, or cars (all kinds) not in		56 31	4	2 2 51 1	6	5 1 32 1	6	10 2 14 1
11 12 (13	motion  Miscellaneous causes  Not clearly explained  Slipped getting on moving trains or cars  Jumping off moving trains	10 31 7	66 89 40 80 157	3 17 4 7	50 67 24 51 104	1 5 10 5	62	5 6 6	27 43 12 33 54
15	Jumping on moving trains  Jumping from engines or cars anticipating collision, derailment, or other accident  Fell from engines or cars by reason of defective handholds and sill steps	2	31	7	15 26	2	9 25	ı	2
17 18	Getting on or off moving engine	8	200		151	8	154 3	3	49
	Total	79	882	52	640	50	694	29	26

#### [Public—No. 171.]

AN ACT requiring common carriers engaged in interstate commerce to make full reports of all accidents to the Interstate Commerce Commission.

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, It shall be the duty of the general manager, superintendent, or other proper officer of every common carrier engaged in interstate commerce by railread to make to the Interstate Commerce Commission, at its office in Washington, District of Columbia, a monthly report, under oath, of all collisions of trains or where any train or part of a train accidently leaves the track, and of all accidents which may occur to its passengers or employees while in the service of such common carrier and actually on duty; which report shall state the nature and causes thereof, and the circumstances connected therewith.

SEC. 2. That any common carrier failing to make such report within thirty days after the end of any month shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor and, upon conviction thereof by a court of competent jurisdiction, shall be punished by a fine of not more than one hundred dollars for each and every offense and for every day during which it shall fail to make such report after the time herein specified for making the same.

SEC. 3. That neither said report nor any part thereof shall be admitted as evidence or used for any purpose against such railroad so making such report in any suit or action for damages growing out of any matter mentioned in said report.

SEC. 4. That the Interstate Commerce Commission is authorized to prescribe for such common carriers a method and form for making the reports in the foregoing section provided.

Approved, March 3, 1901.


			•		
•					
•	•				
		_			
		•			
			•		
•					
•					
			•		
			•	•	

#### SPECIAL INFORMATION CONTAINED IN PRECEDING BULLETINS.

- Each accident bulletin contains tables showing the number of passengers and employees killed and injured, and these figures are classified according to cause (see Table No. 1); also tables showing cost of the different classes of train accidents. The causes of accidents to employees in coupling and uncoupling and in falling from cars, etc., are further classified in Tables No. 3 and No. 4. Each bulletin is for three months, and No. 1 was for the quarter ending September 30, 1901. The bulletin for the quarter ending June 30 contains, in addition to the quarterly statistics, tables showing the same information for the whole of the fiscal year ending on that date.
- Bulletin No. 1 contains brief notes on the most serious collisions in that quarter, 57 passengers having been killed. There are notes on the causes of coupler accidents, explanatory of Table No. 3. Table No. 4 is supplemented by similar notes. In this quarter special mention was made of 130 casualties (4 killed, 126 injured) due to operating trains in which air brakes were used on only a portion of the cars; and the danger of running trains partially air-braked is commented on.
- Bulletin No. 2 contains a detailed list showing the cost and causes of the 27 most serious butting collisions in that quarter. In these collisions 70 persons were killed and 234 were injuried, and the damage to cars, engines, and roadway amounted to \$306,511. The incompleteness of the statements of causes, as sent in by the railroads, is commented on.
- Bulletin No. 3 contains a list similar to that just mentioned, but showing rear instead of butting collisions. As in the first list, only the most serious accidents are considered; and of these there were 41, costing \$160,247. The number of persons killed was 43, and of injured 255.
- Bulletin No. 4 contains a third list of collisions, this one including all classes; but it includes only a few in which the damage was less than \$5,000. The totals of this list are: Killed. 30; injured, 187; cost, \$228,597. Collisions occurring where the trainmen had worked very long hours are commented on. In this bulletin a table is given showing the deaths and injuries due to trains parting. The aggregate of damage shown in this table is \$492,781; persons killed, 14; injured, 386. The table shows that nearly all of the coupler failures which resulted in a collision or derailment were reported as due to "cause unknown."
- Bulletin No. 5 contains a table of the most serious train accidents in the quarter. Derailments as well as collisions are included. The causes of a few of the accidents are set forth in some detail. A table is given in this bulletin showing the cause (as reported) of each coupling accident in the quarter. The table fills 12 pages.
- Bulletin No. 6 contains a list of the 34 most serious accidents in the quarter. One of these was a rear collision, killing 27 passengers. There is also a table giving notes on the causes of the 16 rear collisions which occurred in this quarter on railroads where the block system is in use. Comment is made on the large increase in the number of accidents to men in coupling, as compared with previous quarters.
- Bulletin No. 7 contains the usual list of the most serious accidents (Class A). In collisions 46 passengers were killed, and the bulletin gives in detail the causes of a rear collision in which 23 persons were killed. A note is also given on the cause of a rear collision due to the inadequacy of the time-interval rule.

Bulletin No. 8 contains the usual statistics, including annual statistics to June 30, 1903, and explains in detail the causes of two butting collisions. In one of these collisions a conductor gave a hand-signal to stop, which was taken by the engineman to mean go-ahead. In another case the men in charge of a train read "No. 2" when the order was written "second No. 2." This bulletin contains a list of all the collisions of the quarter, of whatever magnitude, which were caused by mistakes in connection with time-tables or telegraphic orders.

Bulletin No. 9 records two collisions in which 44 persons were killed, one due to careless handling of a telegraphic order and the other to gross negligence of an engineman, who failed to keep the air-brakes in working order. Reference is made to the derailment of four fast mail trains by reason of reckless speed.







# ACCIDENT BULLETIN,

No. 11,

# SHOWING COLLISIONS AND DERAILMENTS OF TRAINS

AND

# CASUALTIES TO PERSONS

**DURING** 

JANUARY, FEBRUARY, AND MARCH, 1904.

INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMMISSION,
WASHINGTON, D. C.

WASHINGTON:
GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE.
1904.

## THE INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMMISSION.

Hon. MARTIN A. KNAPP, of New York, Chairman.

Hon. JUDSON C. CLEMENTS, of Georgia.

Hon. JAMES D. YEOMANS, of Iowa.

Hon. CHARLES A. PROUTY, of Vermont.

Hon. JOSEPH W. FIFER, of Illinois.

EDWARD A. MOSELEY, Secretary.

#### ACCIDENT BULLETIN No. 11.

## RAILROAD ACCIDENTS IN THE UNITED STATES

DURING THE

## THREE MONTHS ENDING MARCH 31, 1904.

The number of persons killed in train accidents during the months of January, February, and March, 1904, as shown in reports made by the railroad companies to the Interstate Commerce Commission, under the "accident law" of March 3, 1901, was 221, and of injured 2,797. Accidents of other kinds, including those sustained by employees while at work, and by passengers in getting on or off the cars, etc., bring the total number of casualties up to 919 killed and 12,444 injured. These accidents are classified in the following table. These reports deal only with (a) passengers and (b) employees on duty.

Table No. 1.—Summary of casualties to persons—January, February, and March, 1904.

		leen-	Trainmen. Trainmen in yards.			trai (su i	ard nmen vitch- ng ews).	Other em-   ployees.		Total em- ployees,		
	Killed.	Injured.	Killed.	Injured.	Killed.	Injured.	Killed.	Injured.	Killed.	Injured.	Killed.	Injured.
Collisions Derailments Miscellaneous train accidents (excluding the above), in-	33 7	661 813	57 43	554 234	15 7	259   49	15 4	89 48	12	104 60	69 56	1,006 391
cluding locomotive boiler ex- plosions		21	14	<b>26</b> 8	6	73	4	49	3	15	27	405
Total train accidents	40	995	114	1,056	28	381	23	186	16	179	181	1,802
Coupling or uncoupling		• • • • • •	15	214	18	210	36i	414	1	19	70	857
switches	•••	••••	16	1,299	13	623	14	501	22	<b>403</b>	65	<sup>1</sup> 2,8 <b>26</b>
head bridges, structures out- side of track, etc		2	22	146	3	83	9	72	3	16	37	317
while getting on or off Other causes	25 14	295 298	57 32	908 136	20 37	639 137	47 27	683 118	19 248	223 2, 208	143 344	2, 453 2, 599
Total (other than train accidents)	39	595	142	2, 703	91	1,692	133	1,788	298	2, 869	659	9, 052
Total all classes	79	1,590	256	3, 759	119	2,073	156	1,974	309	3,048	840	10,854

Note.—Accidents to employees resulting in slight injuries which do not prevent the employee injured from performing his accustomed service for more than three days, in the aggregate, during the ten days immediately following the accident are not reported.

The most prominent items in the foregoing table show a gratifying falling off, both from the figures of the preceding quarter (Bulletin No. 10) and from those of this quarter a year ago (Bulletin No. 7), though, of course, it is only in making such a comparison that any gratification can be found in a record of deaths averaging 10 persons a day. The number of employees killed by falling off cars, etc. (143), is 32 per cent less than the record in Bulletin No. 10. This, very likely, may be due to the increased use of air brakes on freight trains, diminishing the necessity for the men in charge of such trains to ride on the tops of box cars. It seems hardly likely that it is due to a difference in weather conditions, for January, February, and March probably were, as a whole, much colder and more icy than the last three months of 1903. This diminution in the figures as a whole is made in spite of a record of passengers killed in one class-collisionswhich is large. Of the 33 fatalities in this class, 18 are chargeable to one collision (No. 18 in Class A).

The total number of collisions and derailments was 2,799 (1,659 collisions and 1,140 derailments), of which 294 collisions and 144 derailments affected passenger trains. The damage to cars, engines, and roadway by these accidents amounted to \$2,256,477. Given more in detail, these facts appear as below:

Num-Persons 1 Persons Loss. ber. killed. injured. 526 **\$**536, 056 40 Collisions, rear..... Collisions, butting ..... 217 390, 213 56 546 102, 038 334, 506 238 1 96 Collisions, trains separating ..... 678 49× Collisions, miscellaneous ..... 1,659 1, 362, 813 132 1,667 172, 900 411, 625 Derailments due to defects of roadway, etc..... 217 **ZZ**Z 11 530 10 124 74 80, 423 (ti Derailments due to unforseen obstruction, etc ..... 82, 148 110 93 15 Derailments due to malicious obstruction of track, etc..... 11,964 23 134,604 Derailments due to miscellaneous causes..... 161 212 17 1,140 893,664 62 704 Total collisions and derailments..... 2, 256, 477 2,371 2,799 194

TABLE No. 2.—Collisions and derailments.

Note.—Collisions and derailments which cause no death or personal injury and which cause not over \$150 damage to the property of the milroad are not reported.

Following is the usual list of Class A train accidents—all in which the damage is reported at \$10,000 or over, notable cases in which passengers are killed, and those doing damage less than \$10,000 and down to \$2,000, wherever the circumstances or the cause may be of particular interest:

### Causes of twenty-six prominent train accidents (Class A).

[NOTE.—R. stands for rear collision; B., butting collision; M., miscellaneous collisions; D., derailment; P., passenger train; F., freight and miscellaneous trains.]

#### COLLISIONS.

. —		1	1	i	上で	c	1
					en-	-	
No.	Class.	Kind of train.		<u>.</u> ا	e to	n c e	Cause.
				l red	nag nes.	rec	<b></b>
	ļ		Killed	Injured	Damage to gdnes, cars, roadway.	Referen ce record.	
1	В	F. and F	0	3	\$2,300	59	Dispatcher (experienced, and with good record)
2	В	F. and F	1	0	2,400	55	
3	В	F. and F	0	16	3, 160	15	utes before reaching meeting point. Sixteen employees, who were injured, were riding in caboose, which was the leading car of a work train moving westward; engineman of eastbound
4	В	P. and F	0	6	3,600	54	passenger train misread name of station in order.
5	В	F. and F	0	4	3, 900	40	train.  Butting collision of extra freight trains; dispatcher failed to make meeting point; his experience 13
6	В	P. and P	0	14	4,941	52	months as dispatcher, 12 years as operator.  Conductor neglected to deliver meeting order to engineman.
7	B	F. and F	0	3	5,000	14	Operator, 8 months' experience, failed to deliver order.
8	В	F. and F	1	0	5,900	41	Flagman, who had been ordered to hold one of the trains, went into caboose to get red light; sat down to warm himself and dry his clothes; fell asleep;
y	В	P. and F	.1	2	7, 298	11	had been on duty 16½ hours.  Engineman and fireman of empty engine misread telegraphic order; engineman in handing order to fireman told him what it read, but did not tell him correctly; order read "2d No. 1;" these men read
10	В	F. and F	1	8	7, 400	57	it No. 1. Operator failed to notify southbound train that a northbound train, first section, had brought to that
11	В	F. and F	2	1	8, 730	60	point signals for a second section.  Operator signed conductor's name to order, but then failed to deliver it; expected conductor to come into office for clearance card, but conductor neglected this duty; both experienced men.
12 13	R	P. and P F. and F		11 4	10, 242 10, 400	2 7	
14	В	P. and P	2	8	12, 526	33	
15	M	P. and F	3	3	14, 500	30	Passenger train ran past station; in setting back, ran over a switch, which had meantime been turned, and crushed caboose of freight train on side track; 3 passengers in caboose killed; freight brakeman, in charge of switch, 22 years old; on duty 14 hours 58 minutes.
16	B	P. and F	5	8	17, 100	53	Engineman of north-bound train neglected to examine register, and so was ignorant of nonarrival of south-bound train; proceeded and collided with it at 30 miles an hour. Engineman depended on conductor to check south-bound train, but conductor
17	В	P. and F	0	9	19,000	13	bound freights; waited only for 3; operator also at
18	B	P. and F	18	37	26, 500	8	fault for clearing signal.  Occurred 1 a. m.; passenger train passed a meeting station without stopping; conductor and engineman did not correctly identify freight met at station.
19	M	P	0	11	27, 180	61	1
20	R	P. and P	4	9	29, 400	. 1	Foremost train standing at water tank; second train following too closely; furious snows torm and wind, and very low temperature.
	Tota	d	38	157	211, 477		
		<del></del>		1	i	1	<u> </u>

Causes of twenty-six prominent train accidents (Class A)—Continued.

#### DERAILMENTS.

No.	Class.	Kind of train.	Killed.	Injured.	Damages to engrines, cars, and roadway.	Reference to record.	Cause.
1	Ď	P F F	0		\$10,300	29	Unkno.vn.
2 3	D	i.	0	0	10,400	65	Broken wheel.
3	D		0	0	11,500	24	On 11 per cent grade; air brakes failed; extremely cold weather; packing leather in air-brake cylinders frozen, allowing air to leak out; engineman, 31 years' experience, failed to call for hand brakes in season.
4	D	F	0	0	11,901	48	Broken flange; wheel cast-iron, 33 inches. 600 pounds, made in 1893; chill was too deep and wheel was not bored true.
5	D	P P	0	0	14, 121	44	Track distorted by solar heat.
5 6	D	P	0	0	23, 260	49	Misplaced switch; wreck burned by fire starting in oil which ran out of the tender.
	Tota	ì	0	7	81,482		
	Tota and me		38	164	292, 959		

Only one accident in this list rises to the magnitude of the seven cases which made such an appalling exhibit in Bulletin No. 10; that one is collision No. 18, a butting collision, in which 18 passengers were killed. The circumstances of this case are typical of those features of train management which give rise to the charge, often repeated in various public prints, that American railroad management is reck-The men in charge of the passenger train in this case had positive written orders to look out for (and meet) a freight train, with an engine of a certain number, at a certain place. This order was delivered to and read by both the conductor and the engineman. The freight train had not reached the appointed meeting place, and the only thing to be done by the men in charge of the passenger train—the regular and usual thing—was to stop their train and wait until the freight train should arrive. But another freight train was there on the side track, and it was assumed that that was the one-specified in the meeting order. The conductor, apparently, made no effort to identify the freight engine, trusting that his engineman would do so; and the engineman, evidently, was willing to take the risk of passing on (at full speed, no stop being required at that station for leaving or taking passengers), knowing that if his assumption proved wrong he would in all probability cause much damage to property, if not great loss of In point of fact, he caused both.

The other cases in the list which are most prominent, on account of being fatal to passengers, are collisions 15 and 20. The last named appears to have been occasioned by the very severe weather which prevailed in January. Two other accidents, both costly, were due, in part, to the unusually low temperature which was so widespread in that month—collision No. 13 and derailment No. 3. A brake failure

due to freezing of packing leather has never before appeared in these records.

Misconduct or negligence of telegraph operators is given as the chief or principal cause of 4 collisions costing \$40,130 in damage to cars and engines and the loss of 3 lives. These are Nos. 7, 10, 11, and 17. One operator failed to deliver an order; one failed to give an oral notice, or notice by flag or signal, and one signed a conductor's name to an order without having been authorized to do so; and in the fourth case, although the conductor and engineman were primarily to blame, the wrongful clearing of a train-order signal by the operator was the final act which made the collision possible. Two collisions, Nos. 1 and 5, were due to mistakes of dispatchers—and dispatchers are presumed to be men who have made good records as operators.

Collision No. 9 is notable as being the fourth case recorded recently as due to precisely the same error in reading a written order—the overlooking of "2d," or "Second." Two such cases appeared in Bulletin No. 8, and a third in Bulletin No. 9. This would seem to point, obviously, to the need of a change in the scheme of numbering or naming trains, or in writing the numbers or names in dispatcher's orders. Collision No. 3 was also due to misreading, no explanation being given except that the name which was written and the name which the reader assumed both begin with "St".

TABLE No. 3.—Details of Table 1—Causes of accidents to employees in coupling and uncoupling cars.

8ub-	Canses.		ain- ien.		nmen vards.	trai: (sw i:	ard nmen itch- ng (ws).		er em-
ciass.	•	Killed.	Injured.	Killed.	Injured.	Killed.	Injured.	Killed.	Injured.
1	Sticking of parts (bent pins, etc.) preventing quick work		7		10		15		,
2	Holding up pin by hand (presumably made neces- sary by defective uncoupling mechanism)		20	1	14	2	39		
3 4 5 6	Other causes, apparently due to defective uncoupling mechanism  Defective draft gear, with automatic coupler Coupling to an engine or tender Same (with link-and-pin coupler)	3	2 1 13 1	1 1	1 11 2	••••	1 3 14 1		4
7 8 9	Coupling on inside of sharp curve. Foot caught in or between couplers while adjusting coupler. Slipped, usually on ice or snow.	i	7 7 14	i	8 16 2	7	29 20 25 3		i
10 11 12 18	Foot caught in frog, guard rail, or switch		8 4 2 13	4	1 1 24	1 5	2 3 48		1
14 15 16	While coupling safety chains	• • • •	8 2	• • • •	2 2	1	4 6 5	• • • •	•••••
17 18	Coupling damaged cars (presumably an unavoidable risk)	••••	14	1 2	11 10	2	14 19		1
19 20 21	Uncoupling, other causes  Miscellaneous  Not clearly explained	1 8 4	84 45 18	1 6	36 37 16	2 11	58 78 82		2 4 1
	Total	15	214	18	210	36	414	1	19

TABLE No. 4.—Details of Table 1—Causes of accidents to employees classified (C6 and C7) as falling from and getting on or off cars and engines.

Sub-	Сапаса		min- ien.	Tra.	inmeu	tra	ard inmen	UUI	erem• yees.
еляя.	CRUSCS.	Killed.	Injured.	4 M244				Ritted.	Infured
1 2 8 4	Pelt from roof of box car by reason of— Defect in car lee or snow. Parting of train Derailment, collision, or shock due to abnormal movements of cars other than those in	 2 1	6 17 4	1	2 18 4	i i	4 25 5		1
C6: 5	while setting brakes  Fell from— Coal car Freight car other than box or coal car Engine or tender. Passenger car Engines, tenders, or cars (all kinds) not in	3 3 1 	38 36 6 1 90	 4	82 32 2 1 68	5 5	86 36 3	4	5 2 9 4 8
11 12 (13 14 15	motion  Miscellaneous causes.  Not clearly explained.  Slipped getting on moving trains or cars.  Jumping off moving trains.  Jumping from engines or cars anticipating collision, derailment, or other accident.	7 26 1 2	80 87 70 83 157	1 5 1 2	76 72 17 43 97	7 14 2 2	20 82 38 73 120	1 1 3 5	37 32 14 22 50
C7 16	Fell from engines or cars by reason of defective handholds and sill steps. Gutting on or off moving engine		185 185 1	 	18 126 2 689	8	27 142 1	19	35

#### [Public—No. 171.]

AN ACT requiring common carriers engaged in interstate commerce to make full reports of all accidents to the Interstate Commerce Commission.

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, It shall be the duty of the general manager, superintendent, or other proper officer of every common carrier engaged in interstate commerce by railroad to make to the Interstate Commerce Commission, at its office in Washington, District of Columbia, a monthly report, under oath, of all collisions of trains or where any train or part of a train accidentally leaves the track, and of all accidents which may occur to its passengers or employees while in the service of such common carrier and actually on duty, which report shall state the nature and causes thereof, and the circumstances connected therewith.

SEC. 2. That any common carrier failing to make such report within thirty days after the end of any month shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor and, upon conviction thereof by a court of competent jurisdiction, shall be punished by a fine of not more than one hundred dollars for each and every offense and for every day during which it shall fail to make such report after the time herein specified for making the same.

SEC. 3. That neither said report nor any part thereof shall be admitted as evidence or used for any purpose against such railroad so making such report in any suit of action for damages growing out of any matter mentioned in said report.

SEC. 4. That the Interstate Commerce Commission is authorized to prescribe for

SEC. 4. That the Interstate Commerce Commission is authorized to prescribe for such common carriers a method and form for making the reports in the foregoing section provided.

Approved, March 3, 1901.

#### SPECIAL INFORMATION CONTAINED IN PRECEDING BULLETIES.

Each accident bulletin contains tables showing the number of passengers and employees killed and injured, and these figures are classified any ciling to cause (see Table No. 1); also tables showing cost of the different classes of train accidents. The causes of accidents to employees in coupling and unput; ing and in falling from cars, etc., are further classified in Tables No. 3 and No. 4. Each colletin is for three months, and No. 1 was for the quarter ending September 30. 1401. The bulletin for the quarter ending June 30 contains, in addition to the quarterly statistics, tables showing the same information for the whole of the fiscal year ending on that date.

Bulletin No. 1 contains brief notes on the most serious callist as in that quarter, 57 passengers having been killed. There are notes on the causes of complex activities, explanatory of Table No. 3. Table No. 4 is supplemented by similar notes. In this quarter special mention was made of 130 casualties 4 killed, 125 injured due to operating trains in which air brakes were used on only a portion of the cars; and the danger of running trains partially air-braked is a namented on.

Bulletin No. 2 contains a detailed list showing the cost and causes of the 27 usest serious butting collisions in that quarter. In these collisions 70 persons were killed and 234 were injured, and the damage to cars, engines, and readway amounted to \$306,511. The incompleteness of the statements of causes, as sent in by the railroads, is commented on.

Bulletin No. 3 contains a list similar to that just mentioned, but showing rear instead of butting collisions. As in the first list, only the most serious arridents are considered; and of these there were 41, costing \$160,247. The number of persons killed was 43, and of injured 255.

Bulletin No. 4 contains a third list of collisions, this one including all classes; but it includes only a few in which the damage was less than \$5,000. The totals of this list are: Killed, 30; injured, 187; cost, \$225,597. Collisions occurring where the trainmen had worked very long hours are commented on. In this bulletin a table is given showing the deaths and injuries due to trains parting. The aggregate of damage shown in this table is \$492,781; persons killed, 14: injured, 386. The table shows that nearly all of the coupler failures which resulted in a collision or derailment were reported as due to "cause unknown."

Bulletin No. 5 contains a table of the most serious train accidents in the quarter. Derailments as well as collisions are included. The causes of a few of the accidents are set forth in some detail. A table is given in this bulletin showing the cause (as reported) of each coupling accident in the quarter. The table fills 12 pages.

Bulletin No. 6 contains a list of the 34 most serious accidents in the quarter. One of these was a rear collision, killing 27 passengers. There is also a table giving notes on the causes of the 16 rear collisions which occurred in this quarter on railroads where the block system is in use. Comment is made on the large increase in the number of accidents to men in coupling, as compared with previous quarters.

Bulletin No. 7 contains the usual list of the most serious accidents (Class A). In collisions 46 passengers were killed, and the bulletin gives in detail the causes of a rear collision in which 23 persons were killed. A note is also given on the cause of a rear collision due to the inadequacy of the time-interval rule.

Bulletin No. 8 contains the usual statistics, including annual statistics to June 30, 1903, and explains in detail the causes of two butting collisions. In one of these collisions a conductor gave a hand-signal to stop, which was taken by the engineman to mean go-ahead. In another case the men in charge of a train read "No. 2" when the order was written "second No. 2." This bulletin contains a list of all the collisions of the quarter, of whatever magnitude, which were caused by mistakes in connection with time-tables or telegraphic orders.

Bulletin No. 9 records two collisions in which 44 persons were killed, one due to careless handling of a telegraphic order and the other to gross negligence of an engineman, who failed to keep the air-brakes in working order. Reference is made to the derailment of four fast mail trains by reason of reckless speed.

Bulletin No. 10 records the death of 147 passengers in collisions and derailments—more than three times the average number killed during the nine preceding quarters. One derailment, due to an accidental obstruction, killed 65 passengers, and six other accidents caused 106 deaths. The causes of the derailment mentioned and four of the worst collisions are explained at length.

# ACCIDENT BULLETIN,

No. 12,

# SHOWING COLLISIONS AND DERAILMENTS OF TRAINS

AND

# CASUALTIES TO PERSONS

**DURING** 

APRIL, MAY, AND JUNE, 1904,

HTIW

TABLES FOR THE YEAR ENDING JUNE 30, 1904.

INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMMISSION,
WASHINGTON, D. C.

WASHINGTON:
GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE.
1904.

## THE INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMMISSION.

Hon. MARTIN A. KNAPP, of New York, Chairman.

Hon. JUDSON C. CLEMENTS, of Georgia.

Hon. JAMES D. YEOMANS, of Iowa.

Hon. CHARLES A. PROUTY, of Vermont.

Hon. JOSEPH W. FIFER, of Illinois. EDWARD A. MOSELEY, Secretary.

#### ACCIDENT BULLETIN No. 12.

# RAILROAD ACCIDENTS IN THE UNITED STATES,

DURING THE

## THREE MONTHS ENDING JUNE 30, 1904.

The number of persons killed in train accidents during the months of April, May, and June, 1904, as shown in reports made by the rail-road companies to the Interstate Commerce Commission, under the "accident law" of March 3, 1901, was 167 and of injured 2,378. Accidents of other kinds, including those sustained by employees while at work and by passengers in getting on or off the cars, etc., bring the total number of casualties up to 12,095 (677 killed and 11,418 injured). These accidents are classified in the following table. These reports deal only with (a) passengers and (b) employees on duty.

TABLE No. 1.—Casualties to persons—April, May, and June, 1904.

•		lssen- gers.	Trai	nmen.		Trainmen in yards.		Yard trainmen (switch- ing crews).		er em-		
	Killed.	Injured.	Killed.	Injured.	Killed.	Injured.	Killed.	Injured.	Killed.	Injured.	Killed.	Injured.
Collisions  Derailments  Miscellaneous train accidents (excluding the above), in- cluding locomotive boiler ex-	10 12	761 343	39 44	<b>309</b> 234	7 2	114 47	6	49 49	16 3	66 55	<b>68</b> 55	538 385
plosions	1	30	18	214	2	65	1	31		11	21	321
Total train accidents	23	1, 134	101	757	11	226	13	1 129	19	132	144	1,244
Coupling and uncoupling While doing other work about trains or while attending			17	221	15	169	25	335	3	21	ĠÛ	746
switches Coming in contact with overhead bridges, structures at	••••		7	1, 103	7	449	8	422	9	476	81	2, 450
side of track, etc	2	11	11	147	3	55	1	65	1	4	16	271
Falling from cars or engines or while getting on or off Other causes	29 3	331 386	63 20	721 99	20 13	448 70	31 17	574 65	19 186	276 2,592	133 236	2,019 2,826
Total (other than train accidents)	34	728	118	2, 291	58	1, 191	82	1, 461	218	3, 369	476	8, 312
Total, all classes	57	1,862	219	3,048	69	1,417	95	1,590	<del>237</del>	3, 501	620	9, 556

Note.—Accidents to employees resulting in slight injuries which do not prevent the employee injured from performing his accustomed service for more than three days, in the aggregate, during the ten days immediately following the accident are not reported.

In train accidents, the total number of killed, both of passengers and of employees, is less than in the corresponding quarter of the preceding year; and the same is true of employees both in train accidents and in other classes. The reduction in the passenger death list is gratifying, but the yearly tables, given on a subsequent page, show, unfortunately, a large increase which completely neutralizes the decrease for the quarter.

The total number of collisions and derailments was 2,418 (1,180 collisions and 1,238 derailments), of which 176 collisions and 144 derailments affected passenger trains. The damage to cars, engines, and roadway by these accidents amounted to \$2,015,252. Given more in detail, these facts appear as below:

TABLE No. 2.—Collisions and derailments.

	Num- ber.	Loss.	Persons killed.	Persons injured.
Collisions, rear	136	\$196, 322 321, 588	14 39	276 552
Collisions, trains separating	212 597	97, 815 256, 712	9 16	102 369
Total	1, 180	872, 437	78	1, 299
Derailments due to defects of roadway, etc	585 58 71	161, 114 551, 221 47, 249 111, 966	5 11 7 15	208 146 42 94
Derailments due to malicious obstruction of track, etc  Derailments due to miscellaneous causes	62 <b>228</b>	13, 613 257, 652	12 17	67 171
Total	1, 238	1, 142, 815	67	728
Total, collisions and derailments	2,418	2, 015, 252	145	2,027

Note.—Collisions and derailments which cause no death or personal injury and which cause not over \$150 damage to the property of the railroad are not reported.

Following is the usual list of Class A train accidents—all in which the damage is reported at \$10,000 or over, notable cases in which passengers are killed, and those doing damage less than \$10,000 and down to \$2,000, wherever the circumstances or the cause may be of particular interest.

Causes of twenty-seven prominent train accidents (Class A).

[Note.—R. stands for rear collision; B., butting collision; M., miscellaneous collisions; D., derailment; P., passenger train; F., freight and miscellaneous trains.]

COLLISIONS.

						Ç 13 2	
No.	Class.	Kind of train.	Killed.	Injured.	Damage to engines, cars, and roadway.	Reference to record.	Causes.
1	В.	F. and F	1	2	<b>\$</b> 1,150	32	Collision between freight and work trains: work train pushing car ahead of engine; dispatcher, twenty-seven years' experience, overlooked east-bound extra when giving orders to west-bound.
2	В.	P. and P	0	51	1,750	25	South-bound train waiting on sidetrack as north- bound train approached; a train porter, of three months' experience, became unaccountably con- fused and threw switch for sidetrack. Injuries slight.

## · Causes of twenty-seven prominent train accidents (Class A)—Continued.

#### COLLISIONS—Continued.

No.	Class.	Kind of train.	Killed.	Injured.	Damage to engines, cars, and roadway.	Reference to record.	Causes.
3	В.	F. and F	0	0	<b>\$</b> 2,175	58	Conductor and engineman of extra train overlooked the fact that the time of regular train had been
4	R.	F. and F	0	1	2, 200	23	changed by new time-table issued that day.  Block-signal operator (experienced) gave clear signal when block section was not clear.
5	R.	P. and P	3	21	2,700	1	Engineman (experienced) ran past three automatic stop block signals; signals were 6,410 feet, 3,830 feet, and 1,330 feet back from point of collision; flagman also back 1,000 feet.
6	В.	P. and P	0	10	2,754	48	Conductor of train No. 1 examined register and failed to note that train No. 2 had not arrived.
7 8	B. B.	F. and F P. and F	3 2	3 24	3, 025 4, 100	57 4	Operator failed to deliver meeting order. Conductor and engineman, who had been on their trip only 15 minutes, overlooked meeting order.
9	B.	P. and F	0	17	6, 430	52	Engineman and fireman of empty engine overlooked meeting order.
10	B.	P. and P	0	27	8, 691	53	Conductor and engineman (experienced) forgot meeting order. Injuries of passengers slight.
11	<b>M</b> .	P. and F	0	3	9,500	1 11	Cars of freight train left standing on main track while switching was being done on side tracks; engineman of freight in service only 2 weeks.
12	В.	F. and F	0	3	13,000	29	Mistake of dispatcher; sent conflicting orders when he could and should have used the "duplicate form," sending the orders to the two trains in the same words.
13	B.	F. and F	1	3	13, 400	9	East-bound train had order to run 6 hours 20 min- utes late; ran 6 hours 5 minutes late.
14	В.	F. and F	1	5	15,000	8	
15	В.	F. and F	1	1	15,(0)	59	
16	В.	F. and F	0	2	20,000	49	Block signalman admitted west-bound train to block section occupied by an east-bound train.
17	В.	P. and F	2	25	20,000	6	Freight, waiting on a sidetrack, ordered to meet 3 trains, was started out after 2 trains had passed; conductor, engineman, and flagman, while waiting, had slept, and on waking assumed that 3
18	В.	P. and F	1	8	21,575	28	trains had passed.  Conductor and engineman of freight overlooked meeting point. (See further note in text below.)
	Tota	ıl l	15	206	162, 450		

#### DERAILMENTS.

						_	
1		<b>F</b>		2	<b>\$</b> 5,603	!	Brake beam dropped and damaged air pipe; air brakes became inoperative, and train ran away on steep grade. Men in charge had not complied with the rule requiring them to stop and inspect cars before descending grade, and also neglected to use hand brakes, in lieu of retaining valves, to partly control speed.
2	D.	F	0	0	8,500	39	Air brakes on one car, unknown to trainmen, remained applied and heated a wheel, causing it to break.
Q !	n	<b>F</b>	Λ	0	10 000	18	Broken wheel flange.
3	ν. Σ	D	Ŏ,	3	10, 165	14	Defective spindle in switch, allowing switch to be-
•	v.	1	١	_	10, 105	1.9	come unlastened.
	D	F	0	0	11.127	15	Broken wheel.
ě	Ď.	P	ň	ň	15 000	36	Thirty-four cars derailed, of which 28 were wrecked.
	D.	F		U	10,000		Believed due to drawbar pulled out; speed of train, 45 miles an hour.

Causes of twenty-seven prominent train accidents (Class A)—Continued.

DERAILMENTS-Continued.

No.	Class.	Kind of train.	Killed.	Injured.	Damage to engines, cars, and roadway.	Reference to record.	Causes.
7	D.	P	7	23	\$25, 797	20	Engineman (who was killed) overlooked order to reduce speed on entering sidetrack at small station where main track was obstructed. Engineman, of 30 years' experience, on duty 4 hours.
8	D.	P	1	6	30,000	67	Occurred 10 p. m.; washout at iron-pipe culvert, caused by unusually severe local storm.
8	D.	F	0	1	39,000	64	Derailment, caused by broken wheel flange; occurred on bridge; derailed cars knocked down 2 spans of bridge.
	Tota	1	8	34	155, 192		
		al collisions d derailments	23	240	317, 642		

The accident most fatal to passengers in this record was a derailment (No. 7 in the foregoing table). The cause, however, was one which constantly recurs in the collision record—forgetfulness on the In this case the man at fault was killed. The part of an engineman. circumstances show the weakness and insufficiency of the requirement ostensibly a safeguard—that the conductor of a train, equally with the engineman (so far as possible), shall guard against disaster. This requirement is found in all rule books. Theoretically, the conductor, in this case, having in his possession a copy of the slow-order, could have had his mind on the matter, approaching the sidetrack, and his hand on the emergency brake valve with which every car is equipped, and thus could have stopped the train in spite of the engineman's failure to act. But, practically, this safeguard fails in a large percentage of the emergencies which it is designed to provide for. The inadequacy of the requirement that the fireman shall be an assistant lookout man is also illustrated in this case. To be of sufficient value as a lookout to be relied upon firemen must not only be intelligent and experienced, but must also be trained in lookout duties.

In the collision record, the salient feature is the fact that three cases occurred on block-signaled lines. Two of these (Nos. 4 and 16) fortunately were unattended by fatalities; but the third, No. 5, killed three passengers. This case is somewhat similar to a notable one recorded in Bulletin No. 7 (January, 1903) where over 100 persons were killed or injured (23 deaths). In both cases the automatic block-signal equipment of the road was complete and in good order.

While, as in these cases, the block system, as used and administered n the best-managed railroads, does not provide against extreme reckseness or all kinds of gross negligence, and to that extent falls short perfection, the roads not block signaled continue to fill the records

with costly and fatal collisions, which the block system would undoubtedly have prevented. Nos. 1 and 12 in the present record were due to errors by dispatchers—errors in work, the very essence of which is or should be constant watchfulness against errors. No. 8 records the forgetfulness of a conductor and an engineman whose minds had had only fifteen minutes in which to lapse from their supposedly normal state of vigilance. No. 17 shows concurrent recklessness on the part of three men, or inexplicable dullness.

In No. 18 the engineman of the freight (who was killed) started out from a station on the time of a passenger train then due from the opposite direction. Either he forgot about the passenger train or assumed that a switching engine which had passed was the passenger train. The conductor of the freight, sitting in the caboose, heard the switching engine pass, but took no pains to identify it; the engineman having started the train immediately afterwards, the conductor then assumed that the switching engine was the passenger train.

The rest of the collisions in the table are no less worthy of attention, for they show costly blunders, which would be startling if they had not become so common.

TABLE No. 3.—Details of Table 1—Causes of accidents to employees in coupling and uncoupling cars.

Sub- class.	Causes.		Train men.		rain- en in urds.	Yard trainmen (switch- ing crews).			er em- yces,
	•	Killed.	Injured.	Killed.	Injured.	Killed.	Injured.	Killed.	Injured.
1	Sticking of parts (bent pins, etc.), preventing quick work		15	1	9	i	12		1
8			10	1	12		22		- • • • • •
4 5 6	ling mechanism  Defective draft gear, with automatic coupler.  Coupling to an engine or tender  Same (with link-and-pin coupler)	' I	3 4 9	i	2 2 10	1	5   8 1	••••	·····i
7 8	Coupling on inside of sharp curve  Foot caught in or between couplers while adjusting coupler	1 '	9 15		2		22 30	••••	1
9 10 11	Flipped, usually on ice or snow		5 2	2	11 2	1 8	14   7		<b>2</b>
12 13 14	Load shifted  Engaged in operations preliminary to coupling While coupling safety chains		3 17	3	1 28	ō	2 46 6	1	<u>2</u>
15 16 17	Link-and-pin coupler Link and pin, with automatic. Coupling damaged cars (presumably an unavoid-		3 2		1		1	· ·	
18	able risk)	3	12 7	1	7	4	13 19	•••	1
19 20 21	Uncoupling, other causes  Miscellaneous  Not clearly explained		39 43 18	2 2 1	21 26 15	1 2 2	53 47 22	1	5 4 2
	Total	17	221	15	169	25	335	3	21

TABLE No 4.—Details of Table 1—Causes of accidents to employees classified (C6 and C7)
as falling from and getting on or off cars and engines.

Sub-	Causes.		rain- ien.		nmen ards.	Yard trainmen (switch- ing crews).			erem- yees.
		Killed.	Injured.	Killed.	Injured.	Killed.	Injured.	Killed.	Injured.
$\begin{bmatrix} 1 \\ 2 \end{bmatrix}$	Fell from roof of box car by reason of— Defect in car Ice or snow.	• • • •	4		6	• • • •	6	,	1
8 4	Parting of train  Derailment, collision, or shock due to abnormal movements of cars other than those in		3	i	2	••••	8	1	. i
C6 5	subclass 3 While setting brakes Fell from—	<b>3</b> 5	55 28	2 1	43 13	2 4	73 44	2 1	19 3
6 7 8 9	Coal car Freight car other than box or coal car Engine or tender Passenger car Engines, tenders, or cars (all kinds) not in	2	3 7 79 2	4	43 3	6	5 1 82 2	• • • •	3 10 8 2
11 12 (18	motion Miscellaneous causes Not clearly explained Slipped getting on moving trains or cars Jumping off moving trains	4 29	46 63 50 88 109	8	49 27 14 45 75	1 7 5 2	28 40 23 60 110	1	22
C7 15 16	Jumping from engines or cars anticipating colli- sion, derailment, or other accident	••••	28	-	6		12	••••	3
17 18	handholds and sill steps	3	24 131 1	2	15 107	1 2	26 101 2	4	46
	Total	63	721	20	448	81	574	19	276

#### YEARLY TABLES.

This bulletin completes the publication of the accident records under the law of March 3, 1901, for three years, and the following table (A) gives the aggregate, for the year ending June 30, 1904, of the items which are given in Table No. 1 of the quarterly returns. The total number of casualties shown in Table A is 55,130 (3,787 killed and 51,343 injured).

These totals are not comparable with those given in the Commission's Annual Statistical Reports, for the reason that the monthly reports deal only with accidents to passengers and employees while actually on duty. The monthly reports take no account of accidents to "other persons." These appear in the Annual Reports, and include casualties at highway crossings, to trespassers and persons walking along the track, accidents to employees in shops remote from the railroad, and all other accidents not occurring to passengers and employees actually on duty.

Table A.—Summary of casualties to persons, year ending June 30, 1904.

		sen- ers.	Trainmen.		Train- men in yards.		Yard trainmen (switch- ing crews).		Other employees.		Total employees.	
	Killed.	Injured.	Killed.	Injured.	Killed.	Injured.	Killed.	Injured.	Killed.	Injured.	Killed.	Injured.
Collisions Derailments Miscellaneous train accidents (excluding the above), in- cluding locomotive-boiler		3, <b>3</b> 83 1, <b>422</b>	267 229	2,077 1,078	51 20	738 196	41 20	295 201	105 16	590 264	464 285	3, 700 1, 789
explosions	1	140	62	980	15	325	14	165	4	81	95	1,551
Total train accidents	270	4, 945	558	4, 135	86	1, 259	75	661	125	935	844	6, 990
Coupling and uncoupling While doing other work about trains or while attending	••••		69	926	89	895	111	1,538	9	82	278	3, 441
switches Coming in contact with over- head bridges, structures at	••••		51	4, 788	48	2,279	40	1,815	69	1, 779	208	10,661
Falling from cars or engines,	5	33	79	620	13	260	13	286	11	44	116	1,210
or while getting on or off Other causes	115 30	1,517 1,582	291 133	3, 434 559	131 120	2, 365 412	163 86	2, 541 398	115 882	1, 031 10, 224	700 1, 221	9,371 11,593
Total (other than train accidents)	150	3, 132	623	10, 327	401	6, 211	413	6, 578	1,086	13, 160	2, 523	36, 276
Total, all classes	420	8,077	1, 181	14, 462	187	7,470	488	7, 239	1, 211	14, 095	3, 367	43, 266

In Table B, following, comparisons may be made of the totals of the principal classes of casualties. The large increase of 64½ per cent in the number of fatal accidents to passengers is but the record of a condition which has already been made familiar by the quarterly bulletins and by the daily newspapers month by month. In the first quarter of the year a rear collision of circus trains and a butting collision of a passenger train and a freight killed 22 each. In the second quarter one collision of passenger trains caused 32 deaths, another 18, and a third 16; and a derailment due to an accidental obstruction on the track swelled the death list for the quarter to figures far beyond any ever before recorded. (This quarter also shows two collisions of work trains, killing, together, 33 railroad employees.) In the third quarter 18 persons were killed in one collision. The fourth quarter, now reported, has no collisions so disastrous as those here recounted.

As the Accident Bulletins are issued for the purpose of furnishing the public with facts, this exhibit of the dangers of railroad travel—an exhibit which the most conservative must agree should be termed alarming—will not be made the subject of comment in this place; but it will be proper to observe that each succeeding bulletin adds materially to the mass of evidence going to enforce the observations and recommendations which were made in the last annual report of the Commission.

TABLE B.—Casualties to passengers and employees, years ending June 30.

	1	934.	19	003.	1	902.
	Killed.	Injured.	Killed.	Injured.	Killed.	Injured.
Passengers:						
In train accidents	270 150	4,945 3,132	164 157	4, 424 2, 549	167 136	3, 586 2, 505
Other causes		0,102		2,010		
Total	420	8,077	321	6, 973	303	6, 089
Employees:	-					
In train accidents	844	6, 990	895	6,440	697	5,046
In coupling accidents	278	3, 441	258	2, 788	148	2, 113
Overhead obstructions, etc	116	1,210	9 <b>3</b> 678	992	104	1,070
Falling from cars, etc	700 1,429	9, 371 22, 254	1,314	8, 025 20, 759	537 1,085	6, 867 18, 615
Total	8, 367	43, 266	3, 233	39,004	2,516	83, 711
Total passengers and employees	3,787	51, 843	8,554	45, 977	2, 819	39, 800

The following tables, C, D, and E, show, respectively, for twelve months, the facts which appear in Tables 2, 3, and 4 of the quarterly returns:

Table C.—Collisions and derailments; damage to cars, engines, and roadway, year ending June 30.

		190	)4.		:	1903.	:	1902.
	Num- ber.	Loss.		Persons injured.	Num- ber.	Loss.	Num- ber.	Loss.
Collisions, rear	928 1,024	\$1,683,020 1,696,425 491,666 1,319,807	195 280 25 130	1, 931 2, 728 412 2, 012				
Total	6, 436	5, 190, 918	630	7,083	6, 167	<b>\$</b> 5, 615, 746	5,042	\$4, 285, 683
Derailments due to defect of roadway, etc	866 2, 297	612, 538	33	716	821 1,841	636, 718 1, 502, 325	547	443, 706
Derailments due to negli- gence of trainmen, signal- men, etc	833	302,592	41	355	297	230, 907	255	136, 241
seen obstruction, etc Derailments due to malicious obstruction of track, etc Derailments due to miscella-	336 110	402, 417 102, 717	132	416 196	277 71	317, 456 157, 290	239	546, 478 63, 246
neous causes	918	818, 508	103	848	1,169	1, 136, 535	926	874, 758
Total	4, 855	4, 192, 159	388	3, 161	4, 476	3, 981, 231	3,633	3, 359, 728
Total collisions and de- railments	11, 291	9, 383, 077	1,018	10, 244	10, 643	9, 596, 977	8,675	7, 645, 406

Table D.—Causes of accidents to employees in coupling and uncoupling cars, year ending June 30, 1904.

Sub-	Camses.		rain- ien.	Trainmen in yards.		Yard trainmen (switch- ing crews).			er em-
CIENC		Killed.	Injured.	Killed.	Injured.	Killed.	Injured.	Killed.	Injured.
1	Sticking of parts (bent pins, etc.) preventing quick work		41	2	34	1	53		
2	Holding up pin by hand (presumably made neces-	••••							Q
•	eary by defective uncoupling mechanism)	••••	60	2	62	2	108	ļ	•••••
3	Other causes, apparently due to defective uncoupling mechanism		10	1	16	1	16	'	2
4	Defective draft gear, with automatic coupler	1	8	1	9		13		
5	Coupling to an engine or tender		42	3	38	1		1 <b>1</b> ,	7
6 7	Same (with link-and-pin coupler)	••••	2 29	i	9 21	4	96		2
Ś	Foot caught in or between couplers while adjust-	4	29	1	21	44	30		Z
	ing coupler.	_	49		43		91	[ 	<b>A</b>
9	Slipped, usually on ice or snow	8	36	5	37	12	65	1	4
10	Foot caught in frog, guard rail, or switch	3	8	4	11	22		; !	
11	Caught by overhanging load on platform car	2	17	• • • • ¦	8	1	10		3
12 13	Load shifted Engaged in operations preliminary to coupling	15	11 93	ii	6 119	17		   <b>2</b>	11
14	While counling safety chains	1.7	4	! <b>**</b>	4	2	16	2	7
15	While coupling safety chains Link-and-pin coupler	'	14		10		24		
16	Link and pin, with automatic		10		4	••••	13		
17	Coupling damaged cars (presumably an unavoid-	_		: _			! !		_
10	able risk)	6	41	5	49	14	67		4
18	Uncoupling without using lever (presumably by	2	40	5	53	4	92		1
19	reason of defective uncoupling mechanism) Uncoupling, other causes		165		147	3	264	,	1 16
20	Miscellaneous		176		147	7			
21	Not clearly explained	12	70	28	<b>6</b> 8	20	93	2	
	Total	69	926	89	895	111	1,538	9	82

Table E.—Causes of accidents to employees classified (C6 and C7) as falling from and getting on or off cars and engines, year ending June 30, 1904.

Sub- class.		Causes.		rain- nen.	Trainmen in yards.		ing crews).		Other employees.	
			Killed.	Injured.	Killed.	Injured.	Killed.	Injured.	Killed.	Injured.
	1 2 3 4	Fell from roof of box car by reason of— Defect in car. Ice or snow. Parting of train Derailment, collision, or shock due to abnormal movements of cars other than those in	5	1 29	     1   3	13 25 22	2	16 36 33		'
C6	5	subclass 3	13   18 	126	8	200 108	17 17	302 167	17	61 11
	6 7 8 9 10	Coal car Freight car other than box or coal car Engine or tender Passenger car Engines, tenders, or cars (all kinds) not in	35	; 313	14	5 4 211 4	22	16 2 128 3	1	25 16 36 5
	11 12 (13	motion  Miscellaneous causes  Not clearly explained  Slipped getting on moving trains or cars	1 34 123 14	351 193 364	11 41	221 , 246 , 90 , 202 , 375	16	248 108	10	130 65
C7	17	Jumping off moving trains.  Jumping from engines or cars, anticipating collision, derailment, or other accident.  Fell from engines or cars by reason of defective handholds and sill steps.  Getting on or off moving engine.  Caught in frog, guard rail, or switch.	1	124 87	, · · · · · 7	52 81	. 2 2	53 98	i 	8
•	(18	Total							115	1,031

#### [Public—No. 171.]

AN ACT requiring common carriers engaged in interstate commerce to make full reports of all accidents to the Interstate Commerce Commission.

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, It shall be the duty of the general manager, superintendent, or other proper officer of every common carrier engaged in interstate commerce by railroad to make to the Interstate Commerce Commission, at its office in Washington, District of Columbia, a monthly report, under oath, of all collisions of trains or where any train or part of a train accidentally leaves the track, and of all accidents which may occur to its passengers or employees while in the service of such common carrier and actually on duty, which report shall state the nature and causes thereof, and the circumstances connected therewith.

SEC. 2. That any common carrier failing to make such report within thirty days after the end of any month shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor and, upon conviction thereof by a court of competent jurisdiction, shall be punished by a fine of not more than one hundred dollars for each and every offense and for every day during which it shall fail to make such report after the time herein specified for making the same.

SEC. 3. That neither said report nor any part thereof shall be admitted as evidence or used for any purpose against such railroad so making such report in any suit or nation for demagns growing out of any matter mentioned in said report

action for damages growing out of any matter mentioned in said report.

SEC. 4. That the Interstate Commerce Commission is authorized to prescribe for such common carriers a method and form for making the reports in the foregoing section provided.

Approved, March 3, 1901.

#### SPECIAL INFORMATION CONTAINED IN PRECEDING BULLETINS.

Each accident bulletin contains tables showing the number of passengers and employees killed and injured, and these figures are classified according to cause (see Table No. 1); also tables showing cost of the different classes of train accidents. The causes of accidents to employees in coupling and uncoupling and in falling from cars, etc., are further classified in Tables No. 3 and No. 4. The most serious collisions and derailments are dealt with in a supplementary table (Class A) showing the causes in some detail. Each bulletin is for three months, and No. 1 was for the quarter ending September 30, 1901. The bulletin for the quarter ending June 30 contains, in addition to the quarterly statistics, tables showing the same information for the whole of the fiscal year ending on that date.

Bulletin No. 1 contains brief notes on the causes of coupler accidents, explanatory of Table No. 3. Table No. 4 is supplemented by similar notes. In this quarter special mention was made of 130 casualties due to operating trains in which air brakes were used on only a portion of the cars.

Bulletin No. 4 has comments on collisions occurring where the trainmen had worked very long hours. In this bulletin a table is given showing the deaths and injuries due to trains parting. The table shows that nearly all of the coupler failures which resulted in a collision or derailment were reported as due to "cause unknown."

Bulletin No. 5 contains a table showing the cause (as reported) of each coupling accident in the quarter. The table fills 12 pages.

Bulletin No. 6 contains a table giving notes on the causes of the 16 rear collisions which occurred in this quarter on railroads where the block system is in use. Comment is made on the large increase in the number of accidents to men in coupling, as compared with previous quarters.

Bulletin No. 7 contains a note on the cause of a rear collision due to the inadequacy of the time-interval rule.


Bulletin No. 8 explains in detail the causes of two butting collisions. In one of these collisions a conductor gave a hand-signal to stop, which was taken by the engineman to mean go-ahead. In another case the men in charge of a train read "No. 2" when the order was written "second No. 2." This bulletin contains a special list of all the collisions of the quarter, of whatever magnitude, which were caused by mistakes in connection with time-tables or telegraphic orders.


Bulletin No. 9 records two collisions in which 44 persons were killed, one due to careless handling of a telegraphic order and the other to gross negligence of an engineman, who failed to keep the air-brakes in working order. Reference is made to the derailment of four fast mail trains by reason of reckless speed.

Bulletin No. 10 records the death of 147 passengers in collisions and derailments—more than three times the average number killed during the nine preceding quarters. One derailment, due to an accidental obstruction, killed 65 passengers, and six other accidents caused 106 deaths. The causes of the derailment mentioned and of four of the worst collisions are explained at length.

Bulletin No. 11 contains a note on one butting collision which resulted in the deaths of 18 passengers and injuries to 37, the collision being caused by failure to identify a freight train on a sidetrack at night; but aside from this the quarter's totals are in nearly every case less than in preceding quarters. Two costly accidents were caused by air-brake failures which were due to extreme cold weather. Mention is made of a fourth error like that shown in Bulletin No. 8 (readers overlooked the word "second").

O





# E ACCIDENT BULLETIN,

CSi

No. 13.

JULY, AUGUST, AND SEPTEMBER, 1904.

INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMMISSION, WASHINGTON, D. C.

WASHINGTON:
GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE.
1905.

		-	•
	•		
-			
		•	

# ACCIDENT BULLETIN,

No. 13.

# SHOWING COLLISIONS AND DERAILMENTS OF TRAINS

AND

# CASUALTIES TO PERSONS

DURING

JULY, AUGUST, AND SEPTEMBER, 1904.

INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMMISSION, WASHINGTON, D. C.

WASHINGTON:
GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE.
1905.

### THE INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMMISSION.

Hon. MARTIN A. KNAPP, of New York, Chairman.

Hon. JUDSON C. CLEMENTS, of Georgia.

Hon. JAMES D. YEOMANS, of Iowa.

Hon. CHARLES A. PROUTY, of Vermont.

Hon. JOSEPH W. FIFER, of Illinois.

EDWARD A. MOSELEY, Secretary.

### ACCIDENT BULLETIN No. 13.

### RAILROAD ACCIDENTS IN THE UNITED STATES

#### DURING THE

#### THREE MONTHS ENDING SEPTEMBER 30, 1904.

The number of persons killed in train accidents during the months of July, August, and September, 1904, as shown in reports made by the railroad companies to the Interstate Commerce Commission, under the "accident law" of March 3, 1901, was 411, and of injured 3,747. Accidents of other kinds, including those sustained by employees while at work and by passengers in getting on or off the cars, etc., bring the total number of casualties up to 14,239 (1,032 killed and 13,207 injured). These accidents are classified in the following table. These reports deal only with (a) passengers and (b) employees on duty.

TABLE No. 1.—Casualties to persons—July, August, and September, 1904.

		Passen- gers.		inmen.	m	rain- en in ards.	tra (81	(ard inmen witch- ing ews).	JUM	er em- oyees.	Total em- ployees.	
·	Killed.	Injured.	Killed.	Injured.	Killed.	Injured.	Killed.	Injured.	Killed.	Injured.	Killed.	Injured.
Collisions Derailments Miscellaneous train accidents (excluding the above), in-	124 104	1,201 922	60 66	457 329	12	152 34	57	76 42	9 6	99 65	86 86	784 470
cluding locomotive boiler explosions		31	7	227	! ; 2	65	1	31	1	16	11	339
Total train accidents	228	2, 154	183	1,013	21	251	13	149	16	180	183	1,593
Coupling or uncoupling While doing other work about trains or while attending		!	17	190	21	169	21	344	i   	18	= <del>-</del> 59	721
switches. Coming in contact with over- head bridges, structures at		; ;	12	1,1 <b>06</b>	<b>10</b> 	537	6	433	<b>18</b> 	477	46	2,613
side of track, etc	4	23	15	139	4	62	2	75	2	17	23	293
or while getting on or off Other causes	34 10	478 518	80	695 <b>9</b> 6	20	486 76	39 24	485 57	23 223	285 2, <b>634</b>	142 803	1,951 <b>2,863</b>
Total (other than train accidents)	48	1,019	143	2,286	72	1,330	92	1,394	266	3, 431	573	8,441
Total all classes	276	3,173	276	3, 299	93	1.581	105	1,543	282	3,611	 756	10,034

NOTE.—Accidents to employees resulting in slight injuries which do not prevent the employee injured from performing his accustomed service for more than three days, in the aggregate, during the ten days immediately following the accident are not reported.

The total number of casualties reported as occurring in this quarter is less than for the corresponding quarter of the preceding year. The number of employees killed in coupling accidents (59) is 11 less; in train accidents (183) it is 37 less, and every item in that column is less, the total (756 employees killed) showing a falling off of 160. This is a gratifying showing, which it is to be hoped is not due alone to a diminution of the number of men at work. But notwithstanding the facts here shown, the quarter under review may, as a whole, be termed the most disastrous on record, for the fatal accidents to passengers make an unprecedented aggregate, practically neutralizing the diminution in the number of employees killed. In Bulletin No. 10 (quarter ending with December, 1903) the number of passengers killed in train accidents (147) was shown to be more than three times the average of nine preceding quarters; and now we must record a total more than 50 per cent greater than that in Bulletin No. 10.

Of the 228 passengers and 183 employees killed in train accidents 217 cases are accounted for by six accidents, and these 217 were nearly all passengers. The causes of these six (two derailments and four collisions) are given below in connection with the table of class A accidents.

These six accidents were the subject of widespread comment in the press, and the feeling of the public concerning the dangers of railroad travel and railroad employment, as illustrated by these cases, was alluded to in the eighteenth annual report of the Commission. The six cases, in the order of their magnitude, measured by the number of persons killed, were as follows (the numbers refer to the class A table):

	Killed.	Injured.
(a) Derailment No. 10 (b) Collision No. 23 (c) Collision No. 24 (d) Collision No. 11	88 63 24 18	0 162 45 183
(e) Collision No. 5.  (f) Derailment No. 2.  Total, in 6 accidents	8 217	52 45 487

The first and fifth of these cases (a and e) illustrate the need, also spoken of in the eighteenth annual report, of special inquiries into particular accidents if full and impartial statements of the facts are to be secured. The derailment (a), as will be seen by the statement of circumstances given below, was due to a bridge failure. From the conclusions of the coroner's jury which investigated the case there would appear to be reason for making a thorough inquiry not only into the circumstances attending the accident, but also into the design and construction of the bridge and even the surveys and plans which were made to decide the location of the road and its

elevation above the surrounding lands and streams. Such an investigation would have to be made on the ground, of course; not by correspondence from a city 2,000 miles distant.

The collision (e) is one in which the need of a full inquiry is especially important, because it occurred on a road where the block system is in use. The block system is the best means known for preventing collisions of this kind, and when it fails or appears to fail the exact circumstances should be laid before the public to the end that the responsibility for the resulting collision may be clearly understood. The securing of the facts in such a case obviously demands an inquiry on the ground. In the present case it appears that dependence was placed on the rear flagman of the foremost train to go back with hand signals; this as a supplementary safeguard in addition to the block signals; but he failed to do so, or failed to go as far as he ought to have gone. It also appears that the flagman was a person of limited experience in the duties of his position.

The notes following the table of class A accidents cover five of the six cases here referred to, and also several others which are of particular interest.

The total number of collisions and derailments was 2,760 (1,439 collisions and 1,321 derailments), of which 232 collisions and 137 derailments affected passenger trains. The damage to cars, engines, and roadway by these accidents amounted to \$2,439,073. Given more in detail, these facts appear as below:

Num-Persons Persons Loss. killed. injured. ber. \$269,601 801 Collisions, rear.... 49 458 Collisions, butting..... 168 418,997 104 764 Collisions, trains separating..... 103,684 218 70 432, 319 Collisions, miscellaneous 752 53 693 1,439 1,224,601 1,985 210 Derailments due to defects of roadway, etc.

Derailments due to defects of equipment.

Derailments due to negligence of trainmen, signalmen, etc.

Derailments due to unforeseen obstruction, etc. 214 140,277 377 14 686 535, 834 16 213 75 98, 930 11 119 **90** 136, 191 109 153 Derailments due to malicious obstruction of track, etc.... 20 60, 234 60 **243**, UU 88 1,214,472 190 1,392 Total collisions and derailments 2,760 2,439,073 **400** 3,377

TABLE No. 2.—Collisions and derailments.

Following is the usual list of class A train accidents—all in which the damage is reported at \$10,000 or over, notable cases in which passengers are killed, and those doing damage less than \$10,000 and down to \$2,000, wherever the circumstances or the cause may be of particular interest:

### Causes of thirty-six prominent train accidents (Class A).

### COLLISIONS.

senger train; 4 passongers killed. Conflict of testimony as to whether signalisms withdrew clear block signal before preceding train had a vacated block. He had fallen asleep and failed to put signal at stop after passage of trais.  B P. and F	No.	Class.	Kind of train.	Killed.	Injured.	Damage to engines, cars, and roadway.	Reference to record.	Cause.
Bate for the train to be stopped.    Section	1	M	P. and F	4	8	\$2,046	38	Crossing collision; freight cars pushed into pas- senger train; 4 passengers killed. Conflict of testimony as to whether signalman withdrew clear signal from freight train after it was too
B P. and F P. and P. 17 8.185  B P. and P P. and P. 16 52 3,700  B P. and P P. 16 52 3,700  B P. and F	2	R	F. ard F	0	2	2,100	51	late for the train to be stopped.  Operator, 27 years old, with good record, gave clear block signal before preceding train had vacated block. He had fallen asleep and failed
4 B P. and P. 0 17 8.165 25 3,700 2 5 8 P. and P. 16 52 3,700 2 5 9,700 2 6 B F. and F. 1 9 4,000 35 6 B F. and F. 0 0 4.150 53 6 B P. and F. 2 5 4,400 8 B P. and F. 2 5 4,400 8 F. and F. 2 3 4,400 6 5 6,500 16 B F. and F. 0 0 2 6,086 112 B F. and F. 0 0 2 6,086 112 B F. and F. 0 0 2 6,086 112 B F. and F. 2 1 10,620 5 16 B P. and F. 2 10 14,400 7 16 B P. and F.	3	В	P. and F	U	26	3,070	33	Extra freight ran on time of regular passenger. Conductor of freight overlooked passenger train on time-table; engineman, new to this run, de- pended on conductor. These men on duty 18
5 R P. and P. 18 E 2, 700  6 B F. and F. 1 9 4,000  7 R F. and F. 0 0 4,150  8 B P. and F. 2 5 4,400  8 B P. and F. 2 5 4,400  8 B P. and F. 2 3 4,400  10 B F. and F. 0 2 3,400  10 B F. and F. 0 2 6,686  11 R P. and F. 1 8 183  12 B F. and F. 0 0 6,500  13 B F. and F. 2 8 9,333  14 B P. and F. 2 1 10,620  15 R F. and F. 2 1 10,620  16 M F. and F. 2 1 10,620  17 B P. and F. 2 1 10,620  18 R F. and F. 2 1 10,620  19 M F. and F. 2 5 11,620  10 M F. and F. 0 6 6,500  10 M F. and F. 0 6 6,500  11 B P. and F. 2 5 11,620  12 B F. and F. 0 6 6,500  13 B F. and F. 0 6 6,500  14 B P. and F. 2 1 10,620  15 B P. and F. 2 1 10,620  16 M F. and F. 2 1 10,620  17 B P. and F. 2 1 10,620  18 R F. and F. 0 6 6,500  19 B P. and F. 2 5 11,620  19 B P. and F. 2 5 11,620  10 B P. and F. 2 6 10,400  10 B F. and F. 2 6 10,400  11 B P. and F. 2 6 10,400  12 B F. and F. 0 6 6,500  13 B P. and F. 2 6 10,400  14 B P. and F. 2 10 14,400  15 B P. and F. 2 10 14,400  16 M F. and F. 0 6 6,500  17 B P. and F. 2 6 10,400  18 R F. and F. 0 6 16,900  20 M F. and F. 0 6 6,500  21 B F. and F. 0 6 6,500  22 B P. and P. 6 3 162 36,000  23 B P. and P. 6 3 162 36,000  24 M P. and F. 24 45 65,000  25 M P. and P. 6 3 162 36,000  26 M P. and P. 6 3 162 36,000  27 M P. and P. 6 3 162 36,000  28 B P. and P. 6 3 162 36,000  29 M P. and P. 6 3 162 36,000  20 M P. and P. 6 3 162 36,000  20 M P. and P. 6 3 162 36,000  21 B P. and P. 6 3 162 36,000  22 B P. and P. 6 3 162 36,000  23 B P. and P. 6 3 162 36,000  24 M P. and F. 24 45 65,000  25 M P. and P. 25 45 65,000  26 M P. and P. 25 45 65,000  27 M P. and P. 25 45 65,000  28 M P. and P. 6 3 162 36,000  29 M P. and P. 6 3 162 36,000  20 M P. and P. 6 3 162 36,000  20 M P. and P. 6 3 162 36,000  21 B P. and P. 6 3 162 36,000  22 B P. and P. 6 3 162 36,000  23 B P. and P. 6 3 162 36,000  24 M P. and P. 24 45 65,000  25 M P. and P. 25 10 10,000  26 M P. and P. 25 10 10,000  27 M P. and P. 26 10 10,000  28 M P. and P. 27 10 10,000  29 M P. and P. 27 10 10,000  20 M P. and P. 27 10 10,000  20 M P. and P. 28 10 10,00	4	В	P. and P	0	17	8, 185	56	Mistake in dispatcher's order; operator, 15 months' experience, delivered order before repeating it
Security of the property of								Operator gave clear block signal when preceding train was still in the block. (See note in text below.)
Courred 5 a. m. in dense fog. Leading train un expectedly stopped; second train allowed to follow from a block station on caution signal is minutes behind the leading train; was not run under control. Men in charge on duty 16 hours and 30 minutes.  P B F. and F. 2 3 4,400 8 Conductor, engineman, and fireman of empty engine forgot about a passenger train; fireman's experience, 27 days.  Conductor and engineman misread name of station in meeting order: operator had neglected to require them to read order adout to him.  Dispatcher, 18 months' experience, gave meeting order to one train only, disregarding the duplicate rule.  See note in text below.  See note one time of the upin case and server one of the principle	6	В	r. and r	1	8	4,000	35)	looked order to hold extra train. Order lying
8 B P. and F. 2 5 4,400 8 Conductor engineman, and fireman of empty em and graphic properties about a passenger train; fireman's experience, 27 days.  6 Conductor and engineman misread name of station in meeting order: operator had neglected to require them to read order aloud to him.  10 B F. and F. 0 2 6,086 11 Dispatcher, 18 months' experience, gave meeting order to one train only, disregarding the duplication of think to awaken engineman; assumed untitoo late that latter was watching speed.  12 B F. and F. 3 1 8,400 13 Menin charge of north bound careless about rights of south bound. (See note in text below.)  13 B F. and F. 2 8 9,933 5 Brakeman of freight, 4a. m., went forward to flag passenger train from opposite direction, but his signal was not seen; torpedoes not used. Brakeman's experience, 9 months on this road; 2 months elsewhere.  15 B F. and F. 2 10,620 54 Cocurred 4a. m. in dense fog; 5 cars broke away from rear of freight standing at tank and ran back; rear brakeman wason forward part of train most of empty engine, north bound, ran or time of regular south-bound train. A conductor and an operator by lax conduct contributed.  16 M F. and F. 2 10 14,400 7 In fog, 4a. m.; freight ran beyond end of double track without right. Engineman claims lost his bearings; fireman's experience, asleep. One passenger car and 3 freight cars destroyed by fire shouth of the train. Conductor and engineman of west-bound train.  20 M F. and F. 0 6 16,500 55 000 16 Freight ran past fixed story signal and through cross-over into empty passenger train. Engineman, 19 years' experience, asleep. One passenger car and 3 freight cars destroyed by fire shouth-bound regular train.  21 Conductor and engineman of west-bound train from the conductor and engineman of the wells.  22 B P. and F. 2 4 45 65,000 16 6 10 for the text below.)  23 B P. and F. 2 4 45 65,000 16 6 10 for the text below.)	7	R	F.and F	0	0	4, 150	53	Occurred 5 a. m. in dense fog. Leading train unexpectedly stopped; second train allowed to follow from a block station on caution signal 2 minutes behind the leading train; was not run under control. Men in charge on duty 16 hours
B F. and F. 2 3 4,400 65 Conductor and engineman misread name of station in meeting order: operator had neglected to require them to read order aloud to him.  10 B F. and F. 0 2 6,666 11 Dispatcher, 18 months 'experience, gave meeting order to one train only, disregarding the duplicate value of the duplicate of the duplicate of the duplicate order to one train only, disregarding the duplicate value of verticate view.  See note in text below.  13 B F. and F	8	В	P.and F	2	5	4,400	8	Conductor, engineman, and fireman of empty en- gine forgot about a passenger train; fireman's
10 B F. and F. 0 2 6,086 11 Dispatcher, 18 months' experience, gave meeting order to one train only, disregarding the duplicate rule.  12 B F. and F. 0 0 6,500 10 Engineman fell asleep and entered yard too fast fireman, 22 years old, 3 months' experience, did not think to awaken engineman; assumed untitoo late that latter was watching speed.  13 B F. and F. 2 8 9,933 5 Br. and F. 2 1 10,620 54 Cocurred 4 a. m., went forward to flag passenger train from opposite directions, but his signal was not seen; torpedoes not used. Brakeman's experience, of months elsewhere.  15 R F. and F. 2 10 14,400 7 Engineman of empty engine, north bound, ran on time of regular south-bound train. A conductor and an operator by lax conduct contributed.  16 M F. and F. 0 6 16,900 57 Bagman not out far enough.  17 B P. and F. 0 6 16,900 59 South bound entering sidetrack struck by north-bound double-head train.  18 R F. and F. 0 6 20,000 6 F. and F. 0 6 25,000 12 B F. and F. 0 6 25,000 12 B F. and F. 0 7 Cocurred 4 a. m. in dense fog: 5 cars broke away from rear of freight standing at tank and ran back; rear brakeman of empty engine, north bound, ran on time of regular south-bound train. A conductor and an operator by lax conduct contributed.  10 Dispatcher, 18 months' experience, did not think to awaken engineman; asymended untitoo late that latter was watching speed.  11 B F. and F. 2 1 10,620 50 Brakeman of reight, 4 a. m., went forward to flag passenger train from opposite directions, but his signal was not seen; torpedoes not used. Brakeman's experience, a sway from rear of freight, 4 a. m., went forward to flag passenger train from opposite directions, but his signal was not seen; torpedoes not used. Brakeman's experience, of weeks.  16 M F. and F. 2 10 14,400 7 Info data that latter was watching speed.  18 B P. and F. 2 10 14,400 7 Info data that latter was watching speed.  19 B P. and F. 2 10 16,620 50 Cocurred 4 a. m. in dense fog: 5 cars broke away from rear of freight cars don't south bound entering sidetrack struck by north-b	9	В	F. and F	2	3	4,400	65	Conductor and engineman misread name of sta- tion in meeting order; operator had neglected to
12 B F. and F. 0 0 6,500 10 Engineman fell asleep and entered yard too fast fireman, 22 years old, 3 months' experience, did not think to awaken engineman; assumed untit too late that latter was watching speed.  Men in charge of north bound carelessa bout rights of south bound. (See note in text below.)  Brakeman of freight, 4a. m., went forward to fing passenger train from opposite direction, but his signal was not seen; torpedoes not used. Brakeman's experience, 9 months on this road; 2 months elsewhere.  15 R F. and F. 1 5 11,620 19 Engineman fell asleep and entered yard too fast fireman, 22 years old, 3 months' experience, did, 4 months' experience, did, 4								Dispatcher, 18 months' experience, gave meeting order to one train only, disregarding the duplicate rule.
B F. and F 3 1 8,400 13 Men in charge of north bound careless about rights of south bound. (See note in text below.)  Brakeman of freight, 4 a. m., went forward to flag passenger train from opposite direction, but his signal was not seen; torpedoes not used. Brakeman's experience, 9 months on this road; 2 months elsewhere.  Cocurred 4 a. m. in dense fog; 5 cars broke away from rear of freight standing at tank and ran back; rear brakeman was on forward part of train.  B P. and F 2 10 14,400 71 Engineman of empty engine, north bound, ran on time of regular south-bound train. A conductor and an operator by lax conduct contributed. In fog, 4 a. m.; freight ran beyond end of double track without right. Engineman claims lost his bearings; freman's experience, 6 weeks.  Flagman not out far enough.  West-bound train ran past meeting point. (See note in text below.)  Brakeman of freight, 4 a. m., went forward to flag passenger train from opposite direction, but his signal was not seen; torpedoes not used. Brakeman of empty engine, north bound, ran on time of regular south-bound train. A conductor and an operator by lax conduct contributed.  In fog, 4 a. m.; freight ran beyond end of double track without right. Engineman claims lost his bearings; freman's experience, 6 weeks.  Flagman not out far enough.  West-bound train ran past meeting point. (See note in text below.)  South bound entering sidetrack struck by north-bound double-head train.  Freight ran past fixed storp signal and through cross-over into empty passenger train. Engineman, 19 years' experience, asleep. One passenger car and 3 freight cars destroyed by fire started by illuminating gas leaking from tank.  Men in charge of north bound carterion, but his signal was not seen; torpedoes not used. Brakeman of west-bound train.  Freight ran past fixed storp signal and through cross-over into empty passenger train. Engineman of west-bound entering sidetrack struck by north-bound entering gas leaking from tank.  Men in charge of north bound carelians to said	11 12	R B					1	Engineman fell asleep and entered yard too fast; fireman, 22 years old, 3 months' experience, did not think to awaken engineman; assumed until
Brakeman of freight, 4 s. m., went forward to flag passenger train from opposite direction, but his signal was not seen; torpedoes not used. Brakeman's experience, 9 months on this road; 2 months elsewhere.  15 R F. and F 2 1 10,620 54 Cocurred 4 s. m. in dense fog; 5 cars broke away from rear of freight standing at tank and ran back; rear brakeman wason forward part of train. A conductor and an operator by lax conduct contributed.  16 M F. and F 2 10 14,400 7 Infog, 4 s. m.; freight ran beyond end of double track without right. Engineman claims lost his bearings; fireman's experience, 6 weeks.  18 R F. and F 0 0 15,999 30 Infog, 4 s. m.; freight ran beyond end of double track without right. Engineman claims lost his bearings; fireman's experience, 6 weeks.  18 R F. and F 0 6 16,900 39 West-bound train ran past meeting point. (See note in text below.)  20 M F. and F 0 6 20,000 6 Freight ran past fixed stop signal and through cross-over into empty passenger train. Engineman, 19 years' experience, asleep. One passenger car and 3 freight cars destroyed by fire started by illuminating gas leaking from tank.  22 B F. and F 0 0 25,000 58 Conductor and engineman of west-bound train forgot meeting order. (See note in text below.)	13	В	F.and F	3	1	8,400	13	Men in charge of north bound careless about rights
16 M F. and F 2 10 14,400 19	14	В	P. and F	2	8	9,933	5	Brakeman of freight, 4 a. m., went forward to flag passenger train from opposite direction, but his signal was not seen; torpedoes not used. Brake- man's experience, 9 months on this road; 20
16 M F. and F 1 5 11,620 19 Engineman of empty engine, north bound, ran on time of regular south-bound train. A conductor and an operator by lax conduct contributed.  18 P. and F 2 10 14,400 7 In fog. 4 a. m.; freight ran beyond end of double track without right. Engineman claims lost his bearings; fireman's experience, 6 weeks.  18 F. and F 0 0 15,999 30 Flagman not out far enough.  20 M F. and F 0 6 16,900 39 South bound train ran past meeting point. (See note in text below.)  21 B F. and F 0 6 20,000 6 Freight ran past fixed stop signal and through cross-over into empty passenger train. Engineman, 19 years' experience, asleep. One passenger car and 3 freight cars destroyed by fire started by illuminating gas leaking from tank.  22 B P. and P 63 162 36,000 58 Conductor and engineman of west-bound train forgot meeting order. (See note in text below.)  23 B P. and P 63 162 36,000 58 Conductor and engineman of west-bound train forgot meeting order. (See note in text below.)	lõ	R				10,620	54	Occurred 4 a. m. in dense fog; 5 cars broke away from rear of freight standing at tank and ran
In fog. 4 a. m.; freight ran beyond end of double track without right. Engineman claims lost his bearings; fireman's experience, 6 weeks.  Flagman not out far enough. West-bound train ran past meeting point. (See note in text below.)  Br. and F 0 6 16,900 39 South bound entering sidetrack struck by north-bound double-head train.  Freight ran past fixed stop signal and through cross-over into empty passenger train. Engineman, 19 years' experience, asleep. One passenger car and 3 freight cars destroyed by fire started by illuminating gas leaking from tank.  Br. and F 0 0 25,000 12 Men in charge of north-bound extra forgot about south-bound regular train.  Conductor and engineman of west-bound train forgot meeting order. (See note in text below.)  Misplaced switch; believed malicious. (See note in text below.)	16	M	F. and F	1	5	11,620	19	Engineman of empty engine, north bound, ran on time of regular south-bound train. A conductor
18 R F. and F 0 0 15,999 30 Flagman not out far enough.  19 B P. and P 2 50 16,400 57  20 M F. and F 0 6 16,900 39 South bound entering sidetrack struck by northbound double-head train.  21 B F. and F 0 6 20,000 6 Freight ran past fixed stop signal and through cross-over into empty passenger train. Engineman, 19 years' experience, asleep. One passenger car and 3 freight cars destroyed by fire started by illuminating gas leaking from tank.  22 B F. and F 0 0 25,000 12 Men in charge of north-bound extra forgot about south-bound regular train.  23 B P. and P 63 162 36,000 58 Conductor and engineman of west-bound train forgot meeting order. (See note in text below.)  24 M P. and F 24 45 65,000 16 Misplaced switch; believed malicious. (See note in text below.)	17	В	P. and F	2	10	14,400	7	In fog. 4 a. m.; freight ran beyond end of double track without right. Engineman claims lost his
South bound entering sidetrack struck by north-bound double-head train.  Freight ran past fixed stop signal and through cross-over into empty passenger train. Engineman, 19 years' experience, asleep. One passenger car and 3 freight cars destroyed by fire started by illuminating gas leaking from tank.  Br. and F 0 0 25,000 12 Men in charge of north-bound extra forgot about south-bound regular train.  Conductor and engineman of west-bound train forgot meeting order. (See note in text below.)  Men in charge of north-bound extra forgot about south-bound regular train.  Conductor and engineman of west-bound train forgot meeting order. (See note in text below.)								Flagman not out far enough. West-bound train ran past meeting point. (See
B F. and F 0 6 20,000 6 Freight ran past fixed stop signal and through cross-over into empty passenger train. Engineman, 19 years' experience, asleep. One passenger car and 3 freight cars destroyed by fire started by illuminating gas leaking from tank.  Men in charge of north-bound extra forgot about south-bound regular train.  P. and P 63 162 36,000 58 Conductor and engineman of west-bound train forgot meeting order. (See note in text below.)  Misplaced switch; believed malicious. (See note in text below.)	20	M	F. and F	0	6	16,900	39	South bound entering sidetrack struck by north-
B F. and F 0 0 25,000 12 Men in charge of north-bound extra forgot about south-bound regular train.  B P. and P 63 162 36,000 58 Conductor and engineman of west-bound train forgot meeting order. (See note in text below.)  M P. and F 24 45 65,000 16 Misplaced switch; believed malicious. (See note in text below.)	21	В				20,000	6	Freight ran past fixed stop signal and through cross-over into empty passenger train. Engine- man, 19 years' experience, asleep. One passen- ger car and 3 freight cars destroyed by fire
B P. and P 63 162 36,000 58 Conductor and engineman of west-bound train forgot meeting order. (See note in text below.)  P. and F 24 45 65,000 16 Misplaced switch; believed malicious. (See note in text below.)	İ			ļ	i	1	12	Men in charge of north-bound extra forgot about
24 M P. and F 24 45 65,000 16 Misplaced switch; believed malicious. (See note in text below.)	ļ		<b>!</b>		ŀ		•	Conductor and engineman of west-bound train forgot meeting order. (See note in text below.)
— , a la la la la la la la la la la la la l	24		1				16	Misplaced switch; believed malicious. (See note

# Causes of thirty-six prominent train accidents (Class A)—Continued. DERAILMENTS.

					_		
					,	Reference to	Cause.
1	<b>D</b>	P	Û	1	\$485	25	At derailing switch. Track circuit having failed, operator used emergency key to unlock lever; the lock being then out of service, operator allowed signal to indicate clear while derailing
2	D	P	á	46	8,750	80	switch was open. Two rear cars of passenger train, running 50 miles an hour, derailed on straight line. After accident track was out of line, but cause of derailment not determined; no defect found in rails,
3	D	P	0	4	8,600	96	fastsnings or ties, nor in cars.  At 25 miles an hour, on 8-degree curve, forward truck of tender jumped truck. "Unable to lo-
4	D	! ም 	2	8	11,730	84	cate cause" Elevation of outer rail, 5 inches.  Bunaway on steep grade; entire crew except fireman held responsible. One brakeman had only Tmonths' experience. (See note in text below)
5	D	F	2	0	12,000	47	Occurred 9 p. m.; open draw, signals at stop; en-
6	D	P	2	8	12,000	24	At derailing switch. Engineman and fireman killed. Engineman had received order to run slowly at this point, but was running fast.
7	D	P	0	0	18,000	28	Excessive speed over reverse curve
Ħ	Đ	<b>F</b>	. 0	· ·	14,800	51	Bunaway: cars derailed on bridge, knocking it down Runaway was started by 3 cars which, unattended, bumped against train in yard
9	D	P	0	0	17,986	90	Train ran on burning bridge; origin of fire un-
10	D	P	88	0	26,309	48	Bridge gave way under train (See note in text
11	D	` P	4	34	81,780	62,88	below ) Train derailed on trestle and cars fell to stream below Cause, malicious loosening of rail. All the men on the train being disabled, no danger signal was sent back, and 8 minutes afterwards
12	, <b>D</b>	! !   <b>P</b>	0	19	38,670	 	a train consisting of engine and caboose, following, ran into wreck. Part of the personal injuries due to this second derailment.  Broken tender wheel, breakage probably due to overheating by brakes sticking, unknown to men on engine. Wreck partly destroyed by fire from gas ignited from light in mail car.
	Total	derailments.	108	114	190,500		
	Total and	collisions derailments.	248	715	490, 880	1	

Derailment No. 10 was the wrecking of a passenger train while crossing a trestle, in consequence of the bridge giving way. Eighty-eight persons were killed, the engine and all of the cars of the train except two being swept down by the fleet bick wrecked the bridge. According to the report of the railroad company, the bridge was knocked down by floating wreckage, which struck it while the train was on the bridge. The report says:

A volume of water more than 20 feet deep came down an arroya which is usually dry, filling the channel and overflowing the banks. It came with such rapidity as to displace the county wagon bridge situated about 1,000 feet up the stream, which wagon bridge was thrown against the railroad bridge with such violence as to force it from its bearings at the very time the train was crossing the stream.

The engine had just reached the embankment on the further side of the stream when the bridge was torn away and the engine fell back into the arroya, lodging on its side. The tank (tender) and the coach, chair car, and baggage car were carried down the arroya a distance of about half a mile; the cars were torn to pieces, and the tank, of steel, was separated from its trucks and was carried still farther down.

The most of the trucks of the wrecked cars were scattered in various places from the bridge down to where the car bodies lodged. There was no water flowing in this arroya when two trains passed over the same bridge less than one hour before the catastrophe, and it was not raining at this point at the time the wreck occurred. In the river into which this arroya empties, half a mile from the bridge, the flow of water below the confluence was 40 cubic feet per second on the morning before the disaster, and it was 1,000 cubic feet per second on the morning after. In the interval it had reached a maximum of 4,000 cubic feet per second.

The road has been operated for thirty-three years and the permanent way has been on practically the same grade and the same alignment across this arroya during all this time. The bridge that was washed away was in thoroughly good condition immediately preceding the accident. The conductor who was in charge of the train had served the company in that capacity twenty-two years and the engineman twenty-one years.

Collision No. 23, killing 63 persons, occurred in daylight, but on a curve where neither of the two enginemen could see the opposing train until close upon it. Both trains were running at high speed. The conductor and the engineman of the west-bound train forgot a meeting order which had been delivered to them about thirty-five minutes before. The engineman was killed in the collision, but there is satisfactory evidence that he had correctly read the order which he had received. He is said to have read the order to the fireman, but this appears to have done no good. The fireman was killed. conductor simply forgot that he had the order. The conductor thinks that he read the order to the flagman, as he is required by rule to do, but the flagman says that he did not. These two trains were running on long-established schedules and had often met at the station which was prescribed in this case, on orders similar to this one. There were no other trains on this part of the road at this time. The most of the victims of the wreck were passengers riding in two passenger cars of comparatively light construction in the east-bound train, which were between a large and heavy baggage car and a heavy vestibuled passenger car. Behind this vestibuled car were three sleeping cars. The negligent conductor and engineman were men of long experience, good records, and excellent character.

In pointing out that the lesson of this collision—the need of the block system—is one which has been frequently emphasized before,

we are saying only what is obvious to all. The danger involved in running weak or light cars in the middle of a train, the rest of which is composed of heavy and strong cars, is also obvious.

Collision No. 24 occurred to a passenger train, running at high speed, near a station where the switches had no interlocking or distant signals. The train ran over a misplaced switch and collided with freight cars on a sidetrack. The time was about 5 p. m. (daylight). A preceding passenger train running in the same direction had passed over the switch in safety forty-two minutes before. Investigation by officers of the road and by a coroner's jury indicated that the switch had been misplaced by some person or persons unknown. The evidence is not clear as to whether the switch was set for the sidetrack or was left in an intermediate position. Whether this accident was or was not occasioned by a malicious act is perhaps not conclusively shown; but in either case the occurrence illustrates the danger, well known, attending the running of trains at high speed over facing-point switches that are not provided with distant signals.

Collision No. 11 was due to the running of a part of a freight train on the main line from one station to another without having the right to the track; and the error which led to this movement was a mistake in or misunderstanding of hand signals on the part of a brakeman and an engineman. The engineman, who had had only four months' experience on this road, though he had served several years on other roads, absconded the day after the collision. The brakeman had had only five months' experience as such, though he had worked for the same company in a bridge-repair gang for five years. The circumstances of the case may be described as follows, the road being doubletracked: A freight train moving northward from A to B, C, D, E, etc., was detained, near A, by the breaking of a coupling and the separation of the train into two parts. The grade being descending, it was necessary to move the forward part of the train on to station C and put it out of the way before the engine could be run back to bring on the rear portion of the train. At C it was necessary, in order to put these freight cars on a sidetrack, to run them first to the south-bound main track and then to the sidetrack; but having reached the main track, the cars—the engine pushing them southward—were kept moving back toward station B. The brakeman asserts that he endeavored, by hand motion, to prevent the engineman from thus pushing the cars, while the engineman claimed (at the hearing on the next day after the collision) that the brakeman motioned to him to back—that is, to proceed toward B.

In the meantime an excursion passenger train following this freight from the south, and being detained at A by the detached rear portion, reported to the train dispatcher and received from him an order to run northward from A to D on the south-bound track; and while executing this order, after having run nearly to the next station (B), the

passenger train collided with the freight. The train dispatcher, when giving this order, gave an order also that all south-bound trains should be stopped at D; this in order to leave a clear track for the passenger train. The freight train had the right, under the rules, to use the south-bound main track at C to reach the side track, provided fiagmen were sent out both north and south to stop approaching trains; but it had no right to move away from C, in either direction, on the south-bound track. It appears that not only did the men in charge of this train disobey the rule against running from station to station without an order from the dispatcher, but also neglected to send a flagman in either direction. The conductor of the train, on arriving at C, went to the telegraph office for orders, and the wrong movements were made by the engineman and the brakeman without his knowledge. This conductor had had seven months' experience as such on this road and twenty years' experience elsewhere. fireman of this freight train, who had served five years, part of the time as extra engineman, was the only person on the train who had been in the train service of the company more than seven months.

Collision No. 5 occurred in the daytime and at a point less than one-fourth mile beyond a block-signal station, the foremost train having stopped at that point to take water. As soon as this train had passed the block-signal station (station B) the signalman (station agent) gave the prescribed telegraphic signal to the next block station in the rear (station A), and a following passenger train was started from A in about two minutes thereafter. It reached B in about four minutes, or six minutes after the foremost train stopped at the water tank. The operator at B appears to have telegraphed to A without first putting his own outdoor signal in the stop position. This operator was a man of eleven years' experience, with a good record.

The rear flagman of the foremost train, who, according to the rule, should have signaled the following train in season to stop it before it should collide with his own train, did not do so, going back only a short distance, and that apparently after some delay. This flagman was 23 years old and had been in the service seven months. The conductor, who is held responsible for seeing that this flagman performed his duties, has had ten years' experience. His record is not perfect, but appears to have been regarded by the officers of the road as fair.

Derailment No. 4 occurred on a grade of about 2 per cent, some 10 miles long. The train consisted of 36 cars, with air brakes in service on 25 cars. The inspectors reported all in good order at the starting point at the head of the grade. The control of the speed of the train was intrusted to the conductor and brakeman, the engineman being required by rule to use air brakes only in emergencies. After running 2 or 3 miles at high speed the train broke apart behind the nineteenth car. This break is believed to have been due to the breaking

of a wheel, and most of the rear part of the train was wrecked at this point. The forward portion ran several miles farther, when the engine was derailed at a curve and the whole of the cars were wrecked. It is believed that the air brakes were not operative behind the first car, as there is some circumstantial evidence that none of them acted as they should have done, automatically, when the break occurred. It is supposed, therefore, that the angle cock at the rear end of the first car had been closed by some means not discovered. Both conductor and engineman were killed.

Collision No. 2, like No. 5, was due to a failure in block working. Collision No. 7 occurred on a line where block signaling appears to be in force, but it was "permissive blocking." It appears to be clear that the fault lies with the engineman of the second train. The men on this train had been on duty sixteen and one-half hours.

Collision No. 13 illustrates the complicated nature of some of the rules under which trains are run on single-track lines. This case may be described as follows: Extra 324 north and fourth 56 south met in collision north of E, killing 3 men and damaging 2 engines and 21 cars. The stations and distances on this line are as follows:

	Miles.	
<b>A</b>	. 0	Z
B	. 7	Ë
<b>B</b>	_ 12	<b>]</b> 4.
D	_	
D	25	Ü
<b>F</b>		
<b>G</b>		

There were four sections of train No. 56 from G to E, and there were to have been three sections from E to A. Third 56 was turned at E, where it set off its cars, and engine and crew started for G as an extra before extra 324 arrived. At D extra 324 received an order reading, "Extra 324 has right of track against third 56 D to E. Extra 325 has right of track against third 56 B (E. D. T.) to D." Upon arriving at E, engineman of extra 324 received a meet order with train No. 50 at F; inquired if third 56 had arrived, but asked nothing about signals, and when informed that third 56 had been there, proceeded without He had met second 56 at C and noted that it carried signals, which plainly showed that there would be a third section of train to C; and from the order that he received at D he knew that extra 325, which was following him, had right of track against third The crew of extra 324 therefore knew that there would be three sections of 56 south of E, and also knew that they had met but Operator did not notify crew of extra 324 that third 56 two sections. had arrived carrying signals, and conductor of the train left his work to the flagman, making no effort to stop train when he knew that he had no right to proceed beyond E.

Collision No. 19 was due to a combination of causes, one of which was unusual. The conductor and engineman of a west-bound train had orders to meet two east-bound passenger trains at a certain station, where the west-bound did not stop. On approaching that station the engineman received from the operator a go-ahead signal by flag, and took this for a clear block-signal, superseding the telegraphic meeting order which he held from the dispatcher. The conductor was busy collecting tickets and the meeting order dropped out of his mind until he reached the station. While passing he imagined he saw two east-bound passenger trains on the side track, though in fact there was only one such train there. The operator who gave the clear flag signal had been stationed at that point temporarily for the purpose of block-signaling trains running in the same direction, without regard to dispatcher's orders concerning the movement of trains running toward each other.

Collisions 4, 6, 8, 9, 10, 16, and 22 were due to mistakes or forgetfulness in connection with telegraphic orders or in reading time-tables. In collision No. 3 the men at fault had been on duty eighteen hours.

Table No. 3.—Details of Table 1—Causes of accidents to employees in coupling and uncoupling cars.

Sub-	Causes.		ain- en.	Train- men in yards.		Yard trainmen (switch- ing crews).		Other employ-	
class.	Cuusos,	Killed.	Injured.	Killed.	Injured.	Killed.	Injured.	Killed.	Injured.
1	Sticking of parts (bent pins, etc.) preventing quick work	1	7		12		15		9
2	Holding up pin by hand (presumably made necessary by defective uncoupling mechanism). Other causes, apparently due to defective un-	1	12		13		83		
8	coupling mechanism		1		1		8		
<b>4</b> 5	Defective draft gear, with automatic coupler Coupling to an engine or tender		1 5		5		1 15		
6	Same (with link-and-pin coupler)				3		1	••••	
8	Coupling on inside of sharp curve.  Foot caught in or between couplers while ad-		9		ð	1	20		' - <b></b>
8	justing coupler	1 9	10	;	12 7	2	25 16		
10	Slipped, usually on ice or snow. Foot caught in frog, guard rail, or switch. Caught by overhanging load (on platform car). Load shifted.	3	i		2	7	7		·
11 12	Caught by overhanging load (on platform car)		3		8		1 6		 
13	Engaged in operations preliminary to coupling	i	28	3	21	2	34		
14 15	While coupling safety chains.		i	<u>i</u> -	1		2		]
16	Link-and-pin coupler Link and pin, with automatic		1	1	*		1		' 
17	Coupling damaged cars (presumably an unavoidable risk)	`	8	2	6	3	- 1 - 8		
18	Uncoupling without using lever (presumably by		10			<b> </b>	94		
19	reason of defective uncoupling mechanism) Uncoupling, other causes		10 <b>4</b> 3	3	11 20	i-	24 <sup>1</sup> 59 <sup>1</sup>		. 6
20	Miscellaneous	2	37	4	81	<u></u>	50		·
21	Miscellaneous Not clearly explained	5	12	6	13	4	19		8
	Total	17	190	21	169	21	344		18

TABLE No. 4.—Details of Table 1—Causes of accidents to employees classified (C6 and C7) as falling from and getting on or off cars and engines.

Sub-	Causes.		ain- ien.	me	ain- en in irds.	trai: (sw	ard nmen itch- ng (ws).	em	her ploy- es.
c <b>ia</b> s∓.	Cas diseas.	Killed.	Injured.	Killed.	Injured.	Killed.	Injured.	Killed.	Injured.
[ 1	Fell from roof of box car by reason of— Defect in car		4			1		1	2
2	Top or show			,					<b>-</b>
3	Parting of train	2	8	1	2	1	3	••••	2
C8 5	Parting of train  Derailment, collision, or shock due to abnormal movements of cars other than those in subclass 3  While setting brakes	3	<b>60</b> <b>21</b>	. 4	30 24	6 2	56 40	4 2	14 2
6	Fell from— Coal car Freight car other than box or coal car	: 	6		5		3		3 2 1
8 9	Engine or tender	. 5	50 6	i	42	4	16 2		Î 1
10	Passenger car Engines, tenders, or cars (all kinds) not in motion		41	1	40		11		47
11	Miscellaneous causes		64	•	30	1	*5	3	14
12	Not clearly explained	31	57 85	1	18	12	40	4	18 73
13 14 15	Jumping off moving trains	4	119		82	1 12 4 3	48 84	3	02
C7 16	Jumping from engines or cars anticipating collision, derailment, or other accident  Fell from engines or cars by reason of defective		27	1	6		11		5
17 18	handholds and sill steps Getting on or off moving engine Caught in frog, guard rail, or switch	3	23 123	4	22 114 1	5	23 105 1	<b>ż</b> ·	37 1
<b>\-</b>		60	695	20	446	30	455	23	255

#### [Public—No. 171.]

AN ACT requiring common carriers engaged in interstate commerce to make full reports of all accidents to the Interstate Commerce Commission.


Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled. It shall be the duty of the general manager, superintendent, or other proper officer of every common carrier engaged in interstate commerce by railroad to make to the Interstate Commerce Commission, at its office in Washington, District of Columbia, a monthly report, under oath, of all collisions of trains or where any train or part of a train accidentally leaves the track, and of all accidents which may occur to its passengers or employees while in the service of such common carrier and actually on duty, which report shall state the nature and causes thereof, and the circumstances connected therewith.

SEC. 2. That any common carrier failing to make such report within thirty days after the end of any month shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor and, upon conviction thereof by a court of competent jurisdiction, shall be punished by a fine of not more than one hundred dollars for each and every offense and for every day during which it shall fail to make such report after the time herein specified for making the same.

SEC. 3. That neither said report nor any part thereof shall be admitted as evidence or used for any purpose against such railroad so making such report in any

suit or action for damages growing out of any matter mentioned in said report. SEC. 4. That the Interstate Commerce Commission is authorized to prescribe for such common carriers a method and form for making the reports in the foregoing section provided.

Approved, March 3, 1901.



#### SPECIAL INFORMATION CONTAINED IN PRECEDING BULLETINS.

- Each accident bulletin contains tables showing the number of passengers and employees killed and injured, and these figures are classified according to cause (see Table No. 1); also tables showing cost of the different classes of train accidents. The causes of accidents to employees in coupling and uncoupling and in falling from cars, etc., are further classified in Tables No. 3 and No. 4. The most serious collisions and derailments are dealt with in a supplementary table (Class A) showing the causes in some detail. Each bulletin is for three months, and No. 1 was for the quarter ending September 30, 1901. The bulletin for the quarter ending June 30 contains, in addition to the quarterly statistics, tables showing the same information for the whole of the fiscal year ending on that date.
- Bulletin No. 1 contains brief notes on the causes of coupler accidents, explanatory of Table No. 3. Table No. 4 is supplemented by similar notes. In this quarter special mention was made of 130 casualties due to operating trains in which air brakes were used on only a portion of the cars.
- Bulletin No. 4 has comments on collisions occurring where the trainmen had worked very long hours. In this bulletin a table is given showing the deaths and injuries due to trains parting. The table shows that nearly all of the coupler failures which resulted in a collision or derailment were reported as due to "cause unknown."
- Bulletin No. 5 contains a table showing the cause (as reported) of each coupling accident in the quarter. The table fills 12 pages.
- Bulletin No. 6 contains a table giving notes on the causes of the 16 rear collisions which occurred in this quarter on railroads where the block system is in use. Comment is made on the large increase in the number of accidents to men in coupling, as compared with previous quarters.
- Bulletin No. 7 contains a note on the cause of a rear collision due to the inadequacy of the time-interval rule.
- Bulletin No. 8 explains in detail the causes of two butting collisions. In one of these collisions a conductor gave a hand signal to stop, which was taken by the engineman to mean go ahead. In another case the men in charge of a train read "No. 2" when the order was written "second No. 2." This bulletin contains a special list of all the collisions of the quarter, of whatever magnitude, which were caused by mistakes in connection with time-tables or telegraphic orders.
- Bulletin No. 9 records two collisions in which 44 persons were killed, one due to careless handling of a telegraphic order and the other to gross negligence of an engineman, who failed to keep the air brakes in working order. Reference is made to the derailment of four fast mail trains by reason of reckless speed.
- Bulletin No. 10 records the death of 147 passengers in collisions and derailments—more than three times the average number killed during the nine preceding quarters. One derailment, due to an accidental obstruction, killed 65 pas-

sengers, and six other accidents caused 106 deaths. The causes of the derailment mentioned and of four of the worst collisions are explained at length.

Bulletin No. 11 contains a note on one butting collision which resulted in the deaths of 18 passengers and injuries to 37, the collision being caused by failure to identify a freight train on a side track at night; but aside from this the quarter's totals are in nearly every case less than in preceding quarters. Two costly accidents were caused by air-brake failures which were due to extreme cold weather. Mention is made of a fourth error like that shown in Bulletin No. 8 (readers overlooked the word "second").

Bulletin No. 12 records one derailment, killing 7 passengers, due to the failure of an engineman to reduce speed, on entering a side track, according to a telegraphic order which had been delivered to him. This bulletin contains summaries of the casualties, collisions, and derailments for the three years ending June 30, 1904.

# ACCIDENT BULLETIN,

No. 14.

## SHOWING COLLISIONS AND DERAILMENTS OF TRAINS

AND

### CASUALTIES TO PERSONS

DURING

OCTOBER, NOVEMBER, AND DECEMBER, 1904.

INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMMISSION.
Washington, D. C.

WASHINGTON:
GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE.
1905.

### THE INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMMISSION.

Hon. MARTIN A. KNAPP, of New York, Chairman.

Hon. JUDSON C. CLEMENTS, of Georgia.

Hon. CHARLES A. PROUTY, of Vermont.

Hon. JOSEPH W. FIFER, of Illinois.

Hon. FRANCIS M. COCKRELL, of Missouri. EDWARD A. MOSELEY, Secretary.

MARCH 11, 1905.

#### ACCIDENT BULLETIN No. 14.

### RAILROAD ACCIDENTS IN THE UNITED STATES

DURING THE

### THREE MONTHS ENDING DECEMBER 31, 1904.

The number of persons killed in train accidents during the months of October, November, and December, 1904, as shown in reports made by the railroad companies to the Interstate Commerce Commission, under the "accident law" of March 3, 1901, was 242, and of injured 3,298. Accidents of other kinds, including those sustained by employees while at work, and by passengers in getting on or off the cars, etc., bring the total number of casualties up to 14,978 (951 killed and 14,027 injured). These accidents are classified in the following table. These reports deal only with (a) passengers and (b) employees on duty.

Table No. 1.—Summary of casualties to persons, October, November, and December, 1904.

	Passen- gers.		Trai	nmen.		inmen y <b>ards</b> .	Yard trainmen (switch- ing crews).		Other employees.		Total employees.	
	Killed.	Injured.	Killed.	Injured.	Killed.	Injured.	Killed.	Injured.	Killed.	Injured.	Killed.	Injured.
Collisions Derailments Miscellaneous train accidents (excluding the above) in-	51 2	899 495	68 39	586 252	13 4	242 45	15 6	99	21 6	162 54	117 55	1,089 395
cluding locomotive boiler ex- plosions	• • • •	36	13	256	2	73	1	37	1	18	17	384
Total train accidents	53	1,430	120	1,094	19	360	22	180	28	234	189	1,868
Coupling and uncoupling While doing other work about trains or while attending	••••	• • • • • •	24	252	16	181	29	866	2	33	71	832
switches Coming in contact with overhead bridges, structures at	••••	• • • • • •	12	1,404	17	708	18	542	26	529	73	3, 178
side of track, etc	4	5	15	144	4	66	2	72	1	19	22	301
while getting on or off Other causes	45 12	489 458	72 86	986 128	25 22	607 108	49 23	706 78	35 220	268 2, 591	181 <b>30</b> 1	2, 566 2, 905
Total (other than train accidents)	81	947	159	2, 914	84	1,665	121	1,768	284	3,440	648	9, 782
Total, all classes	114	2,877	279	4,008	108	2,025	143	1,943	312	3, 674	837	11,650

Note.—Accidents to employees resulting in slight injuries which do not prevent the employee injured from performing his accustomed service for more than three days, in the aggregate, during the ten days immediately following the accident are not reported.

The quarterly bulletin issued three months ago (No. 13) and that issued one year ago (No. 10) were both marked by very high casualty records, so that the present one shows well in comparison with either; but the three most serious accidents in the present record caused 48 deaths. These are collisions 17, 22, and 23. The total numbers of employees killed in the various classes—which numbers, when taken for a whole quarter, are but little affected by the notable disasters to passenger trains—will be found to vary both ways from the figures given in the earlier bulletins named; some items have increased, while others have decreased. The total of employees killed in accidents other than train accidents (648) is larger than in the last preceding quarter; but the number of men employed in the train service was doubtless larger. As compared with the October-December quarter one year ago, the present total under this head is smaller.

The total number of collisions and derailments was 2,950 (1,760 collisions and 1,190 derailments), of which 268 collisions and 139 derailments affected passenger trains. The damage to cars, engines, and roadway by these accidents amounted to \$2,406,081. Given more in detail, these facts appear as below:

TABLE No. 2.—Collisions and derailments.

	Number.	Loss.	Persons killed.	Persons injured.
Collisions, rear	445 215	<b>\$49</b> 8, 745 467, 793	43 89	685 <b>69</b> 8
Collisions, trains separating	307	142, 781 867, 800	4 82	108 497
Total	1,760	1, 476, 619	168	1,968
Derailments due to defects of roadway, etc	609 94 51	184, 706 525, 840 62, 776 47, 284 13, 874 146, 082	9 6 13 7 1 21	806 153 101 73 15 242
Total	1,190	929, 462	57	890
Total collisions and derailments	2, 950	2, 406, 081	225	2,878

Note.—Collisions and derailments which cause no death or personal injury and which cause not over \$150 damage to the property of the railroad are not reported.

Following is the usual list of Class A train accidents; all in which the damage is reported at \$10,000 or over; notable cases in which passengers are killed; and those doing damage less than \$10,000 and down to \$2,000, wherever the circumstances or the cause may be of particular interest:

#### Causes of thirty-three prominent train accidents (Class A).

[Norm.—R. stands for rear collision; B., butting collision; M., miscellaneous collisions; D., derailment; P., passenger train; F., freight and miscellaneous trains.]

#### COLLISIONS.

	1	<u> </u>	1		Τ.		
No.	Class.	Kind of train.	Killed.	Injured.	4 11 11 11		
1	R	F. and F	1	1	\$500	47	Operator gave clear block signal when block was not clear. Engineman had control of air brakes on
2	R	F. and F	2	3	2, 140	46	only 7 out of his 19 cars. (See note in text below.) Superintendent reports this as "unavoidable." Leading train had stopped just after emerging from tunnel, because of broken drawbar; flagman heard following train in tunnel, but did not dare enter because tunnel was filled with smoke; regular time interval had been maintained at last station.
3	R	F. and F	1	1	4,538	4	Train approached yard at uncontrollable speed, 11 p. m.; engineman on duty since 8.45 a m., after rest of 4 hours following 12-hour trip.
4	R	F. and F	1	1	5,000	8	One passenger killed. Failure to flag, and poor lookout on engine, flagman on duty 17 hours 30 minutes, with intermission of 1 hour.
5	В	P. and F	•	7	5,000	34	Engineman forgot meet order; conductor endeavored unsuccessfully to stop train.
6	R	P. and P	4	36	5,110	25	Four passengers killed Engineman negligent as to signals when approaching a junction.
7	' BB	F. and F	1 0	•	6,100	67	below.)
*	B	F. and F	2	1	7,482	35	Dispatcher (experience, 4 months as dispatcher, 4 years as operator) sent meeting order to only one of the two trains.
9	В	P. and F	0	10	8, 800	81	Pilot on one train overlooked the schedule of the other train.
ю	R	F.and F	•	•	10,629	28	Leading train, entering side track, alightly delayed; following train not under proper control.
11	M	P. and P	•	1	11,265	68	Collision at crossing of two failroads; air brakes in- operative; had not been tested at beginning of trip. Engineman negligent in not calling for use of hand brakes.
12	B	F. and F	1	18	11,800	51	Entering side track at meeting point; overran switch and out on to main track.
13	B	F, and F		13	12,000	17	Conductor and engineman of mixed train (1.30 a. m.) disregarded order to wait for opposing train; engineman was killed.
14	R	F. and F	1	0	18,000	*	Runaway on long descending grade. Air brakes failed, presumably because of closing of train-pipe cock in front part of train from some cause unknown Conductor and flagman in caboose, men of brief experience, did not respond to whistle signal and did not apply air brakes.
15	В	F. and F	0	*	<b>16,000</b>	33	Engineman started from station without signal from conductor. Conductor had delivered certain dis- patcher's orders to engineman, but afterwards went back and received additional orders, of which he did not advise engineman.
16 17	B	P. and P P. and P	30 30	21 84	16,820 17,581	1 13	Approached station (8 a. m.) at uncontrollable speed.  Men in charge of freight neglected to observe signals on passing passenger trains. (See note in text
18	В	F. and F	0	4	17,600	36	Agent, 24 months' experience, failed to deliver dis-
19	M	P.and P	0	18	19,000	60	patcher's order.  Rastbound ran through crossover and into side of westbound train. Interlocking connections had failed and switch had to be spiked, repairman by mistake spiked it in the wrong position. Personal
20-	В	P. apá F	ı	11	22,045	11	Injuries slight. Conductor and engineman of freight forgot order to
21	R	P. and F	1	18	30, 350	26	meet passenger train. Freight not properly protected at rear by flag. Conductor, engineman, and flagman on duty 18 hours. Torpedoes had been used up; flagman neglected
22	В	P.and P	10	31	84, 200	32	to replenish, had difficulty in lighting fuses.  Operator recopying dispatcher's order made it read  1 hour 50 minutes instead of 1 hour 50 minutes.  According to rule should have traced second copy from the first.

Causes of thirty-three prominent train accidents (Class A)—Continued.

#### COLLISIONS—Continued.

No.	Class.	Kind of train.	Killed.	Injured.	Damage to engines, cars, and roadway	Reference to record.	Causes.
23	В	P. and P	8	25	\$36, 300	48	Occurred 3 a. m. Operator (experienced) failed to deliver meeting order; evidently acknowledged the order to the dispatcher without setting his signal in the stop position. Six cars destroyed by fire.
24	R	P. and F	0	2	37,900	2	Misunderstanding between block-signal operators.
	Tota	l, collisions	69	286	349, 860		
1	D	F	2	2	\$4,000	70	Train thrown off track by derailing switch at crossing, 4 a. m.; operator changed signal after train was close to crossing, evidently thinking train was on another (parallel) track. Operator's experience at this place, 3 days; elsewhere, 6 months.
2	D	F	0	1	5, 400	71	At derailing switch, 3 a. m.; engineman and brake- man asleep on engine.
3	D	P	1	43	7, 125	42	Very high speed on curve of 10°; elevation of outer rail, 4½ inches; weight of engine, 197,820 pounds. Engineman, who was killed, had satisfactory record up to the beginning of this trip. Injuries to passengers reported "not serious."
4	D	P	1	7	10, 200	22	Burning trestle, 6 a. m.
5 6	B	<del>!.</del>	0	45	10, 918	65	Broken rail.
7		P	0	0	11. 150 15, 000	43	Unknown. Broken wheel: personal injuries slight.
Ŕ	ď	F	ŏ	Ö	18,900	40	Drawbar broke and fell to the track.
9	Ď	P	1	8	25,000	67	Breakage of cast-iron weeel of baggage car; speed 50 miles an hour; three cars destroyed by fire.
	Tota	l, derailments	5	112	107, 688		

Collision No. 17, the most disastrous accident in the present record, was between an eastbound passenger train and a westbound freight. It occurred at 4 a. m., and both trains a moment before the collision were moving at about 30 miles an hour. The freight was encroaching on the time of the passenger train in consequence of the failure of its conductor and engineman to observe or heed the green-light signals on a preceding passenger train. The freight train had been waiting on a side track about one hour and forty minutes, and, according to the rules, was to wait there until the passage of the eastbound passenger train and all of its sections. On the first section green lights were displayed to indicate that a second section was to follow, but failing to look for these lights the men in charge of the freight started their train out of the side track immediately after the passage of the first section (which did not stop at that point). The conductor and engineman in charge of this freight were both men of experience. The 30 passengers who were killed were all riding in the foremost

Total, collisions

and derailments 74 398 457, 548

passenger car, which was next to the tender of the engine, there being no baggage car in the train.

In connection with collision No. 22 (causing 10 deaths) the officers of the road state that a rule has been issued requiring that hereafter an operator who, after receiving a telegraphic order needs additional copies of it, must, after writing such additional copies, telegraph them to the dispatcher and receive the dispatcher's "o k."

The third most serious collision, No. 23, killing 8 persons and injuring 25, was due to a failure on the part of a telegraph operator whose experience had extended over several years, but whose service had been intermittent and had been on several different roads.

Butting collision No. 7 resulted from negligence on the part of three or more persons. The third section of a freight train passed the first section without the exchange of dispatcher's orders between the conductors of the two trains, as is required by rule; and a meeting order was thereby nullified. A copy of the meeting order had been sent to the station at which the opposing train should have been met, but the operator at this station, a man of one year's experience, did not display his stop signal. Soon after receiving the order his tour of duty expired and he went off without giving to the operator who relieved him a notice of the existence of the meeting order.

Collision No. 1 occurred about 6 a. m., and the victims were drovers riding in the caboose of the leading train. Although the block-signal operator appears to have been grossly negligent, the collision would not have occurred but for neglect on the part of others. The line of the road was straight. The foremost train having been stopped, the conductor went back with a red light and put one torpedo on the rail, but before he could go farther and put down another torpedo, the second train (19 cars) was upon him. The engineman of this train did not see the conductor's red stop signal until he was very close to it, because of an electric headlight on a passenger train coming from the opposite direction, the rays of which shone directly in his eyes. Of the 19 cars in the second train only 7 had their air brakes coupled so as to be within the control of the engineman. This train had left the last preceding station ahead of time.

Derailment No. 1 appears to have been directly due to the signal-man's lack of acquaintance with his surroundings. Though in the service of the company only three days, he was intrusted with the management (in the night) of the signals at a crossing of one road with another where the two lines approached from one direction on parallel lines close to each other. Derailment No. 3 appears to have been due to a reckless disregard of regulations.



TABLE No. 3.—Details of Table 1—Causes of accidents to employees in coupling and uncoupling cars.

Sub- class.	Causes.		rain- ien.	Trainmen in yards.		Yard trainmen (switch- ing crews).			
		Killed.	Injured.	Killed.	Injured.	Killed.	Injured.	Killed.	Injured.
1	Sticking of parts (bent pins, etc.) preventing quick work	1	17		14	2	10		
2	Holding up pin by hand (presumably made neces-	1	17	<b> </b>	14	2	13	***	
-	sary by defective uncoupling mechanism)		12	<b> </b>	12	1	25		1
8	Other causes, apparently due to defective uncoup-						_		_
_	ling mechanism	• • • •	2		1	• • • •	5		;
4 5	Defective draft gear, with automatic coupler Coupling to an engine or tender	•••	<b>2</b> 7	i	<u>ii</u>	i	3 16	• • • •	1 6
6	Same (with link-and-pin coupler)		2		**	•	10		
7	Coupling on inside of sharp curve		! 9		3	3	22		
8	Foot caught in or between couplers while adjusting	}							_
9	coupler	;-	16 6	:	15		14		1
10	Foot caught in frog, guard rail, or switch	4	, <b>0</b>	1 3	7	<b>2</b> 5	11 6	• • • •	1
ii	Caught by overhanging load (on platform car)			l	î		_		
12	Load shifted	1	3		8	1		• • • •	1
13	Engaged in operations preliminary to coupling	5	31	2	18	2	53		3
14	While coupling safety chains		1			• • • •	2	• • • •	1
15 16	Link-and-pin coupler		1		2	• • • •	1 2	• • • •	2
17	Link and pin, with automatic				2		2	• • • •	2
	able risk)		7	4	8	i	6	2	2
18	Uncoupling without using lever (presumably by		}		_			_	
	reason of defective uncoupling mechanism)	1	16		9	8	17	• • • •	2 5
19	Uncoupling, other causes Miscellaneous	2	58 35	2	26 34	1 2	76 <b>6</b> 0		5 6
20 21	Miscellaneous Not clearly explained	4	16	8	16	5	31	••••	1
**	Tot oromit ownmon								
	Total	24	252	16	181	29	366	2	33

Table No. 4.—Details of Table 1—Causes of accidents to employees classified (C6 and C7) as falling from and getting on or off cars and engines.

Sub-	Causes.		rain- aen.	Train- men in yards,		Yard trainmen (switch- ing crews).		Other em- ployees.	
class.	•	Killed.	Injured.	Killed.	Injured.	Killed.	Injured.	Killed.	Injured.
1 2 3 4	Derailment, collision, or shock due to abnor-	2	6 13 4	••••	6 11 6	1	8 14 9		2 1
C6 5	mal movements of cars other than those in subclass 3. While setting brakes	4	75 25	3	61 14	7 2	86 43	4 2	18 6
6 7 8 9	Coal car Freight car other than box or coal car Engine or tender Passenger car	7	4   6   85   6	2	3 8 49	1 2	5 27 1	1	2 3 8 5
10 11 12 13 14	Engines, tenders, or cars (all kinds) not in motion Miscellaneous causes. Not clearly explained. Slipped getting on moving trains or cars Jumping off moving trains. Jumping from engines or cars anticipating colli-	2 87 2	82 105	12	43 28 58	2 6 14 1 4	14 60 44 63 151	3 13 6 2	28 9 26 47 52
C7 16 17 18	Jumping from engines or cars anticipating collision, derailment, or other accident  Fell from engines or cars by reason of defective handholds and sill steps  Getting on or off moving engine  Caught in frog, guard rail, or switch	1 7	38 22 178	4	14 23 127	8	13 \$3 132 2	3	11 2 48
	Total	72	986	25	607	49	705	35	268

#### [Public-No. 171.]

AN ACT Requiring common carriers engaged in interstate commerce to make full reports of all accidents to the Interstate Commerce Commission.

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, It shall be the duty of the general manager, superintendent, or other proper officer of every common crrrier engaged in interstate commerce by railroad to make to the Interstate Commerce Commission, at its office in Washington, District of Columbia, a monthly report, under oath, of all collisions of trains or where any train or part of a train accidently leaves the track, and of all accidents which may occur to its passengers or employees while in the service of such common carrier and actually on duty, which report shall state the nature and causes thereof, and the circumstances connected therewith.


SEC. 2. That any common carrier failing to make such report within thirty days after the end of any month shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor and, upon conviction thereof by a court of competent jurisdiction, shall be punished by a fine of not more than one hundred dollars for each and every offense and for every day during which it shall fail to make such report after the time herein specified for making the same.

SEC. 3. That neither said report nor any part thereof shall be admitted as evidence or used for any purpose against such railroad so making such report in any suit or

action for damages growing out of any matter mentioned in said report.

SEC. 4. That the Interstate Commerce Commission is authorized to prescribe for such common carriers a method and form for making the reports in the foregoing section provided.

Approved, March 3, 1901.



#### SPECIAL INFORMATION CONTAINED IN PRECEDING BULLETINS.

- Each accident bulletin contains tables showing the number of passengers and employees killed and injured, and these figures are classified according to cause (see Table No. 1); also tables showing cost of the different classes of train accidents. The causes of accidents to employees in coupling and uncoupling and in falling from cars, etc., are further classified in Tables No. 3 and No. 4. The most serious collisions and derailments are dealt with in a supplementary table (Class A) showing the causes in some detail. Each bulletin is for three months, and No. 1 was for the quarter ending September 30, 1901. The bulletin for the quarter ending June 30 contains, in addition to the quarterly statistics, tables showing the same information for the whole of the fiscal year ending on that date.
- Bulletin No. 1 contains brief notes on the causes of coupler accidents, explanatory of Table No. 3. Table No. 4 is supplemented by similar notes. In this quarter special mention was made of 130 casualties due to operating trains in which air brakes were used on only a portion of the cars.
- Bulletin No. 4 has comments on collisions occurring where the trainmen had worked very long hours. In this bulletin a table is given showing the deaths and injuries due to trains parting. The table shows that nearly all of the coupler failures which resulted in a collision or derailment were reported as due to "cause unknown."
- Bulletin No. 5 contains a table showing the cause (as reported) of each coupling accident in the quarter. The table fills 12 pages.
- Bulletin No. 6 contains a table giving notes on the causes of the 16 rear collisions which occurred in this quarter on railroads where the block system is in use. Comment is made on the large increase in the number of accidents to men in coupling, as compared with previous quarters.
- Bulletin No. 7 contains a note on the cause of a rear collision due to the inadequacy of the time-interval rule.
- Bulletin No. 8 explains in detail the causes of two butting collisions. In one of these collisions a conductor gave a hand signal to stop, which was taken by the engineman to mean go ahead. In another case the men in charge of a train read "No. 2" when the order was written "second No. 2." This bulletin contains a special list of all the collisions of the quarter, of whatever magnitude, which were caused by mistakes in connection with time-tables or telegraphic orders.
- Bulletin No. 9 records two collisions in which 44 persons were killed, one due to careless handling of a telegraphic order and the other to gross negligence of an engineman, who failed to keep the air brakes in working order. Reference is made to the derailment of four fast mail trains by reason of reckless speed.
- Bulletin No. 10 records the death of 147 passengers in collisions and derailments—more than three times the average number killed during the nine preceding quarters. One derailment, due to an accidental obstruction, killed 65 passengers, and six other accidents caused 106 deaths. The causes of the derailment mentioned and of four of the worst collisions are explained at length.

Bulletin No 11 contains a note on one butting collision which resulted in the deaths of 18 passengers and injuries to 37, the collision being caused by failure to identify a freight train on a side track at night; but aside from this the quarter's totals are in nearly every case less than in preceding quarters. Two costly accidents were caused by air-brake failures which were due to extreme cold weather. Mention is made of a fourth error like that shown in Bulletin No. 8 (readers overlooked the word "second").


Bulletin No. 12 records one derailment, killing 7 passengers, due to the failure of an engineman to reduce speed on entering a side track, according to a telegraphic order which had been delivered to him. This bulletin contains summaries of the casualites, collisions, and derailments for the three years ending June 30, 1904.

Bulletin No. 13 records the death of 228 passengers in collisions and derailments—a number far greater than had been reported in any previous quarter. One derailment caused the death of 88 persons (passengers and employees); one collision, 63; another, 24; another, 18; and a fourth, 16. The circumstances of these unusually serious accidents are given in detail. One of these collisions, and another not so disastrous to life and limb, occurred under somewhat unusual circumstances, due to the complicated nature of the regulations under which the trains were run.

 $\bigcirc$ 



	•				
•					
•					
i					



• . . • •

# ZZ ZCCIDENT BULL

06

No. 15.

# JANUARY, FEBRUARY, AND M

WASHINGTON, D. C.

WASHINGTON:
GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
1905.

### THE INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMMISSION.

Hon. MARTIN A. KNAPP, of New York, Chairman.

Hon. JUDSON C. CLEMENTS, of Georgia.

Hon. CHARLES A. PROUTY, of Vermont.

Hon. JOSEPH W. FIFER, of Illinois.

Hon. FRANCIS M. COCKRELL, of Missouri.

EDWARD A. MOSELEY, Secretary.

### ACCIDENT BULLETIN No. 15.

### RAILROAD ACCIDENTS IN THE UNITED STATES

DURING THE


### THREE MONTHS ENDING MARCH 31, 1905.

The number of persons killed in train accidents during the months of January, February, and March, 1905, as shown in reports made by the railroad companies to the Interstate Commerce Commission under the "accident law" of March 3, 1901, was 232, and of injured 3,713. Accidents of other kinds, including those sustained by employees while at work, and by passengers in getting on or off the cars, etc., bring the total number of casualties up to 909 killed and 14,397 injured. These accidents are classified in the following table. These reports deal only with (a) passengers and (b) employees on duty.

Table No. 1.—Summary of casualties to persons—January, February, and March, 1905.

	Passen- gers.		Trainmen.		Train- men in yards.		Yard trainmen (switch- ing crews).		Other employees.		Total employees.	
•	Killed.	Injured.	Killed.	Injured.	Killed.	Injured.	Killed.	Injured.	Killed.	Injured.	Killed.	Injured.
Collisions	18 9	834 794	66 48	533 350	14 6	252 51	15	137 58	9 10	182 57	104 70	1, 104 516
explosions	1	23	21	276	6	102	1	36	2	28	30	442
Total train accidents	28	1,651	135	1,159	26	405	22	231	21	2 ;7	201	2,062
Coupling and uncoupling While doing other work about trains, or while attending	• • • •	••••	16	195	16	170	27	406	3	19	62	790
switches	• • • •		19	1, 453	12	773	16	595	18	654	65	3,475
side of track, etc	• • • •	3	13	116	4	83	4	95	•	9	21	303
while getting on or off Other causes	24 12	317 343	76 <b>3</b> 8	933 114	19 27	624 136	32 29		28 244	275 2, 575	155 338	2, 540 2, 913
Total (other than train accidents)	36	663	162	2,811	78	1,786	108	1,892	293	3, 532	641	10, 021
Total, all classes	64	2,314	297	3,970	104	2, 191	130	2, 123	314	3, 799	815	12,083

Note.—Accidents to employees resulting in slight injuries which do not prevent the employee injured from performing his accustomed service for more than three days, in the aggregate, during the ten days immediately following the accident are not reported.



# ACCIDENT BULLETIN,

No. 15,

# SHOWING COLLISIONS AND DERAILMENTS OF TRAINS

AND

# CASUALTIES TO PERSONS

DURING

JANUARY, FEBRUARY, AND MARCH, 1905.

INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMMISSION, Washington, D. C.

WASHINGTON:
GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE.
1905.

### THE INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMMISSION.

Hon. MARTIN A. KNAPP, of New York, Chairman.

Hon. JUDSON C. CLEMENTS, of Georgia.

Hon. CHARLES A. PROUTY, of Vermont.

Hon. JOSEPH W. FIFER, of Illinois.

Hon. FRANCIS M. COCKRELL, of Missouri.

EDWARD A. MOSELEY, Secretary.

### ACCIDENT BULLETIN No. 15.

## RAILROAD ACCIDENTS IN THE UNITED STATES

DURING THE

## THREE MONTHS ENDING MARCH 31, 1905.

The number of persons killed in train accidents during the months of January, February, and March, 1905, as shown in reports made by the railroad companies to the Interstate Commerce Commission under the "accident law" of March 3, 1901, was 232, and of injured 3,713. Accidents of other kinds, including those sustained by employees while at work, and by passengers in getting on or off the cars, etc., bring the total number of casualties up to 909 killed and 14,397 injured. These accidents are classified in the following table. These reports deal only with (a) passengers and (b) employees on duty.

Table No. 1.—Summary of casualties to persons—January, February, and March, 1905.

	Passen- gers.		Trai	nmen.	m	rain- en in ards.	Yard trainmen (switch- ing crews).		Other employees.		Total employees.	
,	Killed.	Injured.	Killed.	Injured.	Killed.	Injured.	Killed.	Injured.	Killed.	Injured.	Killed.	Injured.
Collisions	18 9	834 794	66 48	533 350	14 6	252 51	15 6		9 10	182 57	104 70	1, 104 516
explosions	1	23	21	276	6	102	1	36	2	28	30	142
Total train accidents	28	1,651	135	1,159	26	405	22	231	21	2:37	204	2,062
Coupling and uncoupling While doing other work about trains, or while attending		• • • • • •	16	195	16	170	27	406	3	19	62	790
switches Coming in contact with over- head bridges, structures at	• • • •		19	1,453	12	773	16	595	18	654	65	3,475
side of track, etc	••••	3	13	116	4	83	4	95	·	9	21	303
Falling from cars or engines, or while getting on or off Other causes	24 12	317 343	76 88	933 114	19 27	624 136	32 29	708 88	28 244	275 2, 575	155 338	2, 540 2, 913
Total (other than train accidents)	36	663	162	2,811	78	1,786	108	1,892	293	3, 532	611	10, 021
Total, all classes	64	2, 314	297	3, 970	101	2, 191	130	2, 123	314	3, 799	815	12, 083

NOTE.—Accidents to employees resulting in slight injuries which do not prevent the employee injured from performing his accustomed service for more than three days, in the aggregate, during the ten days immediately following the accident are not reported.

The totals in this table are not strikingly different from those in Bulletin No. 11, covering the same quarter of the preceding year, though there is a decrease of 12 in the number of passengers killed in train accidents. In this item Bulletin No. 11 was swelled by one collision which killed 18 persons. In the present record the largest passenger death list was that of collision No. 24, in which 7 were killed. Particulars of this and other collisions are given below. Coupling accidents, while fewer than one year ago, do not show any marked falling off in fatalities. From the details of "coupling accidents," as given in Table 3, on a following page, it is evident that a considerable percentage of the injuries classed under this head are of a kind not peculiar to this department of work, but are due to causes which occur, and probably to about the same extent, in other kinds of work.

The total number of collisions and derailments was 3,108 (1,787 collisions and 1,321 derailments), of which 284 collisions and 177 derailments affected passenger trains. The damage to cars, engines, and roadway by these accidents amounted to \$2,449,248. Given more in detail, these facts appear as below:

TABLE 1	No.	2.—	Collisions	and	derailments.
---------	-----	-----	------------	-----	--------------

	Num- ber.	Loss.	Persons killed.	Persons injured.
Collisions:				
Rear	511	<b>\$473,785</b>	44	634
Butting	203	350, 704	47	650
Trains separating		90, 754	2	109
Miscellaneous	821	343, 834	29	545
Total	1,787	1, 259, 077	122	1,938
Derailments:				
Due to defects of roadway, etc	334	328, 326	19	506
Due to defects of equipment	598	439, 354	7	234
Due to negligence of trainmen, signalmen, etc	72	43, 744	7	70
Due to negligence of trainmen, signalmen, etc	92	113, 968	19	165
Due to malicious obstruction of track, etc	11	20, 240	3	46
Due to miscellaneous causes	214	244, 539	24	289
Total	1,321	1, 190, 171	79	1, 310
Total collisions and derailments	3, 108	2, 449, 248	201	3, 248

Note.—Collisions and derailments which cause no death or personal injury and which cause not over \$150 damage to the property of the railroad are not reported.

Derailments at derailing switches caused losses of \$18,652 in this quarter, and of \$29,735 in the quarter last preceding (not including personal injuries and losses of merchandise). In the present quarter two of these derailments are charged to the fault of the tower man; one to a runaway, due to bad management of the air brakes by the engineman; one to the freezing of a distant signal in the clear position, and one to a defect in the derailing switch. Other cases are reported as due to the more ordinary kinds of carelessness. In one instance the engineman had been on duty twenty hours. In the list for the

preceding quarter (three months ending December 31, 1904), two derailing switch accidents were reported as due to the engineman falling asleep. In another the engineman mistook the signal light; the light which should have guided him had been accidentally extinguished, but he saw some other light, which he took to be the signal light. One case was due to bad hand signaling, and in one case a signalman changed the position of a derailing switch when the train was too near to it. This signalman was 18 years old.

Following is the usual list of Class A train accidents—all in which the damage is reported at \$10,000 or over; notable cases in which passengers are killed, and those doing damage less than \$10,000 and down to \$2,000, wherever the circumstances or the cause may be of particular interest:

### Causes of fortly prominent train accidents (Class A).

[Note.—R. stands for rear collision; B., butting collision; M., miscellaneous collisions; D., derailment; P., passeuger train; F., freight and miscellaneous trains.]

_	1		71 1	_		_	
No.	Class.	Kind of train.	Killed.	4 1 1		*******	Cause,
		COLLISIONS.					
1	R	F. and F	1	2	\$700	7	Empty engine ran into rear of standing freight, killing 4 passengers in caboose; caboose took fire and, with occupants, was burned up. The standing train was not properly protected, and the approaching engine was running at excessive speed.
2	R	F. and F	. з	1	700	54	Freight, standing at water tank, run into by fol- lowing freight approaching at unauthorized speed; 3 passengers in caboose killed.
3	В	P. and P	1 '	8.	2,300	29	Dispatcher's meeting order incorrectly copied by 1 of 8 operators, though repeated to dispatcher correctly. Stop signal was displayed at meeting point, but engineman holding the incorrect or- der ran past this signal 400 feet; dense fog
4	В	P. and F	2	8	3, 064	61	Both enginemen and both firemen of "double- head" freight forgot about passenger train; these men on duty 19 hours.
5	в	P. and F	0	7	3, 183	81	Operator (4 months in this place and 4 months' experience in telegraph work elsewhere) delivered elearance can't instead of meeting order. This operator (at the meeting point) was to have delivered clearance to the other train if it had arrived first. In sending a meeting order to the meeting point the dispatcher should direct the operator to take special precautions, but failed to do so.
6	В	P. and F	0	6	4,700	10	Two engines coupled together, going to assistance of passenger train stalled in snow, collided with passenger train. Passenger brakeman had placed torpedo signals, but these were not heard. He is censured for not using fusees also. The engines, however, had been notified by one flagman some distance back.
7	В	F. and F	2	2	4, R00	62	Operator (in service 8 weeks, experience elsc- where, 1 year) wrote name of wrong station in meeting order.
8	R	F and F				6	Engineman (50 years old), intoxicated, ran at ex- cessive speed and did not heed flag.
9	<b>B</b>	F and F	0	2	5,000	36	Operator neglected to deliver order. Both engines had electric headlights, and I engineman admitted that he had seen the light of the other train several miles away, but thought that it was on a sidetrack.
10	м	F	0	0	5, 100	39	Fart of train left standing on grade without hand brakes set.

## Causes of forty prominent train accidents (Class A)—Continued.

No.	Class.	Kind of train.	Killed.	Injured.	Damage to engines, cars, and roadway.	Reference to record.	Cause.
		collisions— continued.					
11	В	P. and F	0	7	<b>\$</b> 5, 118	32	Passenger train, stuck in snow, did not send flag ahead. Freight engineman ran unreasonably
12	В	F. and F	0	1	5,800	34	fast, having been informed about passenger train.  Block-signal operator, 16 years' experience, turned eastbound freight into siding against westbound empty engine (standing), having forgotten about
13	R	F. and F	0	2	6,656	27	presence of empty engine.  Engineman approached yard at unauthorized speed; on duty 22 hours 35 minutes; 9 locomotives damaged.
14	M	P. and F	1	1	6, 800	66	Freight encroached on time of passenger train;
15	В	P. and F	0	19	7, 300	33	men at fault on duty 18 hours.  Block-signal operator gave yard engine time against passenger train after dispatcher had refused to do so; passenger train approached at unauthorized speed.
16	В	F. and F	0	6	7,600	35	authorized speed. Conductor and engineman disregarded meeting order; reported by railroad company as "criminally responsible." (See note in text below.)
17	В	F. and F	1	4	7,800	12	Conductor, engineman, and brakeman failed to identify train on sidetrack. (See note in text below.)
18	В	P. and F	2	23	10,800	57	Engineman of castbound freight encroached on time of westbound passenger, having "gained the impression" that he had 3 hours 30 minutes against it when he had only 30 minutes. Con-
19	R	P. and F	2	6	13, 175	1	engine standing in yard without red lights dis-
20	R	P. and F	1	5	13, 900	2	played. Freight encroached on time of passenger train in consequence of failure of two watches. (See note in text below.)
21	В	P. and F	3	12	14, 200	8	
22	В	F. and F	4	6	15,731	21	"Double-head" freight train ran past meeting point. (See note in text below.)
23	В	F. and F	2	3	19, 635	63	Engineman fell asleep and ran past meeting point. (See note in text below.)
24	R	P. and P	7	142	44,000	51	7 passengers killed, some of them suffering from fire; engineman, running at high speed at night, ran past distant signal without observing its position, and then ran 900 feet past home signal, striking preceding train, which had been stopped because of a hot journal.
	Tota	1	35	269	213, 012		
	]	DERAILMENTS.	===	<del></del>			
1	D	<b>F</b>	5	1	800	49	Excessive speed; work train running with tender
2	D	P	o	2	2,775	17	first.  Derailing switch open; distant signal (9 p. m.)
3 4	D D	F	1	2	3, 900 9, 148	68 73	frozen in clear position; signalman negligent. Track distorted by solar heat (Mar. 29). Landslide; watchman had passed over track just before; damage partly due to fire; gas tank exploded.
5 6	D D	F	0	<b>0</b> 8	10,000 11,000	42 78	ploded. Flange of wheel of tender broken. Unexplained; speed 35 miles an hour; tender derailed on good track.
<b>7</b>	D	P	1 0	13 1	12, 400 14, 725	76 74	Rails maliciously loosened. Burning bridge (3 p. m.).
9 10 11	D D D	P P F	0 0 1	30 19 0	15, 741 18, 700 19, 800	18 15 24	Rock fell on track (night).  Broken 80-pound rail; 12 years old; internal flaw. Runaway (4 trespassers killed). (See note in text
12	D	F	0	0	20,000	16	below.) Broken wheel; wheel excessively heated by
-	,		1	j	1	1	brakes; defective casting.

Causes of forty prominent train accidents (Class A)—Continued.

No.	Class.	Kind of train.	Killed.	Injured.	Damage to engrines, cars, and roadway.	Reference to record.	. Cause.
	<b> </b>	DEBAILMENTS— continued.					
13	D	P	0	56	<b>\$22, 500</b>	48	Baggage car of rapidly moving train blown off track by explosion of boiler of engine of another train passing in opposite direction on adjacent track.
14	D I	P	1	20	25, 360	77	Excessive speed on curve. Engineman was making his first trip over this division; had made 20 round trips to learn the road.
15	D	F	3	1	25, 500	20	Runaway; men in charge of train had neglected to test brakes at head of grade; depended partly on hand brakes, but did not apply them soon enough. The first brakeman on the train had had 9 months' experience; the second, 6 months, and the third, none.
16	D	P	1	40	65, 000	41	Broken rail at entrance to bridge; 8 cars and bridge destroyed. Rail, 85-pound, 3 years old, was split longitudinally for 5 feet; internal defect. Train, running about 50 miles an hour, drawn by 2 heavy Atlantic-type engines.
	Tota	1	14	194	277, 349		
		l collisions and railments	49	463	490, 361		

The most notable accident in this list, collision No. 24, occurred on a road thoroughly equipped with automatic block signals, the cause being bald inattention to signals on the part of an engineman whose record had been good. For about 12 miles this engineman, running at high speed, closely following the other passenger train, had encountered successive signals about three-fourths of a mile apart, all indi-As he approached the distant signal which was cating "all right." against him, that signal was obscured by the smoke from a locomotive on another track, and he passed the signal without knowing its indica-He gives no satisfactory explanation of this, from which the conclusion is drawn that he had assumed that the signal indicated "all right," with no other ground for such assumption than that he had found the preceding signals "all right." But he knew that he had passed a distant signal, and thus was bound to prepare to stop at the home signal. Not only did this man ignore the distant signal, but evidently after passing it he allowed his attention to be drawn away, for he did not observe the home signal until he was quite near to it. The distant signal which was obscured by smoke ought to have been seen by the engineman 1,070 feet before reaching it.

The fireman of this engine, who ordinarily watches for signals when practicable, had seen all the signals for several miles, but at this particular point he was engaged in putting coal into the fire box and did not give his attention to the signal. The fire in this wreck broke out in less than one minute after the collision. It was rapidly spread by gas

escaping from broken pipes beneath the cars, and was started, no doubt, by the ignition of this gas by the fire in the wrecked locomotive or the flames of the lamps or by friction. The three rear cars of the foremost train and the three leading cars of the second train were burned up.

In collisions No. 1 and No. 2, taken together, 7 passengers were killed while riding in caboose cars attached to the rear of freight trains. In connection with these cases it may be observed that it has long been generally recognized that the lives of passengers are not so safe on freight trains as on passenger trains.

In three of the accidents in this list the men at fault had been on duty for an excessive length of time; in one case, 19 hours; in another, 22 hours 35 minutes, and in a third, 18 hours.

Collision No. 8, due to the reckless conduct of an engineman who was intoxicated, is the first case of this kind which has come to notice since the accident records have been kept.

In collision No. 16, a butting collision between two heavy freight trains, eastbound train No. 8 received orders to meet westbound No. 5 at A and No. 7 at B. On arrival at A, No. 5 was met, and the eastbound (No. 8) immediately received a second order to meet No. 7 at A instead of B, and to meet second No. 7 at B. The conductor and engineman read and signed this order, and then immediately went to their train and started out, utterly disregarding the order. The conductor and engineman claim to have been under the impression that they were to meet only one train at A, but this one train was met before they received the second order. The fireman of No. 8 was disciplined for failing to read the order when it was handed to him by the engineman. This fireman's experience was one year. The conductor and engineman had each had several years' experience.

Collision No. 17 was due to the failure of the men on train No. 1, west bound, to identify an eastbound train standing on a side track. The fireman of the westbound, holding a lantern in his hand, stood in the gangway of the engine as, moving at about 5 miles an hour, it passed the engine standing on the side track. On account of escaping steam he was unable to see the number distinctly, but was satisfied that it was not the number which he was looking for (that of the engine of train No. 2). Failing to get the desired information, but wishing to save time by avoiding a stop, the engineman of No. 1, on passing the caboose of the standing train, asked the flagman, who was in the cupola, if his train was No. 2, and the flagman is claimed to have replied "yes." The flagman, however, says that he did not understand the question, did not answer "yes," and merely tried to get the engineman to repeat his question.

Collision No. 20 was due to a miscalculation of time, and both the engineman's and the conductor's watches were out of order. The conductor's was nineteen minutes slow, and the engineman's had stopped

at 10.56 a. m. by the minute hand being blocked by the hour hand. The engineman was fatally injured. The conductor's watch had on the previous day been thrown violently to the ground by an accident. When picked up it was running, in apparently good condition, but the conductor had not afterwards compared it with any other timepiece. Furthermore, the conductor and engineman had neglected to compare the time by their watches when they received the meeting order.

In collision No. 22 the train which overran the meeting point—the eastbound—was drawn by two engines, and the enginemen of both these engines disobeyed the meeting order. The engineman and fireman of the second engine were killed. All four men on the engines had also disregarded the rule forbidding a train to pass a passing track without receiving an "all right" signal from the conductor. The surviving engineman had "got the impression" in his mind that the meeting order specified another station 5 miles beyond. There was no reason or excuse for this impression, and he gives no explanation of it. His conversation with the operator at the time he received the order was such as to prove that he had read it correctly. He was unable to state positively that he had read the order to his fireman. The fireman admits that he did not read the order, though both claim that their habits in this matter had been correct. Both trains held orders to meet at W. As the eastbound was approaching W. the station signal was sounded by one of the enginemen, and the stop signal was given by the flagman, under direction of the conductor. signal was answered from the engine, but the train did not reduce speed; and the conductor, seeing that they were going to pass the station, had the flagman get out on top of the train and endeavor to give an effective stop signal to the enginemen. He failed to get them to notice his signal, and his lamp went out. On account of the speed of the train and the possibility of meeting the opposing train at any moment, the flagman and conductor were afraid to attempt to go over the seven nonair cars in order to open the angle cock and apply the air brake. The conductor is held at fault for failing to have his three brakemen in the proper positions on the train to pass along the hand signals when approaching a meeting point. These brakemen were also at fault for not being in proper positions on the train.

Collision No. 23 occurred about 5 a.m., and was caused by one of the freight trains running past a sidetrack, where it should have waited for the train from the opposite direction. The engineman of this train had fallen asleep and a brakeman on the engine with him (who was killed) probably also had fallen asleep. The fireman of the train was not sufficiently familiar with the road to know that he was running past a station, there being no station lights at the point in question. The engineman had been awake about three minutes before the collision. The report of the railroad company says that he had

voluntarily overworked himself, failing to ask for rest, and concealing the actual facts from his superior officers. After a run of 14 hours, preceded by a short rest, he lay off for 2 hours 55 minutes, and then entered upon the run of 10 hours which terminated in the collision. At the end of his 14-hour run he told the roundhouse foreman that if needed to go back he would be ready to go whenever called.

The fireman had been on the road only three months, including the time spent in learning. He also had worked the excessive hours above mentioned. The brakeman who was killed on the engine had had eight months' experience. The conductor tried to signal the engineman to stop, but, as before stated, the brakeman on the engine, who should have seen this signal, was probably asleep. The conductor and one of his brakemen, the latter of eight months' experience, neglected to make proper effort to apply the air-brake valve on one of the freight cars in the train.

Derailment No. 11 was a runaway of a train over 10 miles of a crooked road. It was due to the negligence of trainmen in leaving the cars of the train standing on a grade without having enough hand brakes applied to keep them from moving. The train was stopped in a tunnel by the bursting of an air-brake hose. While making repairs a new trainman was overcome by gas and smoke, and the engine had to be detached from the cars to carry this brakeman out of the tunnel to save his life. While the engine was detached the air leaked out from the brake cylinders of the cars in the train and this caused the runaway. When the cars struck the engine (which had started to return) the engineman was knocked off and the fireman jumped off. conductor of the train did not board it when it started, for the reason that he also had been overcome by gas. On 8 or 9 cars the hand brakes had been set before entering the tunnel, but these were not enough to hold the train. After running 10 miles, on a 1 per cent grade, the train was derailed on a curve of 10° where the outer rail was elevated 7 inches. The engine and 34 cars were destroyed. fireman who jumped off had been in the employ of the company two

Table No. 3, given below, showing details of accidents to employees in coupling and uncoupling cars, has been changed and amplified so as to show more clearly the circumstances under which the injuries occurred.

The subclassification in this table is designed to separate, as far as practicable, those accidents which are due to the employee's own carelessness, defective judgment, or disobedience of rules from those which are due to faults in the couplers or to noncompliance with the law by the railroad company. In a large part of the cases it is impossible to classify perfectly, as two or more causes contribute to the accident. For example, some cases fall into subclass 24 without ques-

tion; in others the circumstances are such that doubt arises. In subclass 14 some cases are clearly due to recklessness; in other cases the man was one of reasonably cautious habits, and his error is to be classed simply as misadventure. Cases in subclass 11 are sometimes due to palpably blameworthy conduct on the part of the injured person, and sometimes to hurried work, which a jury would readily class as excusable, if not justifiable. Other considerations like those here mentioned will occur to the reader in connection with some other subclasses.

Subclass 27 includes cases which it has been difficult or impossible to classify. Some of these ought possibly to go into subclass 4 (cars not equipped with automatic couplers), and in other cases the man appears to have been only indirectly connected with coupling operations, and the accident should have been put into some other class; but it has been impossible as yet to fully clear up the facts of these cases by correspondence.

Table No. 3.—Details of Table 1—Causes of accidents to employees in coupling and uncoupling cars.

Sub-	Causes.		min- ien.	me	rain- en in urds.	Yard trainmen (switch- ing crews).		Other employees.	
class.		đ.	cd.	٠	ed.	rj.	ed.		ed.
<del></del>		Killed	Injured	Killed.	Injured	Killed.	Injured	Killed.	Injured.
1	Adjusting coupler with foot		11		9		18		
2	Adjusting coupler, cars accidentally started	• • • •	7	1	11	• • • •	18	•••	
3	Careless manipulation of uncoupling lever	• • • •	3	• • • •	2		3	• • • •	• • • • •
4	Cars not equipped with automatic coupler	• • • •	3 5	• • • •	2		5	••••	1
5 ; 6 !	Coupler broken, using link and pin, or chain Coupling damaged cars	• • • •	7	• • • •	13	2	6 8	••••	1
7	Coupling with chain or other emergency appli-	• • • •	•	••••	10	0	0	••••	*
•	ance on curve too sharp for automatic coupling	'	2				5		
8	Coupling with chain or other emergency appli-								
•	ance because of uneven track					• • • •			1
9	Coupling or uncoupling safety chains		1		2		11	• • • •	$\tilde{2}$
10	Fingers or hand caught between uncoupling lever								
	and body of car		41		32		73	1	2
11	Uncoupling without using lever (unnecessary)	• • • •	7	• • • •	4	• • • •	18	• • • •	
12	Uncoupling without using lever, uncoupling lever		~		10				
70	not in working order	3	20 4	1	12	3	54		2
13 14	Foot caught in frog, switch, or guard rail	3	4	••••	4.	4	6	••••	• • • • •
4.9	together, miscalculated speed	3	12	1	10	2	21		1
15 '	Opening knuckle when cars were near together,	•	**	•	10	-		••••	•
•	engine accidentally started		2	:	. 2	2	6	1	1
16	Opening knuckle, part of defective coupler fell on		_		_			-	
	foot		2	• • • •	5		11	!	
17	Opening knuckle, lost footing		3	2			7		
18	Riding on car to uncouple, slipped off	1	2		1		1		
19	Struck by object at side of track		5		5		24		1
20	Caught by unexpected movement of car, due to				4.0				_
01	slack running in	2	14	2	18	2	27	• • • •	3
21	Caught by unexpected movement of car, due to				i				
}	mistake or misunderstanding in giving hand sig- nals		1		2	i	,		
22	Uncoupling moving cars and lost footing	1	20	i	11	2	23		• • • • •
23	Parts hard to move, causing delay		12	-	8		20		
24	Went between cars unnecessarily and contrary to							1	
	rule		3	3	2	1	10	••••	••••
25	Hand caught between projecting load and end of						_	ĺ	
	next car	•••	4	• • • •	3	•••	1		
26	No witness (fatal injury)	5		5		5		1	•••••
27 28 i	Other causes (see detailed list below)		3 1		8	1	24 5	••••	
25	Unexplained					••••		<del>••••</del>	
J	Total	16	195	16	170	27	406	8	19
Į	~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~							<u> </u>	

### Details of injuries included in Table 3, subclass 27.

- 1 J. Coupling cars on scale track; fell off trestle.
- 2 J. Coupling engine to car (Thurmond and Miller couplers); finger lacerated.
- 3 J. Pilot of engine broke a brake beam; man was knocked against a shed.
- 1 F. Climbing down between cars; squeezed.
- 2 F. Driving pin out of knuckle preparatory to coupling car; struck thumb.
- 3 F. Pulling out broken pin; finger caught.
- 4 F. While cutting cars, wheel ran over foot.
- 5 F. Stooped over to hook up cut-off chain; head caught between cars.
- 6 F. Uncoupling; glove caught, causing man to fall on track; body bruised.
- 7 F. Acid from tank car splashed out through manhole, burning face and neck.
- 8 F. In the act of replacing a knuckle, cars moved up, catching his hand.
- 9 F. Standing on footboard of engine; squeezed between sills of engine and car.
- 10 F. Coupling engine to car; caught between sills of engine and car.
- 11 F. Cutting engine from car; caught hand on hook of engine.
- 12 F. Slipped on ice, cutting knee.
- 13 F. Uncoupling engine from coach; coach split switch, catching man between end sill of engine and corner of coach.
- 14 F. Uncoupling; stepped on stone, spraining ankle.
- 15 F. Hand crushed between drawhead of engine and dead block of snow plow.
- 16 F. Foot caught by wheel while uncoupling.
- 17 F. Coupling cars; struck knee, causing contusion.
- 18 F. Leg caught and injured.
- 19 F. Coupling on a curve; drawbars passed, squeezing him.
- 20 F. Foot caught on frozen stone; ankle sprained.
- 21 F. Coupling an engine; foot caught on pilot.
- 22 F. Finger caught between drawbars.
  - 1 M. Jar caused footboard on hopper car to strike man in the back.
  - 2 M. (Fatal.) Reaching to hook chain of uncoupling lever; head caught between sills.
  - 3 M. Caught on inside of curve and bruised.
  - 4 M. Coupling cars; slipped, and in falling hand caught in bumpers.
  - 5 M. Gave signal to kick cars; grabbed lever with both hands; in so doing got partly between cars and was struck on back by lever.
- 6 M. Jumped down to cut car and landed on a nail; foot injured.
- 7 M. Foot caught under wheel while switching.
- 8 M. Piece of iron fell off car and struck man on hand.
- 9 M. While uncoupling cars broken lever fell on finger.
- 10 M. Coupling cars on curve; caught between coaches and shoulder bruised.
- 11 M. Fell; arm caught between drawbars.
- 12 M. Coupler broke and struck man on nose.

TABLE No. 3A.—Nature of injuries to employees in coupling and uncoupling curs, January, February, and March, 1905.

Injuries.	Train- men.	Train- men in yards.	Yard train- men.	Other em- ployees.
Loss of feet Loss of legs Loss of arms Loss of hands Loss of fingers Loss of toes Fractured skull	4 3 1 9	3 3 6		2
Fractured leg				1

Table No. 3a.—Nature of injuries to employees in coupling and uncoupling cars, January, February, and March, 1905—Continued.

Injuries.	Train- men.	Train- men in yards.	Yard train- men.	Other em- ployees.
Fractured arm Fractured collar bone or ribs Fractured, other bones Contusion of head or body Contusion or laceration of feet Contusion or laceration of toes Contusion or laceration of legs Contusion or laceration of arms Contusion or laceration of hands Contusion or laceration of fingers	4 16 19 2 3 10 27 77	3 5 3 20 15 4 3 7 25 52	3 7 4 59 27 9 22 14 50 148	1 1 4
Dislocation Internal injuries Sprains Shock Miscellaneous	8 7 1	6 6 1 6	21 13	
Total injuries	195 16	170	406 27	19
Total killed and injured	211	186	433	22

#### RECAPITULATION.

KilledInjured	62 790
•	
Total killed and injured	852

Table No. 4.—Details of Table 1—Causes of accidents to employees classified (C6 and C7) as falling from and getting on or off cars and engines.

Sub-	Causes.		rain- ien.		nmen ards.	traii (sw	ard nmen ritch- ng ews).	Otherem ployees.	
class.	•	Killed.	Injured.	Killed.	Injured.	Killed.	Injured.	Killed.	Injured.
1 2 3	Fell from roof of box car by reason of— Defect in car Ice or snow Parting of train	1 1	30 7		2 20 6	1	4 10 12		1 3
C6 5	Derailment, collision, or shock due to abnormal movements of cars other than those in subclass 3.  While setting brakes.  Fell from—	5	65 39	1 2	55 28 5	2	78 45	2	12 1
6 7 8 9	Coal car Freight car other than box or coal car Engine or tender. Passenger car Engines, tenders, or cars (all kinds) not in	10	5	1	44	1	7 1 57 1	1	7 1 10 3
11 12 (13	motion  Miscellaneous causes  Not clearly explained  Slipped getting on moving trains or cars  Jumping off moving trains	35 9 3	81 123	5 3 1	18	2 11 5	34 53 30 65 138	1 5	49 16 15 31 64
C7 15 16 17 19	Jumping from engines or cars anticipating collision, derailment, or other accident  Fell from engines or cars by reason of defective handholds and sill steps  Getting on or off moving engine  Caught in frog, guard rail, or switch	4	23 1 <i>3</i> 5	1	10 18 149	7	9 33 130	1	8 1 53
	Total	76		<u> </u>	624	32	708	28	275

### [Public—No. 171.]

AN ACT Requiring common carriers engaged in interstate commerce to make full reports of all accidents to the Interstate Commerce Commission.

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, It shall be the duty of the general manager, superintendent, or other proper officer of every common carrier engaged in interstate commerce by railroad to make to the Interstate Commerce Commission, at its office in Washington, District of Columbia, a monthly report, under oath, of all collisions of trains or where any train or part of a train accidentally leaves the track, and of all accidents which may occur to its passengers or employees while in the service of such common carrier and actually on duty, which report shall state the nature and causes thereof, and the circumstances connected therewith.

Sec. 2. That any common carrier failing to make such report within thirty days after the end of any month shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor and, upon conviction thereof by a court of competent jurisdiction, shall be punished by a fine of not more than one hundred dollars for each and every offense and for every day during which it shall fail to make such report after the time herein specified for making the same.

Sec. 3. That neither said report nor any part thereof shall be admitted as evidence

or used for any purpose against such railroad so making such report in any suit or

action for damages growing out of any matter mentioned in said report.

SEC. 4. That the Interstate Commerce Commission is authorized to prescribe for such common carriers a method and form for making the reports in the foregoing section provided.

Approved, March 3, 1901.

### SPECIAL INFORMATION CONTAINED IN PRECEDING BULLETINS.

- Each accident bulletin contains tables showing the number of passengers and employees killed and injured, and these figures are classified according to cause (see Table No. 1); also tables showing cost of the different classes of train accidents. The causes of accidents to employees in coupling and uncoupling and in falling from cars, etc., are further classified in Tables No. 3 and No. 4. The most serious collisions and derailments are dealt with in a supplementary table (Class A) showing the causes in some detail. Each bulletin is for three months, and No. 1 was for the quarter ending September 30, 1901. The bulletin for the quarter ending June 30 contains, in addition to the quarterly statistics, tables showing the same information for the whole of the fiscal year ending on that date.
- Bulletin No. 1 contains brief notes on the causes of coupler accidents, explanatory of Table No. 3. Table No. 4 is supplemented by similar notes. In this quarter special mention was made of 130 casualties due to operating trains in which air brakes were used on only a portion of the cars.
- Bulletin No. 4 has comments on collisions occurring where the trainmen had worked very long hours. In this bulletin a table is given showing the deaths and injuries due to trains parting. The table shows that nearly all of the coupler failures which resulted in a collision or derailment were reported as due to "cause unknown."
- Bulletin No. 5 contains a table showing the cause (as reported) of each coupling accident in the quarter. The table fills 12 pages.
- Bulletin No. 6 contains a table giving notes on the causes of the 16 rear collisions which occurred in this quarter on railroads where the block system is in use. Comment is made on the large increase in the number of accidents to men in coupling as compared with previous quarters.
- Bulletin No. 7 contains a note on the cause of a rear collision due to the inadequacy of the time-interval rule.
- Bulletin No. 8 explains in detail the causes of two butting collisions. In one of these collisions a conductor gave a hand signal to stop, which was taken by the engineman to mean "go ahead." In another case the men in charge of a train read "No. 2" when the order was written "second No. 2." This bulletin contains a special list of all the collisions of the quarter, of whatever magnitude, which were caused by mistakes in connection with time-tables or telegraphic orders.
- Bulletin No. 9 records two collisions in which 44 persons were killed, one due to careless handling of a telegraphic order and the other to gross negligence of an engineman, who failed to keep the air brakes in working order. Reference is made to the derailment of four fast mail trains by reason of reckless speed.
- Bulletin No. 10 records the death of 147 passengers in collisions and derailments—more than three times the average number killed during the nine preceding quarters. One derailment, due to an accidental obstruction, killed 65 passengers, and six other accidents caused 106 deaths. The causes of the derailment mentioned and of four of the worst collisions are explained at length.

- Bulletin No. 11 contains a note on one butting collison which resulted in the deaths of 18 passengers and injuries to 37, the collision being caused by failure to identify a freight train on a sidetrack at night; but, aside from this, the quarter's totals are in nearly every case less than in preceding quarters. Two costly accidents were caused by air-break failures which were due to extreme cold weather. Mention is made of a fourth error like that shown in Bulletin No. 8 (readers overlooked the word "second").
- Bulletin No. 12 records one derailment, killing 7 passengers, due to the failure of an engineman to reduce speed on entering a sidetrack, according to a telegraphic order which had been delivered to him. This bulletin contains summaries of the casualties, collisions, and derailments for the three years ending June 30, 1904.
- Bulletin No. 13 records the death of 228 passengers in collisions and derailments—a number far greater than had been reported in any previous quarter. One derailment caused the death of 88 persons (passengers and employees); one collision, 63; another, 24; another, 18; and a fourth, 16. The circumstances of these unusually serious accidents are given in detail. One of these collisions, and another not so disastrous to life and limb, occurred under somewhat unusual circumstances, due to the complicated nature of the regulations under which the trains were run.
- Bulletin No. 14 records 3 collisions, in which 48 persons were killed. The causes of these are explained. In one the men in charge of a freight train, which was sidetracked, neglected to observe signals on passing passenger trains. In another an operator recopying a telegraphic order made a mistake in writing the number of minutes. In a third an operator failed to deliver a meeting order, having acknowledged the receipt of it without first setting his signal in the stop position.

# ACCIDENT BULLETIN,

No. 16.

# APRIL, MAY, AND JUNE, 1905,

AND THE

YEAR ENDING JUNE 30, 1905.

WASHINGTON, D. C.

WASHINGTON:
GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE.
1905.

•			
	•	•	
·			
		•	

# ACCIDENT BULLETIN,

No. 16,

# SHOWING COLLISIONS AND DERAILMENTS OF TRAINS

AND

# CASUALTIES TO PERSONS

DURING

APRIL, MAY, AND JUNE, 1905,

WITH

TABLES FOR THE YEAR ENDING JUNE 30, 1905.

INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMMISSION, WASHINGTON, D. C.

WASHINGTON:
GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE.
1905.

## THE INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMMISSION.

Hon. MARTIN A. KNAPP, of New York, Chairman.

Hon. JUDSON C. CLEMENTS, of Georgia.

Hon. CHARLES A. PROUTY, of Vermont.

Hon. JOSEPH W. FIFER, of Illinois.

Hon. FRANCIS M. COCKRELL, of Missouri.

EDWARD A. MOSELEY, Secretary.

### ACCIDENT BULLETIN-No. 16.

## RAILROAD ACCIDENTS IN THE UNITED STATES

DURING THE

## THREE MONTHS ENDING JUNE 30, 1905.

The number of persons killed in train accidents during the months of April, May, and June, 1905, as shown in reports made by the rail-road companies to the Interstate Commerce Commission, under the "accident law" of March 3, 1901, was 262, and of injured 2,764. Accidents of other kinds, including those sustained by employees while at work and by passengers in getting on or off cars, etc., bring the total number of casualties up to 14,669 (886 killed and 13,783 injured). These accidents are classified in the following table. These reports deal only with (a) passengers and (b) employees on duty.

Table No. 1.—Casualties to persons—April, May, and June, 1905.

Casualties to persons—April, May, and June, 1905.

		isen- ers.	Trai	nmen.		nmen ards.	trai (sw i	ard nmen vitch- ng ews).		er em- oyces.		l em-
	Killed.	Injured.	Killed.	Injured.	Killed.	Injured.	Killed.	Injured.	Killed.	Injured.	Killed,	Injured.
Collisions	5   <b>36</b>	549 680	64 70	338 383	10 6	153 <b>49</b>	8	54 <b>6</b> 2	25 10	81 70	102 94	626 564
explosions		24	10	212	5	55	3	25	7	29	25	321
Total train accidents	41	1,253	144	933	21	257	14	141	42	180	221	1,511
Coupling and uncoupling While doing other work about trains or while attending	; <del></del>		20	226	હ	182	18	341	3	17	49	766
switches	 		20	1,369	13-	664	15	560	24	735	72	3, 328
side of track, etc		7	22	137	' • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •	73	4	67		8	26	285
or while getting on or off Other causes	31 10	446 457	60 31	749 92	29 15	468 81	41 20	627 57	22 218	328 3, 328	152 284	2, 172 3, 558
Total (other than train accidents)	41	910	153	2, 573	65	1,468	98	1,652	267	4, 416	583	10, 109
Total all classes	82	2, 163	297	3,506	86	1, 725	112	1,793	309	4, 596	804	11,620

Note.—Accidents to employees resulting in slight injuries which do not prevent the employee injured from performing his accustomed service for more than three days in the aggregate during the ten days immediately following the accident are not reported.

In train accidents the total number of fatalities this quarter, both to passengers and to employees, is decidedly larger than in the last quarter or in this quarter a year ago. Two derailments this quarter caused the death of 34 passengers, and four collisions caused the death of 41 employees, one of the four killing 26. The particulars of these notable accidents are given in connection with the "Class A" list below.

The tables for the whole year, given on a subsequent page of this bulletin, show the unprecedented total of 350 passengers killed in train accidents, an appalling figure, for which the bulletins for the first, second, and third quarters have prepared the reader. The number of employees killed in the twelve months, while very large, is less than in the year preceding, both by train accidents (collisions and derailments) and by other causes. In coupling accidents the total number of fatalities, 243, is 35 less than in the year preceding, and the number of injuries is 331 less, a gratifying diminution, which it is to be hoped may continue. This diminution, moreover, occurs in a year when the number of men exposed to the risk of injury in this class of accident has increased materially.\*

The total number of collisions and derailments was 2,766 (1,231 collisions and 1,535 derailments), of which 163 collisions and 168 derailments affected passenger trains. The damage to cars, engines, and roadway by these accidents amounted to \$2,410,671. Given more in detail, these facts appear as below:

	Num- ber.	Loss.	Persons killed.	Persons injured.
Collisions, rear	234	<b>\$</b> 219, <b>971</b>	16	304
Collisions, butting	120	212, 212	63	338
Collisions, trains separating.	193	103, 008	1 1	77
Collisions, miscellaneous	684	349, 988	. 27	456
Total	1, 231	885, 179	107	1, 175
Derailments due to defects of roadway, etc	256	173, 624	8	257
Derailments due to defects of equipment	711	567, 592	11	198
Derailments due to negligence of trainmen, signalmen, etc	100	66, 804	9	128
Derailments due to unforeseen obstruction of track, etc	99	378, 608	42	255
Derailments due to malicious obstruction of track, etc	26	48, 913	23	75
Derailments due to miscellaneous causes	343	289, 951	87	331
Total	1,535	1, 525, 492	130	1,214
Total collisions and derailments	2,766	2, 410, 671	237	2, 419

Table No. 2.—Collisions and derailments.

Note.—Collisions and derailments which cause no death or personal injury and which cause not over \$150 damage to the property of the railroad are not reported.

Following is the usual list of Class A train accidents—all in which the damage is reported at \$10,000 or over; notable cases in which passengers are killed, and those doing damage less than \$10,000 and down to \$2,000, wherever the circumstances or the cause may be of particular interest:

<sup>\*</sup>An advance compilation, made from the reports of railroad companies, which, however, is not complete, indicates that the number of men employed by the railroads of the country on June 30, 1905, was about 9 per cent greater than on June 30, 1904.

### Causes of thirty-one prominent train accidents (Class A).

[Note.—R. stands for rear collision; B., butting collision; M., miscellaneous collisions; D., derailment; P., passenger train; F., freight and miscellaneous trains.]

No.	Class.	Kind of train.	Killed.	Injured.	Damage to engrines, cars, and roadway.	Reference to record.	Cause.
		COLLISIONS.					
1	В	F. and F	1	1	<b>\$2,233</b>	46	Engineman forgot an order fixing a meeting point; conductor asleep. See note in text below.
2	R	F. and F	0	1	3, 500	18	Engineman, 39 years old, in the service two years, had fallen asleep; was under influence of in-
3	M	P. and F	0	4	3, 675	51	toxicating liquor.  Occurred at crossing, in fog. 4 a. m.; freight approached crossing at uncontrollable speed and
4	В	P. and F	5	4	4, 350	4	ran into side of passenger train.  Freight train ran past meeting point in consequence of engineman's watch being too slow; watch some time before had stopped and engineman had wound it without discovering that it had run down; conductor tried to stop the train but failed. These men on duty many hours. See
5	R	F. and F	1	1	5,000	16	note in text below.  Runaway on steep grade; both of the two enginemen of the train held responsible for having
6	М	P. and F	3	17 !	5,000	52	failed to test air brakes at head of grade.  Crossing collision; engineman of passenger train  (who was killed) neglected to stop before passing over crossing, and his train was struck by a
7	В	F. and F	0	4	6,000	20	freight train.  Train dispatcher, eighteen months' experience, gave conflicting orders to two empty engines.
8	В	P. and F	1	' <b>38</b>   	6, 100	3	way after having heard torpedoes and shut off steam; he was killed and his action is inexpli-
9	R	F. and P	4	24	6, 125	41	matic application of air brakes, run into at rear by following freight train, which had disregarded
10	<b>B</b>	F. and F	6	4	6,800	19	time of delayed opposing train. See note in text below.
11	В	F. and F			7,000	1 48	Dispatcher gave conflicting orders to extra freight trains.
12	B	F. and F	Į.	!	10,000	ł	Conductor and engineman of west-bound train for- got about east-bound train.
13	M	<b>F</b>	1	2	11,800	24	Coal train became uncontrollable on descending grade of 31 per cent; only 18 cars out of 40 airbraked; hose ruptured and air leaked off, but did not thereby apply brakes sufficiently to reveal the leak.
14	В	P. and P	2	31 	16,910	42	Engineman misread telegraphic meeting order; engineman, conductor, and fireman had neg- lected to read order aloud, as required by rules.
15	R	P. and P	1	36	20,000	1	Passenger train, standing at station, run into at the rear by following passenger train, which approached at uncontrollable speed. Engineman held responsible for running too fast and flagman for not going back; also for not having given
16	В	P. and F	26	11	25,000	43	fusce signals. Freight train waiting on side track to be passed by four trains was started out after the passing of the third. All of the men responsible for this error were killed in the collision. See note in text below.
17	M	P. and F	1	11	52, 400	9	Extra passenger train, in disobedience of rule, entered yard at uncontrollable speed and collided with yard train. Damage caused largely by fire from overturned stove in dining car and from explosion of gas tanks.
	Tota	d	54	199	191, 893		

Causes of thirty-one prominent train accidents (Class A)—Continued.

_							
No.	Class.	Kind of train.	Killed.	Injured.	Damage to engines, cars, and roadway.	Reference to record.	Cause.
		DERAILMENTS.					
1 2	D D	P	ł	10 0	\$1,000 3,475	<b>37</b> 57	Malicious removal of rail fastenings. Work train derailed at washout, 5 p. m. Crew had been on duty 14 hours 20 minutes.
3	D	F	. 0	0	6,000	26	Car of blasting powder in long freight train derailed by running in of slack when brakes were applied. See note in text below.
<b>4</b> 5	$\bar{\mathbf{p}}$	P	0	89	7,390	53	Track distorted by solar heat.
5	D	P	0	7	10,500	65	Cause undiscovered; speed of train 45 miles an hour.
6	D	Р	19	8	12,000	59	Misplaced facing-point switch, turning train into a sidetrack; 14 passengers killed. See note in text below.
7	D	Р	3	29	12, 400	64	Cause undiscovered; speed 45 miles an hour on straight line; injuries to 28 passengers reported as slight.
8 9	D	P	2	0	18, 610	15	Malicious obstruction; rock on track.
9 10	D	F	0	0 5 5	15, 000 15, 000	63	Cause undiscovered; speed 25 miles an hour. Train broke through burning trestle bridge; speed 40 miles an hour; engineman had view of bridge for only 225 feet before reaching it.
11	D	<b>F</b>	1	1	25,000	62	Train of empty passenger cars running 25 miles an hour; cause undiscovered. The engine was running with the tender first.
12	D	P	0	9	28, 859	33	Train broke through trestle bridge which had been
13	D	P	2	13	29, 100	31	weakened by heavy rains. Some part of engine or tender or first car became detached and fell on track; wreck partly destroyed by fire.
14	D	Р	23	110	200,000	` 27	West-bound passenger train ran into wreck of east- bound freight, in which was a carload of blast- ing powder; whole train destroyed by explosion or fire. See note in text below.
	Tota	.1	59	236	279, 334		
	Tota de	l collisions and railments	113	<b>43</b> 5	471, 227		

In collision No. 1, which occurred at 5 a. m., two freight trains running toward each other collided with sufficient force to cause the damage stated and to cause the fatal scalding of one of the firemen. The collision was due to the failure of the men on the east-bound train to keep in mind a dispatcher's order to meet the west-bound train at B; and in consequence of this lapse of memory the train ran 2 miles beyond B. The meeting order was delivered to the conductor of the east-bound train at A, but it appears that he was asleep or drowsy when it was given to him. The flagman, who claims that he had awakened the conductor, was told by the latter to go to the telegraph office and get the meeting order which was waiting, and he did so, signing the conductor's name. The engineman made no objection to this improper action of the flagman. The telegraph operator was a new man and did not know that the man signing for the order was not the conductor. Returning to the caboose, the flagman did not deliver the order into the hands of the conductor, who was in the cupola, but put it under the edge of a water bucket, expecting the conductor to take it when he got down from the cupola; but the flagman claims

that he told the conductor the contents of the order—to meet the opposing train at B. The conductor claims to have no recollection of these things. On arrival at B the train was stopped by the train-order signal. The conductor alighted from the caboose, and, with the engineman, went to the telegraph office, but as the signal was displayed for some other train, and as the operator had no order for this train, he gave-clearance cards and the train proceeded; the engineman having forgotten the meeting order received at A and the conductor knowing nothing about it. The flagman made no protest against passing B, assuming that the conductor and engineman had received (at B) a new order changing the meeting point to some place beyond B.

This collision occurred at 5 a.m. The conductor was a man of twelve years' experience. The flagman had had three years' experience. The engineman who forgot the order failed to show it to the fireman (who was killed), but claims that he had told him the substance of it: This engineman was making his first trip as a road engineman. He had had three and one-half years' experience as fireman and four months as engineman of a switching engine. All of these men had been on duty twelve hours after eighteen hours or more of rest.

Collision No. 4 is a case where the men at fault had been on duty irregularly for many hours. The train began its trip at A at 3 p. m. of Friday and continued its run until 3.30 a. m. of Saturday. At this point (B) a stop of seven and one-half hours was made. Starting from B at 11 a. m. Saturday the run was continued until 5.05 p. m. the same day, where there was another wait (C) until 11.30 p. m. (six hours, twenty-five minutes). The trip was resumed from C at 11.30 and continued until the collision occurred (at D) at 4.40 Sunday morning, thirty-seven hours and ten minutes from the time of starting.

Collision No. 8 occurred at 2 a. m., and was due to the inexplicable negligence of an engineman, who was killed. An eastbound freight had set off part of its cars on a sidetrack and the engine had been run back some distance for the remainder of the train. The flagman, who had been sent forward to stop the passenger train, was not seen by the engineman of the passenger, though the torpedoes which had been placed on the rail were exploded and the engineman shut off steam; but he soon again put on steam and did not shut it off until he saw the headlight of the freight train, when it was too late to avoid the collision. The fireman heard the torpedoes and noticed the slackening of speed, but presumed that the subsequent increase of speed (after the train had passed the flagman) was in response to an "all-right" signal. The engineman was one of long experience. He may have been deceived by the part of the freight train which was on the sidetrack.

In collision No. 9 a freight train ran into the rear of a stalled passenger train. Two passenger cars and a dining car were wrecked,

and the smallness of the number of passengers killed (4) is due to the fact that the conductor was able to warn most of the people on the train in time to enable them to jump off. Many of the injuries were caused by jumping off. The passenger train had passed the freight train at A, had gone on to D (6 miles), and was stopped a half mile beyond D by an unexplained defect in the air-brake apparatus, causing the brakes to apply on one of the cars. train left A in from two to five minutes after the passenger train, in violation of the rule which requires an interval of ten minutes in such cases. Besides this irregularity, the engineman and fireman of the freight appear also to have become confused when they came in sight of the passenger train on a descending grade, and to have neglected to use the means at their command for reducing speed; and their train was running at 25 miles an hour when it struck the passenger train. The accident occurred in the daytime and the signal at station D, which was against the freight train, was visible for 1,100 feet before reaching it. The crew of the passenger train had succeeded, in spite of the difficulty with the air brakes, in getting their train started before the collision occurred, but not in attaining sufficient speed to materially mitigate the severity of the shock. The engineman and fireman of the freight had jumped off their engine some distance before reaching the point of collision. The conductor of the freight, who shares the responsibility for this improper running, had been in the service only six months, though he is reported as having had experience on other roads. The fireman had been in the service nine months and the engineman four years.

Collision No. 10 was caused by the conductor of the eastbound train making a mistake of one hour in calculating the time that an opposing train would be due; this opposing train was four hours forty minutes late and was so described in a dispatcher's order. The conductor counted the hours on his fingers and claims that his engineman (who was killed in the collision) had counted in the same way and had reached the same result. Another clause in the dispatcher's order would have shown the conductor his error if he had compared it carefully with the clause with which he was dealing, but he did not make any such comparison. The conductor's calculations were also somewhat confused by the presence of a passenger train on that part of the road which was one hour thirty minutes late. The fireman and one brakeman had read the order on which the miscalculation was made, but did not detect the conductor's error. The conductor reread the order after passing another station, but still failed to discover his All of the men at fault were experienced, except the brakeman, who was not familiar with the handling of train orders.

In collision No. 16 an extra freight train, south bound, drawn by two engines, running without right on the time of north-bound passen-

ger train No. 1, collided with it, causing the death of both enginemen, both firemen, the conductor, and one other man on the freight train, and the engineman, fireman, and 18 laborers (riding in or on the baggage car) on the passenger train. The men in charge of the freight train were all experienced employees. Their train had waited on a siding at A, 5 miles back, about an hour for one south-bound train and two north bound, and should have waited for one more north bound (the one with which it collided); but for some reason, which a rigid investigation failed to develop, the men in charge started their train out after the passage of the last of the other three trains. The train at fault, being a freight train, had no right to the road whatever as against the opposing passenger train.

The only surviving members of the freight-train crew, two brakemen and a learner, state that while lying at A the conductor and the two enginemen consulted their time cards very carefully and talked about train No. 1, giving evidence that they had not forgotten the They ate their luncheons out of buckets at the same time. before train No. 2 came the enginemen of one of the engines discovered a broken bolt in his engine which it was necessary to replace. While they were hunting for one to replace it No. 2 passed, and while the bolt was being put in the conductor said to one of the brakemen, "This sticks us here an hour and ten minutes," evidently figuring at that time to remain at A for No. 1. At this time the rear brakeman went for a second bucket of water, and while at the spring, which is a short distance south of the side track on which they were lying, train No. 3 passed, and the freight train started to pull out of the siding. He got back to the switch about the time the engines reached it, and, being on the fireman's side, called to him, asking him where they were going, to which the fireman replied, "To B." The brakeman said something about No. 1 not having passed, to which the fireman replied, jokingly, that his (the brakeman's) watch must be stopped. point the stories conflict a little, one story being to the effect that the conductor called to the front brakeman and said, "You had better get on unless you want to get left and have us come back to-morrow and get you." The brakeman, having the bucket in his hand, did not like to get on the head end of the train on account of the difficulty of carrying the bucket over the train, and he was stunned with the idea that he must be wrong about the time and the right to the road. He waited for the caboose, put the bucket of water on it, and then closed the switch. Immediately on getting into the caboose he looked up his time card, examined his watch, and found that there was no question but what they were on the time of No. 1. He states that he then thought there must be something the matter with his watch and unscrewed the back of it, but, so far as he could judge, it was running at its normal rate. It then occurred to him to go over the three rear

cars, which were not equipped with air, and set the brake on the cars immediately ahead, but, thinking that he would break the train in two, he did not do this; and he then concluded he would go to the head end and question the men there about what they were going to do for No. 1. He started to make this move, although, as he says, he "figured that the head end was a dangerous place to be on about that time," and almost at once the trains struck.

As the conductor and both enginemen and both firemen were killed, it is impossible to determine whether they forgot No. 1, whether they figured No. 1 had passed, or whether they were making a close run against No. 1. They were running their own train at a very moderate rate of speed, and the last supposition is deemed by the officers of the road improbable.

The company has a rigid watch inspection and the watches of the men were all good and had been keeping excellent time.

The men were men of good habits, and the two enginemen had been off duty thirteen hours and the conductor fifteen hours before starting on this trip, and they had been on duty less than nine hours when the accident occurred.

Derailment No. 14 was that of a passenger train running at high speed striking a freight car, which had been derailed and pushed upon the track from a train on an adjoining track, in consequence of another accident, which had occurred a few seconds before (derailment No. 3). The first derailment was that of the thirty-fifth car in a freight train of 68 cars. This train, moving at about 6 miles an hour, was signaled to stop, on account of the presence of another train on the line ahead. On sighting the stop signal the engineman applied the brakes by reducing the train-line air pressure about 5 pounds per square inch. The grade of the road was level, or very slightly descending, but the air brakes were in operation on only half of the cars of the train (34), and the pressure of the other 34 cars, not air braked and therefore not retarded, against the forward half of the train was so severe that the thirty-fifth car was derailed and, with the thirty-sixth car, was pushed to one side. It does not appear that these cars were badly crushed or their contents much broken. The engine of the passenger train, striking these cars, was wrecked, and the fire in its fire box was scattered about the wreck. This fire ignited illuminating gas escaping from ruptured tanks of the passenger cars, and the fire, either from the coals or from the gas, exploded a large quantity of blasting powder, which was in the thirty-sixth car of the freight train, and this explosion created great havoc throughout the wreck and the adjacent cars of both the passenger train and the freight. Twenty passengers, 2 trainmen, and 1 other employee were killed, and 103 passengers and 7 employees were injured. Those cars of the passenger

train which were not wrecked by the explosion were consumed by the fire, and many of the freight cars were destroyed in the same way.

It will be observed from this abstract of the railroad company's report that this distressing accident was due to the lack of power brakes on the rear half of the train. This main cause may or may not have been reenforced by excessive slack between the cars, or by putting together in the same train cars of different degrees of stiffness and strength. It is not, however, deemed important to further analyze the cause of this accident, as it is very generally agreed that the only safe rule for the management of very long freight trains, as regards this question, is to require a large percentage of the cars to be power-braked, to keep the cars in the best possible condition as regards slack in the draft gear, and to avoid putting light or weak cars in front of heavy cars in the same train.

It is to be noted that this accident to the freight train was a great danger to the passenger train, regardless of the presence or absence of explosives, and that, therefore, the foregoing statement embraces the main body of facts to be considered in connection with the accident.

In regard to explosives, it is universally recognized that their presence in large quantities in a railroad train is an imperative reason for exercising extreme care in the management of such train. The railroad company on whose line this disaster occurred and one or more other companies have now adopted regulations containing elaborate rules forbidding the transportation of explosives in large quantities except in trains of not over 30 cars, two-thirds air-braked. The explosives must be near the middle of the train and not within 10 cars of the front end, and must be in cars with steel underframes and air brakes, and which are known to be sound, by special inspection.

Derailment No. 6 was of a fast passenger train, made up of a heavy locomotive and five cars. The car next to the engine was a combination baggage and passenger (smoking) car, and it was in this car that nearly all of the fatalities occurred. The accident occurred at night, and the train appears to have run over the misplaced switch at unabated speed—about 60 miles an hour—and it was derailed in consequence of the curve of the side track being too sharp for the speed. The engine, after running off the track, ran against a building and was turned around. The first car took fire from the coals in the engine, and the passengers in this car were burned by the fire and also scalded by steam escaping from the engine. It is believed that the steam caused many of the deaths. The engineman was killed, so that the evidence concerning the signal light attached to the switch is not clear. The switch is known to have been in proper position thirty-four minutes before the accident. The fireman, who survived, said that this light and that on another switch, 175 feet away, indicated white (all right), and that the engineman and himself confirmed each other in this view, on approaching the station, while some distance away, the fireman calling out "Right," and the engineman responding; but when within about 800 feet of the fatal switch the fireman was startled by a shout from the engineman, "Jump!" He at once got down behind the boiler-head and did not again see the switch light. It is not known, therefore, what had occurred to cause the engineman to give the alarm of danger; whether the light had been turned to red (stop) or had been extinguished, or whether he had seen the wrong position of the rails by the light of his head-light.

Immediately after the derailment the conductor of the train and other persons examined the switch and found it set for the side track and locked; the switch lamp was in proper position (to show red), but was not burning. It was afterwards relighted without turning up the wick. The switch had not been damaged in any way. Extended inquiries were made by the railroad company for the purpose of discovering how the switch came to be misplaced, but the report says that these inquiries have not had any useful result.

This derailment occurred opposite a station. The agent or telegraph operator in charge of the station at night is required to inspect the switch signals immediately before the time at which a fast passenger train is due. In this case, the agent says that he stepped out of his office about three minutes before the arrival of this train, saw the signal lights of the switches, and of the train order or block signal, all showing "All right;" also saw the headlight of the train approaching, 2 or 3 miles away; and then he returned to his office. A person who came into the station just as the derailment occurred testifies to having seen the agent taking his seat at his desk after turning the semaphore signal to the stop position, as is done, in the regular routine, immediately after the arrival or passage of a train.

A young man who is employed by the railroad company, though not in the operating department, had driven across the railroad at a crossing near the fatal switch about ten minutes before the accident and testifies that at that time the switch light, as well as the other switch light near by, showed white ("All right").

The station agent in question is 23 years old and had been in the service of the company eighteen months. The fireman of the train, whose testimony is referred to above, is 30 years old, and had been in the service of the company six years.

TABLE No. 3.—Details of Table 1—Causes of accidents to employees in coupling and uncoupling cars.

Sub-	Causes.		ain- ien.	me	eain- en in erds.	trai: (sw i	ard nmen itch- ng ws).		er em- yecs.
CIASS	•	Killed.	Injured.	Killed.	Injured.	Killed.	Injured.	Killed.	Injured.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7	Adjusting coupler with foot.  Adjusting coupler, cars accidentally started  Careless manipulation of uncoupling lever  Cars not equipped with automatic coupler  Coupler broken, using link and pin or chain  Coupling damaged cars  Coupling with chain or other emergency appliance on curve too sharp for automatic coupling	3	1 2 1	2	16 14 8 6 14	1	28 20 1 6 2 16	i	1 1 2 2
9 10	Coupling with chain or other emergency appliance because of uneven track.  Coupling or uncoupling safety chains.  Fingers or hand caught between uncoupling lever and body of car.	1	46		28	1   1   1	2 3 74	i	i
11 12 • 13 14	Uncoupling without using lever (unnecessary) Uncoupling without using lever, uncoupling lever not in working order Foot caught in frog, switch, or guard rail	i	16 5	1 1	7 14 2	`   <sub>2</sub>   	40 6		· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·
15 16	together, miscalculated speed	8	9		6 3	<b>1</b>   	11 3		1
17 18 19 20 21	foot. Opening knuckle, lost footing Riding on car to uncouple, slipped off. Struck by object at side of track Caught by unexpected movement of car, due to slack running in Caught by unexpected movement of car, due to mistake or misunderstanding in giving hand sig-	1 3	2 8 1 5		3 7 19	2	6 4 1 3 27		
22 23 24	nals Uncoupling moving cars and lost footing. Parts hard to move, causing delay. Went between cars unnecessarily and contrary to rule	2	9 20 11	2	8 9 3	1	15 16 14	1	1
25 26 27 28	Hand caught between projecting load and end of next car No witness (fatal injury). Other causes (see detailed list below). Unexplained.	4	5 15 1	1	6 	8	$egin{array}{c} 2 \ 21 \ 7 \end{array}$		1 2
	Total	20	226	8	182	18	341	8	17

Details of injuries included in Table 3, subclass 27.

- A. 1. Head injured by striking uncoupling lever.
- A. 2. End door of car fell off and bruised arm.
- A. 3. Arm caught while moving block which had been put between buffers to prevent cars from coupling.
- A. 4. Lifting lever; lever swung around and bruised stomach.
- A. 5. Stumbled and fell.
- A. 6. Knuckle broke at pin hole and pieces flew out.
- A. 7. Standing on front end of engine with hand resting on drawbar when engine coupled to cars.
- A. 8. Had hand on end gate; load shifted, finger lacerated.
- A. 9. Standing inside car loaded with steel billets; cars struck and load shifted, catching leg.
- A. 10. Uncoupling cars; fellow-workman pulled lever on opposite side, causing lever to strike mouth.

- A. 11. Fell by reason of failure of rod to which he was hanging.
- A. 12. Coupling engines together; holding up coupler with pinch bar.
- A. 13. Coupling on curve; drawheads passed each other.
- M. 1. Fell into culvert.
- M. 2. Uncoupling cars, struck hand against rail.
- M. 3. Uncoupling engine from car, another engine pushed cars.
- M. 4. Stepped on lump of coal.
- M. 5. Foot caught in crossing plank.
- M. 6. Struck by exploding torpedo.
- M. 7. Lump of coal fell off tender and hit head.
- M. 8. Chain too long, caused man to strike arm against car.
- M. 9. Preparing to couple engine to car; stumbled.
- M. 10. Uncoupling cars; gave lever a jerk and wrenched shoulder.
- M. 11. Riding on cars to make coupling, couplers did not couple, cars separated, man fell between cars.
- J. 1. Lump of coal fell on head.
- J. 2. Lump of coal fell on head.
- J. 3. Uncoupling coaches, hand caught in lever.
- J. 4. Apron on ballast plow car fell.
- J. 5. Uncoupling lever came up suddenly, throwing man against car.
- J. 6. Coupling engine to car, engine pilot struck heel.
- J. 7. Coupling engine to tender, drawbar slipped, hand caught between engine and tender.
- J. 8. Hanging on side of car trying to raise lever, strained shoulder and side.
- J. 9. Stepped on nail.
- J. 10. Stooping down to uncouple cars, sprained back.
- J. 11. Walking alongside cars, wheel struck foot which was on rail.
- J. 12. Coupling cars on curve, hand slipped.
- J. 13. Coupling on sharp curve, opened knuckle, fingers caught.
- J. 14. Uncoupling cars, arm caught by shifting load.
- J. 15. Uncoupling, neglected to shut air-brake cock and hose flew up.
- J. 16. Uncoupling engine from coaches, lever flew back.
- J. 17. Reaching for lever, leg caught between end sills.
- J. 18. Stepped out from between cars, struck by train.
- J. 19. Stepped on nail.
- J. 20. Stepped on piece of glass.
- J. 21. Hand caught between overhanging loads.

Table No. 3a.—Nature of injuries to employees in coupling and uncoupling cars, April, May, and June, 1905.

Injuries.	Train- men.	Train- men in yards.	Yard train- men.	Other em- ployees.
oes of feet	2	1	3	
oss of legs	ī	2	2	
oss of arms.	$\overline{\mathbf{i}}$	<b>-</b>	$\overline{2}$	
ose of hands	`  <b>.</b>	1	, ĩ	
oss of fingers	11	7	11	
oss of toes		i	**	
ractured skull		1		
ractured leg	2		1 4	
ractured arm	7 5	, 2	1 -	1
ractured collar bone or ribs	$\tilde{5}$	, 8	3	1
ractured other bones		1	6	1
ontusion of head or body.	23	26		1
ontusion or laceration of feet	24	<b>1</b> 9	30	1
ontusion or laceration of toes	5	,	8	
ontusion or laceration of legs.		<b>2</b>	. 14	•
ontusion or laceration of arms.		11	17	1
ontusion or laceration of hands		25	53	
ontusion or laceration of fingers		65		
islocation	•	•	2	1
iternal injuries	10	4	5	
prains		4	**	1
ock		•		1
liscellaneous.	7	9	6	1
Total injuries	226	182	341	17
illed	4341		18	
Total killed and injured	246	190	359	20

Table No. 4.—Details of Table 1—Causes of accidents to employees classified (C6 and C7) as fulling from and getting on or off cars and engines.

Sub-	Causes.		ain- ien.	me	ain- en in .rds.	Yard trainmen (switch- ing crews).		Other em ployees.	
class.		Killed.	Injured.	Killed.	Injured.	Killed.	Injured.	Killed.	Injured.
$\begin{bmatrix} 1 \\ 2 \end{bmatrix}$	Fell from roof of box car by reason of— Defect in car Lice or snow		4		1		4	  !	3
3 4	Parting of train  Derailment, collision, or shock due to abnormal movements of cars other than those in		6		3	:	11	1	4
C6 5	subclass 3. While setting brakes	3 1	64 24	3 1	58 12		85 39		18 1
6 7 8	Coal car	2 2	4 5 59	···· <sub>2</sub>	26	1 1 4	2	,	8 2 10
10	Passenger car. Engines, tenders, or cars (all kinds) not in motion		43		37		 15		46
11 12 (13	Miscellaneous causes Not clearly explained Slipped getting on moving trains or cars. Jumping off moving trains.	$egin{array}{c} 29 \ 6 \end{array}$	75 63 91 112	$\begin{bmatrix} 3 \\ 12 \\ 2 \\ 1 \end{bmatrix}$	32 25 42 89	1 15 4 3	50 63		26 33 60 64
C7 16	Jumping from engines or cars anticipating collision, derailment, or other accident	1	31	1	6		9		4
17 18	handholds and sill steps	2	23 142 1	1 8	18 110 1	3 1 2	34 131 2	'	3 42
g	Total	60	749	29	468	41	627	22	328

### YEARLY TABLES.

This bulletin completes the publication of the accident records under the law of March 3, 1901, for four years, and the following table (A) gives the aggregate for the year ending June 30, 1905, of the items which are given in Table No. 1 of the quarterly returns. The total number of casualties shown in Table A is 59,264 (3,798 killed and 55,466 injured).

This table includes the following statistics which did not appear in the quarterly bulletins, the reports from which they are taken having been received after the bulletins were printed: One passenger and 19 employees killed and 13 passengers and 39 employees injured; damage to railroad companies' property, \$6,582.

The totals of these yearly tables are not comparable with those given in the Commission's Annual Statistical Reports, for the reason that the monthly reports deal only with accidents to passengers and to employees while actually on duty. The monthly reports take no account of accidents to "other persons." These appear in the Annual Reports, and include casualties at highway crossings to trespassers and persons walking along the track, accidents to employees in shops remote from the railroad, and all other accidents not occurring to passengers and to employees actually on duty.

Table A.—Summary of casualties to persons, year ending June 30, 1905.

	Pass	Passen <b>ger</b> s.		nmen.	Trainmen in yards.		Yard trainmen (switching crews).			er em- yees.	Total employees.	
	Killed.	Injured.	Killed.	Injured.	Killed.	Injured.	Killed.	Injured.	Killed.	Injured.	Killed.	Injured.
Collisions Derailments Miscellaneous train accidents (excluding the above), including locomotive-boiler explo-	198 151	3, 493 2, 891	259 223	1, 922 1, 316	49 23	804 179	38 27	366 206	64 32	526 246	410 305	3, 618 1, 947
sions	1	114	51	972	15	295	6	129	11	91	83	1,487
Total train accidents	350	6, 498	533	4, 210	87	1,278	71	701	107	863	798	7,052
Coupling and uncoupling While doing other work about trains or while attending switches			77 64	864 5, 392	61 52	702 2,677		1, 457 2, 132	87	2,397		3, 110 12, 598
Coming in contact with overhead bridges, structures at side of track, etc	8	38     	65	537	12	284	12	311	3	53	92	1,185
gines or while getting on or off	134 45	1,732 1,772	269 147	3, 367 431	93 81	2, 187 401	162 96	2,527 280	109 913	1, 156 11, 132	633 1, 237	9, 237 12, 244
Total (other than train accidents)	187	3, 542	622	10, 591	299	6, 251	422	6, 707	1,120	14, 825	2, 463	38, 374
Total, all classes	537	10,040	1, 155	14,801	386	7,529	493	7,408	1,227	15, 688	3, 261	45, 426

From Table B, next following, comparisons may be made for the four years since these records were begun. Beyond the points already mentioned, the most favorable feature of this table is the reduced number of casualties to trainmen from falling off cars, being knocked off, etc. Of these items (the two in the table next following "coupling accidents") the totals are:

Year.	Killed.	Injured.
1905	725	10, 422
1904	816	10, 581
1908	771	9, 017

Table B.—Casualties to passengers and employees, years ending June 30.

	1	905.	1	904.	1	903.	1	902.
	Killed.	Injured.	Killed.	Injured.	Killed.	Injured.	Killed.	Injured.
Passengers:								
In train accidents Other causes	350 187	6, 498 3, 542	270 150	4, 945 3, 132	164 157	4, 424 2, 549	167 136	3, 586 2, 503
Total	537	10,040	420	8,077	321	6, 973	303	6, 089
Employees:								` <u></u>
In train accidents	798	7,052	844	6, 990	895	6, 440	697	5, 046
In coupling accidents Overhead obstructions,	243	3, 110	278	3, 441	253	2,788	143	2, 118
etc	92	1, 185	116	1,210	93	992	104	1,070
Falling from cars, etc	633	9, 237	700	9, 371	678	8, 025	537	6, 867
Other causes	1, 495	24, 842	1,429	22, 254	1,814	20,759	1,035	18, 615
Total	8, 261	45, 426	3, 367	43, 266	3, 233	39,004	2, 516	33, 711
Total passengers and employees	3,798	55, 466	3, 787	51, 343	3,554	45, 977	2, 819	39, 800

The following two tables are self-explanatory, being consolidations of the quarterly tables giving the same classes of facts:

Table C.—Collisions and derailments; damage to cars, engines, and roadway; years ending

			o anco					
		190	06.			190	4.	
	Num- ber.	Loss.	Persons killed.	Persons injured.	Num- ber.	Loss.	Persons killed.	Persons injured.
Collisions, rear	1,493 707	\$1,463,012 1,451,906	152 304	2, 085 2, 453	1,736 928	\$1,683,020 1,696,425	195 280	1, 931 2, 728
ingCollisions, miscellaneous.	972 3, 052	440, 495 1, 493, 641	11 141	369 2, 204	1, 024 2, 748	491, 666 1, 319, 807	25 130	412 2,012
Total	6, 224	4, 849, 054	608	7,111	6, 436	5, 190, 918	630	7, 083
Derailments due to de- fects of roadway, etc Derailments due to de-	1,007	777, 433	50	1, 446	866	612, 538	33	716
fects of equipment Derailments due to neg-	2,605	2,068,620	40	798	2, 297	1, 953, 892	60	630
ligence of trainmen, signalmen, etc Derailments due to un-	341	272, 254	40	418	833	302, 592	41	355
foreseen obstruction of track, etc	332	676, 001	177	646	336	402, 417	132	416
Derailments due to ma- licious obstruction of track, etc	76	142, 761	34	196	110	102, 717	19	196
cellaneous causes	1,010	925, 533	115	1,834	913	818, 503	103	848
Total	5, 371	4, 862, 602	456	4,838	4,855	4, 192, 159	388	3, 161
Total collisions and derailments		9, 7	,	11, 949	11, 291	9, 383, 077	1,018	

TABLE E.—Causes of accidents to employees classified (C6 and C7) as falling from and getting on or off cars and engines, year ending June 30, 1905.

Sub-	Causes.	_	rain- nen.	me	ain- en in irds.	Yard trainmen (switch- ing crews).		ployees.	
class.		Killed.	Injured.	Killed.	Injured.	Killed.	Injured.	Killed.	Injured.
$\begin{bmatrix} 1 \\ 2 \\ 3 \\ 4 \end{bmatrix}$	Fell from roof of box car by reason of— Defect in car Ice or snow. Parting of train Derailment, collision, or shock due to abnormal movements of cars other than those in	1 8 2	18 44 25	1	14 31 17	2 1 1	22 24 35	1	8 3 7
C6 5	while setting brakes Fell from—	14 10	266 109	11 8	204 78	19 10	306 167	15 4	62 10
6 7 8 9	Coal car  Freight car other than box or coal car  Engine or tender.  Passenger car  Engines, tenders, or cars (all kinds) not in	8 2 24 1	17 13 300 18	6	16 15 161 5	2 1 11 	18 4 116 4	1 1 1	20 8 29 13
11 12 (13 14 15	motion  Miscellaneous causes.  Not clearly explained  Slipped getting on moving trains or cars.  Jumping off moving trains.  Jumping from engines or cars anticipating colli-	132 20 13	229 300 274 362 535	1 6 36 6 8	203 138 89 206 389	10 53 14 10	74 207 164 240 477	2 9 30 24 8	170 (55 92 211 242
C7 16 17 18	sion, derailment, or other accident.  Fell from engines or cars by reason of defective handholds and sill steps.  Getting on or off moving engine.  Caught in frog, guard rail, or switch.	.2 16	91 638 1	2 2 15	82 501 2	3 22 1	123 498 6	10	28 7 150 1
	Total	269	3, 867	98	2, 187	162	2, 527	109	1, 156

#### [Public—No. 171.]

AN ACT Requiring common carriers engaged in interstate commerce to make full reports of all accidents to the Interstate Commerce Commission.

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, It shall be the duty of the general manager, superintendent, or other proper officer of every common carrier engaged in interstate commerce by railroad to make to the Interstate Commerce Commission, at its office in Washington, District of Columbia, a monthly report, under oath, of all collisions of trains or where any train or part of a train accidentally leaves the track, and of all accidents which may occur to its passengers or employees while in the service of such common carrier and actually on duty, which report shall state the nature and causes thereof, and the circumstances connected therewith.

Sec. 2. That any common carrier failing to make such report within thirty days after the end of any month shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor and, upon conviction thereof by a court of competent jurisdiction, shall be punished by a fine of not more than one hundred dollars for each and every offense and for every day during which it shall fail to make such report after the time herein specified for making the same.

SEC. 3. That neither said report nor any part thereof shall be admitted as evidence or used for any purpose against such railroad so making such report in any suit or action for damages growing out of any matter mentioned in said report.

SEC. 4. That the Interstate Commerce Commission is authorized to prescribe for such common carriers a method and form for making the reports in the foregoing section provided.

Approved, March 3, 1901.

#### SPECIAL INFORMATION CONTAINED IN PRECEDING BULLETINS.

- Each accident bulletin contains tables showing the number of passengers and employees killed and injured, and these figures are classified according to cause (see Table No. 1); also tables showing cost of the different classes of train accidents. The causes of accidents to employees in coupling and uncoupling and in falling from cars, etc., are further classified in Tables No. 3 and No. 4. The most serious collisions and derailments are dealt with in a supplementary table (Class A) showing the causes in some detail. Each bulletin is for three months, and No. 1 was for the quarter ending September 30, 1901. The bulletin for the quarter ending June 30 contains, in addition to the quarterly statistics, tables showing the same information for the whole of the fiscal year ending on that date.
- Bulletin No. 1 contains brief notes on the causes of coupler accidents, explanatory of Table No. 3. Table No. 4 is supplemented by similar notes. In this quarter special mention was made of 130 casualties due to operating trains in which air brakes were used on only a portion of the cars.
- Bulletin No. 4 has comments on collisions occurring where the trainmen had worked very long hours. In this bulletin a table is given showing the deaths and injuries due to trains parting. The table shows that nearly all of the coupler failures which resulted in a collision or derailment were reported as due to "cause unknown."
- Bulletin No. 5 contains a table showing the cause (as reported) of each coupling accident in the quarter. The table fills 12 pages.
- Bulletin No. 6 contains a table giving notes on the causes of the 16 rear collisions which occurred in this quarter on railroads where the block system is in use. Comment is made on the large increase in the number of accidents to men in coupling as compared with previous quarters.
- Bulletin No. 7 contains a note on the cause of a rear collision due to the inadequacy of the time-interval rule.
- Bulletin No. 8 explains in detail the causes of two butting collisions. In one of these collisions a conductor gave a hand signal to stop, which was taken by the engineman to mean "go ahead." In another case the men in charge of a train read "No. 2" when the order was written "second No. 2." This bulletin contains a special list of all the collisions of the quarter, of whatever magnitude, which were caused by mistakes in connection with time-tables or telegraphic orders.
- Bulletin No. 9 records two collisions in which 44 persons were killed, one due to careless handling of a telegraphic order and the other to gross negligence of an engineman, who failed to keep the air brakes in working order. Reference is made to the derailment of four fast mail trains by reason of reckless speed.
- Bulletin No. 10 records the death of 147 passengers in collisions and derailments—more than three times the average number killed during the nine preceding quarters. One derailment, due to an accidental obstruction, killed 65 passengers, and six other accidents caused 106 deaths. The causes of the derailment mentioned and of four of the worst collisions are explained at length.

- Bulletin No. 11 contains a note on one butting collision which resulted in the deaths of 18 passengers and injuries to 37, the collision being caused by failure to identify a freight train on a side track at night; but, aside from this, the quarter's totals are in nearly every case less than in preceding quarters. Two costly accidents were caused by air-brake failures which were due to extreme cold weather. Mention is made of a fourth error like that shown in Bulletin No. 8 (readers overlooked the word "second").
- Bulletin No. 12 records one derailment, killing 7 passengers, due to the failure of an engineman to reduce speed on entering a side track, according to a telegraphic order which had been delivered to him. This bulletin contains summaries of the casualties, collisions, and derailments for the three years ending June 30, 1904.
- Bulletin No. 13 records the death of 228 passengers in collisions and derailments—a number far greater than had been reported in any previous quarter. One derailment caused the death of 88 persons (passengers and employees); one collision, 63; another, 24; another, 18; and a fourth, 16. The circumstances of these unusually serious accidents are given in detail. One of these collisions, and another not so disastrous to life and limb, occurred under somewhat unusual circumstances, due to the complicated nature of the regulations under which the trains were run.
- Bulletin No. 14 records 3 collisions, in which 48 persons were killed. The causes of these are explained. In one the men in charge of a freight train, which was sidetracked, neglected to observe signals on passing passenger trains. In another an operator recopying a telegraphic order made a mistake in writing the number of minutes. In a third an operator failed to deliver a meeting order, having acknowledged the receipt of it without first setting his signal in the stop position.
- Bulletin No. 15 records a remarkable rear collision of passenger trains, causing the death of 7 persons, in which an engineman of long experience and good record disregarded two automatic block signals. Particulars are given of butting collisions of freight trains, due to complicated combinations of negligence and misconduct. In this bulletin the causes of accidents to employees in coupling and uncoupling cars are classified more in detail than in former bulletins, so as to show more clearly the circumstances under which the injuries occurred. Many cases, however, could not be classified satisfactorily. A table is given also showing the nature of the injuries to employees in coupling and uncoupling cars. Out of 790 nonfatal injuries 281 were contusions or lacerations of fingers.


# ACCIDENT BULLETIN,

No. 17.

JULY, AUGUST, AND SEPTEMBER, 1905.

INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMMISSION, WASHINGTON, D. C.

WASHINGTON:
GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE.
1906.



## ACCIDENT BULLETIN,

No. 17,

## SHOWING COLLISIONS AND DERAILMENTS OF TRAINS

AND

## CASUALTIES TO PERSONS

DURING

JULY, AUGUST, AND SEPTEMBER, 1905.

INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMMISSION, WASHINGTON, D. C.

WASHINGTON:
GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE.
1906.

### THE INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMMISSION.

Hon. MARTIN A. KNAPP, of New York, Chairman.

Hon. JUDSON C. CLEMENTS, of Georgia.

Hon. CHARLES A. PROUTY, of Vermont.

Hon. JOSEPH W. FIFER, of Illinois.

Hon. FRANCIS M. COCKRELL, of Missouri.

EDWARD A. MOSELEY, Secretary.

## RAILROAD ACCIDENTS IN THE UNITED STATES

DURING THE

THREE MONTHS ENDING SEPTEMBER 30, 1905.

The number of persons killed in train accidents during the months of July, August, and September, 1905, as shown in reports made by the railroad companies to the Interstate Commerce Commission, under the "accident law" of March 3, 1901, was 272, and of injured, 3,455. Accidents of other kinds, including those sustained by employees while at work and by passengers in getting on or off the cars, etc., bring the total number of casualties up to 17,439 (1,053 killed and 16,386 injured). These accidents are classified in the following table. These reports deal only with (a) passengers and (b) employees on duty.<sup>a</sup>

TABLE No. 1.—Casualties to persons, July, August, and September, 1905.

[Table continued on next page.]

[Table Constituted on next pego.]												
•	(ch	sengers asses a id b).	Persons carried under agree- ment or contract (class bb).			l (a, b, i bb).	Trai	n <b>m</b> en.	Trainmen in yards.			
	Killed.	Injured.	Killed.	Injured.	Killed.	Injured.	Killed.	Injured.	Killed.	Injured.		
Collisions  Derailments  Miscellaneous train accidents, including locomotive-boiler explosions.	15 16	952 677 24	7 5	97 76 6	22 21	1, 049 753 30	83 70 14	469 330 253	12 5	124 57 54		
Total train accidents	31	1,653	12	179	43	1,832	167	1,052	18	235		
(4)upling or uncoupling							28	236 1, 647	18	167 730		
while attending switches		15		9		24	16	195	6	68		
ting on or off	48 20	571 665	9	20 57	50 29	591 722	68 67	975 130	24 18	544 84		
Total (other than train accidents)	68	1, 251	11	86	79	1,837	193	3, 183	75	1,593		
Total, all classes	99	2,904	23	<b>2</b> 65	122	3, 169	360	4, 235	93	1,828		

Note.—Accidents to employees resulting in slight injuries which do not prevent the employee injured from performing his accustomed service for more than three days in the aggregate during the ten days immediately following the accident are not reported.

a In table No. 1 the passengers have been divided into two classes, and to make comparisons with the passenger casualties in former bulletins it will be necessary to take the numbers shown in the third double column of the table (of which the totals are 122 and 3,169). Passengers are classed a, b, and bb. Class a includes all ordinary passengers. Class b includes passengers traveling on freight trains. Class bb includes persons (not ordinary passengers on passenger or freight trains) who are customarily carried or allowed on trains under special arrangements or privileges, such as postal clerks and express messengers; conductors, porters, and other employees on Pullman cars; employees on private or special cars; newsboys; baggage solicitors; peddlers; live-stock tenders; and men in charge of freight.

Table No. 1.—Casualties to persons, July, August, and September, 1905—Continued.

	men (	train- switch- rews).		her oyees.		otal loyees.	Total person reported.	
•	Killed.	Injured.	Killed.	Injured.	Killed.	Injured.	Killed.	Injured.
Collisions	10 6	82 58	21 7	101 <b>4</b> 6	126 88	776 <b>4</b> 91	148 109	1,825 1,244
locomotive-boiler explosions		25		24	15	356	15	<b>3</b> 86
Total train accidents	16	165	28	171	229	1,623	272	3, 455
Coupling or uncoupling	25	391	3	25	. 74	819	74	გ19
While doing other work about trains, or while attending switches	10	653	12	791	45	8, 821	45	3, 821
Coming in contact with overhead bridges, structures at side of track, etc	2	89	2	21	26	373	26	397
ting on or off	40 28	657 82	39 273	346 3, 763	171 386	2, 522 4, 059	221 415	3, 113 4, 781
Total (other than train accidents)	105	1,872	329	4, 946	702	11,594	781	12, 931
Total, all classes	121	2, 037	357	5, 117	931	13, 217	1,053	16, 3×6

Nearly all of the totals in Table No. 1 are larger than in the three months last preceding, and some are very much larger. These figures are doubtless in large measure a reflection of the very heavy traffic done by the principal railroads of the country during the busiest summer months. The number of passengers killed in train accidents, 43, is larger than in either of the two preceding quarters, yet it is far below the disastrous quarter which included the same three months of 1904, when 228 passengers were killed in collisions and derailments. The two most notable accidents in the present report are a collision killing 12 persons and a derailment killing 15. In the table of causes given below these accidents are numbered, respectively, 5 and 10. Flagrant misconduct and negligence characterized both cases.

The total number of collisions and derailments was 3,135 (1,605 collisions and 1,530 derailments), of which 240 collisions and 141 derailments affected passenger trains. The damage to cars, engines, and roadway by these accidents amounted to \$2,540,908. Given more in detail, these facts appear as below:

Table No. 2.—Collisions and derailments.

	Number.	Loss.	Persons killed.	Persons injured.
Collisions, rear Collisions, butting Collisions, trains reparating Collisions, miscellaneous	225	\$388, 873 412, 956 91, 404 391, 428	36 68 4 40	476 709 74 566
Total	1,605	1, 284, 661	148	1,825

Note.—Collisions and derailments which cause no death or personal injury and which cause not over \$150 damage to the property of the railroad are not reported.

TABLE No. 2.—Collisions and derailments—Continued.

	Number.	Loss.	Persons killed.	Persons injured.	
Derailments due to defects of roadway, etc	733 115 74	159, 058 534, 704 95, 395 88, 482 55, 026 323, 582	12 11 24 16 8 38	408 234 170 100 43 289	
Total	1,530	1, 256, 247	109	1, 244	
Total collisions and derailments	3,135	2,540,908	257	3,069	

Following is the usual list of class A train accidents—all in which the damage is reported at \$10,000 or over; notable cases in which passengers are killed, and those doing damage less than \$10,000 and down to \$2,000, wherever the circumstances or the cause may be of particular interest:

#### Causes of thirty-one prominent train accidents (Class A).

[Note.—R. stands for rear collision; B., butting collision; M., miscellaneous collisions; D., derailment; P., passenger train; F., freight and miscellaneous trains.]

#### COLLISIONS.

Item.	Class.	Kind of train.	Killed.	Injured.	Damage to engines, cars, and roadway.	Record No.	Cause.
1 2	R R	F. and F F. and F	1 3	0 2	<b>\$2</b> , 875 <b>2</b> , 700	74 30	Failure of torpedoes to explode.  Occurred 2 a. m. Engineman of 13 years' experience, on duty 121 hours, ran past two automatic block signals and a flagman. This engineman
3	В	P. and F	1	14	3, 800	79	was killed. Watch wrong; conductor and engineman failed to
4	M	P. and F	0	4	4, 350	10	Compare watches, as required by rule.  Occurred 8 p. m. Switch turned under train. (See
Б	В	P. and F	12	54	5, 584	38	note in text below.) Occurred 1 a. m. West bound freight train encroached on the time of east bound passenger train-
6	В	P. and F	5	10	7,800	77	(See note in text below.) Pay car train encroached on time of regular passenger train. The pilot in charge of the pay car, who was the trainmaster of the division, miscal-culated the time available for reaching the next station, by reason of the failure of his watch, which
7	••••	P. and P	3	21	8.000	1	had stopped.  North bound train wrongfully ran into a cross-over track. The switch, which had been spiked and ordered kept closed, was unfastened by a track repair man. This employee, who was experienced, decamped.
8	В	P. and P	0	59	8,500	34	Train approached meeting station with speed not under control. Engineman had inadvertently shut off the connection to the air brake reservoir, and had neglected to test the air brakes 2 miles before reaching the station, according to rule.
9	В	P. and F	0	20	8, 600	39	Dispatcher gave order, "No. 1 will run 2 hours late;" should have said, "second No. 1;" did not send order to all interested stations at once.
10	В	F. and F	1	3	11,200	82	Operator failed to deliver order to east-bound freight.
11	R	P. and P	6	<b>3</b> 5	12,000	69	Engineman disregarded stop signal. (See note in text below.)
12	M	F. and F	3	3	12,200	11	West-bound freight, switching at a way station, crossed over to the east-bound track without first flagging east-bound trains.
13	В	P. and P	2	83	13, 200	78	Engineman misread time or was deceived by defective watch. Watch lost in wreck. Engineman being experienced and reliable, conductor did not carefully calculate time to meeting point.

### Causes of thirty-one prominent train accidents (Class A)—Continued.

					COLI	LISIC	ONS—Continued.
Item.	Class.	Kind of train.	Killed.	Injured.	Damage to engines, cars, and roadway.	Record No.	Cause.
14	В	P. and F	3	8	\$14,500	80	Passenger train started from station in advance of time named in wait order; freight failed to clear time of passenger 10 minutes. Passenger conductor, brakeman, and fireman left all care to engineman.
15	В	F. and F	1	6	14, 923	6	who forgot order.  Mistake in copying train order. (See note in text
16	В	F. and F	4	3	15,000	83	below.) Signalmen, each 6 months experience, admitted opposing freight trains into "controlled manual" block section on single track. (See note in text below.)
17	В	P. and F	2	13	18,000	35	Freight encroached 2 minutes on time of passenger train. Men in charge (2 years' experience) "took chances."
18	M	P. and F	2	25	21, 200	88	Engineman of empty engine (1 a. m.) ran over mis- placed switch and through crossover track; it was his duty to see that the switch was set right before
19	R	F. and P	3	53	21,865	71	passing it. Freight approached station on descending grade with speed not under proper control; passenger train standing at station had insufficient tail lights.
	Tota	al	52	416	205, 797		
					]	DER.	AILMENTS.
1	D	F	1	6	<b>\$</b> 240	24	One passenger killed, 5 passengers injured. Train consisted of engine and caboose, the engine running backward. The tender was the first vehicle to jump the track.
2	D	F	0	39	3,000	90	Unexplained; large box car loaded with staves and heading was probably unfit to run around curve.
3	D	P	0	15	5,000	92	Passenger car overturned by turning of switch beneath moving train. (See note in text below.)
4	D	P	1	2	5,000	54	Misplaced switch; speed, 40 miles an hour. Switch was undergoing alteration and was not suitably signaled. There was no rule requiring reduction of the speed of trains running past the point where alterations were in progress.
5	D	P	0	4	5,300	58	Passenger train derailed by striking street car at highway crossing. Conductor of street car sailed to give required flag signal (3 fatal and 7 non-fatal injuries in street car).
6 7	D D	F	1 2	2 2	6, 150 6, 450	17	Switch maliciously misplaced.  Runaway on 2 per cent grade. Nonautomatic air brakes inoperative because coupling between en-
8	D	F	1	2	11,600	22	gine and tender had accidentally parted. Excessive speed.
9 10	D	P	0 15	18 28	13,300 32,000	16 56	Broken truck. Open draw. (See note in text below.)
11	Ď	P	2	20	35, 469	21	Switch maliciously misplaced; 4 a. m.
12	$\mathbf{D}$	} P	0	20	39, 278	25	Unexplained. Supposed that empty baggage car wa

Collision No. 4 appears to have been due to a combination of an inexperienced towerman and the lack of a suitable detector bar. collision occurred at 8 p. m., and though three cars were overturned the personal injuries were slight. A passenger train, running at 40 miles an hour, was diverted by the turning of a switch while one

Unexplained. Supposed that empty baggage car was

which started from an explosion of acetylene.

lifted by sudden application of air brakes. Track in first-class condition. Wreck burnt up by fire

. | 23 | 158 | 162, 787

Total .....

Total collisions and

derailments ...... 75 574 368, 584

39, 278 | 25

of the passenger cars was passing over it, with the effect that the cars ran against a locomotive on the adjoining main track. The towerman (23 years old) had been in service only nine days. The detector bar, designed to prevent the throwing of a switch while a train or car is passing over it, was only 25 feet long—not long enough to reach from the rear wheels of a front truck of a car to the leading wheels of the rear truck of the same car. This made it possible for the towerman to throw the switch after the passage of the leading truck and before the passage of the other one.

Collision No. 5, killing 12 and injuring 54 persons, nearly all of whom were passengers, occurred in the middle of the night, and one of the trains was running at nearly full speed. The men in charge of the freight train (west bound) were grossly negligent in occupying the main track on the time of the east-bound passenger train. The freight train had run a few hundred feet beyond the sidetrack at which it should have stopped and have cleared the track for the passenger train. The explanation offered by the engineman, is that he made a mistake in reading the time at L., the last station that he had passed. that he read "11.33" when the true time was 12.33. This man is 46 years old and had been in the service as engineman on the same road for nineteen years. The company gives him a good record. He had been on duty about thirteen hours at the time of the collision and had been off duty twenty hours and twenty-five minutes immediately preceding this trip. In the case of a man who, at midnight, has been on duty thirteen hours, the query naturally arises whether he was not asleep or dozing. This engineman denies that such was the case, and there is no evidence to contradict his assertion.

The conductor is held at fault for not having had a complete understanding with the engineman at L. as to the point at which they should meet the passenger train and for not making reasonable effort to stop his train before encroaching upon the time of the passenger. About 2 miles before reaching the point of collision this conductor left the caboose and started over the tops of the cars to go to the forward end. He had gone about two-thirds of the way over the train when it reached the point where the engineman should have shut off steam and applied the air brakes, but instead of at once stopping the train, as might have been done by applying the air brakes on any car, the conductor continued on to the engine; but by the time he had reached there it was too late to prevent the collision. The fireman and the front brakeman were also held accountable because, knowing that their train was on the time of the passenger train, they took no measures either to caution the engineman or to stop the train. The rear brakeman was also held blameworthy for not acting promptly in the emergency. The air brakes were in operation on the whole of the

train except the caboose and one platform car at the rear. By going over this platform car the brakeman could have applied the brakes.

Collision No. 11 occurred in a yard on a four-track line completely signaled, the semaphore signals being on bridges above the tracks. An accommodation train standing at the station was run into by an express train which should have passed on another main track, but which, in disregard of a stop signal, was run through a crossover track. The engineman appears to have allowed his attention to be drawn away from the signal by the movements of the accommodation train, which he was watching.

Collision No. 15, occurring at 1 a.m., was due to copying "79" instead of "59" in a dispatcher's order. The receiving operator claims that after writing "79" he repeated the figures to the dispatcher; but four other operators, listening, testify that in repeating the order he sent "59." This operator, with six months' experience as an operator and six months before that as a student, neglected to watch the wording of the same order when it was repeated, on the same wire, by the operators at other stations. He seems to have trusted to his memory, not writing down the words and figures of the message in successive order as they were transmitted.

Collision No. 16, occurring about 3 a.m. and causing the death of one engineman, one fireman, and two brakemen, was due to very irregular and improper action on the part of two block-signal men, each of about six months' experience, and the negligence of an engineman of seven years' experience. Each of the two trains had identical orders from the dispatcher to meet at B, and the collision occurred a short distance south of B (between B and C), the south-bound train having passed the meeting station without stopping. The operator at B gave to the train (wrongfully) a clear signal, and the engineman says that this action of the operator deceived him and caused him to forget the meeting order which was in his possession. The conductor and a brakeman noticed his error and endeavored to apply the air brakes, but were not able to do so in time to prevent the collision. This was a train of 33 cars, of which 25 were air braked.

The operator gave the clear signal because of some neglect, not clearly explained, in the preliminary operations which had taken place between his office and the office at C. The block-signal instruments at the two stations are connected electrically, so that either station wishing to permit a train to proceed toward the other must first communicate with the other station. The operator at C had communicated with B, and B had taken the necessary action to permit C to forward the north-bound train (which was in collision); and C asserts that eight minutes after this train had departed he received a signal from B that he north-bound train had arrived and cleared the block section, where-

upon he permitted B to give the clear signal for the south-bound train. These two block-signal stations are connected by telephone, as well as by the wires which connect the signal-indicating instruments, and the train sheets at each station, on which are recorded the times of departure of all trains, both at the station recording and at the station in the rear and the station in advance, are filled out on information conveyed over the telephone, but no communication had been made by telephone concerning the north-bound train. One of these signalmen was 19 years old and the other 21 years.

Derailment No. 3 is somewhat like collision No. 4, in that the man in charge of the switches in the signal tower was able to turn the switch while a train was passing over it, by reason of the lack of a suitable detector bar. As in the other case there was a detector bar in use but it was not long enough to provide for all conditions.

Derailment No. 10, killing 15 persons, of whom 14 were passengers, was due to the negligence of an engineman approaching an open drawbridge at a high rate of speed, so fast that the engine passed over a 24-foot opening and struck the truss of the open drawbridge on the pier at the farther side of the opening. This engineman is reported to have had a good record, and he had had five years' experience, but he had been in the service of the road where the accident occurred only seven months and had not run over this part of the line at all until the fatal trip. It is said that he "knew the line pretty well," but this knowledge, such as it was, appears to have been accidental and not the result of any definite instruction or test on the part of the railroad At the same time it is to be observed that the line of road approaching the bridge is perfectly straight and that the day was clear. There is a warning signal at a point one-half mile before reaching the draw and a stop signal 300 feet before reaching it, and the bridge itself, standing crosswise of the track, was in plain sight. Besides this the draw tender had displayed a red flag in the center of the track. foreman who assigned this inexperienced engineman to this train and the conductor of the train had some conversation with the runner in regard to his knowledge of the line, but they appear to have been satisfied with a very incomplete knowledge of his qualifications.

The warning and stop signals being only fixed boards, in no way connected to the bridge, the rules require all trains to be stopped before crossing. The disregard of this rule and the fact that the engineman gives no rational explanation of his awful neglect indicate not only that he was poorly acquainted with the line, but that he must have been utterly heedless of all landmarks.

At a point about 500 feet before reaching the bridge the porter of the train applied the air brakes by the use of the conductor's valve in one of the cars in the forward part of the train, and this application appears to have been effective, as men in the train were thrown down by the sudden checking of the speed; but the porter's action was not soon enough to overcome the momentum of the train, and two of its six cars fell into the gap at the draw.

Table No. 3.—Details of Table 1—Causes of accidents to employees in coupling and uncoupling cars.

Sub-	Causes.		rain- nen.	Train- men in yards.		Yard trainmen (switch- ing crews).		Other employees.	
class.	•	Killed.	Injured.	Killed.	Injured.	Killed.	Injured.	Killed.	Injured.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8	Adjusting coupler with foot	1	23 4 1 2 5 10 2	4	14 4 5 2 1 4	1 3  1 2	33 16 12 4 6 15	    	1 i i 1
9 10	because of uneven track.  Coupling or uncoupling safety chains  Fingers or hand caught between uncoupling lever and body of car				4 31	1	1 4 66		2
11 12	Uncoupling without using lever (unnecessary) Uncoupling without using lever uncoupling lever not in working order	1	12 24		26 26	1	47		
13   14   15	Foot caught in frog, switch, or guard rail.  Opening or closing knuckle when cars were near together, miscalculated speed.	3	17	3	13	1	10 27		3
16	Opening knuckle when cars were near together, engine accidently started.  Opening knuckle, part of defective coupler fell on	• • • •	2	• • • •	1	    	2	1	
17 18	footOpening knuckle, lost footing	2 1	2 4	••••	6 2 1	1 1	8 10 4	••••	•••••
19 20 21	Struck by object at side of track  Caught by unexpected movement of car, due to slack running in  Caught by unexpected movement of car, due to	1	7 16	3	13	3	17 18		2
22	mistake or misunderstanding in giving hand sig- nals Uncoupling moving cars and lost footing	3	2 9	i	3 6		2 20		
23 21	Parts hard to move, causing delay. Went between cars unnecessarily and contrary to rule	2	13		<b>4</b> 5	1	11 12		2
25 26	Hand caught between projecting load and end of next car.		3		•••••	·	6	 	
26 27 23	No witness (fatal injury). Other causes (see detailed list below) Unexplained		14	1	10 3	3 1	83	<u> </u>	3 2
i	Total	23	236	18	167	25	391	3	25

Details of injuries included in Table No. 3, subclass No. 27.

- J. 1. Steel billet fell from car, striking leg.
- J. 2. Stepped on engine as engine struck cars, lost balance.
- J. 3. Pulling pin, stepped on stone, turning ankle.
- J. 4. Caught foot in binding wire, turning ankle.
- J. 5. Air hose struck elbow.
- J. 6. Piece of coal fell off car, striking head.
- J. 7. Hand caught in crack on pilot of engine.
- J. 8. Loose rod struck hand.
- J. 9. Hand caught by switch.
- J. 10. Coupling engine to car, lever chain flew up.
- J. 11. Stepped on nail.
- J. 12. Head caught between car and projecting log.

- J. 13. Casting fell off car, striking hand
- J. 14. Stepped off bridge.
- J. 15. Struck head against bolt.
- J. 16. Lump of coal fell from car.
- J. 17. Holding lever to uncouple, engine moved ahead, knuckle flew out.
- A. 1. Coupling engine to car, drawbars slid by.
- A. 2. Hanging to end of car, drawbars slid by.
- A. 3. Logs rolled off car.
- A. 4. Stepped into hole or drain, bruising elbow.
- A. 5. Uncoupling lever flew up.
- A. 6. Car struck man on head.
- A. 7. Engine moved unexpectedly; hip bruised.
- A. 8. Failed to notice lever was up; caught between lever and tender of engine.
- A. 9. Thrown by jarring of car.
- A. 10. Pushing down coupling lever, stumbled and fell.
- A. 11. Hand caught by lever chain.
- A. 12. Coupling engine to car, caught between sill of tender and bumper of car.
- A. 13. Caught finger in chain.
- A. 14. Arm caught between lever and car.
- A. 15. Making coupling on curve, drawheads passed; squeezed body.
- A. 16. Coupling engine to car, drawheads passed.
- A. 17. Stepped in hole, spraining ankle.
- A. 14. Coupling engine to car on curve, drawheads passed.
- A. 19. Caught between tender and switch rope and killed.
- A. 20. Foot injured by stepping on nail.
- A. 21. Hand struck against corner of car.
- A. 22. Coupling on curve, couplers passed.
- A. 23. Lever slipped.
- A. 24. Pinched between end sills on curve.
- S. 1. Couplers passed (on curve).
- S. 2. Stepped on nail.
- S. 3. Struck stump of injured finger.
- 8. 4. Opening knuckle; caught arm.
- 8. 5. Attempted to pass between cars while coupling; killed.
- S. 6. Coupling engine to car; leg caught between couplers.
- S. 7. End gate on flat car fell on head.
- 8. 8. Caught hand in hand hold.
- 8. 9. Coupling; lever slipped back and struck finger.
- 5. 10. Fell between cars; broke leg.
- S. 11. Foot caught between pilot of engine and brake beam.
- S. 12. Hit head against brake step.
- S. 13. Uncoupling cars; was removing jumpers between cars; jumper came in contact with iron shell of train line, causing short circuit, burning hand.
- S. 14. Fell, breaking collar bone.
- S. 15. Trying to drop lock in coupler; thumb mashed.
- S. 16. Foot slipped off pilot, spraining ankle.
- S. 17. Caught head between end sills (killed).
- S. 18. Reaching for lever to cut off car; ran a sliver in thumb.
- S. 19. Fell over switch, bruising leg.
- 8. 20. Finger caught in groove where lock pin goes, tearing nail off.
- S. 21. Coupling engines together, leg caught between footboards of engines and bruised.
- S. 22. While reaching to lift pin, lading of car shifted, injuring leg and hip.
- 8. 23. Coupling cars on curve, drawbars passed each other, catching finger.
- 8. 24. Coupling cars, car struck and exploded torpedo, piece of which struck man in leg, cutting it slightly.
- 8. 25. Crossing over drawbars while coupling cars, hand was caught, mashing it.

Table No. 3a.—Details of Table 1—Nature of injuries to employees in coupling and uncoupling cars.

Injuries.

Yard

train-

Train-

men in

Train-

Other

em-

Injuites.	men.	yards.	men.	ployees.
Loss of feet	1 2	1 1	4 2	1
Loss of arms Loss of hands	1	1	4 8	
Loss of fingers Loss of toes	8	5 3	12	1
Fractured skull			1	
Fractured leg. Fractured arm	3		5	1
Fractured collar bone or ribs	1		1	
Contusion of head or body	26	21 21	50 45	$\begin{vmatrix} 3 \\ 2 \end{vmatrix}$
Contusion or laceration of toes	6	5	8 12	1
Contusion or laceration of arms	36	13 27	27 57	8
Contusion or laceration of fingers		52	112	4 
Internal injuries	9	4	10 14	1
Shock	4	8	10	
Total injuries	236 28	167 18	391 25	25 3
Total killed and injured		185	416	28

Table No. 4.—Details of Table 1—Causes of accidents to employees classified (C6 and C7) as falling from and getting on or off cars and engines.

Injured .....

Sub-	~ Causes.		nin- ien.		nmen ards.	Yard trainmen (switch- ing crews).		Other em ployees.	
cluss.		Killed.	Injured.	Killed.	Injured.	Killed.	Injured.	Killed.	Injured.
$\begin{bmatrix} 1 \\ 2 \end{bmatrix}$	Fell from roof of box car by reason of— Defect in car		5	1	• <u>1</u>		4		2
3 4	Parting of train  Derailment, collision, or shock due to abnormal movements of cars other than those in subclass 3.		8 84	3	7 46	7	5 86	1 <sub>1</sub>	1 27
C6 5 6 7	While setting brakes Fell from— Coal car Freight car other than box or coal car	3	36 7 7	1	21 4 3	3	35 2 5	1	1 4 17
8 9 10	Engine or tender	8	77 3	8	49	6	17	3	14 4
11 12 13 14	motion Miscellaneous causes Not clearly explained Slipped getting on moving trains or cars Jumping off moving trains	34 34	68 82 61 120 187	1 2 6 4	31 43 40 62 82	4 8 3 2	14 58 48 77 117	2 10 5 5	50 26 18 59 76
C7 16	Jumping from engines or cars anticipating colli- sion, derailment, or other accident		87		11		15	   	8
17 18	handholds and sill steps	, פ	23 169 1	2	23 120	5	35 138	6	39
	Total	68	975	24	544	40	657	39	346

#### [Public—No. 171.]

AN ACT requiring common carriers engaged in interstate commerce to make full reports of all accidents to the Interstate Commerce Commission.

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, It shall be the duty of the general manager, superintendent, or other proper officer of every common carrier engaged in interstate commerce by railroad to make to the Interstate Commerce Commission, at its office in Washington, District of Columbia, a monthly report, under oath, of all collisions of trains or where any train or part of a train accidentally leaves the track, and of all accidents which may occur to its passengers or employees while in the service of such common carrier and actually on duty, which report shall state the nature and causes thereof, and the circumstances connected therewith.

SEC. 2. That any common carrier failing to make such report within thirty days after the end of any month shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor and, upon conviction thereof by a court of competent jurisdiction, shall be punished by a fine of not more than one hundred dollars for each and every offense and for every day during which it shall fail to make such report after the time herein specified for making the same.

SEC. 3. That neither said report nor any part thereof shall be admitted as evidence or used for any purpose against such railroad so making such report in any suit or action for damages growing out of any matter mentioned in said report.

SEC. 4. That the Interstate Commerce Commission is authorized to prescribe for such common carriers a method and form for making the reports in the foregoing section provided.

Approved, March 3, 1901.

#### SPECIAL INFORMATION CONTAINED IN PRECEDING BULLETINS.

Each accident bulletin contains tables showing the number of passengers and employees killed and injured, and these figures are classified according to cause (see Table No. 1); also tables showing cost of the different classes of train accidents. The causes of accidents to employees in coupling and uncoupling and in falling from cars, etc., are further classified in Tables No. 3 and No. 4. The most serious collisions and derailments are dealt with in a supplementary table (Class A) showing the causes in some detail. Each bulletin is for three months, and No. 1 was for the quarter ending September 30, 1901. The bulletin for the quarter ending June 30 contains, in addition to the quarterly statistics, tables showing the same information for the whole of the fiscal year ending on that date.

Bulletin No. 1 contains brief notes on the causes of coupler accidents, explanatory of Table No. 3. Table No. 4 is supplemented by similar notes. In this quarter special mention was made of 130 casualties due to operating trains in which air brakes were used on only a portion of the cars.

Bulletin No. 4 has comments on collisions occurring where the trainmen had worked very long hours. In this bulletin a table is given showing the deaths and injuries due to trains parting. The table shows that nearly all of the coupler failures which resulted in a collision or derailment were reported as due to "cause unknown."

Bulletin No. 5 contains a table showing the cause (as reported) of each coupling accident in the quarter. The table fills 12 pages.

Bulletin No. 6 contains a table giving notes on the causes of the 16 rear collisions which occurred in this quarter on railroads where the block system is in use. Comment is made on the large increase in the number of accidents to men in coupling as compared with previous quarters.

Bulletin No. 7 contains a note on the cause of a rear collision due to the inadequacy of the time-interval rule.

1

- Bulletin No. 8 explains in detail the causes of two butting collisions. In one of these collisions a conductor gave a hand signal to stop, which was taken by the engineman to mean "go ahead." In another case the men in charge of a train read "No. 2" when the order was written "second No. 2." This bulletin contains a special list of all the collisions of the quarter, of whatever magnitude, which were caused by mistakes in connection with time-tables or telegraphic orders.
- Bulletin No. 9 records two collisions in which 44 persons were killed, one due to careless handling of a telegraphic order and the other to gross negligence of an engineman who failed to keep the air brakes in working order. Reference is made to the derailment of four fast mail trains by reason of reckless speed.
- Bulletin No. 10 records the death of 147 passengers in collisions and derailments—more than three times the average number killed during the nine preceding quarters. One derailment, due to an accidental obstruction, killed 65 passengers, and six other accidents caused 106 deaths. The causes of the derailment mentioned and of four of the worst collisions are explained at length.
- Bulletin No. 11 contains a note on one butting collision which resulted in the deaths of 18 passengers and injuries to 37, the collision being caused by failure to identify a freight train on a side track at night; but, aside from this, the quarter's totals are in nearly every case less than in preceding quarters. Two costly accidents were caused by air-brake failures which were due to extreme cold weather. Mention is made of a fourth error like that shown in Bulletin No. 8 (readers overlooked the word "second").
- Bulletin No. 12 records one derailment, killing 7 passengers, due to the failure of an engineman to reduce speed on entering a side track, according to a telegraphic order which had been delivered to him. This bulletin contains summaries of the casualties, collisions, and derailments for the three years ending June 30, 1904.
- Bulletin No. 13 records the death of 228 passengers in collisions and derailments—a number far greater than had been reported in any previous quarter. One derailment caused the death of 88 persons (passengers and employees); one collision, 63; another, 24; another, 18; and a fourth, 16. The circumstances of these unusually serious accidents are given in detail. One of these collisions, and another not so disastrous to life and limb, occurred under somewhat unusual circumstances, due to the complicated nature of the regulations under which the trains were run.
- Bulletin No. 14 records 3 collisions, in which 48 persons were killed. The causes of these are explained. In one the men in charge of a freight train, which was sidetracked, neglected to observe signals on passing passenger trains. In another an operator recopying a telegraphic order made a mistake in writing the number of minutes. In a third an operator failed to deliver a meeting order, having acknowledged the receipt of it without first setting his signal in the stop position.
- Bulletin No. 15 records a remarkable rear collision of passenger trains, causing the death of 7 persons, in which an engineman of long experience and good record disregarded two automatic block signals. Particulars are given of butting collisions of freight trains, due to complicated combinations of negligence and misconduct. In this bulletin the causes of accidents to employees in coupling and uncoupling cars are classified more in detail than in former bulletins, so as to show more clearly the circumstances under which the injuries occurred. Many cases, however, could not be classified satisfactorily. A table is given also showing the nature of the injuries to employees in coupling and uncoupling cars. Out of 790 nonfatal injuries 281 were contusions or lacerations of fingers.

Bulletin No. 16 records a butting collision, killing 26 persons, and two derailments, which together caused 42 deaths. The collision was due to the unaccountable negligence of five men on a freight train, all of whom were killed. One of the derailments was due to a misplaced facing point switch (and the party responsible was not detected). The other was due to the accidental obstruction of the path of a fast passenger train by the wreck of a freight train, which had been caused by the sudden stoppage of a long train by the application of the air brakes on the front portion only. This bulletin gives the total casualties for four years. For the twelve months ending with Bulletin 16 the number of passengers killed in train accidents reached the unprecedented total of 350. The fatal coupling accidents of the year aggregated 243, as compared with 278 in the year preceding.

	•		
	•		
	•		
	•		
			•
•	•		
		•	

## ACCIDENT BULLETIN,

No. 18.

## SHOWING COLLISIONS AND DERAILMENTS OF TRAINS

AND

## CASUALTIES TO PERSONS

DURING

OCTOBER, NOVEMBER, AND DECEMBER, 1905.

INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMMISSION, WASHINGTON, D. C.

WASHINGTON:
GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE.
1906.

### THE INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMMISSION.

Hon. MARTIN A. KNAPP, of New York, Chairman.

Hon. JUDSON C. CLEMENTS, of Georgia.

Hon. CHARLES A. PROUTY, of Vermont.

Hon. FRANCIS M. COCKRELL, of Missouri.

EDWARD A. MOSELEY, Secretary.

#### ACCIDENT BULLETIN No. 18.

## RAILROAD ACCIDENTS IN THE UNITED STATES

DURING THE

### THREE MONTHS ENDING DECEMBER 31, 1905.

The number of persons killed in train accidents during the months of October, November, and December, 1905, as shown in reports made by the railroad companies to the Interstate Commerce Commission, under the "accident law" of March 3, 1901, was 320 and of injured 3,797. Accidents of other kinds, including those sustained by employees while at work and by passengers in getting on or off the cars, etc., bring the total number of casualties up to 18,227 (1,109 killed and 17,118 injured). These accidents are classified in the following table. These reports deal only with (a) passengers and (b) employees on duty.<sup>a</sup>

Table No. 1.—Casualties to persons, October, November, and December, 1905. b c

	Passen- gers.		Persons carried under agree- ment or contract.			l (a, b, l bb).	Trainmen.		Trainmen in yards.	
	Killed.	Injured.	Killed.	Injured.	Killed.	Injured.	Killed.	Injured.	Killed.	Injured.
Collisions Derailments Miscellaneous train accidents, including	23 15	970 529	8 3	100 70	<b>3</b> 1 18	1,070 599	113 56	663 356	18	179 60
locomotive boiler explosions		36	1	16	1	52	29	267	1	64
Total train accidents	38	1,535	12	186	50	1,721	198	1,286	23	303
Coupling or uncoupling							28	262	14	195
While doing other work about trains, or while attending switches		} . • • • • • •		 	••••		16	1,924	10	752
Coming in contact with overhead bridges, structures at side of track, etc	2	2	••••	4	2	6	17	189	9	79
ting on or off	24	538	1	18		556	76	1, 201	26	626
Other causes	18	524	6	61		<b>5</b> 85	41	158	26	106
Total (other than train accidents)	41	1,064	7	83	51	1,147	178	3,734	85	1,759
Total all classes	82	2,599	19	269	101	2,868	376	5, 020	108	2,061

a In Table No. 1 the passengers have been divided into two classes, and to make comparisons with the passenger casualties in former years it will be necessary to take the numbers shown in the third double column of the table. Class a includes all ordinary passengers. Class b includes passengers traveling on freight trains. Class bb includes persons who are customarily carried on trains under special arrangements, such as postal clerks and express messengers, employees on Pullman cars, newsboys, live-stock tenders, and men in charge of freight.

Table No. 1 is continued on next page.

Accidents to employees resulting in slight injuries which do not prevent the employee injured from performing his accustomed service for more than three days in the aggregate during the ten days immediately following the accident are not reported.

Table No. 1.—Casualties to persons, October, November, and December, 1905—Continued.

	men (	train- switch- rews).	_	her oyees.		otal loyees.	Total persons reported.		
•	Killed.	Injured.	Killed.	Injured.	Killed.	Injured.	Killed.	Injured.	
Collisions	5 10	125 68	19 11	140 95	155 81	1, 107 579	186 99	2,177 1,178	
locomotive boiler explosions	2	25	2	34	84	390	35	442	
Total train accidents	17	218	32	269	270	2,076	320	3, 797	
Coupling or uncoupling	38	405	5	24	85	886	85	886	
While doing other work about trains, or while attending switches	8	745	29	703	63	4, 124	63	4, 124	
structures at side of track, etc	8	105	4	10	38	383	40	389	
ting on or off. Other causes	53 39	883 108	35 256	331 3,368	190 362	8, 041 3, 740	215 386	3, 597 4, 325	
Total (other than train accidents)	146	2, 246	829	4, 436	788	12, 174	789	13, 321	
Total all classes	163	2,464	361	4, 705	1,008	14, 250	1, 109	17, 118	

The total number of casualties to employees this quarter is very large; larger in nearly every item than during the last preceding quarter, and much larger than in the October-December quarter of As there was an enormous amount of traffic moving the year before. on all of the principal railroads of the country throughout the time covered by this report, it is fair to conclude that the number of men employed had been materially increased, and that therefore the proportion of employees killed or injured to the number in the service was not so much greater as would appear from a comparison of the. casualties alone. On the other hand, there is evidence that many of the new men which it was necessary to employ to handle the additional business were entrusted with dangerous duties after but very little training, and that both new and old men were, in the stress of work necessitated by an enormous freight business, frequently kept on duty continuously for many hours beyond a reasonable day. Some notes are given below of accidents caused by men who had been on duty without adequate periods of rest. In view of the high standard of safety which the railroads set for themselves, and which the people and the courts justly require of the railroads, this list of instances of overwork constitutes a grave criticism of the management of the roads on which the accidents occurred; and as the instances are drawn from the reports of many roads, indicating that the faults referred to are not exceptional, it seems proper to call attention to the matter in this place.

The most disastrous accident in the present record, measuring by the number of fatal injuries, was collision No. 16, killing 17 persons, for which an engineman of limited experience was at fault. Another collision, No. 26, killing 10 persons, was due to gross carelessness of three men, one of whom was killed. One derailment, reported as due to cause unknown, killed 13. These cases, and some of those in which accidents were caused by the negligence or misconduct of men who had worked excessive hours, are explained in detail in the paragraphs following the table of causes.

The total number of collisions and derailments was 3,722 (2,077 collisions and 1,645 derailments), of which 267 collisions and 133 derailments affected passenger trains. The damage to cars, engines, and roadway by these accidents amounted to \$2,817,294. Given more in detail, these facts appear as below:

Persons. Persons Number. L068. injured. killed. Collisions, rear.... 538 **\$**513, **2**82 60 736 Collisions, butting ..... 447, 086 685 231 74 Collisions, trains separating..... 294 128, 973 3 98 1,014 463, 744 Collisions, miscellaneous..... 49 658 1,553,085 2,077 186 ' 2, 177 Derailments due to defects of roadway, etc ...... **356** 255, 170 414 10 Derailments due to defects of equipment ..... 530, 543 767 11 181 Derailments due to negligence of train men, signalmen, 60,363 10 : 91 Derailments due to unforeseen obstruction of track, etc ... 92,887 68 17 99 23,745 Derailments due to malicious obstruction of track, etc .... 16 22 - 6 Derailments due to miscellaneous causes ..... 345 301,501 45 371 99 1,178 1,645 1, 264, 209 Total collisions and derailments...... **3,72**2 2,817,294 285 3, 355

TABLE No. 2.—Collisions and derailments.

Following is the usual list of Class A train accidents—all in which the damage is reported at \$10,000 or over, notable cases in which passengers are killed, and those doing damage less than \$10,000 and down to \$2,000, wherever the circumstances or the cause may be of particular interest:

TABLE 2a.—Causes of thirty-seven prominent train accidents (Class A).

[Note.—R. stands for rear collision; B., butting collision; M., miscellaneous collisions; D., derailment; P., passenger train; F., freight and miscellaneous trains.]

#### Damage to engines, cars, and roadway. Record No. Kind of train. Cause. Class. 1 F. and P..... R 0 300 56 2 engines coupled together "bucking" snow ran into the cars of their own train; occurred 5 a.m. Engineman, 15 years' experience, on duty 15 hours, intoxicated. Conductor suspended 10 days for continuing operations, knowing engineman's unfitness. Occurred 1 a.m. Conductor in caboose fell asleep F. and F.... 2 R 2 985 74 and failed to flag; engineman of approaching train also asleep. (See note in text below.) Engineman and fireman both asleep. They had been 2,000 3 R 1 F. and F..... on duty 27 hours, detained by landslide, but had had 4 hours' sleep in this time.

Table 2a.—Causes of thirty-seven prominent train accidents (Class A)—Continued.

COLLISIONS—Continued.

Item.	Class.	Kind of train.	1—.l—	Damage to en- gines, cars, androadway.	Record No.	Canse.
4	R.	P. and F	0 0	8,000	26	Signal operator, 2 weeks in service, gave passenger train clear block signal when block section was occupied.
5	В	P. and F	2 17	3,200	84	Misplaced switch; engineman of passenger train not keeping good lookout.
7	B R	F and F	1 1 0		10 58	Misplaced switch. (See note in text below.) Inexperienced engineman failed to control speed of 50-car freight train (48 cars air braked). Brakemen censured by superintendent for not applying hand
8	Ř	F. and F	0 0	4,811	57	brakes. Disregard of automatic stop signal, and also of stop signal given by flag. Engineman, 15 days' experience, on duty 14 hours, with 8 hours' intermission.
9	B	F and F	2 3	4,517	8	Fullure to deliver disputcher's order. (See note in text below.)
10	В	F. and F	2 1	4,981	89	Occurred 4 a. m. Operator asleep: awoke when called by conductor, delivered 3 orders, forgetting a fourth.
11	В	F. and F	1 4	5,120	40	Dispatcher gave conflicting orders to 2 passenger trains. Mer in charge of one of the trains disregarded rule to get a clearance card at a preceding station.
12	В	P and F	0 29	5, 500	87	Work train encroached on time of regular passenger train
13	R	F and F	0 2	6,000	33	Fulse clear block signal given; also engineman approached station carelessly; saw tail lights of standing train, but assumed that they were on the parallel track of another railroad. Signalman in service here 5 days, elsewhere 2 years, had long experience us telegraph operator.
14	В	F. and F	0 8	8,300	42	Southbound train ran past meeting point. North- bound had run past automatic block signal set against it.
15	M	F. and F	3 2	10,600	41	Approached station not under control, engineman in service 7 months.
16	R	P. and P	17 36	10,700	27	Engineman of 5 months' experience ran past five warning signals. (See note in text below.)
17 18	BR	P. and F	0 3		59	Freight encroached on time of passenger train. Engineman asleep, ran past automatic block signal set against him, also past a red fing. Brakeman on engine failed to keep good lookout. Crew on duty 16 hours 45 minutes, with 2 hours intermission.
19	В	P. and F	6 15	11,907	85	Freight ran beyond meeting point; engineman and fireman killed. Conductor tried, too late, to apply air brakes.
20	В	F. and F	5 2	13,800	6	Westbound freight train metonly one section of east- bound, schedule of second section was "over- looked," engineman and fireman killed.
21	В	P. and P	8 10	14,000	62	Southbound encroached on schedule time of superior northbound train—Should have cleared 5 minutes.
<u>••</u>	В	P. and F	4 4	20,000	36	Southbound freight encroached on time of north- bound passenger train. Engineman killed; con- ductor asleep in caboose. (See note in text below.)
23 24	В <b>М</b>	F. and F F. and P	0 3 23		9 11	Mistake by dispatcher. (See note in text below.) Freight train became uncontrollable on descending grade. Air brakes had been tested, but were found ineffective when applied a short distance from
25	В	P. and P	2 67	29,700	2	fouling point.  Dispatcher claims to have cent a meeting order which operator denies having received. No evidence to prove other statement.
<b>2</b> 6	В	P. and F	10 17	32, 500	66	Men in charge of freight failed to identify opposing passenger trains. (See note in text below)
27	R	F. and F	0 2	34, 553	29	Freight train, 65 cars (85 per cent air braked), became uncontrollable on steep grade. Brakes had worked for 5 miles on grade; engineman appears to have failed to maintain adequate supply of air.
	Tota	J	61 243	302,591		

TABLE 2 a.—Causes of thirty-seven prominent train accidents (Class A)—Continued.

DERAILMENTS.

Item.	Class.	Kind of train.	Killed.	Injured.	Damage to engines, cars, and roadway.	Record No.	Cause.
1	D	F	0	0	<b>\$</b> 2,500	82	Occurred 1 a. m.; excessive speed; conductor and
2	D	P	2	1 1 2	5, 310	49	engineman on duty 18 hours.  Double-head train ran past signal and off derailing
3	D	P	2	24	8,000	51	switch; both enginemen killed. Excessive speed on curve of 13 degrees 30 minutes;
4	D	F	0	2	10, 700	f     <b>50</b> 	outer rail elevated 8 inches; speed limit, 25 miles an hour; speed of this train estimated 70 miles an hour; engineman experienced.  Stone-arch bridge undermined by heavy rain. Train had a helping engine at the rear; 14 cars fell down bank.
5	Ð	F	0	0	12,000	83	Lading of open car shifted and struck bridge, knock- ing down one span.
6	D	P	2	6	12,500	80	Spikes maliciously removed. Express car, with mes-
7	D	P	1	1	13, 500	78	senger inside, took fire and was burned up. Accidental obstruction; car derailed by casting which
8	n	70	13	40	14 600		had fallen from a car of preceding train.
ŷ	D D	P	13	46   21	14,600 18,000	47	Unexplained. (See note in text below.) Broken rail; rail found defective inside.
10	Ď	P	3	31	18,000	53	Probably due to excessive speed (35 miles an hour)
							over a line on which there was a temporary speed limit of 18 miles an hour. Yard engine, running tender first.
	Tota	1	23	133	115, 110	Í	
		d. 27 collisions d10derailments	84	376	417, 701	† 	

Collision No. 16 was due to the gross negligence of an engineman of five months' experience. The accident occurred about 8 p. m. The engineman had been on duty only about an hour, and had been off duty all that day. A heavy express train, consisting of two engines and nine cars was following, at a speed of about 40 miles an hour, an accommodation train which made station stops about every mile; and it was a few seconds after the slower train had started from a station that the collision occurred. The express had been following within less than the regular time interval for several miles; and at two points within 2½ miles of the point of collision lantern signals were shown to caution the engineman of the express; but these the engineman of the leading engine disregarded, as well as one or more fusee signals which had been thrown off by the rear brakeman of the preceding train; and the express struck the rear car of the local train with great force. The wreck took fire from the locomotive fire box and some of the passengers were burned to death. The line of road approaching the point of collision was straight for a long distance up to the station, where it curved through a cut, and it was just around this curve that the collision occurred. The explanation made by the negligent engineman is not clear, and the officers of the road appear to have been unable to get at the truth as to all of the circumstances and conditions. The engineman asserts that he was giving his

attention mainly to watching for the tail lights of the preceding train; but this, of course, affords no explanation of how he became entirely oblivious to the lantern and fusee signals. His statements about shutting off steam and applying brakes appear to be wholly unreliable. The fireman of the leading engine was killed, so that there is no evidence either to corroborate or to contradict what the engineman says.

The engineman of the second engine of this train shut off steam a mile or more before reaching the point of collision, having seen the warning signals; yet he took no measures to check what was obviously reckless conduct on the part of the leading engineman. engineman of the leading engine had been a fireman on this division for six years and in that capacity had worked on fast trains, but he had been engineman only a few months and had been passenger engineman only one trip, and that on a local train. The fireman of the leading engine had been in the service only three months. engineman asserts that he had had no conversation with the fireman for some minutes before the collision. A rule of the road requires firemen to so arrange their work as to be able to assist the engineman in the lookout at stations and crossings and in observing the indications of fixed signals, but it appears that both the engineman and fireman in this case paid no attention to this rule. Both the engineman and the fireman are reported as men of good character, and their records had been clear.

Collision No. 26 occurred about 3 a.m. and caused 10 deaths and 17 None of the killed were passengers. The freight train, bound westward, waiting on a side track for four east-bound passenger trains, was started out after the passage of the third train and collided with the fourth. These trains were first and second No. 20, No. 18, and No. 4. Conductor X, of the freight, says that when he left A (west bound) he knew that he could go no farther than B for the four east-bound first-class trains, and so notified not only the engineman, when he delivered him personally the orders, but the head brakeman and rear brakeman, Z, as well. Engineman Y entered the side track at the east switch at B, and as the train cleared this switch the conductor remarked to Z, "We are here for all four of them." The conductor claims that after going onto the side track he began to make out his wheel report—he having filled out his train at A—and that the rear brakeman was eating his luncheon. The conductor says that he looked out when No. 20 passed and saw the sig-He also noted second 20 when it went by, and when No. 18 went by he walked to the rear of his caboose and remarked to the rear brakeman, "That is not No. 4; No. 4 must have run around No. 18." While he was discussing the matter with the brakeman, Engineman Y gave the whistle starting signal, the head brakeman threw the west switch, and the train started to move. Both X and Z claim that they

were morally certain that all four passenger trains had gone by. The orders were perfectly clear to them and thoroughly understood, and neither of them has been able to figure out, since the accident, how the oversight occurred. Fireman H claims that when Y started to move his engine he told him that but three trains had gone. Y corrected him by saying that all four trains had gone and that there were no other trains to come. Engineman Y was killed.

Derailment No. 8 is reported as due to some cause unknown. The report says that the tender of the engine first left the track and that six cars following it were derailed. The baggage car, next to the engine, ran against the bluff on the inside of the curve, and the cars were telescoped and wrecked. The inside rail of the track was found turned over for about 90 feet. The track was in good surface and alignment and had been inspected daily. The ballast was stone. The weight of the engine was 201,500 pounds; weight on drivers, 99,500 pounds. The tender was in good condition. The speed of the train was about 35 miles an hour.

In collision No. 6 a switch had been left in wrong position by a brakeman of two weeks' experience. Extra freight train, engine 131, westbound, collided with extra freight train, engine 8, eastbound, which was standing on the passing track. When extra 8 went into the passing track, a local freight, No. 19, westbound, backed out of the east end onto the main track to proceed west. The rear brakeman of this train set the switch for the main track, and after his train had cleared it (going west on main track) he threw the switch for the passing track again and locked it. Extra 131 was about 1 mile east when No. 19 departed. In some way the lamp on the switch, which was burning when No. 19 passed over it, became extinguished, and the engineman of 131 failed to notice the absence of the light, being deceived, he says, by other lights in the vicinity. The engineman and fireman on 131 jumped off and the fireman was instantly killed. The rear brakeman of No. 19, who wrongfully threw the switch for the passing track, had been in the service two weeks, under instructions; and, moreover, had been told by both the engineman and the fireman of his train just after it had backed out of the passing track to set and lock the switch for the main track and get onto his train.

Collision No. 9, which occurred at 3 a.m., was due to the failure of an operator to deliver a meeting order. First No. 8 had orders to meet No. 7 at X, and No. 7 was to receive the order at X. The operator at that point, 19 years of age and of ten months' experience, failed to take the precaution of placing torpedoes on the rail, as required by the rules (when an order fixes a meeting at the point where the order is delivered), and he also failed to fasten the rope of the train-order signal in the "tell-tale" device. When No. 7 arrived at his station, he forgot that he held an order for that train, and

changed the semaphore signal from "stop" to "all right," and did not discover his error until after No. 7 had passed.

Collision No. 22 was between a freight train and a passenger train, both running on schedules of six months' standing. The freight, after having done considerable work at a station, was started for the next station on the time of the passenger train. The engineman and fireman were killed. The conductor had given the starting signal and then had gone to the caboose and had fallen asleep, and he was asleep at the time of the collision, though he had not worked excessive hours. It does not appear that the conductor or any of his men had had any conference with the engineman as to where the freight should meet the passenger train.

Collision No. 23 was due to an error in the dispatcher's office. dispatcher who was on duty at 11 p. m. issued an order scheduling No. 3 west from A to F somewhat later than its regular schedule, leaving A at 1 and arriving at B at 1.25 a. m. Extra 85 east bound signed this order at F at 11.15 p. m. and left there. No. 3 was ready to leave A at 12.15 a.m., about thirty minutes earlier than the dispatcher had expected. The dispatcher who came on duty at 12 o'clock midnight revoked the special schedule and so notified No. 3 at A, overlooking the fact that extra 85 had received a copy of it at F. Extra 85 was going to B to meet No. 3, which was due there on the special schedule This order having been annulled to No. 3 at A, No. 3 ran at 1.25. earlier, and the collision occurred a half mile west of B at about 1.05 a. m. The record of the transfer of outstanding orders from one dispatcher to the other at 12 o'clock indicated very clearly that extra 85 had been given the order at F. The second dispatcher had had eighteen years' experience as dispatcher, but had been in this place only eight months. He had had a good record up to the time of accident.

Two collisions shown in Table 2 a, Nos. 4 and 13, were due to "failures in block working"—errors of attendants at block-signal stations. It will be noted that both of these attendants were men of brief experience. Three other collisions, Nos. 8, 14, and 18, were due to disregard of automatic block signals indicating "stop." In one of these cases the men at fault had been on duty an excessive number of hours.

In nearly or quite every accident bulletin that has been issued it has been necessary to record one or more collisions due to the mistakes or negligence of men who had been on duty so many hours as to raise the supposition, if not the presumption, that they had become drowsy, if they had not actually fallen asleep; and cases in which enginemen are definitely reported as being asleep on duty are common. In the quarter covered by the present report traffic was very heavy and in some localities, according to common report, there was difficulty in finding addi-

tional men for the freight-train service as fast as they were needed, and the reports make a very unfavorable record in this respect, culminating in a collision—No. 2 in the foregoing table of causes—in which a conductor who should have protected the rear of his train was asleep in his caboose, while the engineman of the following train was asleep in his cab, so that he would not have seen the conductor's red lantern if it had been shown. In collision No. 1 the engineman at fault had been on duty fifteen hours. In collision No. 8 an engineman, who had been in service as such only fifteen days, had been on duty fourteen hours, but with an intermission. In collision No. 18, before referred to, all of the men on the train had been on duty sixteen hours forty-five minutes, with an intermission. Collision No. 10 was due to the fault of an operator who had been asleep, though whether or not his mistake was due to this is not clear. Derailment No. 1, due to misconduct or neglect of a conductor and an engineman who had been on duty eighteen hours, may or may not have been due to overwork. Collision No. 22, referred to above, is also to be noted under this head.

In the list of boiler explosions, which do not appear in Table 2 a, there are also cases in which men were apparently overworked. In one such explosion the engineman, who was held at fault for allowing the water in the boiler to become too low, had been on duty very irregularly for the preceding two days. After a rest of seven hours forty minutes he was on duty twenty-one hours; then rested two hours forty-five minutes; then was on duty eleven hours five minutes, up to the time the accident occurred. The way such a "schedule" of hours works out in practice may be seen by assuming the case of a man who finishes his work at 7 o'clock on Saturday night. If, then, he rests seven hours forty minutes, he will be called at 2.40 a. m. on Sunday; working then twenty-one hours, he will be off at 11.40 p. m. on Sunday. A rest of two hours forty-five minutes then would end at 2.25 a. m. on Monday, and working then for eleven hours five minutes would bring him to 1.30 p. m. Monday.

In another case an engineman, who was dismissed from the service on account of his responsibility for the explosion, had been on duty sixteen hours forty minutes, following a rest of twenty-one hours forty minutes. This man had been in the service of the company about ten years, but had been an engineman only two months. In another boiler explosion, which caused the injury of 9 employees, and was reported as being due to the water becoming low in the boiler, the engineman held accountable had been on duty eighteen hours.

TABLE No. 3.—Details of Table 1—Causes of accidents to employees in coupling and uncoupling cars.

Sub- class.	Causes.		rain- aen.	Train- men in yards.		Yard trainmen ' (switch- ing crews).		Other en	
		Killed.	Injured.	Killed.	Injured.	Killed.	Injured.	Killed.	Injured.
1 2 3 4 5:	Adjusting coupler with foot	1	19 8 2 1 1 7 14		13 2 5	1	30 14 4 4 5 25		
7 8 9	Coupling with chain or other emergency appliance on curve too sharp for automatic coupling	1			2		9		
10 11 12	Fingers or hand caught between uncoupling lever and body of car	1	39		36 4	2	72 9		, 1
13 14	not in working order	2 8 2	18 6 29	2 1 1	37 1 22	4 4	6 36	i	 1
15 16	Opening knuckle when cars were near together, engine accidentally started.  Opening knuckle, part of defective coupler fell on	' 	3	• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •	1	1	5		• • • • •
17 18	foot	4 2	7		3 7 1	2	10 11 8	<sup>}</sup> .	
19 20 21	Struck by object at side of track.  Caught by unexpected movement of car, due to slack running in.  Caught by unexpected movement of car, due to	. 1	24	2	12	3	26	••••	1
22 23	mistake or misunderstanding in giving hand sig- nals Uncoupling moving cars and lost footing Parts hard to move, causing delay	3	16	2 1	2 8 6	4	9   18   9	1	 1 1
24 25	Went between cars unnecessarily and contrary to rule  Hand caught between projecting load and end of	2	13	1	2	1	6	1.	••••
26 27 28	next car. No witness (fatal injury). Other causes (see detailed list below)	2 2 2 1	20	4	3 13 1	2 1 1 1	26 1	i	i
	Total .	28	262	14	195	38	405	5	24

#### Details of injuries included in table No. 3, subclass No. 27.

- O. 1. Standing on car, reaching down for lever, sprained back.
- O. 2. Cutting off engine, foot slightly bruised.
- O. 3. Uncoupling from platform, caught hand between vestibules.
- O. 4. Caught hand between deadwood and tank.
- O. 5. Coupling engine to passenger train, had to raise buffer by hand; hand mashed.
- O. 6. Struck thigh against end of car.
- O. 7. Struck by piece of exploding torpedo.
- O. 8. Killed; lever caught in trousers and threw man down on rail.
- O. 9. Making coupling between weed-burner and caboose; couplers passed, squeezing man between cars.
- O. 10. Hand slipped in using lever at side of car.
- O. 11. Lumps of coal fell on head.
- O. 12. Adjusting couplers on curve; caught between tender and coach.
- O. 13. Adjusting worn coupler, finger crushed.
- O. 14. Caught leg, bruising it.
- O. 15. Grasped brake; brake released, twisting arm.
- O. 16. Ties fell off car, bruising head and face.
- O. 17. Lump of coal fell on head.

- 0. 18. Uncoupling two engines, hand struck by the release rod.
- 0. 19. Coupling engines together, caught hand.
- 0. 20. Cutting off car, wrist injured by rupture of air hose.
- 0. 21. Killed; uncoupling caboose, hand hold gave way; man fell under train.
- 0. 22. Lever struck man in side.
- 0. 23. Cutting off car; fell off and sprained wrist.
- 0. 24. Fingers mashed; carelessness.
- 0, 25. Slabs fell off car and struck hands.
- N. 1. Placed hand back of couplers; hand lacerated.
- N. 2. Couplers slipped.
- N. 3. Struck in side by lever.
- N. 4. Coupling to engine; coupler was too low.
- N. 5. Hand caught between lift-rod and car.
- N. 6. Piece of coupler broke off and struck man on head.
- N. 7. Coupling on curve, drawbars passed; man squeezed between engine and car.
- N. 8. Opening knuckle; steel sliver penetrated hand.
- N. 9. Killed; engine, after being uncoupled, backed.
- N. 10. Knuckle flew up and struck man on elbow.
- N. 11. Lump of coal fell off car.
- N. 12. Coupling on curve; drawbars passed.
- N. 13. Door of car fell on foot.
- N. 14. Caught between end sills.
- N. 15. Between cars to adjust couplers; couplers passed and man was squeezed.
- N. 16. Cutting off cars; sudden application of air threw man off car.
- N. 17. Lift-rod struck man in chest.
- N. 18. Finger ring caught in coupler chain and pulled man under engine.
- N. 19. Coupling engine to empty ladles; finger caught,
- D. 1. Uncoupling cars on curve; caught head between buffers.
- D. 2. Torpedo exploded, cutting lcg.
- D. 3. Lumber shifted, catching fingers.
- D. 4. Mitten caught, catching finger.
- D. 5. Coupling on curve; caught between end sills.
- D. 6. Pinched finger in chain.
- D. 7. Caught between car bodies on short curve.
- D. 8. Head caught between end sills while cutting off cars.
- D. 9. Knuckle broke and flew against leg.
- D. 10. Trying to adjust coupler on inside short curve; leg bruised.
- D. 11. Uncoupling cars; stepped on nail.
- D. 12. Mitten froze to coupler; finger crushed.
- D. 13. Sprained wrist in pulling lever up.
- D. 14. Lifting lever, glove caught, throwing man down.
- D. 15. Foot caught between pilot and angle cock.
- D. 16. Board from roof fell off, striking man on hand.
- D. 17. Couplers passed, catching man between sills.
- D. 18. Heel of rubber caught on spike; wheel ran over foot.

Table No. 3a.—Nature of injuries to employees in coupling and uncoupling cars.

Injuries.	Train- men.	Train- men in yards.	Yard train- men.	Other em- ployees,
Lors of feet	2		5	
Loss of legs	1		1	
Loss of arms	1		. 4	1
Lakes of hands	3	1	1	
Loss of fingers	7	1	9	1
1.0% of toes		 	1	
fractured skull			1	
Fractured leg	1	1	4	1
Fractured arm	6	3	_	
Fractured collar bone or ribs	5	6	12	2
Fractured other bones.	1	2	8	
Contucion of head or body	27	22	46	2
Contusion or laceration of feet	27	19	31	2
Contusion or laceration of toes	6	2	8	
Contusion or laceration of legs		6	24	
Contusion or laceration of arms	16	9	21	1
Contusion or laceration of hands	85	40	48	2
Contusion or laceration of fingers		69	142	9
Dialocation	ĺ	1	• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •	
Internal injuries	12	5	23	1

TABLE No. 3A.—Injuries in coupling and uncoupling cars—Continued.

Injuries.	Train- men.	Train- men in yards.	Yard train- men.	Other em- ployees.
Sprains	9 1 9	<b>8</b> 5	15 1 5	2
Total injuries	262 28	195 14	405 88	24
Total killed and injured	290	209	443	22

	RECAPITULATION,	
Killed		85
Injured		· • • • •
Total killed and injured	o	271

TABLE No. 4.—Details of Table 1—Causes of accidents to employees classified (C6 and C7) as falling from and getting on or off cars and engines.

Sub-	Causes.		rain- nen.	Train- men in yards.		Yard trainmen (switch- ing crews).		Other employees.	
CIBAS.		Killed.	Injured.	Killed.	Injured.	Killed.	Injured.	Killed.	Injured.
$\begin{bmatrix} 1 \\ 2 \\ 3 \\ 4 \end{bmatrix}$	Fell from roof of box car by reason of— Defect in car Ice or snow. Parting of train Derailment, collision, or shock due to abnormal movements of cars other than those in	1	7 11 11		3 6 5	1	6 5 8		1 1 1
C6 5 6 7	subclass 3.  While setting brakes.  Fell from—  Coal car.  Freight car other than box or coal car	1	7	1	56 26 3 1	7 2	127 61 4 2	1	19 4 4 6
8 9 10	Engine or tender.  Passenger car  Engines, tenders, or cars (all kinds) not in motion		113	••••	56 1 59	10	40 1 18	2	15 4
11 12 (13 14 15	Miscellaneous causes. Not clearly explained. Slipped getting on moving trains or cars Jumping off moving trains. Jumping from engines or cars anticipating colli-	45 6	90 62	1 14 8 1	52 7 61 102	5 16 2	<b>69</b> 35	1 6 6 8	16 12 67 70
C7 16	sion, derailment, or other accident	6	37 245	4 1	13 18 155 2	1 .	14 43 168	8	6 1 57
(18	Caught in frog, guard rail, or switch	<u> </u>	1, 201	26	626	53	883	35	331

#### [Public—No. 171.]

AN ACT requiring common carriers engaged in interstate commerce to make full reports of all accidents to the Interstate Commerce Commission.

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, It shall be the duty of the general manager, superintendent, or other proper officer of every common carrier engaged in interstate commerce by railroad to make to the Interstate Commerce Commission, at its office in Washington, District of Columbia, a monthly report, under oath, of all collisions of trains or where any train or part of a train accidentally leaves the track, and of all accidents which may occur to its passengers or employees while in the service of such common carrier and actually on duty, which report shall state the nature and causes thereof and the circumstances connected therewith.

SEC. 2. That any common carrier failing to make such report within thirty days after the end of any month shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor and, upon conviction thereof by a court of competent jurisdiction shall be punished by a fine of

not more than one hundred dollars for each and every offense and for every day during which it shall fail to make such report after the time herein specified for making the same.

SEC. 3. That neither said report nor any part thereof shall be admitted as evidence or used for any purpose against such railroad so making such report in any suit or action for damages growing out of any matter mentioned in said report.

Szc. 4. That the Interstate Commerce Commission is authorized to prescribe for such common carriers a method and form for making the reports in the foregoing metion provided.

section provided.

Approved, March 3, 1901.

#### SPECIAL INFORMATION CONTAINED IN PRECEDING BULLETINS.

Fach accident bulletin contains tables showing the number of passengers and employees killed and injured, and these figures are classified according to cause (see Table No. 1); also tables showing cost of the different classes of train accidents. The causes of accidents to employees in coupling and uncoupling and in falling from cars, etc., are further classified in Tables No. 3 and No. 4. The most serious collisions and derailments are dealt with in a supplementary table (Class A) showing the causes in some detail. Each bulletin is for three months, and No. 1 was for the quarter ending September 30, 1901. The bulletin for the quarter ending June 30 contains, in addition to the quarterly statistics, tables showing the same information for the whole of the fiscal year ending on that date.

Bulletin No. 1 contains brief notes on the causes of coupler accidents, explanatory of Table No. 3. Table No. 4 is supplemented by similar notes. In this quarter special mention was made of 130 casualties due to operating trains in which air

brakes were used on only a portion of the cars.

Bulletin No. 4 has comments on collisions occurring where the trainmen had worked very long hours. In this bulletin a table is given showing the deaths and injuries due to trains parting. The table shows that nearly all of the coupler failures which resulted in a collision or derailment were reported as due to "cause unknown."

Bulletin No. 5 contains a table showing the cause (as reported) of each coupling accident in the quarter. The table fills 12 pages.

Bulletin No. 6 contains a table giving notes on the causes of the 16 rear collisions which occurred in this quarter on railroads where the block system is in use. Comment is made on the large increase in the number of accidents to men in coupling as compared with previous quarters.

Bulletin No. 7 contains a note on the cause of a rear collision due to the inadequacy of the time-interval rule.

Bulletin No. 8 explains in detail the causes of two butting collisions. In one of these collisions a conductor gave a hand signal to stop, which was taken by the engineman to mean "go ahead." In another case the men in charge of a train read "No. 2" when the order was written "second No. 2." This bulletin contains a special list of all the collisions of the quarter, of whatever magnitude, which were caused by mistakes in connection with time-tables or telegraphic orders.

Bulletin No. 9 records two collisions in which 44 persons were killed, one due to careless handling of a telegraphic order and the other to gross negligence of an engineman who failed to keep the air brakes in working order. Reference is made to the derailment of four fast mail trains by reason of reckless speed.

Bulletin No. 10 records the death of 147 passengers in collisions and derailments—more than three times the average number killed during the nine preceding quarters. One derailment, due to an accidental obstruction, killed 65 passengers, and six other accidents caused 106 deaths. The causes of the derailment mentioned and of four of the worst collisions are explained at length.

Bulletin No. 11 contains a note on one butting collision which resulted in the deaths of 18 passengers and injuries to 37, the collision being caused by failure to iden-

TABLE No. 3.—Details of Table 1—Causes of accidents to employees in coupling and uncoupling cars.

Sub-	Causes.		rain- ien.	me	ain- en in .rds.	trai (8W	ard nmen ritch- ing ews).	Other employees.	
class.		Killed.	Injured.	Killed.	Injured.	Killed.	Injured.	Killed.	Injured.
1 2 3 4 5 6 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24	Adjusting coupler with foot.  Adjusting coupler, cars accidentally started. Careless manipulation of uncoupling lever. Cars not equipped with automatic coupler. Coupler broken, using link and pin, or chain. Coupling damaged cars. Coupling damaged cars. Coupling with chain or other emergency appliance on curve too sharp for automatic coupling. Coupling with chain or other emergency appliance because of uneven track. Coupling or uncoupling safety chains. Fingers or hand caught between uncoupling lever and body of car. Uncoupling without using lever (unnecessary). Uncoupling without using lever, uncoupling lever not in working order. Foot caught in frog, switch, or guard rail. Opening or closing knuckle when cars were near together, miscalculated speed. Opening knuckle, part of defective coupler fell on foot. Opening knuckle, lost footing. Riding on car to uncouple, slipped off. Struck by object at side of track. Caught by unexpected movement of car, due to slack running in. Caught by unexpected movement of car, due to mistake or misunderstanding in giving hand signals. Uncoupling moving cars and lost footing. Parts hard to move, causing delay. Went between cars unnecessarily and contrary to	1 1 1 2 3 2	19 8 2 1 7 14 2 39 9 18 6 29 3 4 7	2 1 2 1	13 2 5 1 9 2 1 36 4 37 1 22 1 3 7 1 3 1 2 2 8 6	1 8 2 4 4 4 1 1 2 3 3	30 14 4 4 5 25 9 44 6 36 5 10 11 8 9 26	1	1 1 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
25 26 27 28	rule Hand caught between projecting load and end of next car No witness (fatal injury) Other causes (see detailed list below) Unexplained	2  2 2 1	13 4 20 3	4	3 18 1	2 1 1	6 6 26 1	i	i
	Total	28	262	14	195	38	405	5	24

#### Details of injuries included in table No. 3, subclass No. 27.

- O. 1. Standing on car, reaching down for lever, sprained back.
- O. 2. Cutting off engine, foot slightly bruised.
- O. 3. Uncoupling from platform, caught hand between vestibules.
- O. 4. Caught hand between deadwood and tank.
- O. 5. Coupling engine to passenger train, had to raise buffer by hand; hand mashed.
- O. 6. Struck thigh against end of car.
- O. 7. Struck by piece of exploding torpedo.
- O. 8. Killed; lever caught in trousers and threw man down on rail.
- O. 9. Making coupling between weed-burner and caboose; couplers passed, squeezing man between
- O. 10. Hand slipped in using lever at side of car.
- O. 11. Lumps of coal fell on head.
- O. 12. Adjusting couplers on curve; caught between tender and coach.
- O. 13. Adjusting worn coupler, finger crushed.
- O. 14. Caught leg, bruising it.
- O. 15. Grasped brake; brake released, twisting arm.
- O. 16. Ties fell off car, bruising head and face.
- O. 17. Lump of coal fell on head.

- O. 18. Uncoupling two engines, hand struck by the release rod.
- 0. 19. Coupling engines together, caught hand.
- 0. 20. Cutting off car, wrist injured by rupture of air hose.
- O. 21. Killed; uncoupling caboose, hand hold gave way; man fell under train.
- O. 22. Lever struck man in side.
- O. 23. Cutting off car; fell off and sprained wrist.
- O. 24. Fingers mashed; carelessness.
- O. 25. Slabs fell off car and struck hands.
- N. 1. Placed hand back of couplers; hand lacerated.
- N. 2. Couplers slipped.
- N. 3. Struck in side by lever.
- N. 4. Coupling to engine; coupler was too low.
- N. 5. Hand caught between lift-rod and car.
- N. 6. Piece of coupler broke off and struck man on head.
- N. 7. Coupling on curve, drawbars passed; man squeezed between engine and car.
- N. 8. Opening knuckle; steel sliver penetrated hand.
- N. 9. Killed; engine, after being uncoupled, backed.
- N. 10. Knuckle flew up and struck man on elbow.
- N. 11. Lump of coal fell off car.
- N. 12. Coupling on curve; drawbars passed.
- N. 13. Door of car fell on foot.
- N. 14. Caught between end sills.
- N. 15. Between cars to adjust couplers; couplers passed and man was squeezed.
- N. 16. Cutting off cars; sudden application of air threw man off car.
- N. 17. Lift-rod struck man in chest.
- N. 18. Finger ring caught in coupler chain and pulled man under engine.
- N. 19. Coupling engine to empty ladles; finger caught.
- D. 1. Uncoupling cars on curve; caught head between buffers.
- D. 2. Torpedo exploded, cutting lcg.
- D. 3. Lumber shifted, catching fingers.
- D. 4. Mitten caught, catching finger.
- D. 5. Coupling on curve; caught between end sills.
- D. 6. Pinched finger in chain.
- D. 7. Caught between car bodies on short curve.
- D. 8. Head caught between end sills while cutting off cars.
- D. 9. Knuckle broke and flew against leg.
- D. 10. Trying to adjust coupler on inside short curve; leg bruised.
- D. 11. Uncoupling cars; stepped on nail.
- D. 12. Mitten froze to coupler; finger crushed.
- D. 13. Sprained wrist in pulling lever up.
- D. 14. Lifting lever, glove caught, throwing man down.
- D. 15. Foot caught between pilot and angle cock.
- D. 16. Board from roof fell off, striking man on hand.
- D. 17. Couplers passed, catching man between sills.
- D. 18. Heel of rubber caught on spike; wheel ran over foot.

TABLE No. 3A.—Nature of injuries to employees in coupling and uncoupling cars.

Injuries.	Train- men.	Train- men in yards.	Yard train- men.	Other em- ployees.
Loss of feet. Loss of legs Loss of arms	1 1		5 1 4	1
Loss of hands Loss of fingers Loss of toes Practured skull	3 7	1	1 9 1	i
Fractured leg	1 6 5	1 3 6	12	
Contusion of head or body.  Contusion or laceration of feet  Contusion or laceration of toes	27 27	22 22 19 2	3 46 31 8	$\begin{vmatrix} \frac{2}{2} \end{vmatrix}$
Contusion or laceration of legs	5 16 35	6 9 40 69	24 21 48 142	1 2
Dislocation	1	1 5	142	1

TABLE No. 3A.—Injuries in coupling and uncoupling cars—Continued.

9	8	15	
ā	5	1 5	2
262 28	195 14	405 88	24
290	209	443	29
	28	28 14	28 14 88

KECAPITULATION, Killed	85
Injured	<b>146</b>
Total killed and injured	771

TABLE No. 4.—Details of Table 1—Causes of accidents to employees classified (C6 and C7) as falling from and getting on or off cars and engines.

Sub-	Causes.			me	ain- en in erds.	trai (sw i	ard nmen ritch- ng ws).	Other em- ployees.	
Class.		Killed.	Injured.	Killed.	Injured.	Killed.	Injured.	Killed.	Injured.
$\begin{bmatrix} 1 \\ 2 \\ 3 \\ 4 \end{bmatrix}$	Fell from roof of box car by reason of— Defect in car Ice or snow. Parting of train Derailment, collision, or shock due to abnormal movements of cars other than those in	1	7 11 11		3 6 5	 1	6 5 8		1 1 1
C6 5	while setting brakes Fell from— Coal car	5 4 1	84 42 7	1	56 26 3	7 2	127 61	2	19
7 8 9 10	Freight car other than box or coal car Engine or tender	<b>.</b>	113		1 56 1	10	40 1	2	6 15 4
11 12 (13 14 15	motion Miscellaneous causes. Not clearly explained. Slipped getting on moving trains or cars Jumping off moving trains. Jumping from engines or cars anticipating colli-	45 6		1 14 8 1	59 52 7 61 102	16	18 <b>69</b> <b>35</b> 86 193	1 1 6 6 8	12 67
$\mathbf{C7} \begin{cases} 16 \\ 16 \\ 17 \\ 18 \end{cases}$	sion, derailment, or other accident  Fell from engines or cars by reason of defective handholds and sill steps  Getting on or off moving engine  Caught in frog, guard rail, or switch	6	37 245	4 1	13 18 155 2	8	14 43 168 3	8	6 1 57
	Total	<b> </b> -	1, 201	26	626	53	883	35	331

#### [Public—No. 171.]

AN ACT requiring common curriers engaged in interstate commerce to make full reports of all secilibrate to the Interstate Commerce Commission.

Re it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, It shall be the duty of the general manager, superintendent, or other proper officer of every common carrier engaged in interstate commerce by railroad to make to the Interstate Commerce Commission, at its office in Washington, District of Columbia, a monthly report, under oath, of all collisions of trains or where any train or part of a train accidentally leaves the track, and of all accidents which may occur to its passengers or employees while in the service of such common carrier and actually on duty, which report shall state the nature and causes thereof and the circumstances connected therewith.

SEC. 2. That any common carrier failing to make such report within thirty days after the end of any month shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor and, upon conviction thereof by a court of competent jurisdiction, shall be punished by a fine of

not more than one hundred dollars for each and every offense and for every day during which it shall fail to make such report after the time herein specified for making the same.

SEC. 3. That neither said report nor any part thereof shall be admitted as evidence or used for any purpose against such railroad so making such report in any suit or action for damages growing out of any matter mentioned in said report

action for damages growing out of any matter mentioned in said report.

SEC. 4. That the Interstate Commerce Commission is authorized to prescribe for such common carriers a method and form for making the reports in the foregoing section provided.

Approved, March 3, 1901.

#### SPECIAL INFORMATION CONTAINED IN PRECEDING BULLETINS.

Each accident bulletin contains tables showing the number of passengers and employees killed and injured, and these figures are classified according to cause (see Table No. 1); also tables showing cost of the different classes of train accidents. The causes of accidents to employees in coupling and uncoupling and in falling from cars, etc., are further classified in Tables No. 3 and No. 4. The most serious collisions and derailments are dealt with in a supplementary table (Class A) showing the causes in some detail. Each bulletin is for three months, and No. 1 was for the quarter ending September 30, 1901. The bulletin for the quarter ending June 30 contains, in addition to the quarterly statistics, tables showing the same information for the whole of the fiscal year ending on that date.

Bulletin No. 1 contains brief notes on the causes of coupler accidents, explanatory of Table No. 3. Table No. 4 is supplemented by similar notes. In this quarter special mention was made of 130 casualties due to operating trains in which air brakes were used on only a portion of the cars.

Bulletin No. 4 has comments on collisions occurring where the trainmen had worked very long hours. In this bulletin a table is given showing the deaths and injuries due to trains parting. The table shows that nearly all of the coupler failures which resulted in a collision or derailment were reported as due to "cause unknown."

Bulletin No. 5 contains a table showing the cause (as reported) of each coupling accident in the quarter. The table fills 12 pages.

Bulletin No. 6 contains a table giving notes on the causes of the 16 rear collisions which occurred in this quarter on railroads where the block system is in use. Comment is made on the large increase in the number of accidents to men in coupling as compared with previous quarters.

Bulletin No. 7 contains a note on the cause of a rear collision due to the inadequacy of the time-interval rule.

Bulletin No. 8 explains in detail the causes of two butting collisions. In one of these collisions a conductor gave a hand signal to stop, which was taken by the engineman to mean "go ahead." In another case the men in charge of a train read "No. 2" when the order was written "second No. 2." This bulletin contains a special list of all the collisions of the quarter, of whatever magnitude, which were caused by mistakes in connection with time-tables or telegraphic orders.

Bulletin No. 9 records two collisions in which 44 persons were killed, one due to careless handling of a telegraphic order and the other to gross negligence of an engineman who failed to keep the air brakes in working order. Reference is made to the derailment of four fast mail trains by reason of reckless speed.

Bulletin No. 10 records the death of 147 passengers in collisions and derailments—more than three times the average number killed during the nine preceding quarters. One derailment, due to an accidental obstruction, killed 65 passengers, and six other accidents caused 106 deaths. The causes of the derailment mentioned and of four of the worst collisions are explained at length.

Bulletin No. 11 contains a note on one butting collision which resulted in the deaths of 18 passengers and injuries to 37, the collision being caused by failure to iden-

tify a freight train on a side track at night; but, aside from this, the quarter's totals are in nearly every case less than in preceding quarters. Two costly accidents were caused by air-brake failures which were due to extreme cold weather. Mention is made of a fourth error like that shown in Bulletin No. 8 (readers overlooked the word "second").

Bulletin No. 12 records one derailment, killing 7 passengers, due to the failure of an engineman to reduce speed on entering a side track, according to a telegraphic order which had been delivered to him. This bulletin contains summaries of the casualties, collisions, and derailments for the three years ending June 30, 1904.

Bulletin No. 13 records the death of 228 passengers in collisions and derailments—a number far greater than had been reported in any previous quarter. One derailment caused the death of 88 persons (passengers and employees); one collision, 63; another, 24; another, 18; and a fourth, 16. The circumstances of these unusually serious accidents are given in detail. One of these collisions, and another not so disastrous to life and limb, occurred under somewhat unusual circumstances, due to the complicated nature of the regulations under which the trains were run.

Bulletin No. 14 records three collisions, in which 48 persons were killed. The causes of these are explained. In one the men in charge of a freight train, which was sidetracked, neglected to observe signals on passing passenger trains. In another an operator recopying a telegraphic order made a mistake in writing the number of minutes. In a third an operator failed to deliver a meeting order, having acknowledged the receipt of it without first setting his signal in the stop position.

Bulletin No. 15 records a remarkable rear collision of passenger trains, causing the death of 7 persons, in which an engineman of long experience and good record disregarded two automatic block signals. Particulars are given of butting collisions of freight trains, due to complicated combinations of negligence and misconduct. In this bulletin the causes of accidents to employees in coupling and uncoupling cars are classified more in detail than in former bulletins, so as to show more clearly the circumstances under which the injuries occurred. Many cases, however, could not be classified satisfactorily. A table is given also showing the nature of the injuries to employees in coupling and uncoupling cars. Out of 790 nonfatal injuries, 281 were contusions or lacerations of fingers.

Bulletin No. 16 records a butting collision, killing 26 persons, and two derailments, which together caused 42 deaths. The collision was due to the unaccountable negligence of five men on a freight train, all of whom were killed. One of the derailments was due to a misplaced facing point switch (and the party responsible was not detected). The other was due to the accidental obstruction of the path of a fast passenger train by the wreck of a freight train, which had been caused by the sudden stoppage of a long train by the application of the air brakes on the front portion only. This bulletin gives the total casualties for four years. For the twelve months ending with Bulletin 16 the number of passengers killed in train accidents reached the unprecedented total of 350. The fatal coupling accidents of the year aggregated 243, as compared with 278 in the year preceding.

Bulletin No. 17 records one collision, killing 6 and injuring 35 persons, and one derailment, killing 15 and injuring 28. The collision, occurring 1 a.m., was due to gross negligence on the part of the men in charge of a freight train. The derailment was due to an open draw. The drawbridge was not provided with interlocked signals, and the engineman was not adequately acquainted with the line of the road. A collision and a derailment are reported which were due to the lack of suitable detector bars at switches and a collision which was due to failure of "controlled manual" block signal working.


## ACCIDENT BULLETIN,

No. 19.

JANUARY, FEBRUARY, AND MARCH, 1906.

INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMMISSION, WASHINGTON, D. C.

WASHINGTON:
GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE.
1906.



## ACCIDENT BULLETIN,

No. 19,

## SHOWING COLLISIONS AND DERAILMENTS OF TRAINS

AND

## CASUALTIES TO PERSONS

DURING

JANUARY, FEBRUARY, AND MARCH, 1906.

U.S., INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMMISSION, WASHINGTON, D. C.

WASHINGTON:
GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE.
1906.

#### THE INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMMISSION.

Hon. MARTIN A. KNAPP, of New York, Chairman.

Hon. JUDSON C. CLEMENTS, of Georgia.

Hon. CHARLES A. PROUTY, of Vermont.

Hon. FRANCIS M. COCKRELL, of Missouri.

Hon. FRANKLIN K. LANE, of California.

EDWARD A. MOSELEY, Secretary.

ACCIDENT BULLETIN No. 19.

## RAILROAD ACCIDENTS IN THE UNITED STATES

DURING THE

#### THREE MONTHS ENDING MARCH 31, 1906.

The number of persons killed in train accidents during the months of January, February, and March, 1906, as shown in reports made by the railroad companies to the Interstate Commerce Commission under the "accident law" of March 3, 1901, was 274, and of injured 3,969. Accidents of other kinds, including those sustained by employees while at work, and by passengers in getting on or off the cars, etc., bring the total number of casualties up to 1,126 killed and 17,170 injured. These accidents are classified in the following table. These reports deal only with (a) passengers and (b) employees on duty.<sup>a</sup>

Table No. 1.—Summary of casualties to persons, January, February, March, 1906. bc

	Passen-		Persons carried under agree- ment or con- tract (b b).		Total (a, b, and b b).		Trainmen.		Train- men in yards.	
	Killed.	Injured.	Killed.	Injured.	Killed.	Injured.	Killed.	Injured.	Killed.	Injured.
Collisions Derailments Miscellaneous train accidents, including locomotive-boiler explosions	46 2	939 <b>628</b>	10 3	108 118	56 5	1,047 746 15	85 41 7	755 365 301	12 5 3	216 53 48
Total train accidents	48	1,577	14	231	62	1,808	133	1,421	20	317
Coupling or uncoupling. While doing other work about trains or while attending switches.							24 28	257 1,968	19	173 726
Coming in contact with overhead bridges, structures at side of track, etc	1	3	1	1	2	4	19	167	9	72
on or off	31 16	396 400	1 2	11 48	32 18	407 448	86 47	1,275 180	28 32	580 13
Total (other than train accidents)	48	799	4	60	52	859	204	3,877	101	1,681
Total all classes	<u>9</u> 6	2,376	18	291	114	2,667	337	5,298	121	1,998

In table No. 1 the passengers have been divided into three classes, and to make comparisons with the passenger casualties in former years it will be necessary to take the numbers shown in the third double column of the table. Class a includes all ordinary passengers. Class b includes passengers traveling on freight trains. Class bb includes persons who are customarily carried on trains under special arrangements, such as postal clerks and express messengers, employees on Pullman cars, newsboys, live-stock tenders, and men in charge of freight.

Accidents to employees resulting in slight injuries which do not prevent the employee injured from performing his accustomed service for more than three days in the aggregate during the ten days immediately following the accident are not reported.

TABLE No. 1.—Summary of casualties to persons, January, February, March, 1906—Continued.

	men (	Yard train- men (switch ing crews).		Other employees.		otal loyees.	Total all persons.	
•	Killed.	Injured.	Killed.	Injured.	Killed.	Injured.	Killed.	Injured.
Collisions Derailments Miscellaneous train accidents, including loco-	22 4	121 60	8 20	105 86	127 70	1,197 564	183 75	2,244 1,310
motive-boiler explosions	5	30		21	15	400	16	415
Total train accidents	31	211	28	212	212	2,161	274	3,969
Coupling or uncoupling.	38	494	3	29	84	983	84	983
While doing othes work about trains or while attending switches	21	728	25	694	87	4,116	87	4,116
structures at side of track, etc	4	118	1	11	33	<b>368</b>	35	372
on or off	46 35	886 100	27 295	348 3,376	187 409	3,089 3,786	219 <b>4</b> 27	3, <b>49</b> 6 4, 234
Total (other than train accidents)	144	2,326	351	4,458	800	12,342	852	13,201
Total all classes	175	2,537	379	4,670	1,012	14,503	1,126	17,170

The number of casualties reported as occurring in the quarter under review is large. As in Bulletin 18, the increases over the totals for the corresponding quarter of the preceding year are nearly all very large. Many of the present totals are smaller than those in the corresponding columns three months ago, but this is a comparison that affords scant ground for congratulation, because the changes are not large enough to indicate a tendency. The only sure conclusion that can be reached from these statistical comparisons, in whatever aspect they are taken, is that the Government should investigate the disastrous collisions, derailments, and other accidents on which they are based, and set forth in unmistakable terms their causes and remedies.

The worst accident in the present quarter's record, collision No. 29, Table 2a, causing 34 deaths and 24 injuries, was due to a striking failure of the train-dispatching system. A telegraph operator at a small and lonely station who had been on duty all day and more than half the night fell asleep, and, on awakening, misinformed the train dispatcher as to what had occurred while he had slept. railroads the train-dispatching rules require that the telegraph operator's train-order signal shall always be set to indicate "stop" except when, on the approach of a train, the operator, by pulling a lever or a cord, changes it to the "proceed" position. This rule is designed to insure that no train shall pass a station except when the operator at that station is awake and attentive to duty. This rule was not in force at this place. It is sometimes advocated that the superior train—the one which by the order is to have its right to the track bridged—must receive the order and acknowledge its receipt in vriting before the order is delivered to the opposing or inferior train.

Neither of these ideas finds universal acceptance, however; and, in view of the differences of opinion among railroad officers on the points involved, and on other details of train dispatching, it is pertinent to observe that the block system, repeatedly advocated by the Commission, is the true means that ought to be adopted for the prevention of such distressing disasters as that here recorded.

The details of this and certain other notable accidents are given below. The report of collision No. 8 includes an example of flagrantly excessive working hours.

The total number of collisions and derailments was 3,490 (1,921 collisions and 1,569 derailments), of which 289 collisions and 167 derailments affected passenger trains. The damage to cars, engines, and roadway by these accidents amounted to \$2,924,785. Given more in detail, these facts appear as below:

TABLE No. 2.—Collisions and derailments.

	Number.	Loss.	Persons killed.	Persons injured.
Collisions, rear	504 240	\$492,741 515,330	42 92	675 819
Collisions, trains separating	223	77,325	2	106
Collisions, miscellaneous	954	432, 147	47	644
Total	1,921	1,517,543	183	2,244
Derailment's due to defects of roadway, etc	356	267,477	7	465
Derailments due to defects of equipment	647	579,478	11	235
Derailments due to negligence of trainmen, signalmen, etc	96	59,161	6	81
Derailments due to unforeseen obstruction of track, etc	96	192,738	29	179
Derailments due to malicious obstruction of track, etc  Derailments due to miscellaneous causes	12 362	8,486 299,902	21	12 338
Total	1,569	1,407,242	75	1,310
Total collisions and derailments	3,490	2,924,785	258	3,554

Following is the usual list of Class A train accidents—all in which the damage is reported at \$10,000 or over; notable cases in which passengers are killed, and those doing damage less than \$10,000 and down to \$2,000, wherever the circumstances or the cause may be of particular interest:

Table 2a.—Causes of forty-six prominent train accidents (Class A)

[Note.—R stands for rear collision; B, butting collision; M, miscellaneous collisions, D, derailment, P, passenger train, F, freight and miscellaneous trains.]

#### **COLLISIONS**

						COL	matona
					Damage to en- glies, cars, and readway.	Reference to record.	Cause
1,	В	P. and F	1	36	F2,260	8	Freight stalled in snow; terrible wind and storm Flags and torpedoes failed to attract attention of
2	В	F. and F	3	6	2,695	71	engineman of passenger train.  Conductor of train running north on southhound track failed to arrange for protection, flagman mismanaged when conductor was absent, engine-
4	R	P. and F	0	0	2,700	20	man failed to test air brakes; block-signal operator gave false clear signal.  Milk train disregarded block signal, engineman discharged, conductor of standing freight train discharged for not flagging; freman suspended for failing to observe fixed-signal indication.
4	B	P. and F	0	11	3,000	10	Men in charge of passenger train failed to correctly identify freight standing on sidetrack; occurred in daylight.
5	В	P. and F	1	0	3,200	67	
6	B	F. and F	1	Ð	3,635	13	Operator accepted meeting order after the train ad-
7	R,	F and F	0	6	4,490	50	dressed had passed his station. Occurred 5 a. m Engineman asleep, other members of crew neglected to notice that he approached station too fast, all
Za <sup>3</sup>	В	P. and P	0	40	4,832	61	these men on duty 15t hours Engineman overlooked or confessed orders. (See
$\overline{4}h^4$	$\mathbf{R}$	P and F	0	40	5,000	1	note in text below )  Block-signal man went off duty without giving proper
8	R	F. and F	0	3	5,440	31	Information to his successor  Runaway on steep grade, engineman and fireman asleep. Both on duty long hours. (See note in
9 : 	B	F. and F	7	3	5,800	12	text below ) Disputcher, 18 months' experience, on duty five hours, gave meeting order first to inferior train and forgot
10 11	R M	F. and F P. and P	1	0 12	6,000 6,245	32 41	to hold the superior  Excessive speed under permissive signaling  Train of empty passenger cars in yard disregarded  stop signal, crossing collision, one passenger in  smoking car killed.
12	В	F. and D	0	2	7,442	14	Mistake in identifying extra train standing on side- track.
13	R	P. and P	5	4	9,400	28	Runaway train engineman and fireman driven from cab by steam from burst injector pipe; brakeman
14	R	F. and F	0	2	9,900	57	opened conductor's valve, but too late.  Standing train not protected, approaching train not under control, wreck led to detailment No. 15. (See
15	а	F. and F	1	3	#0,002	72	below.) Conductor and engineman eastbound receiving order to meet westbound No 35 proceeded to execute it with such exclusive attention that they forgot an order previously received to meet No. 71.
16	М	F. and F	1	0	11,000	100	Runaway on descending grade, train consisted of 25 cars air-braked and 9 not air-braked, with two
17	Л	P. and P	3	29	12,191	34	Northbound train running 15 minutes late by dis- putcher's order failed to wait three minutes at
18	B	P. and P	1	18	13,000	35	Conductor and engineman southbound, reading reg- ister, failed to note that opposing northbound train
10	В	P and F	3	20	14,000	9	had carried green signals.  Engineman of empty engine forgot schedule of passenger train
20	В	P. and F	3	12	14,000	37	Conductor and engineman of freight neglected to identify passenger train at meeting point.

Table 2a.—Causes of forty-six prominent train accidents (Class A)—Continued.

#### COLLISIONS—Continued.

No.	Class.	Kind of train.	Killed.	Injured.	Damage to engines, cars, and roadway.	Reference to record.	Cause.
21	R	F. and P	5	5	15,000	29	Runaway freight cars; had been left standing on grade with only air brakes to hold them; men in charge of train on duty 15j hours.
22	M	P. and F	¦ 1 	7	16,789	43	Cars of freight train left standing on siding (1 a. m.) while engine was switching, ran out on main track and met passenger train.
23	R	F. and F	0	0	17,000	3	Air brakes ineffective; angle cock had not been opened behind third car.
24	В	P. and P	2	36	17,789	36	Runner of empty engine miscalculated time and place to meet opposing passenger train.
25	<b>B</b>	P. and F	4	18	18,000	6	Signalman gave false clear block sign: I. (See note in text below.)
26	<b>B</b>	P. and P	1	39	19,630	62	Agent and operator failed to deliver order to east-bound train; operator, 27 years old, 2 months' experience, went off duty without informing agent that there were orders to deliver to 2 trains; agent delivered to only 1 train.
27	В	P. and P	3	8	20,000	5	
28	В	F. and F	3	<b>3</b>	27,000	70	Engineman westbound forgot about one of two east- bound trains he was to meet; conductor and two brakeman slept while waiting at meeting point and assumed engineman had waited for two trains.
29	В	P. and P	34	24	51,249	63	Operator, 2 a. m., on duty 19 hours; accepted order after train had passed. (See note in text below.
		Total colli- sions.	79	396	358,599		

#### DERAILMENTS.

1	D	P	1	2	\$2,000	19	Movable-point frog out of place, rod having been broken. Signalman held blameworthy for not having discovered the fault by the lightening of the load on the lever.
2 '	D	P	0	0	2,100	25	Switch maliciously misplaced: speed of train 65 miles an hour, yet no injuries reported.
3	В	F	0	0	2,300	24	Broken wheel, due to sticking of brake, caused by defect in triple valve.
4	D	P	0	1 <b>40</b> 1	2,500	95	Unexplained; speed 35 miles an hour; 3 cars over- turned.
5	D	<b>F</b>	10	17	2,500	92	Work train carrying laborers derailed at culvert washed out by flood. Water in creek was raised suddenly by melting of snow; ice gorge filled opening beneath track, and water then found its way to culvert 1,000 feet east of bridge.
6	D	<b>F</b>	1	1	3,732	82	Worn tires on driving wheels of engine, combined with slight overelevation of stock rail of switch.
7	D	P	1	28	6,512	93	Switch loosened by mail bag thrown of from car, breaking switch stand.
8	D	P	O	25	9,917	74	
9	D	P	0	10	10,725	1	Washout caused by river changing its course after a rain storm; engineman was not properly observing slow order.
10	$\mathbf{D}$	P			11,735	76	Broken rail; internal defect.
11 '	Ď	P		5	13,500	47	Unexplained.
12	D D	P.	3	5	16,600	89	Washout.
13	D	F		5	17,500	19	Runaway on 34 per cent descending grade: train of 52 cars was started from summit too rapidly. Engineman's experience, 4 years as fireman and 2 months as engineman.
14	$\mathbf{D}$	P	<b>' 2</b>	2	<sup>1</sup> 18,800	88	Occurred 11 a. m.: burned bridge.
15	D	P	<b>2</b>	20	42,700	67	Accidental obstruction; westbound track obstructed by wreck due to rear collision a moment before on eastbound track. (See collision No. 14.)
	Tota	al derailments	20	208	163, 121		
		alcollisions and railments.	99	604	521,720	!	<u> </u>

Collision No. 29, causing the death of 31 passengers and a money loss (besides the damages paid on account of deaths and personal injuries) of over \$50,000, was due to the nondelivery of a meeting order sent by the train dispatcher. The collision occurred about 2 a. m., and a blinding snowstorm prevailed at the time. Immediately after the collision the wreck took fire, and eight cars—passenger, mail, and baggage—were burned up. A portion of the deaths were caused by the fire. The westbound train ran past the meeting point which had been fixed by the dispatcher, for the reason, as before stated, that the meeting order was not delivered. The westbound train, running from A to G, had been ordered to meet the eastbound at E, but it was found that the eastbound train was gaining time over the westbound, and it was decided to change the meeting point to D, and an order to this effect was sent to the eastbound train at F and to the westbound at C. The nondelivery of the order was due to the fact that the telegraph operator at C accepted it from the dispatcher after the train had passed. The dispatcher, depending on the station operators for knowledge as to the whereabouts of all trains, inquired of the operator at C if the westbound train (No. 3) had passed. The operator replied that it had not, and the dispatcher at once instructed him to display his stop signal. But it turned out that the train had passed while the operator had been asleep, and the information given by him to the dispatcher after he awoke was, therefore, false. This operator had been on duty all day the day before, and then served at night in place of the regular night operator—nineteen hours in all, except for the time occupied at meals. It is estimated that he had been asleep only about one minute. worked an excessive length of time to accommodate his fellowoperator and without the permission or knowledge of his superintendent. He had been in service at C one week, for this company two months, and for other companies nearly two years. reported as being proficient and habitually attentive to duty.

Collision No. 6 was due to practically the same cause as No. 29.

Collision No. 5, occurring at 4 a. m. in a severe blizzard, was due to a mistake in conveying orders over a telephone line. Communication with the dispatcher's office had been cut off, and the trainmaster, a dispatcher of twenty-five years' experience, telephoned to the engineman of the superior (passenger) train to stop at H for orders, but the engineman did not so understand the message and proceeded beyond the point where the orders were to be delivered and where he was to have met the opposing train. The train master asserts that he got a response "all right," spoken twice; but he did not cause his order to be written down by the engineman, nor did he have it repeated or delivered to the conductor of the train. Having got his worthless

"all right" from the engineman, he sent the order in regular form to the inferior train.

Collision No. 7a appears to have been due to a confusion of dispatcher's orders on the part of an engineman, and is notable as illustrating the failure of a safeguard which has come into use within recent years, the safeguard of requiring the conductor of a train to notify the engineman on approaching a meeting point. In the present case this notification was given, but did not produce the intended result. Eastbound trains ordinarily have the right of track over westbound; but in this case the westbound passenger train had been made superior to eastbound trains for about 58 miles. At D, within this district, the westbound train received orders to wait at C until 9.15 p. m. The eastbound train therefore had right of track to C until that hour, or until such time as it should be able to reach the side track C and get out of the way of the westbound train; but there was also a westbound freight train waiting at C, and the eastbound train had orders to wait at C until 9.05 p. m. for this freight.

The eastbound train came on at 9.10 p.m., and having fulfilled the order as regards the freight train had no other train to look out for except the westbound passenger. The westbound passenger was at a standstill about 600 feet east of the west switch, and with this standing train the eastbound train collided. It would appear that the engineman of the eastbound forgot entirely about the westbound passenger train or mistakenly calculated that he was to meet it at another station farther east. He asserted that the air-brake pipe had been closed back of the second car of his train, and that this was the cause of his approaching the station at high speed, but the officers of the road reject this explanation. The station next east of C was the usual meeting point for the two passenger trains. conductor of No. 2, on approaching C, gave the proper signal by air whistle to remind the engineman that C was a meeting point; but it is believed that the engineman took this as applying to his order to wait for the freight. He acknowledged the conductor's signal, but did not make the reduction of speed which it required. The signal given by the conductor conveyed no information as to what or how many trains were to be met at that station and therefore did not provide for the contingency of an engineman's forgetfulness as to how many trains he was to look out for at a given point. This engineman had been in the service twenty years.

In collision No. 7b forty passengers were injured, most of them not very seriously, by a combination of neglects, failures, and unfavorable circumstances. The train was a special, occupied by a company of firemen being taken home after extinguishing a fire. The train (two cars) was being pushed from a side track to the main track, when it

was struck by a through freight train. The conductor of the special had instructed a block signalman to protect this switching movement, but the signalman went off duty without informing the man who relieved him, and this man allowed the though freight train to proceed. The conductor of the passenger train threw a lever to put in the stop position a semaphore signal connected with the switch at which he was at work; but this signal did not move to the stop position, for the reason, it is said, that a wire controlling it had been lengthened by the heat from the fire, which had been raging near by. The conductor and the engineman of the special passenger train, as well as the signalman, were dismissed, as it was their duty under the rules to send back a flagman, notwithstanding the arrangement with the block signalman.

Collision No. 8 was due to a freight train running uncontrolled on a steep grade in consequence of both the engineman and the fireman falling asleep. This fireman had been in the service only one month, but the engineman had had long experience. Both of these men had worked very unreasonably long hours. Taking the engineman's record from the third day before the collision, his periods on and off duty were as follows: Off 13 hours, on 14½ hours; off 4½ hours, on 14 hours: off 4½ hours, on 22 hours; off 4 hours and on 10½ hours at the time of the collision. It is to be observed that this is the record as shown on the call books. The short periods off duty could not be availed of entirely for sleep. The report says that after the 22-hour tour of work the engineman requested that he be called for a certain train, this for the purpose of reaching his home sooner (and he was thus called), and that he could have been relieved by another engineman if he had made a request to that effect.

Collision No. 17 was due to a misunderstanding or neglect concerning the time at which a southbound train should clear the track for a northbound. The northbound train, due at B at 3.54 p. m., was authorized to run fifteen minutes late, or to leave B at 4.09. The southbound train, due at B at 4.04, was behind time, but the conductor and engineman were aiming to reach the station at 4.09. These men assert that the collision, which occurred at a point about 1,000 feet north of the station, happened at about 4.08, and though the evidence is conflicting the preponderence is in favor of this statement. The northbound train, however, should have waited at the station, if necessary, until 4.12, as, according to a regular rule, a stop of three minutes should have been made, if necessary, to allow for a possible error on the part of the men in charge of the southbound train. This three-minute rule applied not only at schedule meeting stations, but to meeting stations made by train dispatchers' special orders.

Collision No. 25 was due to the gross negligence of a block signalman, an engineman, and a conductor, and the contributory negligence of several other employees. The collision was between eastbound passenger train No. 2 and westbound freight train No. 7, both running at full speed. The wreck took fire and three cars were burned up. These trains had both been ordered by the train dispatcher to meet at B, but No. 2 passed B, and the collision occurred between B and A. No. 7 was allowed to proceed from A to B by reason of the negligence of the signalman at A, who set his signal in the "proceed" position and subsequently fell asleep. The eastbound train passed B because the block signal at that station was cleared for it, no information having been received from A concerning train No. 7, and because both the engineman and the conductor of train No. 2 carelessly assumed that train No. 9, standing on the side track at that station, was No. 7, the one which they were to meet. The engineman of the eastbound train was killed.

The conductor evidently took no pains to identify the train on the side track. The signal for eastbound trains at B was in the proceed position, because no communication had been received from the block-signal operator at A, and because the meeting order for the trains had not been sent to B. The signalman at A was employed as brakeman five years ago; he lost an arm three years ago and was then employed as signalman. Communication from station to station was by telephone. The report says that this signalman had been on duty eleven hours, after a suitable period of rest. Although this signalman was primarily at fault for permitting the westbound train to pass A, the engineman of that train is also blameworthy, for under the rule he should not have accepted a clear signal unless he saw the signal moved from the stop to the clear position. This rule he disregarded and accepted an all-right signal which had been set at "all right" by the signalman some time before.

Table No. 3.—Details of Table 1—Causes of accidents to employees in coupling and uncoupling cars.

Sub-	Causes.		rain- nen.	me	ain- en in rds.	trai (sw i	ard nmen itch- ng ws).	Otherem- ployees.	
CILBS.	•	Killed.	Injured.	Killed.	Injured.	Killed.	Injured.	Killed.	Injured.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8	Adjusting coupler with foot.  Adjusting coupler, cars accidentally started.  Careless manipulation of uncoupling lever.  Cars not equipped with automatic coupler.  Coupler broken, using link and pin or chain.  Coupling damaged cars.  Coupling with chain or other emergency appliance on curve too sharp for automatic coupling.  Coupling with chain or other emergency appliance because of uneven track.  Coupling or uncoupling safety chains.  Fingers or hand caught between uncoupling lever	1 1 3	24 8 2 1 4 12 2	1	11 5 1 1 1	3	27 15 3 1 9 30 19	1	1 2
11 12	and body of car	1	64 4 30		24 1 33	1	98 8 64	`	5 2 1
13 14 15	Foot caught in frog, switch, or guard rail.  Opening or closing knuckle when cars were near together, miscalculated speed.  Opening knuckle when cars were near together, engine accidentally started.	1 2	3 34 6	4	6 16 2	3	3 48 12		4
16 17 18 19 20	Opening knuckle, part of defective coupler fell on foot.  Opening knuckle, lost footing.  Riding on car to uncouple, slipped off.  Struck by object at side of track.  Caught by unexpected movement of car, due to	6	5 6 1 1		1 4 3 4	2 1 1	6 5 2 8		1
21 22 23 24	slack running in.  Caught by unexpected movement of car, due to mistake or misunderstanding in giving hand signals.  Uncoupling moving cars and lost footing.  Parts hard to move, causing delay.  Went between cars unnecessarily and contrary to	2	19 3 14 7	3 4	12 3 7 12	5 2	32 2 34 15	1	2 2 1
25 26 27 28	rule.  Hand caught between projecting load and end of next car.  No witness (fatal injury).  Other causes (see detailed list below).  Unexplained.	4	10 4 17 2	1 3	3 11 2	1 5	8 11 26 4		5
	Total	24	287	19	173	38	494	3	29

#### Details of injuries included in Table No. 3, subclass No. 27.

- J. 1. Trying to adjust coupler.
- J. 2. Coupling engine to car, caught head between air hose and air pipe.
- J. 3. Coupling engine to way car, hand caught.
- J. 4. Foot caught between coupler and deadwood.
- J. 5. Fingers caught between couplers.
- J. 6. Foot caught in crossing plank.
- J. 7. Raising lock-pin lever with shoulder, collar bone split.
- J. 8. Drawheads passed, ends of fingers mashed.
- J. 9. Uncoupling coach, strained back lifting on lever.
- J. 10. Jammed between end sills of cars on curve.
- J. 11. Uncoupling engine from train.
- J. 12. Hand slipped off grab iron, fell.
- J. 13. Piece of drawbar flew off.
- J. 14. Air hose struck face.
- J. 15. Bumped head against car.
- J. 16. Hand caught between drawheads.
- J. 17. Drawheads passed, leg caught.
- J. 18. Stepped on slab, slipped.
- F. 1. Adjusting drawheads, mashed finger.
- F. 2. Couplings slipped by, caught between car bodies.

- F. 3. Uncoupling engine, steam hose struck hand.
- F. 4. Foot caught under brake beam.
- F. 5. Coupling engine to car, slipped and fell into ash pit.
- F. 6. Coupling engine to car, caught foot under pilot.
- F. 7. Turned ankle on rail.
- F. 8. Stepped out from between cars into a hole in bridge.
- F. 9. Leaning forward to reach lever, strained arm.
- F. 10. Slipped and fell.
- F. 11. Stepping out from between cars, stumbled over pile of coal.
- F. 12. Letting down drawhead, caught hand under drawhead.
- F. 13. Uncoupling engine from train, caught between stock chute and tender.
- F. 14. Sudden lurch of cars caused fall.
- F. 15. Attempted to close knuckle to prevent cars coupling, finger lacerated.
- F. 16. Lump of coal fell from tank and struck thigh.
- F. 17. Lift lever flew up.
- F. 18. Drawheads passed, caught between engine and car.
- F. 19. Coat caught in handle of lever.
- F. 20. Caught between cars on curve.
- F. 21. Stepped on pebble.
- M. 1. Thrown down by shock when cars came together.
- M. 2. Drawheads passed, body squeezed.
- M. 3. Pole fell on foot.
- M. 4. Holding to brake wheel; brakes were applied, twisting hand.
- M. 5. Glove caught on coupler, hand mashed.
- M. 6. Piece of coal fell off car on foot.
- M. 7. Hand carelessly resting on drawhead, mashed.
- M. 8. Hot metal splashed out of car on foot.
- M. 9. Struck leg against footboard of engine.
- M. 10. Coupling engine to flat car loaded with lumber; load shifted, catching hand.
- M. 11. Cars joited; lost balance, fell.
- M. 12. Stepped on rail, foot crushed.
- M. 13. Standing on footboard of engine, foot caught.
- M. 14. Standing on footboard of engine, foot caught between pilot and footboard.
- M. 15. Stepped on stone, spraining ankle.
- M. 16. Stepped on nail.
- M. 17. Piece of drawhead broke off, struck face.
- M. 18. Lever fell on hand.
- M. 19. Apron fell and struck head.
- M. 20. When ears came together load shifted, bruising body.

TABLE NO. 34 -Nature of injuries to employees in counting and uncounting care

Injuries.	Train- men.	Train- men in yards.	Yard train- men.	Other em- ployees.
Loss of feet	4	1 4		
oss of arms	3	i l	$\hat{3}$	
oss of hands	3	ī!	$\tilde{2}$	
ass of fingers	11	5	$1\bar{2}$	
loss of toes		1	1	
ractured skull	. <b></b>			
Fractured leg	4 ;	1		
ractured arm	6	3	<b>9</b> .	
ractured collar bone or ribs	3	1	13	
ractured other bones	2	1 1	6	
ontusion of head or body	17	15	45	
ontusion or laceration of feet	29	15	41	
ontusion or laceration of toes	5	3	7	
ontusion or laceration of legs	8	7	13	
ontusion or laceration of arms	20		29	,
ontusion or laceration of hands	34	29	• 61	I
outusion or laceration of fingers	104	52	166	1 .
Dislocation	16	17	20	
nternal injuries	16 8	3	38 32	
prains	• i	J	02	
hock	9	4	11	' ,
Total injuries	287	173	494	2
illed	24	19	38	
Total killed and injured	311	192	532	3:

#### RECAPITULATION.

Total killed	84 983	
•		
Total killed and injured.	1.067	

Table No. 4.—Details of Table 1—Causes of accidents to employees classified (C6 and C7) as falling from and getting on or off cars and engines.

Sub-	Causes.		rain- uen.	me	ain- en in rds.	trai (sw	ard nmen ritch- ng ws).	Other em- ployees.	
class.		Killed.	Injured.	Killed.	Injured.	Killed.	Injured.	Killed.	Injured.
$\begin{bmatrix} 1 \\ 2 \\ 3 \\ 4 \end{bmatrix}$	Fell from roof of box car by reason of— Defect in car Ice or snow Parting of train Derailment, collision, or shock due to abnor-	1		r	4 14 3	1	3 20 7	1 1	1 2
C6 5	mal movements of cars other than those in subclass 3. While setting brakes. Fell from— Coal car.	5 3	73 42 7		50 16	5 6	82 54	3	17
8 9 10	Freight car other than box or coal car Engine or tender	9		2	2 44 2	7	38	1	17 3
11 12 (13 14 15	Engines, tenders, or cars (all kinds) not in motion  Miscellaneous causes  Not clearly explained  Slipped getting on moving trains or cars  Jumping off moving trains  Jumping from engines or cars anticipating collision,	43 5		2 19	45 36 25 54 122	3 11 3	20 93 40 72 191	4 4 6 5	37 29 17 55 91
C7 16 17 18	derailment, or other accident  Fell from engines or cars by reason of defective handholds and sill steps.  Getting on or off moving engine.  Caught in frog, guard rail, or switch.	1 1 5	38 274		5 14 143	6	20 30 201 4	2	1 58 2
	Total	86	1,275	28	580	46	886	27	348

#### [Public—No. 171.]

AN ACT requiring common carriers engaged in interstate commerce to make full reports of all accidents to the Interstate Commerce Commission.

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled. It shall be the duty of the general manager, superintendent, or other proper officer of every common carrier engaged in interstate commerce by railroad to make to the Interstate Commerce Commission, at its office in Washington, District of Columbia. a monthly report, under oath, of all collisions of trains or where any train or part of a train accidentally leaves the track, and of all accidents which may occur to its passengers or employees while in the service of such common carrier and actually on duty, which report shall state the nature and causes thereof and the circumstances connected therewith.

SEC. 2. That any common carrier failing to make such report within thirty days after the end of any month shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor and, upon conviction thereof by a court of competent jurisdiction, shall be punished by a fine of not more than one hundred dollars for each and every offense and for every day during which it shall fail to make such report after the time herein specified for making the same.

SEC. 3. That neither said report nor any part thereof shall be admitted as evidence or used for any purpose against such railroad so making such report in any suit or action for damages growing out of any matter mentioned in said report.

SEC. 4. That the Interstate Commerce Commission is authorized to prescribe for such common carriers a method and form for making the reports in the foregoing section provided.

Approved, March 3, 1901.

#### SPECIAL INFORMATION CONTAINED IN PRECEDING BULLETINS. a


Each accident bulletin contains tables showing the number of passengers and employees killed and injured, and these figures are classified according to cause (see Table No. 1); also tables showing cost of the different classes of train accidents. The causes of accidents to employees in coupling and uncoupling and in falling from cars, etc., are further classified in Tables No. 3 and No. 4. The most serious collisions and derailments are dealt with in a supplementary table (Class A) showing the causes in some detail. Each bulletin is for three months, and No. 1 was for the quarter ending September 30, 1901. The bulletin for the quarter ending June 30 contains, in addition to the quarterly statistics, tables showing the same information for the whole of the fiscal year ending on that date.

Bulletin No. 17 records one collision, killing 6 and injuring 35 persons, and one derailment, killing 15 and injuring 28. The collision, occurring at 1 a. m., was due to gross negligence on the part of the men in charge of a freight train. The derailment was due to an open draw. The drawbridge was not provided with interlocked signals, and the engineman was not adequately acquainted with the line of the road. A collision and a derailment are reported which were due to the lack of suitable detector bars at switches and a collision which was due to failure of "controlled manual" block signal working.

Bulletin No. 18 shows total casualties much larger than in the preceding quarters, due largely no doubt to an enormous increase in traffic. Many accidents are reported in which the men had been on duty excessively long hours. One collision, killing 17 persons, was due to the error of an engineman of five months' experience, who ran past five warning signals. Another collision, killing 10 persons, was due to the failure of the men in charge of a freight train to identify opposing passenger trains. One derailment of a passenger train, killing 13 persons, was reported as due to some cause that could not be discovered.

O

a For notes on Bulletins 1 to 16, inclusive, see Bulletin No. 17 or No. 18.



# ACCIDENT BULLETIN,

No. 20.


## APRIL, MAY, AND JUNE, 1906,

AND THE

YEAR ENDING JUNE 30, 1906.

WASHINGTON, D. C.

WASHINGTON:
GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE.
1906.



## ACCIDENT BULLETIN,

No. 20,

## SHOWING COLLISIONS AND DERAILMENTS OF TRAINS

AND

## CASUALTIES TO PERSONS

DURING

APRIL, MAY, AND JUNE, 1906,

WITH

TABLES FOR THE YEAR ENDING JUNE 30, 1906.

INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMMISSION, Washington, D. C.

WASHINGTON:
GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE.
1906.

#### THE INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMMISSION.

Hon. MARTIN A. KNAPP, of New York, Chairman.

Hon. JUDSON C. CLEMENTS, of Georgia.

Hon. CHARLES A. PROUTY, of Vermont.

Hon. FRANCIS M. COCKRELL, of Missouri.

Hon. FRANKLIN K. LANE, of California.

Hon. EDGAR E. CLARK, of Iowa.

Hon. JAMES S. HARLAN, of Illinois.

EDWARD A. MOSELEY, Secretary.

#### ACCIDENT BULLETIN No. 20.

## RAILROAD ACCIDENTS IN THE UNITED STATES

DURING THE

#### THREE MONTHS ENDING JUNE 30, 1906.

The number of persons killed in train accidents during the months of April, May, and June, 1906, as shown in reports made by the rail-road companies to the Interstate Commerce Commission, under the "accident law" of March 3, 1901, was 194, and of injured 3,031. Accidents of other kinds, including those sustained by employees while at work and by passengers in getting on or off cars, etc., bring the total number of casualties up to 16,937 (933 killed and 16,004 injured). These accidents are classified in the following table. These reports deal only with (a) passengers and (b) employees on duty.<sup>a</sup>

TABLE No. 1.—Casualties to persons—April, May, and June, 1906. b c

		sengers and b).	ried agr	ons car- l under eement, c. (bb).	Tot	al (a,b, d bb).	Tra	lnmen.	Trainmen in yards.		
	Killed.	Injured.	Killed.	Injured.	Killed.	Injured.	Killed.	Injured.	Killed.	Injured.	
Collisions  Derailments  Miscellaneous train accidents, includ-	5 15	735 507	6	104 51	11 16	8 <b>89</b> 558	<b>5</b> 0 <b>52</b>	458 829	11 8	150 39	
ing locomotive boiler explosions	·	16		4		20	11	215		49	
Total train accidents	20	1,25%	7	159	27	1,417	113	1,002	14	238	
Coupling or uncoupling					••••		21 17	274 1,761	14	159 663	
etc	4	10	••••	2	4	12	28	201	8	61	
Falling from cars or engines or while getting on or off Other causes	87 12	456 528	i	16 49	87 13	472 577	65 41	982 121	20 17	502 74	
Total (other than train accidents)	53	994	1	67	54	1,061	172	3, 339	63	1, 459	
Total all classes	73	2, 252	8	226	81	2, 478	285	4, 841	77	1,697	

a In Table No. 1 the passengers have been divided into three classes, and to make comparisons with the passenger casualties in former years it will be necessary to take the numbers shown in the third double column of the table. Class a includes all ordinary passengers. Class b includes passengers traveling on freight trains. Class bb includes persons who are customarily carried on trains under special arrangements, such as postal clerks and express messengers, employees on Pullman cars, newsboys, live-stock tenders, and men in charge of freight.

5 Table No. 1 is continued on next page.

Accidents to employees resulting in slight injuries which do not prevent the employee injured from performing his accustomed service for more than three days in the aggregate during the ten days immediately following the accident are not reported.

TABLE No. 1.—Casualties to persons—April, May, and June, 1906—Continued.

·	(sw	trainmen itching ews).		er em- yees.		tal em- oyees.	Total persons reported.		
-	Killed.	Injured.	Killed.	Injured.	Killed.	Injured.	Killed.	Injured.	
Collisions  Derailments  Miscellaneous train accidents, includ-	6	101 46	9 11	117 62	76 78	826 476	87 89	1,665 1,034	
ing locomotive boiler explosions	3	23	4	25	18	812	18	332	
Total train accidents	16	170	24	204	167	1,614	194	3, 081	
Coupling or uncoupling	29	356	4	24	68	813	68	813	
While doing other work about trains, or while attending switches	16	609	80	757	72	8, 790	72	8, 790	
etc	2	90	2	20	<b>3</b> 5	872	89	384	
Falling from cars or engines or while getting on or off Other causes	<b>36</b> 17	780 78	43 271	884 4,071	164 346	2, 598 4, 339	201 859	8, 070 4, 916	
Total (other than train accidents)	100	1,858	350	5, 256	685	11, 912	739	12, <b>973</b>	
Total all classes	116	2,028	374	5, 460	852	13, 526	983	16, 004	

The total number of persons recorded in this bulletin as killed (933) is less than in the last preceding quarter, but it is more than in the corresponding quarter of 1905. The same is true of the numbers of employees killed in coupling accidents. In considering train accidents alone, however, there is a gratifying diminution both in passengers killed and employees killed, compared with either of the two earlier quarters mentioned. These comparisons, tabulated, are:

	1906, Bulle- tin 20, April, May, June	1906, Bulletin 19, January, February, March.	1905, Bulle- tin 16, April, May, June.
1. Passengers killed in train accidents. 2. Employees killed in train accidents. 3. Employees killed, coupling. 4. Total passengers and employees killed.	167 68	62 212 84 1,124	41 221 49 886

In the first of these items the totals have been swelled by great disasters in nearly every quarter for two years. In Bulletin 16 there are two well remembered derailments, killing 34 passengers, and in Bulletin 19 one collision, killing 34 passengers and employees. In the present bulletin this feature is not so bad, yet there is one disastrous butting collision of passenger trains that killed 10 passengers and employees, and one derailment killing 9 passengers.

The total number of collisions and derailments was 3,103 (1,588 collisions and 1,515 derailments), of which 173 collisions and 153 derailments affected passenger trains. The damage to cars, engines, and roadway by these accidents amounted to \$2,373,924. Given more in detail, these facts appear as follows:

TABLE No. 2.—Collisions and derailments.

	Number.	Loss.	Persons killed.	Persons injured.
Collisions, rear Collisions, butting Collisions, trains separating Collisions, miscellaneous	170 í	\$324, 929 224, 196 61, 454 852, 512	31 17 39	537 <b>520</b> 97 511
Total	1,588	963, 091	87	1,665
Derailments due to defects of roadway, etc	291 664 87 62 17 394	286, 351 581, 428 103, 148 98, 546 19, 602 371, 758	9 9 14 14 1 1 42	321 152 152 78 17 314
Total	1,515	1,410,833	89	1,034
Total collisions and derailments	3, 103	2, 373, 924	176	2,699

Note.—Collisions and derailments which cause no death or personal injury and which cause not over \$150 damage to the property of the railroad are not reported.

Following is the usual list of Class A train accidents—all in which the damage is reported at \$10,000 or over; notable cases in which passengers are killed, and those doing damage less than \$10,000 and down to \$2,000, wherever the circumstances or the cause may be of particular interest:

TABLE 2a.—Causes of thirty prominent train accidents (Class A).

[Note.—R stands for rear collision; B, butting collision; M, miscellaneous collisions; D, Derailment; P, passenger train; F, freight and miscellaneous trains.]

#### COLLISIONS.

No.	Class.	Kind of train.	Killed.	Injured.	Damage to engrines, cars, and roadway.	Reference to record.	Cause.
1 2	R R	F and F	0	0 4	\$700 2, 187	2 21	Approached station too fast; misjudged distance. Too high speed in fog. Engineman did not see flagman. Engineman, who was killed, had been on duty 17 hours 30 minutes.
3	В	Pand P	0	38	2, 500	49	Operator omitted two words in writing a meeting
4	В	P and P	10	38	4,000	22	order. Pilot misinterpreted dispatcher's order. See note in
5	В	Fand F	1	5	4,000	27	text below.  Operator failed to deliver order. See note in text
6	R	Pand F	0	1	4,436	51	below. Engineman, 27 years' experience, ran past automatic
7	R	Pand F	1	   <b>21</b> 	4,800	23	signal indicating stop.  Clear block signal given to passenger train while an empty engine was in block section. See note in
8	R	Fand F	0	2	6, 200	50	text below.  Engineman ran past automatic signal indicating stop. Brakeman rlding on engine discharged for not seeing signal and taking measures to stop train.
9	В	P and F	0	23	7,000	47	Operator, 3 months' experience, failed to deliver
10	В	P and P	1	10	10, 377	48	dispatcher's order.  Men in charge of south-bound train overlooked
11	В	Fand F	1	4	10,082	53	meeting point. Conductor, engineman, and whole crew (on duty 16 hours) overlooked meeting orders; orders
12	В	F and F	0	1	12,000	28	delivered to them only 30 minutes before.  Conductor and engineman, east bound, misread orders.
18 14	B B	Pand P Pand F		5 · <b>30</b>	12,050 14,579	45 57	North bound encroached on time of south bound. Signalman failed to put block signal in stop position
	Tota	1	15	187	101, 011	1	after passage of work train. See note in text below.

Table 2a.—Causes of thirty prominent train accidents (Class A)—Continued.

DERAILMENTS.

No.	Class.	Kind of train.	Killed.	Injured.	Damage to engrines, cars, and roadway.	Reference to record.	Cause.
1	D	P	1	8	<b>\$1,25</b> 5	11	Two cars of a passenger train having been detached at a junction ran back down grade and were de- railed at a curve. Brake connections defective; one bolt missing; one hook so weak that it straight-
2	D	F	0	0	2, 800	59	ened out. Brakeman set hand brakes, but these defects thwarted his work.  Ran off derailing switch. Air brakes inoperative; brake-pipe cocks had been maliciously closed in three places; conductor had not properly tested air brakes.
8	D	F	0	0	5, 110	17	Air brakes failed on steep grade; brake pipe found closed near engine; cause not explained. Engine-
4	D	F	1	1	6, 500	58	man disobeyed rule to stop at head of grade.  Air brakes failed on 3.4 per cent grade. Brakes not tested after detaching helping engine; conductor and engineman discharged; conductor's service, as such, three months; engineman's, as such, two
5	D	P	9	18	6, 710	40	months. Unexplained. Speed, 12 miles an hour. A switch at the point of derailment found broken may have been the cause.
6 7	D D	P	0	<b>4</b> 0	7, 825 8, 000	14 88	Overhead bridge burned and fell on track. Rail maliciously misplaced, presumably by dissatisfied track laborers.
8 9	D D	F	0	0	10,000 10,000	67 43	Loose wheel. Unexplained. Speed, 50 to 60 miles an hour on 1 per
10	D	P	1	<b>3</b> 5	11,000	63	cent descending grade. Derailment occurred on bridge; track in good condition. Misplaced switch; left misplaced by men of freight
11	D	P	0	21	12,500	64	train over an hour before. See note in text below. Excessive speed on track not well ballasted.
12	Ď	F	ŏ	Ô	13, 400	82	Steel dump car with top-heavy load; speed, 30 miles an hour.
13	D	F	2	2	16,000	12	Runaway; air brakes ineffective. Conjectured that angle cock had been closed purposely or accident-
14	D	<b>F</b>	0	8	18, 600	83	ally by a tramp. Runaway on 3 per cent grade. See note in text below.
15	D	P	0	0	21,700	72	Open draw. See note in text below.
16	D	P	0	2	27, 900	4	Ran into wreck of freight trains. (Collision No. 1.)
	Tota	1	14	96	179, 800		
		l collisions and railments	29	283	280, 911		

Collision No. 4 occurred about 11 p. m., and was between two passenger trains running on a single-track branch line, in consequence of an obstruction on the double-track main line, which was their usual route. Being on an unusual route the enginemen were guided by "pilot men," and the pilot man, being the only person on the train fully acquainted with the road, was chiefly responsible for seeing that the movement of the train was made in conformity to the rules. The pilot of the west-bound train was mainly at fault. He had received a dispatcher's order to run to a signal tower designated "S T," which was at the end of the double-track section of the branch, and at this tower he was to receive further orders, or, in the absence of such orders, to wait there. When he arrived at "S T" the telegraph operator at the tower delivered to him a message in regard to reducing

speed over a piece of new track which he was to traverse, and he carelessly took it for granted that this message was the dispatcher's order which he was expecting, and he proceeded with his train (on the single-track line). As soon as he read the order and found that it did not give him any right to proceed, he stopt the train and sent the fireman back to consult the conductor. The conductor, however, on receiving the order to run to "ST" had misread it, taking it for an order to run to "S J," which was the name of a tower some distance beyond. The conductor therefore sent back word by the fireman that his order was the same as that which had been given to the pilotman, and that it gave the train the right of road to "SJ." On this the pilet assumed that he himself had been mistaken in reading his order, and proceeded, tho with a doubt in his mind. Before he had settled the doubt, however, the east-bound train was met, and the wreck The report says that the dispatcher's order was plainly written, and that there was no reason for mistaking the "T" for a "J." The conductor and the pilot were both experienced men. conductor had been on duty about three hours. The engineman had been on duty all day, about fourteen hours, except that in the middle of the day his train was laid up about five hours at the terminus of its run.

In the case of collision No. 5 the operator who failed to deliver a meeting order and thereby caused a collision had at the time three other orders for delivery to the same train. The rules require that the operator report to the dispatcher the numbers of orders to be delivered to a given train, and also that he deliver to the conductor of the train a clearance card on which the numbers of the orders are entered. Concerning one of the four orders there was some discussion between the dispatcher and the operator, and the operator definitely stated that he had that order; but he neglected to enter it on the clearance card. The rules also require that meeting orders shall be sent to the operator at the station where the trains are to meet, but in this case the dispatcher, being unable to get a response from the operator at the meeting point, neglected to carry out the rule.

Collision No. 7 appears to have been due to carelessness in the management of permissive block signaling. The passenger train was given a clear block signal when the block was occupied by an empty engine which had preceded the passenger train. This engine was running on a caution card on account of the presence of still another engine in the block ahead of it. It appears that the signalman at the outgoing end of the block had not been advised, or denied having been advised, of the entrance of the second engine, and he authorized the giving of a clear signal to the passenger train before the block was clear.

Collision No. 14 was due to confusion at a block-signal tower where trains pass from a two-track line to a three-track line. A work train

past to the northernmost track of the three-track line and stopt. The next following train, a fast passenger train, was due in about fifteen minutes, and it should have been run on to the middle track of the three-track line; but the signalman neglected to return the signal to the stop position after the passage of the work train, and the fast train when it came on therefore received a clear signal for the northernmost track, the one occupied by the work train. It appears that there was no track circuit or other arrangement to insure the movement of the signal from the clear to the stop position after the passage of the work train. It was the duty of the flagman of the work train, according to the rules, to go back with a flag so as to be ready to stop the passenger train, but it appears that he depended on the signalman in the cabin to provide this protection—tho without looking at the signal to see whether or not the signalman had actually done so.

Derailment No. 10 was a disaster to a fast passenger train which ran thru a misplaced switch that could be seen by the engineman only a few seconds before he reached it—that is to say, about 500 feet away. The switch had been left in the wrong position by a brakeman of a freight train something over one hour before. The station agent is censured by the superintendent for not noticing that the switch had been left in the wrong position. There was no distant signal connected with the switch. The negligent brakeman had been in the service about two years. The conductor of the freight train had been in the service seventeen years, but his record was quite faulty.

Derailment No. 14 was primarily due to the runaway of a heavy train on a 3 per cent grade, tho the damage is believed to have been immediately due to the breaking of a wheel; but the whole trouble could undoubtedly have been prevented if the conductor of the train had made proper use of the air brakes. The train consisted of 37 cars of ore, 27 of them being steel cars carrying 50 tons each, and 10 of them wooden cars carrying 25 tons each. Shortly after beginning the descent of the grade the speed became uncontrollable. It is believed that a tramp rode on one of the cars and that he, without knowing what he was doing, moved the handle of an angle cock so as to close the train line air pipe near the engine. The increase in the speed occurred so rapidly that all of the three men on the front of the train jumped off; but the train reached a safety siding before the speed got above 35 miles an hour, and therefore it should have been stopt without serious damage. Marks on the ties showed, however, that one of the cars had been off the track for nearly a mile, and this car had the broken wheel. The broken wheel knocked the switch rails out of place, causing the derailment of the following cars. Before the broken car jumped the track the conductor had detached the caboose from the train, after closing the angle cocks in the air pipe both of the caboose and of the last freight car. If, instead of doing this, he had applied

the air brakes, in all probability he would have been able to stop the train or greatly to check its speed.

Derailment No. 15 was caused by the carelessness of the attendant at a drawbridge, who opened the draw for the passage of a vessel when the passenger train was approaching and after the engine of the train had past the stop signal. This signal was about one-third mile away from the bridge, and it appears that the bridge tender set it in the stop position immediately after the engine had past it. The signal being so far away from the bridge, and there being no lock to prevent the attendant from moving the draw after the train had past the signal, there was time to move the draw a few feet after the signal had been set and before the train reached the draw span. Tho the train ran upon the partly opened draw and the engine sank in the river, all of the occupants of the train escaped without serious injury.

TABLE No. 3.—Details of Table 1—Causes of accidents to employees in coupling and uncoupling cars.

Sub- class.	Causes.	Train- men.		Train- men in yards.		Yard trainmen (switch- ing crews).		Other em- ployees.	
		Killed.	Injured.	Killed.	Injured.	Killed.	rnjured.	Killed.	Injured.
1 2 8 4 5 6	Adjusting coupler with foot.  Adjusting coupler, cars accidentally started.  Careless manipulation of uncoupling lever.  Cars not equipped with automatic coupler.  Coupler broken, using link and pin or chain.  Coupling damaged cars.  Coupling with chain or other emergency appliance on curve too sharp for automatic coupling.	1	34 6 2 2 4 7	2	16 4 4 1 1 8	1 6	30 10 8 3 19	1	3
8 9 10	Coupling with chain or other emergency appliance because of uneven track.  Coupling or uncoupling safety chains.  Fingers or hand caught between uncoupling lever	••••	2			2	·····2	••••	
11 12	and body of car. Uncoupling without using lever (unnecessary). Uncoupling without using lever, uncoupling lever not in working order.		48 7 82	1	25 6 25	1 1	70 10 57	1	5 2
13 14	Foot caught in frog, switch, or guard rail Opening or closing knuckle when cars were near together, miscalculated speed	<b>3</b>	3 22	i	2	2	37	••••	8
15	Opening knuckle when cars were near together, engine accidentally started	0	2		14 5	4	7		•
16	Opening knuckle, part of defective coupler fell on foot.		8		1		1	••••	1
17 18 19 20	Opening knuckle, lost footing.  Riding on car to uncouple, slipt off.  Struck by object at side of track.  Caught by unexpected movement of car, due to	1	7 8 6	1	8 6	2	88	• • • •	•••••
21	slack running in	1	19		17	2	17		8
22 23 24	nals. Uncoupling moving cars and lost footing. Parts hard to move, causing delay. Went between cars unnecessarily and contrary to rule.	1 2	11 10	1 2 2	4 7 1 8	2 8 	18 8		1
25	Hand caught between projecting load and end of next car	4	12 7	1	2		15 6	••••	3
26 27 28	No witness (fatal injury). Other causes (see detailed list below). Unexplained	8	9	2	4	1 1	11 8	2	2 1
	Total	21	274	14	159	29	856	4	24

#### Details of injuries included in Table No. 3, subclass No. 27.

- A. 1. Foot caught by engine pilot.
- A. 2. Holding up drawbar on engine; finger caught.
- A. 3. Engine struck car too hard, pushing man against tank.
- A. 4. Struck by corner of car.
- A. 5. Glove caught while uncoupling.
- A. 6. Uncoupling; scalded by water from engine stack.
- A. 7. Struck hand against corner of car.
- A. 8. Pin lifter suruck man over eye.
- A. 9. Foot squeezed by sliding hood.
- M. 1. Plank fell from top of car on head.
- M. 2. On footboard of engine; drawheads past.
- M. 3. Torpedo exploded.
- M. 4. On pilot of engine; pilot ran under brakebeam of car.
- M. 5. Caught by projecting load.
- M. 6. Struck by air hose.
- M. 7. Caught by projecting log.
- M. 8. Air hose struck face.
- M. 9. Piece of coal fell from car.
- M. 10. Arm caught in grab iron.
- M. 11. On pilot of engine; couplers past.
- J. 1. Lip of drawbar broke off, striking man in groin.
- J. 2. Board fell from roof of car on head.
- J. 3. Caught foot under wheel and fell across rail.
- J. 4. Straightening pin chain; slipt.
- J. 5. Head struck grab iron.
- J. 6. Struck by lever handle.
- J. 7. Put foot on rail; run over.
- J. 8. Unhooking draft chain; caught hand in chain.
- J. 9. Engine struck car too hard, causing man to fall against pilot.
- J. 10. Manipulating coupler while riding on car; lost balance.

TABLE No. 3A.—Nature of injuries to employees in coupling and uncoupling cars.

Injuries.	Train- men.	Train- men in yards.	Yard train- men.	Other em- ployees
Loss of feet	10	8	5 2	
Loss of legs Loss of arms	1		2	
Loss of hands	2	2	9	
Loss of fingers	<b>6</b>	5	14	
Loss of toes	2	ĭ	ī	
Fractured skull				
Fractured leg	8	• • • • • • • • •	2	 
Fractured arm	8	2	2	
Fractured collar bone or ribs.	4	1	5	
Fractured other bones	5	4	6	<b>  • • • • • • • •</b>
Contusion of head or body		18	49	•
Contusion or laceration of feet		14	80	ł
Contusion or laceration of toes	5 5	2	2 17	
Contusion or laceration of legs Contusion or laceration of arms	17	9	14	• • • • • • • • •
Contusion or laceration of hands.		25	57	
Contusion or laceration of fingers		54	127	1 1
Dislocation			l ~i	
Internal injuries	8	4	7	
Sprains	11	4	7	
Shock		_	<b> </b>	l
Miscellaneous	8	2	8	••••••
Total injuries		159	856	2
Killed	21	14	29	
Total killed and injured.	295	173	385	2

RECAPITULATION.	
Killed	65 813
Total killed and injured	881

TABLE No. 4.—Details of Table 1—Causes of accidents to employees classified (Co and C7) as falling from and getting on or off cars and engines.

Sub-	Causes.	Train- men.		Train- men in yards.		Yard trainmen (switch- ing crews).			er em- yees.
Class.	•	Killed.	Injured.	Killed.	Injured.	Killed.	Injured.	Killed.	Injured.
1 2 3 4	Fell from roof of box car by reason of— Defect in car Ice or snow. Parting of train Dereilment, collider or shock due to abnor-	1	10 1 7	····	<u>5</u> 3	2	12 1 6	<u>1</u>	5 1 1
C6 5	Derailment, collision, or shock due to abnormal movements of cars other than those in subclass 8.  While setting brakes Fell from—	2	71 <b>82</b>		29 24	8 4	76 52	5	18 4
6 7 8 9	Coal car Freight car other than box or coal car Engine or tender Passenger car Engines, tenders, or cars (all kinds) not in	7	6 23 74 6	1 8	8 17 41 1	1 5	5 13 82	6 1 1	24 13 4
11 12 (18	motion Miscellaneous causes Not clearly explained Slipt getting on moving trains or cars Jumping off moving trains	12 17 6 2	65 195 83 117 117	2	38 111 27 42 46		16 164 46 68 74	2 4 8 10 7	31 96 29 56 56
C7 16 17 18	Jumping from engines or cars anticipating colli- sion, derailment, or other accident Fell from engines or cars by reason of defective handholds and sill steps Getting on or off moving engine	3 	48 26 100		10 18 86	1	7 36 121	2	4 1 37
(18	Caught in frog, guard rail, or switch  Total	65	982	20	502	36	730	43	884

#### YEARLY TABLES.

This bulletin completes the publication of the accident records under the law of March 3, 1901, for five years, and the following table (A) gives the aggregates for the year ending June 30, 1906, of the items which are given in Table No. 1 of the quarterly returns. The total number of casualties shown in Table A is 70,934 (4,225 killed and 66,709 injured).

This table includes the following statistics which did not appear in the quarterly bulletins, the reports from which they are taken having been received after the bulletins were printed: Four employees killed and 3 passengers and 28 employees injured; damage to railroad companies' property, \$2,278.

The totals of these yearly tables are not comparable with those given in the Commission's Annual Statistical Reports, for the reason that the monthly reports deal only with accidents to passengers and to employees while actually on duty. The monthly reports take no account of accidents to "other persons." These appear in the Annual Reports and include casualties at highway crossings to trespassers, to persons walking along the track, accidents to employees in shops remote from the railroad, and all other accidents not occurring to passengers and to employees actually on duty.

TABLE A.—Summary of canadties to persons, year ending June 30, 1906.

Persons carried under Total (a, b, ried under Trainmen in yards. Ing crews).	Killed.  Killed.	89 3,596 31 409 120 4,006 331 2,348 53 669 43 429 57 468 484 5,909 604 7,914 48 2,341 12 815 60 2,656 220 1,886 17 209 27 282 49 290 313 2,116 373 4,772	0 86 2 31 2 117 61 1,086 5 215 10 108 6 104 82 1,408 84 1,575	187 6,028 46 755 182, 6,778 612 4,769 75 1,088; 80 764; 112 867 879 7,488 1,061 14,261		75 7,808 42 2,871 55 2,735 96 2,945 268 15,854 268 15,854	7 30 1 16 8 46 80 758 27 280 16 402 9 62 132 1,497 140 1,543	140         1,962         4         65         144         2,027         296         4,486         98         2,252         175         8,156         1,409         718         11,258         857         13,290           66         2,118         18         216         84         2,334         197         691         96         2,262         119         368         1,096         1,409         718         11,258         16,268         18,268	8,302 1,360 19,104 2,928 48,041 3,164	449 1 050
	, 	409 818		755					! !	1.052 418
	.benutut	2, 541 2, 541		6,028				1,962	4,110	50 10 189 68
## -	Kineg	Collisions Derallments	in section of the sec	Total train accidents 18	1 :	verhead	7		Total (other than train soci-	

From Table B, next following, comparisons may be made for the last four years.

TABLE B.—Casualties to passengers and employees, years ending June 30.

	1906.		1	1905. 1904.		904.	1	908.
	Killed.	Injured.	Killed.	Injured.	Killed.	Injured.	Killed.	Injured.
Passengers:				1				
In train accidents	182	6,778	350	6,498	270	4, 945	164	4, 424
Other causes	236	4,407	187	8,542	150	<b>8</b> , 132	157	<b>4, 424</b> <b>2,</b> 549
Total	418	11, 185	537	10,040	420	8,077	321	6, 978
Employees:	<del></del>		<del></del>	<del></del>	<del></del>			
In train accidents	879	7,483	798	7,052	844	6,990	895	6, 440
In coupling accidents  Overhead obstructions,	811	3,503	243	3, 110	278	8, 441	253	<b>2,78</b> 8
etc .	182	1,497	92	1,185	116	1,210	93	992
Falling from cars, etc	713	11, 253	633	9,237	700	9, 371	678	8,025
Other causes	1,772	81,788	1,495	24, 842	1,429	22, 254	1,314	<b>20,</b> 759
Total	3,807	55, 524	3, 261	45, 426	8, 367	43, 266	3, 233	39,004
Total passengers and employees	4, 225	66, 709	3,798	55, 466	3, 787	51,848	3, 554	45, 977

The following tables are self-explanatory, being consolidations of the quarterly tables giving the same classes of facts:

Table C.—Collisions and derailments; damage to cars, engines, and roadway; years ending June 30.

		190	06.		[ 	19	05.	
	Num- ber.	Loss.	Persons killed.	Persons injured.	Num- ber.	Loss.	Persons killed.	Persons injured
Collisions, rear	1,722 866	\$1,720,365 1,599,568	169 251	2, 427 2, 733	1,493 707	\$1,463,012 1,451,906	152 304	2, 08 2, 45
ing Collisions, miscellaneous	901 3, 705	359, 156 1, 640, 669	9 175	375 2, 379	972 3,052	440, 495 1, 493, 641	11 141	369 <b>2,</b> 20
Total	7,194	5, 319, 758	604	7,914	6, 224	4, 849, 054	608	7, 11
Derailments due to defects of roadway, etc	1, 287 2, 811	918, <b>056</b> 2, 226, 158	38 42	1,608 802	1,007 2,605	777, 433 2, 068, 620	5)	1, 440 79
Derailments due to negli- gence of trainmen, sig- nalmen, etc	891	318,067	54	494	841	272, 254	40	41
etc	300	472, 658	76	456	332	676,001	177	64
track, etc	65	106, 859	16	94	76	142,761	84	19
Derailments due to mis- cellaneous causes	1,407	1, 297, 643	147	1,318	1,010	925, 533	115	1,33
Total	6, 261	5, 339, 431	373	4,772	5, 371	4, 862, 602	456	4,83
Total collisions and derailments	13, 455	10, 659, 189	977	12,686	11,595	9,711,656	1,064	11, 94

Table D.—Causes of accidents to employees in coupling and uncoupling cars, year ending June 30, 1906.

Sub-	Causes.	Train- men.		Train- men in yards.		Yard trainmen (switch- ing crews).		Oth plo	er em- yees.
		Killed.	Injured.	Killed.	Injured.	Killed.	Injured.	Killed.	Injured.
1 2 3 4 5 6	Adjusting coupler with foot.  Adjusting coupler, cars accidentally started.  Careless manipulation of uncoupling lever.  Cars not equipped with automatic coupler  Coupler broken, using link and pin or chain.  Coupling damaged cars  Coupling with chain or other emergency appli-	1 2 9	100 26 7 7 20 43	7	54 15 15 4 3 29	1 5  2 19	120 55 22 9 23 89	4	4 2 1 3 8
8	ance on curve too sharp for automatic coupling Coupling with chain or other emergency appli-	1	8		1		38		1
9 10	ance because of uneven track	• • • •	10		<b>2</b> 5	4	13	••••	1 3
11 12	and body of car Uncoupling without using lever (unnecessary) Uncoupling without using lever, uncoupling lever	2	208 32	1	116 18	3	306 31	• • • •	22 3
13 14	not in working order	8	104 14	2 5	121 12	7 15	212 19	1	6 1
15	Opening or closing knuckle when cars were near together, miscalculated speed	10	102	8	65	12	148		12
16	engine accidentally started	••••	18		9	1	26	1	• • • • •
17 18	foot. Opening knuckle, lost footing Riding on car to uncouple, slipt off	12 4	14 24 4	1	11 16 5	5	25 32 17	• • • •	2
19 20	Struck by object at side of track	1	18	• • • •	16	4	42	• • • •	i
21	slack running in	8	78	8	54	8	98	••••	8
22 23	nals Uncoupling moving cars and lost footing Parts hard to move, causing delay	6	10 50 28	8 8 2	12 28 24	13 2	18 90 43	1 1 1	2 2 2
24	Went between cars unnecessarily and contrary to rule	6	48	8	12	6	41	1	4
25 26	Hand caught between projecting load and end of next car. No witness (fatal injury)	16	18	2 12	8	111	29	3	••••
27 28	Other causes. Unexplained	8	60 17	8	38 7	3 2	96 8	1	11 3
	Total	101	1,060	65	695	130	1,646	15	102

TABLE Dx.—Nature of injuries to employees in coupling and uncoupling cars, year ending June 30, 1906.

Injuries.	Train- men.	Train- men in yards.	Yard train- men.	Other em- ployees.
loss of feet	17	5	18	1
Loss of legs.	3	5	-6	!
logs of arms.	6	ž	14	1
oes of hands.	Š.	i āl	- 5	
loss of fingers.	32	16	47	1
loss of toes	3	5	์ 3	•
Practured skull			2	
Inctured leg	11	2	11	1
ractured arm	23	8	16	, <b>3</b>
ractured collar bone or ribs.	16	1 8.	38	4
Fractured other bones	9	=	16	
Contusion of head or body.	97	76	190	13
Contusion or laceration of feet.	113	69	147	-8
Contusion or laceration of toes	17	l ii l	25	l ĭ
Contusion or laceration of legs	24	27	66	$ar{2}$
Contusion or laceration of arms	64	89	91	8 17
Contusion or laceration of hands.	189	121	223	17
Contusion or laceration of fingers	866	228	547	31
Dialocation	2	2	2	
nternal injuries.	45	30	78	5
prains	88	10	68	8
bock	ĭ	-i	1	
discellaneous	<b>2</b> 6	19	29	3
Total injuries	1,060	695	1,646	102
Cilled	101	65	130	15
Total killed and injured	1, 161	760	1,776	117
RECAPITULATION.		<u> </u>		

Table E.—Causes of accidents to employees classified (C6 and C7) as falling from and getting on or off cars and engines, year ending June 30, 1906.

Sub-	Canses.	_	rain- nen.	Train- men in yards.		Yard trainmen (switch- ing crews).		Other employees.	
class.		Killed.	Injured.	Killed.	Injured.	Killed.	Injured.	Killed.	Injured.
1 2 8 4	Fell from roof of box car by reason of— Defect in car Ice or snow. Parting of train Derailment, collision, or shock due to abnormal movements of cars other than those in	1		1 1 2	13 21 18	1 3	25 26 26	1 1 3	9 4 8
C6 5	subclass 3	14	312 152	1	181 87	22 15	371 202	15 	82 13
6 7 8 9	Fell from— Coal car Freight car other than box or coal car Engine or tender Passenger car	3 4 35 2	27 36 873 12	1 1 8	11 23 190 4	1 2 28	18 24 127 2	2 8 6 1	18 51 55 16
11 12 (13 14	Engines, tenders, or cars (all kinds) not in motion  Miscellaneous causes  Not clearly explained  Slipt getting on moving trains or cars.  Jumping off moving trains.	139	344 478 264 495 756	1 10 41 10 8	178 242 99 219 852	16 46 8 9	68 384 169 303 575	3 11 23 27 25	165 167 76 237 292
$\mathbf{C7} \begin{vmatrix} 15 \\ 16 \end{vmatrix}$	Jumping from engines or cars anticipating colli- sion, derailment, or other accident				89	1	56		22
17 18	handholds and sill steps	28	124 788 4	13 1	73 504 3	22	144 628 8	18	191 3
	Total	305	4, 436	98	2, 252	175	3, 156	144	1,410

#### [Public—No. 171.]

AN ACT Requiring common carriers engaged in interstate commerce to make full reports of all accidents to the Interstate Commerce Commission.

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, It shall be the duty of the general manager, superintendent, or other proper officer of every common carrier engaged in interstate commerce by railroad to make to the Interstate Commerce Commission, at its office in Washington, District of Columbia, a monthly report, under oath, of all collisions of trains or where any train or part of a train accidentally leaves the track, and of all accidents which may occur to its passengers or employees while in the service of such common carrier and actually on duty, which report shall state the nature and causes thereof, and the circum stances connected therewith.

SEC 2. That any common carrier failing to make such report within thirty days effect the end of any month shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor and, upon conviction thereof by a court of competent jurisdiction, shall be punished by a fine of not more than one hundred dollars for each and every offense and for every day during which it shall fail to make such report after the time herein specified for making the same.

SEC. 3. That neither said report nor any part thereof shall be admitted as evidence or used for any purpose against such railroad so making such report in any suit or

action for damages growing out of any matter mentioned in said report.

SEC. 4. That the Interstate Commerce Commission is authorized to prescribe for such common carriers a method and form for making the reports in the foregoing section provided.

Approved, March 3, 1901.

#### SPECIAL INFORMATION CONTAINED IN PRECEDING BULLETINS. a

Each accident bulletin contains tables showing the number of passengers and employees killed and injured, and these figures are classified according to cause (see Table No. 1); also tables showing cost of the different classes of train accidents. The causes of accidents to employees in coupling and uncoupling and in falling from cars, etc., are further classified in Tables No. 3 and No. 4. The most serious collisions and derailments are dealt with in a supplementary table (Class A) showing the causes in some detail. Each bulletin is for three months, and No. 1 was for the quarter ending September 30, 1901. The bulletin for the quarter ending June 30 contains, in addition to the quarterly statistics, tables showing the same information for the whole of the fiscal year ending on that date.

Bulletin No. 17 records one collision, killing 6 and injuring 35 persons, and one derailment, killing 15 and injuring 28. The collision, occurring at 1 a. m., was due to gross negligence on the part of the men in charge of a freight train. The derailment was due to an open draw. The drawbridge was not provided with interlocked signals, and the engineman was not adequately acquainted with the line of the road. A collision and a derailment are reported which were due to the lack of suitable detector bars at switches and a collision which was due to

failure of "controlled manual" block signal working.

Bulletin No. 18 shows total casualties much larger than in the preceding quarters, due largely no doubt to an enormous increase in traffic. Many accidents are reported in which the men had been on duty excessively long hours. One collision, killing 17 persons, was due to the error of an engineman of five months' experience, who ran past five warning signals. Another collision, killing 10 persons, was due to the failure of the men in charge of a freight train to identify opposing passenger trains. One derailment of a passenger train, killing 13 persons, was reported as due to some cause that could not be discovered.

Bulletin No. 19 is like Bulletin 18 in showing a large number of casualties. One butting collision, due to failure of train dispatching, caused 34 deaths and 24 injuries and \$50,000 damages, besides the damages for deaths and injuries of persons. One collision was due to the negligence of men who had been worked flagrantly long hours. Particulars are given of a number of collisions due to

complicated and unusual causes.

a For notes on Bulletins 1 to 16, inclusive, see Bulletin No. 17 or No. 18.

# 30


# ACCIDENT BULLETIN,

No. 21.

JULY, AUGUST, AND SEPTEMBER, 1906.

. INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMMISSION, WASHINGTON, D. C.

WASHINGTON:
GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE.
1907.



# ACCIDENT BULLETIN,

No. 21,

# SHOWING COLLISIONS AND DERAILMENTS OF TRAINS

AND

### CASUALTIES TO PERSONS

DURING

JULY, AUGUST, AND SEPTEMBER, 1906.

INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMMISSION,
WARHINGTON, D. C.

WASHINGTON:
GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE.
1907.

### THE INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMMISSION.

Hon. MARTIN A. KNAPP, of New York, Chairman.

Hon. JUDSON C. CLEMENTS, of Georgia.

Hon. CHARLES A. PROUTY, of Vermont.

Hon. FRANCIS M. COCKRELL, of Missouri.

Hon. FRANKLIN K. LANE, of California.

Hon. EDGAR E. CLARK, of lowa.

Hon. JAMES S. HARLAN, of Illinois.

EDWARD A. MOSELEY, Secretary.

#### ACCIDENT BULLETIN No. 21.

### RAILROAD ACCIDENTS IN THE UNITED STATES

DURING THE

THREE MONTHS ENDING SEPTEMBER 30, 1906.

The number of persons killed in train accidents during the months of July, August, and September, 1906, as shown in reports made by the railroad companies to the Interstate Commerce Commission, under the "accident law" of March 3, 1901, was 267, and of injured, 3,891. Accidents of other kinds, including those sustained by employees while at work and by passengers in getting on or off the cars, etc., bring the total number of casualties up to 19,850 (1,182 killed and 18,668 injured). These accidents are classified in the following table. These reports deal only with (a) passengers and (b) employees on duty.<sup>a</sup>

TABLE No. 1.—Casualties to persons, July, August, and September, 1906. b c

	Passen- gers.		carr der me	ersons ded un- agree- ent or atract.	Tot an	al (a,b, d bb).	Trai	n men.	Train men in yards.	
	Killed.	Injured.	Killed.	Injured.	Killed.	Injured.	Killed.	Injured.	Killed.	Injured.
Collisions  Derailments  Miscellaneous train accidents, including	25 16	902 811	2 9	69 107	27 25	971 918	72 61	573 384	14 8	191 60
locomotive-boiler explosions		15	••••	4	• • • •	19	10	<b>2</b> 52	1	68
Total train accidents	41	1,728	11	180	52	1,908	143	1,209	23	319
Coupling or uncoupling				•••••			32	295	12	174
while attending switches			• • • •		• • • •	• • • • • •	21	2, 182	12	724
structures at side of track, etc	2	13	1	2	3	15	22	211	1	65
ting on or off	36 11	551 727	6 2	21 76	42 13	572 803	<b>84</b> 68	1,240 190	30 33	587 84
Total (other than train accidents)	49	1,291	9	99	58	1,390	227	4, 118	88	1,634
Total all classes	90	3,019	20	279	110	3, 298	370	5, 327	111	1,953

a In Table No. 1 the passengers have been divided into three classes. Class a includes all ordinary passengers. Class b includes passengers traveling on freight trains. Class bb includes persons who are customarily carried on trains under special arrangements, such as postal clerks and express messengers, employees on Pullman cars, newsboys, live-stock tenders, and men in charge of freight.

Table No. 1 is continued on next page.

Accidents to employees resulting in slight injuries which do not prevent the employee injured from performing his accustomed service for more than three days in the aggregate during the ten days immediately following the accident are not reported.

TABLE No. 1.—Casualties to persons, July, August, and September, 1906—Continued.

•	men (	Yard train men (switch- ing crews).		er em- y <del>ees</del> .		ıl em- yees.	Total all persons.		
	Killed.	Injured.	Killed.	Injured.	Killed.	Injured.	Killed.	Injured.	
Collisions  Derailments  Miscellaneous train accidents, including	7 5	114 67	22 6	152 66	115 80	1, <b>030</b> 577	142 105	2, 001 1, 495	
locomotive-boiler explosions	7	34	2	22	20	376	20	395	
Total train accidents	19	215	80	240	215	1,988	267	3, 891	
Coupling or uncoupling	33	451	4	22	81	942	81	942	
While doing other work about trains or while attending switches	14	787	26	789	73	4, 432	78	4, 432	
Coming in contact with overhead bridges, structures at side of track, etc	7	107	2	14	32	397	<b>35</b> i	412	
Falling from cars or engines or while get- ting on or off	42 26	800 83	83 855	399 4, 233	189 482	8, 026 4, 590	231 495	<b>3</b> , 598 5, 398	
Total (other than train accidents)	122	2, 178	420	5, 457	857	13, 387	915	14,777	
Total all classes	141	2, 393	450	5, 697	1,072	15, 370	1,182	18, 668	

The totals in Table No. 1 continue large. In some few details there are small decreases from the corresponding quarter one year ago, but in general there is no improvement. The causes of the great losses of life and property here shown have been repeatedly discussed in preceding bulletins. The number of passengers killed in train accidents (52 in this quarter) is large, though it includes the results of only three particularly notable cases, namely, collision No. 28 and derailments 10 and 12. The comparison with Quarterly Bulletin No. 17 (a year ago) and also with Bulletin 20 shows the following numbers killed:

	Bulletin 21.	Bulletin 20.	Bulletin 17.
<ol> <li>Passengers killed in train accidents.</li> <li>Passengers killed, all causes.</li> <li>Employees killed in train accidents.</li> <li>Employees killed in coupling.</li> <li>Total passengers and employees killed, all causes.</li> </ol>	110 215	27 81 167 68 988	43 122 229 74 1,058

The total number of collisions and derailments in the quarter now under review was 3,672 (1,891 collisions and 1,781 derailments), of which 269 collisions and 201 derailments affected passenger trains. The damage to cars, engines, and roadway by these accidents amounted to \$2,932,760. Given more in detail, these facts appear as below:

TABLE No. 2.—Collisions and derailments.

	Number.	Loss	s.	Persons killed.	Persons injured.
Collisions, rear	424 257 183 1,027	\$388, 428, 92, 464,	762 787	40 59 4 89	465 703 83 755
Total	1,891	1, 375,	040	142	2,00
Derailments due to defects of roadway, etc	318 808 118 93 18 426	620, 138, 146,	924	14 19 19 17 5 31	853 224 157 270 19
Total	1,781	1, 557,	720	105	1,498
Total collisions and derailments	8,672	2, 932,	760	247	3, 49

Note.—Collisions and derailments which cause no death or personal injury and which cause not over \$150 damage to the property of the railroad are not reported.

Following is the usual list of Class A train accidents—all in which the damage is reported at \$10,000 or over; notable cases in which passengers are killed, and those doing damage less than \$10,000 and down to \$2,000, wherever the circumstances or the cause may be of particular interest:

Table 2a.—Causes of forty-five prominent train accidents (Class A).

[Note.—R. stands for rear collision; B., butting collision; M., miscellaneous collisions; D., derailment; P., passenger train; F., freight and miscellaneous trains.]

#### COLLISIONS.

No.	G. 886.	Kind of train.	Killed.	Injured.	Damage to engines, cars, and roadway.	Reference to record.	Cause.
1	R	F. and F	2	2	\$440	86	Two passengers killed in freight caboose. Train standing at station (1 a. m.) with indistinct tail lights.
2 ,	M	P. and F	0	0	600	15	
3	B	<b>F.</b> and <b>F</b>	1	16	2, 800	45	
4	R	F. and F	0	0	2, 53 <b>5</b>	78	Block-signal operator became confused and gave false clear signal; engineman approached station, disregarding rule to run under control.
5	R	P. and F	0	3	2, 700	53	Flagman mistook whistle signal to go out, interpret- ing it to mean come in.
6	R	F. and F		1	3, 000	4	Automatic block signal showed clear falsely: cause not discovered, but believed to be residual magnetism due to lightning.
7	R	P. and F	2	, <b>6</b>	3,045	64	Wrong signal given at interlocking. See note in text below.

TABLE 2a.—Causes of forty-five prominent train accidents (Class A)—Continued.

COLLISIONS—Continued.

					en- er, way.	to	
No.	æ	Kind of train.	ð.	red.	Damage to engrines, cars, and roadway.	Reference record.	Cause.
	Class		Killed.	Injured.	Dam	Refe	
8	В	F. and F	0	4	<b>\$3</b> , 113	99	Extra train, waiting on side track for two trains, started out after passage of one train; had answered whistle signal of the passing train.
9	R	F. and F	7	16	8, 420	61	
10 11	BR	F. and F F. and F	2	3 2	8, 600 8, 700	51 57	False clear block signal. See note in text below. Occurred 3 a.m. Signalman at B (3 months' experience) gave false clear signal. The signalman at C, a man of 6 months' experience, claims that he told B to give a permissive signal. The flagman of the
12	В	F. and F	. 0	4	8, 700	97	leading train was killed while sitting in his caboose.  Operator, with 4 train orders in his possession, delivered wrong one to a conductor; had sent conductor's signature to dispatcher before train arrived.
13		<b>F. and F</b>		ı	8, 720	6	Butting collision of extra trains. Dispatcher (4 years' experience) forgot both and sent meeting orders to neither.
14	M	F. and F	0	2		41	Cars broke away from rear of train and ran back down grade. See note in text below.
140	В	F, and F	<b>,</b>	2	<b>8,980</b>	89	Error in order. Dispatcher sent it "Right over 27." Operator, 20 years 9 months of age, copied it "Right over 25," and dispatcher did not detect wrong repetition.
15	В	P. and P	<b>, 2</b>	5	4, 200	80	Mistake in order. Receiving operator omitted two words, and dispatcher failed to check the error in the repetition.
16		F. and F			1		Inefficient flagging; train approached station not under control. Men on leading train on duty 22 hours; on following train, 19 hours.
17		, F. and F					hours late. Engineman 1 month in the service; conductor, 4 months.
18		1 <b>F</b>		l 	: 1		Train parted; rear portion ran into forward; 32 cars in train, only 10 air-braked. Conductor intrusted making up of train to brakeman; this brakeman killed.
19		P. and P	1	1	7,035		of train. Report says cause unknown.
20 '		F. and F	}		1	•	text below.
21	В	F. and F	ŀ		,	60	Mistake in writing name of station in train order.  Operator (experienced) can not explain.
22	<b>M</b> B	. P. and F		}	1	91	passenger train.
23 24	M	P. and P	ļ	!		}	Engineman, southbound, overlooked meeting order; conductor slow in applying brakes.  Passenger train on siding drifted out onto main
25	M	P. and F			12, 730	79	track while engineman was reading orders; train struck by express train passing in same direction. Freight train on siding broke in two; 14 cars ran
26	В	F. and F		! 	•	92	back down grade. Conductor and brakeman tried to stop cars, but brakes were defective. Engineman overlooked orders; engineman and con-
	34	P and P		•	1 10 600		ductor killed. A brakeman called engineman's attention, but while he read order to verify brakeman's assertion, collision occurred.
27	M	F. and F	ļ			i	Collision at meeting point. Southbound approached not under control. See note in text below.
28 29	B	P. and F F and F	2	• <b>5</b>	14, 500 15, 000	12 3	
80	В	Fand F	2	4	16,083	8	Misinterpretation of orders; conductor and engineman, on duty 18 hours; used main track until 9.30 when order gave them only till 9.
31	R	F and F	ì	•	16,885	87	Train stalled 35 minutes failed to flag. Men on duty 14 hours 85 minutes.
82	В	F and F	8	5	29, 200	98	Conductor and engineman of extra train overlooked regular.
		Total	66	226	256, 529		

TABLE 2a.—Causes of forty-five prominent train accidents (Class A)—Continued.

DERAILMENTS.

So.	Class.	Kind of train.	Killed.	Injured.	Damage to engines, cars,	Reference to record.	Cause.
1	D	P	0	7	\$2,600	35	Misplaced switch. Switch tender, having several switches to watch, forgot this one; on duty 18
2	D	F	o	1	4,050	83	hours, the yard being short of men.  Passenger car and 9 freight cars ran away down steep grade. Conductor and brakeman carelessly left cars with hand brakes not properly set.
3	D	P	0	12	5, 100	20	Track out of gauge inch; engine swayed so violently as to break a splice bar. Speed, 50 miles an hour; center of boiler 9 feet 6 inches above rail.
4	D	F	0	8	5, 700	105	Freight cars ran back down 3 per cent grade; brakeman neglected to set enough hand brakes.
5	D	P	0	<b>32</b>	6,000	106	Washout; 5.45 a. m.; section foreman blaimed for not going out promptly in storm.
6 7	D D	P	0	<b>4</b> <b>86</b>	7,000 8,200	115 102	Open draw; engineman (good record) killed. Ran into burning trestle bridge, 6.50 a.m. Fire probably set by spark from a locomotive.
8	D	F	2	2	8, 780	34	
9	D	F	0	0	11,600	21	Bridge knocked down by boom of steam shovel.
10	<b>D</b>	<u>P</u>	7	40	18, 265	23	Excessive speed. See note in text below.
11	D	P	5	<b>60</b>	38,000	108	
12	Ð	P	9	43	57, 300	101	in 1904; 174 feet high, spans 15 feet.  Misplaced switch. Switch light not burning, having been extinguished by high wind. Train approached
	Tota	d derailments	25	240	172, 595		at 60 miles an hour.
		d derailments de collisions	91	466	429, 124		 

Collision No. 28, the worst in the list, killing 17 persons, between an eastbound passenger train and a westbound freight. collision occurred between R and H (H being 6 miles east of R). At R the night operator held an order for the passenger train to meet the freight at R, but while he was outside of his office with this order, intending to deliver it to the men in charge of the passenger train, the day operator, who had gone off duty a short time before, went back into the office and, hearing a call from the dispatcher, took an This order would order annulling the one which had been carried out. have the effect of permitting the train to proceed, but without waiting for the final approval ("complete") of the dispatcher, which, under the rule, is absolutely necessary before it is permissible to act on an . order, he shouted through the window to the operator outside to permit the train to proceed. This was done, and the train went on to The westbound train had, meanwhile, passed H, its destruction. because the original order, to meet at R, as delivered to that train, was still in force.

The operator who recklessly allowed the eastbound train to proceed on the authority of an order which had not been approved was 21 years old, and had been in the service of the company over four years.

Collision No. 7. occurred at about 10 p. m., and was due to confusion at an interlocking tower on a four-track line. A locomotive (without

train) approaching on the eastbound passenger track was to have been diverted to the freight track, and (after the engine had stopped) the switches and signals were so set. After the engine started the leverman began to set the signals and switches for a following passenger train (approaching on the same passenger track), but acted so quickly that he threw the cross-over switch before the empty engine reached it, though it had passed the signal. The engineman, seeing the mistake, stopped; but knowing the passenger train was due he started ahead again slowly, thinking the signal was meant to direct him to proceed to the limits of the interlocking. The leverman then signalled the engine to stop, and immediately followed this with a signal to set back. The engineman, not being satisfied with this, whistled for signals again. He was then given a violent signal to back up, the leverman believing the engine to be on the freight track, to which he supposed it had crossed. The engineman started to back his engine, but just then saw the passenger train approaching at a high speed. He reversed his engine, starting it in the same direction as the passenger train was running, and by so doing lessened the shock of the collision considerably, though the passenger train was running about 50 miles an hour when it struck. Both the leverman and the signalman (his superior) were men of experience, but both of them thought that the empty engine passed the tower on the freight track.

Collison No. 9 in which a work train, not in motion, was run into at the rear by a following freight train, killing 7 and injuring 12 of the workmen on the work train, was due to the excessive speed at which the freight train was running. The work train had stopped to take water and the freight train had been allowed to proceed into the block section under a permissive signal, which required the engineman to run at a rate of speed sufficiently low to avoid the possibility of colliding with any standing train; but this requirement was violated. The experience of this engineman was one year eight months.

Collision No. 10 was due to what appears to have been gross carelessness on the part of a block signalman on a single-track line. After giving a clear signal to a northbound train, the train was delayed so that it could not accept and use the signal. The train dispatcher then directed the signalman to change the signal to stop, but he did not do so, and the northbound train soon afterwards started and collided with a southbound which had been admitted to the block section under the authority of the train dispatcher after he had ordered the change from "clear" to "stop." The signalman absconded immediately after committing this error.

Collision No. 14, occurring at night, was due to a defect in coupling apparatus and to cars being left standing on a steep grade without sufficient hand brakes being set to hold them. A train of eleven cars and a caboose arrived at W., and entered a sidetrack to unload freight.

In moving the train back a short distance, the eleventh car became uncoupled from the tenth, and with the caboose behind it ran back down grade 5 miles to the point of collision. The train men were busy unloading freight and did not discover the breakaway until too late to stop the detached cars. The separation of the caboose and express car from the rest of the train was due to the clevis of the lock pin of the coupler of the freight car ahead becoming caught on the buffer of the express car, lifting the pin. The report indicates that the hand brake was set on the caboose, but that this was not sufficient to prevent the two cars from running down the grade. The collision wrecked the express car and the caboose, and the wreck took fire. The damage due to the collision and fire together amounted to \$3,930.

Collision No. 20 was a butting collision due to forgetfulness on the part of an engineman 21 years old, who had been on duty thirty-nine hours and twenty-five minutes. He had received a meeting order, but had put it into his pocket without reading it. He ran past the meeting place and struck the opposing train at about 12 miles an hour. This engineman had been in the service four years, having been appointed fireman at the age of 17, and had been an engineman about ten months. He had been on duty from 11 p. m. on Friday until 2.50 p.m. on Sunday. The conductor, who had been on duty the same length of time, tried to signal the engineman to stop. If, instead of this, he had applied the air brakes he might have prevented the collision.

Collision No. 27, causing damage to engines and cars amounting to \$13.600, was due apparently to extraordinary carelessness in running a heavy freight train down a steep grade, depending entirely on the hand brakes as a means of controlling the speed. It was a southbound freight train. The air brakes had been made unserviceable by the breaking of the reversing rod of the air pump on the engine. conductor notified the train dispatcher at A that he should not dare to start for B, the grade being 124 feet per mile, descending, unless the up freight, which he expected to meet at B, could take the side track (the rule requiring that ordinarily southbound trains should take the siding). The dispatcher, who had been on this division only three weeks, at once gave the desired order, and the southbound train proceeded. It consisted of 61 cars, 17 of them loaded. The conductor, two brakemen, and the fireman manned the brakes, but they were unable to control the train, and it struck the northbound train, at about 15 miles an hour, just as the latter was entering the side track at B. The wreck took fire, presumably from the wrecked engine, and the damage was largely due to the fire. The dispatcher, who should have ordered the southbound train held until another engine could be procured, which would not have been long, had had twenty years' experience on other roads. The conductor and the engineman of the

southbound train, as well as the two brakemen, had had long experience on trains. They had been on duty only a few hours.

Derailment No. 10 occurred on a 10 degree curve (superelevation 5½ inches) at the exit of a tunnel, and the engine and first two cars fell into a lake, the engine and tender being entirely submerged. A gas tank of the baggage car exploded and set fire to the smoking car, burning several persons. The tender was the first vehicle to jump the track, but as no defect could be found in its wheels or running gear, the conclusion is that the derailment was due to excessive speed. The train was running at abour 45 miles an hour. The engineman was killed, his body being found in the cab of the locomotive at the bottom of the lake. Of the other persons killed, 3 were passengers.

TABLE No. 3.—Details of Table No. 1—Causes of accidents to employees in coupling and uncoupling cars.

Sub-	Causes.		ain- ien.	Train- men in yards.		trai: (sw i	ard nmen itch- ng ws).	Other employees.	
		Killed.	Injured.	Killed.	Injured.	Killed.	Injured.	Killed.	Injured.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7	Adjusting coupler with foot Adjusting coupler, cars accidentally started Careless manipulation of uncoupling lever Cars not equipped with automatic coupler Coupler broken, using link and pin or chain Coupling-damaged cars Coupling with chain or other emergency appliance on curve too sharp for automatic coupling		19 4 5 14	1	12 5 2 2 4 9	3 3 2	34 6 4 8 10 21	i	1 1 2
8 9 10 11 12	Coupling with chain or other emergency appliance because of uneven track  Coupling or uncoupling safety chains  Fingers or hand caught between uncoupling lever and body of car  Uncoupling without using lever (unnecessary)  Uncoupling without using lever, uncoupling lever	1	1 2 68 10		4 27 6	1	4 5 88 7		i 3 1
13 14 15	not in working order	1 2	43 2 22	i	29 1 18	4 6 1	29	<b>1</b>	s
16 17 18 19 20	engine accidentally started Opening knuckle, part of defective coupler fell on foot. Opening knuckle, lost footing Riding on car to uncouple, slipped off. Struck by object at side of track Caught by unexpected movement of car, due to	1	1 1 6 9	3	1 4 1 2	1 2	5 8 17 7 11	1	1
21 22 28 24	slack running in  Caught by unexpected movement of car, due to mistake or misunderstanding in giving hand signals  Uncoupling moving cars and lost footing  Parts hard to move, causing delay  Went between cars unnecessarily and contrary to	4	19 4 7 7	1 2	3 5 3		23 7 14 15	·	
25 26	rule Hand caught between projecting load and end of next car. No witness (fatal injury). Other causes (see detailed list below)	2	12 5	· 2	5 2	2	19 5 19	••••	

#### Details of injuries included in Table No. 3, subclass No. 27.

- J. 1. Jar caused brake wheel to fall on head.
- J. 2. Stepped on switch stand; sprained ankle.
- J. 3. Raising lever; was ruptured.
- J. 4. Standing on car; knocked off by sudden movement of car.
- J. 5. Put foot on rail; run over.
- J. 6. Drawhead broken, and piece struck hand.
- J. 7. Glove caught.
- J. 8. On inside of sharp curve; squeezed.
- J. 9. Stepped in hole.
- J. 10. Stepped on nail.
- J. 11. Gave locking dog sudden jerk and tore hand.
- J. 12. Adjusting coupler; struck hand with bolt.
- A. 1. Lever chain broke and struck hand.
- A. 2. Car door fell on head.
- A. 3. Cut foot on broken glass.
- A. 4. Struck by air hose.
- A. 5. Piece of coal fell on head.
- A. 6. Lost footing and fell on track.
- A. 7. Load of rails shifted, catching hand.
- A. 8. Lever flew up and struck leg.
- A. 9. Stepped into water box, scalding foot.
- A. 10. Lump of coal struck head.
- A. 11. Lever on gravel car struck hand.
- A. 12. Timber fell from car, breaking leg.
- S. 1. Piece of coal fell on heel.
- S. 2. Clothes caught on car; stomach crushed.
- S. 3. Lever flew up and struck chest.
- S. 4. Stepped on nail.
- S. 5. Jar of coupling caused acid to fly in face.
- R. 6. Stepped in a hole.
- S. 7. Struck in neck by lever.
- S. 8. Piece of scrap fell, cutting chest.
- 8. 9. Opening knuckle; assistant jerked lever, cutting finger.
- S. 10. Lever flew over, striking hand.
- S. 11. Lock pin lever caught hand.
- S. 12. Struck by lever in side.
- S. 13. Struck arm against corner of car.

Table 3a.—Nature of injuries to employees in coupling and uncoupling cars.

· Injuries.	Train- men.	Train- men in yards.	Yard train- men.	Other em- ployees.
oss of fect	8	2	8	
oss of legs	2	<del>-</del>	4	1
oss of arms	2	8	4	1
oss of handsoss of fingers	15	2	19	
oss of toes	10	i		
ractured skull			<u> </u>	
ractured leg	1		2	
ractured arm	1	1	6	1
ractured collar bone or ribs	7	4	7	<u> </u>
ractured other bones	7	1	10	; 1
ontusion of head or body	38	27	63	i
ontusion or laceration of feet	25	15	37 10	
Contusion or laceration of toes	6 13	2	25	
Contusion or laceration of arms	21	<b>6</b> :	24	
Contusion of laceration of hands	47	29	64	
ontusion or laceration of fingers.	95		145	'
Dislocation	1	l	• • • • • • • • • •	
nternal injuries		1	б	••••••
prains	6	2 1	8	1
hock	•••••••	2		
fiscellaneous	1	<b>Z</b>	<u> </u>	
Total injuries	295	174	451	2
Cilled	82	12	33	4
Total killed and injured	327	186	484	28
RECAPITULATION.		' <u></u> -		<b>8</b> /
otal injured				94
Total killed and injured				1.02

Table No. 4.—Details of Table No. 1.—Causes of accidents to employees classified (6 and C7) as falling from and getting on or off cars and engines.

Sub-	Causes.		rain- ien.	Train- men in yards.		Yard trainmen (switch- ing crews).		Othe	er em- y <b>ee</b> s.
Class.		Killed.	Injured.	Killed.	Injured.	Killed.	Injured	Killed.	Injured.
1 2	Fell from roof of box car by reason of— Defect in car	2	10	, ,	8		18		<b>3</b>
28 4 4 C6 5	Parting of train  Derailment, collision, or shock due to abnormal movements of cars other than those in subclass 3.  While setting brakes	6	57	3 2	1 36 28	3     5     2	3 71 50		10 2
6 7 8 9	Fell from— Coal car Freight car other than box or coal car Engine or tender Passenger car Engines, tenders, or cars (all kinds) not in mo-	7 13	8   49   128   13	1   2   7 	8 21 60 1	2 4 2	9 17 32 1	1 2 2 1	9
11 12 (13 [14	tion Miscellaneous causes Not clearly explained Slipped getting on moving trains or cars	11 25	61 256 70 134 183	4 2 3 1	88 182 89 46 60	1 8 5 8		2 2 10	49 65 15 71 61
C7	sion, derailment, or other accident	5	53 37 195 4	4	8 22 85 4	6	13 40 108 4	1	7 5 46
•	Total.		1, 240	30	587	42	800	33	399

#### [Public—No. 171.]

AN ACT Requiring common carriers engaged in interstate commerce to make full reports of all accidents to the Interstate Commerce Commission.

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, It shall be the duty of the general manager, superintendent, or other proper officer of every common carrier engaged in interstate commerce by railroad to make to the Interstate Commerce Commission, at its office in Washington, District of Columbia, a monthly report, under oath, of all collisions of trains or where any train or part of a train accidentally leaves the track, and of all accidents which may occur to its passengers or employees while in the service of such common carrier and actually on duty, which report shall state the nature and causes thereof, and the circumstances connected therewith.

SEC. 2. That any common carrier failing to make such report within thirty days after the end of any month shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor and, upon conviction thereof by a court of competent jurisdiction, shall be punished by a fine of not more than one hundred dollars for each and every offense and for every day during which it shall fail to make such report after the time herein specified for making the same.

SEC. 3. That neither said report nor any part thereof shall be admitted as evidence or used for any purpose against such railroad so making such report in any suit or

action for damages growing out of any matter mentioned in said report.

SEC. 4. That the Interstate Commerce Commission is authorized to prescribe for such common carriers a method and form for making the reports in the foregoing section provided.

Approved, March 3, 1901.

#### SPECIAL INFORMATION CONTAINED IN PRECEDING BULLETINS.

Fach accident bulletin contains tables showing the number of passengers and employees killed and injured, and these figures are classified according to cause (see Table No. 1); also tables showing cost of the different classes of train accidents. The causes of accidents to employees in coupling and uncoupling and in falling from cars, etc., are further classified in Tables No. 3 and No. 4. The most serious collisions and derailments are dealt with in a supplementary table (Class A) showing the causes in some detail. Each bulletin is for three months, and No. 1 was for the quarter ending September 30, 1901. The bulletin for the quarter ending June 30 contains, in addition to the quarterly statistics, tables showing the same information for the whole of the fiscal year ending on that date.

Bulletin No. 17 records one collision, killing 6 and injuring 35 persons, and one derail ment, killing 15 and injuring 28. The collision, occurring at 1 a. m., was due to gross negligence on the part of the men in charge of a freight train. The derailment was due to an open draw. The drawbridge was not provided with interlocked signals, and the engineman was not adequately acquainted with the line of the road. A collision and a derailment are reported which were due to the lack of suitable detector bars at switches and a collision which was due to

failure of "controlled manual" block signal working.

Bulletin No. 18 shows total casualties much larger than in the preceding quarters, due largely no doubt to an enormous increase in traffic. Many accidents are reported in which the men had been on duty excessively long hours. One collision, killing 17 persons, was due to the error of an engineman of five months' experience, who ran past five warning signals. Another collision, killing 10 persons, was due to the failure of the men in charge of a freight train to identify opposing passenger trains. One derailment of a passenger train, killing 13 persons, was reported as due to some cause that could not be discovered.

Bulletin No. 19 is like Bulletin 18 in showing a large number of casualties. One butting collision, due to failure of train dispatching, caused 34 deaths and 24 injuries and \$50,000 damages, besides the damages for deaths and injuries of persons. One collision was due to the negligence of men who had been worked flagrantly long hours. Particulars are given of a number of collisions due to

complicated and unusual causes.

Bulletin No. 20 shows total deaths greater than in the corresponding quarter of the previous year, but the number of passengers and employees killed in train accidents was considerably smaller. The most serious accident in this bulletin was a butting collision of passenger trains, due to misinterpretation of a dispatcher's order by a pilot; 10 persons killed, 38 injured. One derailment, unexplained, train running slowly, caused 9 deaths and 18 injuries.

<sup>&</sup>quot; For notes on Bulletins 1 to 16, inclusive, see Bulletin No. 17 or No. 18.

•			
		•	
			•

# ACCIDENT BULLETIN

No. 22

**SHOWING** 

# COLLISIONS AND DERAILMENTS

OF TRAINS AND

## CASUALTIES TO PERSONS

**DURING** 

OCTOBER, NOVEMBER, AND DECEMBER, 1906

'WASHINGTON, D. C.

WASHINGTON
GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
1907

### THE INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMMISSION.

Hon. MARTIN A. KNAPP, of New York, Chairman.

Hon. JUDSON C. CLEMENTS, of Georgia.

Hon. CHARLES A. PROUTY, of Vermont.

Hon. FRANCIS M. COCKRELL, of Missouri.

Hon. FRANKLIN K. LANE, of California.

Hon. EDGAR E. CLARK, of Iowa.

Hon. JAMES S. HARLAN, of Illinois.

EDWARD A. MOSELEY, Secretary.

#### ACCIDENT BULLETIN NO. 22.

### RAILROAD ACCIDENTS IN THE UNITED STATES

DURING THE

#### THREE MONTHS ENDING DECEMBER 31, 1906.

The number of persons killed in train accidents during the months of October, November, and December, 1906, as shown in reports made by the railroad companies to the Interstate Commerce Commission, under the "accident law" of March 3, 1901, was 474 and of injured 4,940. Accidents of other kinds, including those sustained by employees while at work and by passengers in getting on or off the cars, etc., bring the total number of casualties up to 20,944 (1,430 killed and 19,514 injured). These accidents are classified in the following table. These reports deal only with (a) passengers and (b) employees on duty.<sup>a</sup>

TABLE No. 1. - Casualties to persons, October, November, und December, 1906. b c

	Passengers (a and b).		Persons carried under agree- ment or contract (bb).			l (a, b, i bb).	Trai	<b>ņm</b> en.	Trainmen in yards.	
	Killed.	Injured.	Killed.	Injured.	Killed.	Injured.	Killed.	Injured.	Killed.	Injured.
Collisions	113 58	1, 457 787	6 3	173 105	119 61	1,630 892	1 <b>2</b> 2 67	824 467	32 6	211 68
locomotive-boiler explosions	171	24 2, 268	9	280	180	26 2, 548	13 202	285 1,576	40	65 344
Coupling or uncoupling			==				17	319	20	175
while attending switches	2	12		6	2	18	27 24	2, 150 200	10	773 72
ting on or off	33 15	526 504	1 3	14 59	34 18	540 563	87 42	1, 386 197	30 31	<b>638</b> 105
Total (other than train accidents)	50	1,042	4	79	54	1, 121	197	4, 252	97	1, 763
Total all classes	221	3,310	13	359	234	3,669	399	5,828	137	2, 107

and Table No. 1 the passengers have been divided into three classes. Class a includes all ordinary passengers. Class b includes passengers traveling on freight trains. Class bb includes persons who are customarily carried on trains under special arrangements, such as postal clerks and express messengers, employees on Pullman cars, newsboys, live-stock tenders, and men in charge of freight.

b Table No. 1 is continued on next page.

c Accidents to employees resulting in slight injuries which do not prevent the employee injured from performing his accustomed service for more than three days in the aggregate during the ten days immediately following the accident are not reported.

TABLE No. 1.—Casualties to persons, October, November, and December—Continued.

	men (	train- switch- rews).		er em- yees.		al em- yees.	Total persons reported.	
•	Killed.	Injured.	Killed.	Injured.	Killed.	Injured.	Killed.	Injured.
Collisions	20 8	146 42	15 9	149 48	189 85	1, 330 625	308 146	2, 960 1, 517
locomotive-boiler explosions	2	47	3	40	20	437	20	463
Total train accidents	25	235	27	237	294	2, 892	474	4, 940
Coupling or uncoupling	40	556	7	33	84	1,083	84	1,083
While doing other work about trains or while attending switches	20	770	22	771	79	4, 464	79	4, 464
structures at side of track, etc	4	125	1	10	35	407	37	425
ting on or off	71 32	925 133	41 870	331 3,784	229 475	3, 280 4, 219	263 493	8, 820 4, 782
Total (other than train accidents)	167	2,509	441	4,929	902	13, 453	956	14, 574
Total, all classes	192	2,744	468	5, 166	1, 196	15, 845	1,430	19, 514

The totals of collisions and derailments and of deaths and injuries caused by them continue very large. The general cause of the increase over former periods, so far as it is possible to speak definitely on the subject, has been repeatedly stated in these bulletins, and need not be given here. The specific causes of the more prominent accidents are given below, in connection with Table 2a as usual. The number of passengers killed in train accidents in this quarter, 180, is the largest on record except that for the quarter ending September 30, 1904 (Bulletin No. 13), when it was 228. Bulletin No. 10 contained the next highest record. The totals under this head, in this and the 12 bulletins last preceding, are as follows:

PASSENGERS KILLED IN TRAIN ACCIDENTS.

Killed	Quarter ending with—	Bulletin No.
18	December, 1906.	
50	September, 1906 June. 1906	
6	March, 1906	• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •
5	December, 1905	
4	September, 1905 June, 1905	
2	March, 1905	
55	December, 1904.	•••••••••••••••••••••••
22	September, 1904	••••••
2	June, 1904	• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •
a 14	March, 1904. December, 1903.	

a Three times the average of the nine preceding quarters.

The five principal accidents in Bulletin No. 13, with the number of persons killed in each, were: A bridge disaster in Colorado, 88; a butting collision in Tennessee, 63; a derailment at a misplaced switch in Illinois, 24; a collision in Illinois, 18, and a collision in New Jersey, 16.

Bulletin No. 10 includes a derailment in Pennsylvania, due to an accidental obstruction, 65 killed; a collision in Louisiana, 32; a collision in Michigan, 18, and one in Indiana, 16. Besides these disasters to passenger trains, there were in that quarter two collisions of work trains, killing 17 and 16 employees, respectively.

The other principal items in the present bulletin, compared with the last preceding quarter and with the quarter one year ago, appear as follows:

	Bulletin 22.	Bulletin 21.	Bulletin 18.
<ol> <li>Passengers killed in train accidents.</li> <li>Passengers killed, all causes.</li> <li>Employees killed in train accidents.</li> <li>Employees killed in coupling.</li> <li>Total passengers and employees killed, all causes.</li> </ol>	234 294	52 110 215 81 1, 182	50 101 320 85 1,109

Of the 180 fatalities in this quarter, as shown above, 143 are attributable to 3 accidents—collisions No. 23 and No. 28 (Table 2a following) and derailment No. 10.

The total number of collisions and derailments was 3,965 (2,226 collisions and 1,739 derailments), of which 391 collisions and 190 derailments affected passenger trains. The damage to cars, engines, and roadway by these accidents amounted to \$3,099,228. Given more in detail, these facts appear as below:

TABLE No. 2.—Collisions and derailments, October, November, and December, 1906.

	Number.	Loss.	Persons killed.	Persons injured.
Collisions, rear	297	\$627, 125 500, 011 50, 210 539, 533	113 128 4 63	907 1,089 85 879
Total	2, 226	1,716,879	308	2,960
Derailments due to defects of roadway, etc.  Derailments due to defects of equipment.  Derailments due to negligence of train men, signalmen, etc.  Derailments due to unforeseen obstruction of track, etc.  Derailments due to malicious obstruction of track, etc.  Derailments due to miscellaneous causes.	841 771 147 68 14 398	250, 231 569, 550 119, 809 72, 626 17, 113 353, 020	8 20 69 13 1 35	648 167 192 66 82 412
Total	1,739	1, 382, 349	146	1,517
Total collisions and derailments	3, 965	3,099,228	454	4, 477

Following is the usual list of Class A train accidents—all in which the damage is reported at \$10,000 or over; notable cases in which passengers are killed, and those doing damage less than \$10,000 and down to \$2,000, wherever the circumstances or the cause may be of particular interest:

Table 2a.—Causes of forty prominent train accidents (Class A).

[Note,-R. stands for rear collision, B., butting collision, M., miscellaneous collisions; D., derafiment, P., passenger train; F., treight and miscellaneous trains.]

#### COLLISIONS.

				_			
No.	Clam.	Kind of train.	Killed.			Reference to record.	Cause,
1	R	P. and F	1	10	\$2,300	56	Freight train, stopped by automatic block signal, run into at rear by passenger train, which had overrun automatic disk block signal, the face of which was partly covered by snow. Engineman
3	B R	F. and F		5	2,560 3,000	85 87	appears to have taken chances.  Operator wrote "95" for "75" in telegraphic order.  Block signalman Bauthorized A to clear signal when block was occupied. Engineman approached station in fog with speed not under proper control.
4	3	F. and F	0	0	3, 192	10	Signalman gave false clear block signal to west- bound train; operator failed to deliver order to east-bound train. One of these men in service 18
5	В	F. and P	1	II	4,000	45	days, the other 8 months.  Two empty engines, coupled together, encroached on time of regular passenger train. Becond engineman depended on the first, the first misread time
6	R	F. and P	2	26	4, 476	79	by watch.  Freight train approached station in fog with speed not under proper control.
7	В	P. and F	2	33	6,900	9	Operator omitted word "second" from order; opera- tor in service 6 weeks.
8	R	P. and F	٥	8	7, 600	6	Signalman (1 a. m.) gave false clear block signal; flagman failed to go back, though instructed by locomotive whistle signal to do so. Signalman, 34 years of age, in service 8 days.
9	В	F. and F	6	1	7,600	19	Men in charge of eastbound train overlooked meet- ing point.
10	В	P. and F	3	24	8,500	13	Preight approached meeting point with speed not under proper control; conductor and engineman appear to have passed a switch without knowing it.
u	M	P. and F	2	24	9, 056	62	Switch wrong; believed to have been maliciously misplaced
12	В	F, and F,	1	1	9, 400	56	Operator omitted "2d No. 155" from order, though he repeated it to dispatcher correctly; operator in service 39 days.
13 14	M B	F. and F	0	9	10,300	72 16	Preight train without engine left standing on grade with no hand brakes set, rap back down grade.  Operator failed to deliver meeting order; operator
15	<b>B</b>	P. and F	8	7	12, 820	14	decumped.  Eastbound freight encroached on time of westbound passenger; engineman killed, conductor evidently reckless.
16	BR	P. and P F. and F	1	49 2	12,500 12,658	1	Engineman's watch wrong; see note in text below. Failure to flag, and excessive speed.
17 18	B	F. and F		3	13,000		Operator fell asleep and failed to deliver meeting order, on duty 24 hours; his superior ignorant of this.
19	В	F, and F		*	13, 200	76	1
20	В	P. and F	1	13	14,000	91	Dispatcher sent order reading "No. 50." Order de- livered reading "No. 52." Impossible to decide whether error is chargeable to dispatcher or to the receiving operator.
21	В	F. and F	8	3	14,543	17	Operator, holding three orders for tra'n, delivered only two.
22	В	P. and F	9	66			Passenger train (1 a. m.) collided with switching freight train at entrance of yard. See note in text below
23	R	P. and F	1 43 1	63	16,000	83	

TABLE 2a.—Conses of forty prominent train accidents (Class A)—Continued.

COLLISIONS—Continued.

		_				-	
No		l.	Killed.	Injured.	Damage to en- gines, cars, and roadway.	Reference to record.	Cause.
24	В	Fand P	2	5	15, 763	57	Northbound extra train overlooked order to clear the track for southbound extra train; no explana-
25	R	Pand P	5	20	20, 400	2	tion of forgetfulness.  Extra passenger train ran into regular passenger
26	R	Pand F	ı	9	21,900	78	train standing at station. See note in text below Passenger train ran past automatic block signal and flagman; engineman killed. He made no effort to stop, and it is believed he had in some way been
27	В	Pand P	0	6	25, 520	89	incapacitated before the collision.  Misplaced switch at entrance of passing track. Wreck destroyed by fire, which appears to have started in a car of oil.
28 29	B R	Pand P Fund F	43	h55 111	37,600 34,000	40 114a	See note in text below.  Rear collision of freights due to false clear block signal and nonobservance of yard speed limit Passenger train on adjacent main track wrenked because not time to warn it. Wreck burned by
30	В	Pand P	7	8	55, 615	58	fire from caboose stove, False clear block signal. See note in text below,
		I					
	Tota	i	144	564	427, 605		
	Tota	1	144	584	<u> </u>	DER	AILMENTS.
1	Tota	P	0	664	<u> </u>	DER.	Careless running on descending grade; conductor
1 2			<u> </u>			1	Careless running on descending grade; conductor and engineman on duty 23 hours.  Angle bar broken by shortening of rails due to cold
	D	P	0	0	84, 994	28	Careless running on descending grade; conductor and engineman on duty 23 hours.  Angle bar broken by shortening of rails due to cold weather; speed 55 miles an hour.  Unexplained. Speed 55 miles an hour.  Broken rail, speed 60 miles an hour. Rail had excess
2 8 4 5	D D D	P	2 0 0	0 14 22 49	84, 994 5, 700 7, 500 7, 700 9, 148	28 64 66 35	Careless running on descending grade; conductor and engineman on duty 23 hours.  Angle bar broken by shortening of rails due to cold weather; speed 55 miles an hour.  Unexplained. Speed 55 miles an hour.  Broken rail, speed 60 miles an hour. Rail had excess of phosphorus and manganese.  Unexplained. Speed 60 miles an hour.
2 8 4	D D D	P	0 2 0 0	0 14 22 49	\$4,994 5,700 7,500 7,700	28 64 66 36 34 29	Careless running on descending grade; conductor and engineman on duty 23 hours.  Angle bar broken by shortening of rails due to cold weather; speed 55 miles an hour.  Unexplained. Speed 65 miles an hour.  Broken rail, speed 60 miles an hour. Rail had excess of phosphorus and manganese.  Unexplained. Speed 60 miles an hour.  Drawpar pulled out.  Unexplained. Fourteen cars fell through trestle.
2 8 4 5	D D D D	P	2 0 0 0	0 14 22 49 45 0	\$4,994 5,700 7,500 7,700 9,148 10,000	28 64 66 36 34 29	Careless running on descending grade; conductor and engineman on duty 23 hours.  Angle bar broken by shortening of rails due to cold weather; speed 55 miles an hour.  Unexplained. Speed 65 miles an hour. Broken rail, speed 60 miles an hour. Rail had excess of phosphorus and manganese.  Unexplained. Speed 60 miles an hour.  Drawpar pulled out.  Unexplained. Fourteen cars fell through treatie, wreck took fire, probably from heated journal.  Low joint; sudden application of brakes; speed 25
2 3 4 5 6 7	D D D D D	P	0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0	0 14 22 49 45 0	\$4,994 5,700 7,500 7,700 9,148 10,000 10,200	28 64 66 36 34 29 109	Careless running on descending grade; conductor and engineman on duty 23 hours.  Angle bar broken by shortening of rails due to cold weather; speed 55 miles an hour.  Unexplained. Speed 65 miles an hour. Bait had excess of phosphorus and manganese.  Unexplained. Speed 60 miles an hour.  Drawbar pulled out.  Unexplained. Fourteen cars fell through treatle, wreck took fire, probably from heated journal.  Low joint; sudden application of brakes; speed 25 miles an hour. Beetion foreman dismissed Runaway on steep grade; mismanagement of air
2 8 4 5 6 7	D D D D D D D D	P	0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0	0 14 22 49 45 0	\$4,994 5,700 7,500 7,700 9,148 10,000 10,200 15,728	28 64 66 36 34 29 109	Careless running on descending grade; conductor and engineman on duty 23 hours.  Angle bar broken by shortening of rails due to cold weather; speed 55 miles an hour.  Unexplained. Speed 65 miles an hour. Broken rail, speed 60 miles an hour. Rail had excess of phosphorus and manganese.  Unexplained. Speed 60 miles an hour.  Drawpar pulled out.  Unexplained. Fourteen cars fell through treatie, wreck took fire, probably from heated journal.  Low joint; sudden application of brakes; speed 25 miles an hour. Beetion foreman dismissed
2 8 4 5 6 7	D D D D D D	P	0 0 0 0 0 0 0	0 14 22 49 46 0 0 10 6	\$4,994 5,700 7,500 7,700 9,148 10,000 10,200 15,726 16,000	28 64 66 36 34 29 109 32 71	Careless running on descending grade; conductor and engineman on duty 23 hours.  Angle bar broken by shortening of rails due to cold weather; speed 55 miles an hour.  Unexplained. Speed 65 miles an hour.  Broken rail, speed 60 miles an hour. Rail had excess of phosphorus and manganese.  Unexplained. Speed 60 miles an hour.  Drawpar pulled out.  Unexplained. Fourteen cars fell through treatle, wreck took fire, probably from heated journal.  Low joint; sudden application of brakes; speed 25 miles an hour. Beetlon foreman dismissed Runaway on steep grade; mismanagement of air brakes.  Rail out of place at entrance of drawbridge. See

Collision No. 23, causing the death of 43 passengers and the injury of 63, occurred at Terra Cotta, D. C., on the Baltimore & Ohio Railroad, on the night of December 30, 1906, between 6.30 and 7 o'clock. The night was dark and a dense fog prevailed. The leading train, No. 66, had just stopped at the station when it was run into at the rear by a following extra train, consisting of an engine and eight empty passenger cars, and its rear car was completely wrecked. The circumstances of this collision are under investigation, and the Commission intends to issue a special bulletin containing a summary of the facts and its conclusions therefrom.

Collision No. 28, resulting in the death of 42 passengers and 1 train man, and the injury of 150 passengers and 5 train men, was between a

westbound passenger train and an eastbound freight. It occurred about 3 o'clock in the morning during a blinding snowstorm. The engines were wrecked and took fire, and 5 passenger cars, 1 baggage car, and 3 freight cars were burned up. The bodies of the passengers who were killed, except 2, were consumed in the fire. The passenger train was No. 47, second section. The first section of the passenger train carried green flags to indicate to freight trains running in the opposite direction that they must keep out of the way of the second section, but the freight in this case did not get, or did not heed, the signals, and started out from a side track, where it had been waiting, immediately after the passage of the first section. The signal lights fixed on the passenger engine close to the signal flags were not burning, and therefore the men in charge of the freight had no visual notice that there would be a second section of the passenger train.

To provide against the failure of lights in such cases the engineman of the passenger train is required to sound a whistle signal at the point where he meets a freight train. In this case the engineman says that he sounded the whistle, indicating that he was carrying green signals, and the men in charge of the freight admit that they heard a whistle signal, but thought it sounded like a crossing signal. The signal which should have been given consists of one long blast and two short blasts, while that for a highway crossing consists of two long and two short blasts. Whatever may have been the character of this signal, the engineman of the freight, if he understood it to be a notice of a second section, should have acknowledged it by sounding the whistle of his engine. He did not sound this signal. This being so, it was the duty of the engineman of the passenger train, under the rule, to stop and give the proper notice to the freight train by word of mouth. This was not done, and the passenger engineman can give no excuse for his failure to do so. This engineman is reported as having a clear record for the five years preceding the accident. As to the extinguishment of his signal lights, he says that they were burning when he left a station about 30 miles east of the point of collision. The snow was falling rapidly at the time and the wind was blowing a gale, and he appears to have allowed the lamps to go out without paying attention to the fact. This engineman had been in the service of the road sixteen years, and had been on duty two hours and thirty minutes, after a sufficient time for rest.

Derailment No. 10 was due to an unexplained fault in a drawbridge. The train, south bound, was made up of three cars, propelled by electricity, the leading car being the motor car. It was running at ordinary speed, probably 30 to 40 miles an hour. At the entrance of the drawbridge the leading car jumped the track and, after running a short distance on the ties, the leading truck of the car rode over the guard timber at the outer edge of the bridge floor, and the car, with

the two following it, fell into the stream below. Of the passengers in the cars 56, with the motorman-57 persons in all-were drowned, and 36 passengers were injured. The drawbridge is of the "turntable" style, turning on a vertical axis. It had been opened for the passage of a vessel a short time before. Preparatory to opening, the rails of the track at the end of the draw, which extend over a few inches onto the fixed span adjoining, had been lifted so as to clear the fixed rails during the movement of the bridge. When the bridge was returned to its normal position for the movement of trains the supports under these lifted rails were withdrawn, and the rails should have dropped into place by gravity. For some reason, not explained, one or both of the rails of the south-bound track did not thus drop, though the bridge itself was locked in position; and this caused the The attendant in charge had failed to notice the fault, although he stepped to a point within a few feet of the end of the draw to take up a red flag which, according to the regulations, he had displayed on the fixed span as an auxiliary stop signal while the draw Not seeing the misplaced rail, he took up the flag and notified the signalman in the cabin south of the draw that the fixed semaphore signals might be cleared for trains. These fixed signals were interlocked with the bridge, but not with the track rails, and therefore there was nothing to prevent the giving of the clear signal to this train, notwithstanding the imperfection in the track.

The attendant at the bridge who thus wrongfully authorized a clear signal was 65 years old, a man of experience in positions of this kind, and with a good previous record.

Collision No. 16 was between passenger train No. 601, westbound, and passenger train No. 10, eastbound, between the switches at the station where they were ordered to meet. The eastbound train had the right to the track and the westbound encroached on its time in consequence of the engineman's watch being slow. It is the conclusion of the superintendent that the engineman had allowed his watch to run down. The westbound train should have entered the side track east of the point of collision, and for this the conductor, as well as the engineman, is held responsible.

Collision No. 22 occurred in the middle of the night and was due to the neglect of a flagman to give a warning signal a sufficient distance from his train. The passenger train was approaching a station at full speed and ran into a freight train switching on the main track. The flagman of the freight had been instructed to go out 2 miles, but he only went about 1,500 feet, and then stopped on a curve where the engineman of the approaching passenger train could see him for only a very short distance before reaching him.

Collision No. 25 was due to a combination of high speed and an insufficient time interval between trains carrying passengers. A regu-

lar west-bound passenger train standing at a station was run into by a following extra passenger train carrying troops and horses, and consisting of 18 live-stock cars, 9 sleeping cars, and a caboose. This train had left the last preceding station about four minutes behind the regular train, and was run at high speed (about 60 miles an hour or faster over a line where the grade was descending at 40 feet per mile)—so high that on approaching the station the engineman was unable to obey the stop signal given by the flagman of the train standing at the station, who had gone back about 1,400 feet and who was in a position where the engineman of the troop train could see the flag in time to have a space of about 2,000 feet in which to stop. He was unable to do this, and his engine struck the standing train while running at about 20 miles an hour. This engineman was held responsible for the collision, and the conductor of the train also for permitting the excessive speed. Both of these men, as well as those in charge of the regular train, were also held blameworthy for not complying with the rules regarding despatcher's orders, the regular train having passed the extra train without authority when the men of both trains held orders under which the extra train should have kept ahead. Of the 28 cars in the extra train 24 were air braked.

Collision No. 30 occurred about 6.15 a.m. on a line worked by the telegraph block system. Southbound passenger train No. 33 of the Southern Railway left Rangoon, Va., at 6.06 a. m., and after running about 1½ miles was stopped by the automatic application of the air brakes, caused by the parting of the train, the parting being due to the failure of the drawbar of an express car in which the coupler was defective. About three or four minutes after the train had come to a stop it was run into at the rear by a following passenger train, No. 37, and the rear car of the standing train was crushed, 7 persons in it being killed. Eight persons on the train were injured. Train No. 37 had passed Rangoon at 6.14 a. m., the signalman at that point giving it a clear block signal. This signalman, 22 years of age, and in the service of the company two and one-half years, asserts that the signalman at Lawyers, the south end of the block section, had reported the passage of No. 33. The signalman at Lawyers denies this, and his records, on which no entry was made for No. 33, bear out his statement. The flagman of train No. 33 had gone back between 300 and 400 yards to warn the following train, but the line of the road at this point is descending about 60 feet to the mile, the train was running at high speed, and the flag signal was unavailing. This collision, like No. 23, may be made the subject of a special report.

TABLE No. 3.—Details of Table 1—Causes of accidents to employees in coupling and uncoupling cars.

Sub-	Causes.		rain- ien.	me	ain- en in erds.	Yard trainmen (switch- ing crews).		Other employees.	
class.		Killed.	Injured.	Killed.	Injured.	Killed.	Injured.	Killed.	Injured.
1 2 3 4 5	Adjusting coupler with foot  Adjusting coupler, cars accidentally started  Careless manipulation of uncoupling lever  Cars not equipped with automatic coupler  Coupler broken, using link and pin, or chain	2	14 6 6 3 10		9 6 2 1 4	2	35 10 13 2 6	1	2 1 5 1
6 7 8	Coupling damaged cars  Coupling with chain or other emergency appliance on curve too sharp for automatic coupling  Coupling with chain or other emergency appliance because of uneven track	1	12 4 1		10	4	29 9	 1	3
9 10 11	Coupling or uncoupling safety chains Fingers or hand caught between uncoupling lever and body of car. Uncoupling without using lever (unnecessary)	1	66 8	1	37 6		11 97 8		3
12 13	Uncoupling without using lever, uncoupling lever not in working order.  Foot caught in frog, switch, or guard rail		42	1	24 2	5 3	94 8		2
14 15	Opening or closing knuckle when cars were near together, miscalculated speed Opening knuckle when cars were near together, engine accidentally started	3	34 5	2	14 2	3	48 6	1	1
. 16 17	Opening knuckle, part of defective coupler fell on foot.  Opening knuckle, lost footing	i	5 10	<b>.</b>	8	1	13 14		1
18 19 20	Riching on car to uncouple, slipped of	1	5 8	••••	5 2	3 2	16 17	• • • •	2
21	caught by unexpected movement of car, due to mistake or misunderstanding in giving hand sig-	2	24	2	11		23	•	1
22 23 24	nals. Uncoupling moving cars and last footing. Parts hard to move, causing delay Went between cars unnecessarily and contrary to	i	8 7 4	2 1	3 4 5	4	5 25 8		
25	rule  Hand caught between projecting load and end of next car	1	14		7 2	1	22 4	2	1
26 27 28	No witness (fatal injury) Other causes (see detailed list below) Unexplained	1	7	5	1 3	9	17 16	2	3
	Total	17	319	20	175	40	556	7	33

#### Details of injuries included in Table No. 3, subclass 27.

- O. 1. Scalded by hot water from engine.
- O. 2. Glove caught on lever and threw man on track.
- O. 3. Stepped on nail in board and punctured foot.
- O. 4. Door fell off car on arm.
- O. 5. Torpedo exploded, cutting leg.
- O. 6. Uncoupling; caught hand on nail.
- O. 7. Caught foot between ties, spraining ankle.
- O. 8. Stepped on lump of coal, injuring foot.
- N. 1. Adjusting coupler, struck with pin by fellow-employee.
- N. 2. Coat caught on coupler, throwing man under car.
- N. 3. Hatch of ice tank fell on head.
- N. 4. Car ran over scantling, which flew, striking man on legs, knocking him down.
- N. 5. Board fell from top of car on hand.
- N. 6. Air hose burst, striking leg.
- N. 7. Hand slipped off ice-covered lever and struck corner of car.
- N. 8. Leg cut by piece of exploding torpedo.
- N. 9. Apron of car fell down, cutting lip.
- N. 10. Caught between lever and car sill; squeezed about stomach.

- N. 11. Scalded by hot water from injector.
- N. 12. Piece of coal fell off tank on foot.
- D. 1. Lever on car struck face.
- D. 2. Stepped on piece of coal, spraining ankle.
- D. 3. Coat sleeve caught on lifting lever.
- D. 4. Standing on gondola with foot inside, load shifted, crushing foot.
- D. 5. Caught foot in rope on ground, spraining ankle.
- D. 6. Stepped on nail in board.
- D. 7. Lump of coal fell off car on foot.
- D. 8. Cutting off car, struck on head by pole of poling car.
- D. 9. Had hand on end gate of car loaded with steel, load shifted, mashing fingers.

Table No. 3a.—Details of Table 1—Nature of injuries to employees in coupling and uncoupling cars.

Injuries.	Train- men.	Train- men in yards.	Yard train- men.	Other em- ployees.	
Loss of feet. Loss of legs. Loss of arms Loss of hands Loss of fingers. Loss of toes. Fractured skull Fractured leg Fractured collar bone or ribs. Fractured, other bones. Contusion of head or body Contusion or laceration of feet. Contusion or laceration of legs Contusion or laceration of arms. Contusion or laceration of hands Contusion or laceration of fingers. Dislocation. Internal injuries Sprains. Miscellaneous  Total injuries Killed	19 2 14 5 10 10 43 17 9 14 27 43 100 8	3 1 2 3 5 5 1 2 5 25 13 4 8 6 30 56 1 2 3 3 3	6 3 5 1 23 2 1 5 8 10 15 83 46 12 31 47 67 159 1 10 21 6	33	
Total killed and injured	336	195	596	40	

KilledInjured	
Total killed and injured	. 1, 167

TABLE No. 4.—Details of Table 1—Causes of accidents to employees clussified (Co and C7) as falling from and getting on or off cars and engines.

Sub- class.	Causes.		rain- nen.	me	ain- en in tds.	Yard trainmen (switch- ing crews).		Other em- ployees.	
			Injured.	Killed.	Injured.	Killed.	Injured.	Killed.	Injured.
1 2 3 4	Fell from roof of box car by reason of— Defect in car Ice or snow. Parting of train Derailment, collision, or shock due to abnormal movements of cars other than those in	1	6 10 9	1	4 8 9	1	8 6 9		2 3
C6 5	subclass 8 While setting brakes. Fell from—	8	52 41	3	31 30	5 5	90 57	4	6 5
6 7 8 9 10	Coal car Freight car other than box or coal car Engine or tender. Passenger car Engines, tenders, or cars (all kinds) not in	8 10	11 45 147 8	4	4 11 69 4	3 10 2	12 12 51	2 4 4	5 16 16 3
11 12 (13 14 15	motion  Miscellaneous causes.  Not clearly explained.  Slipped getting on moving trains or cars  Jumping off moving trains.  Jumping from engines or cars anticipating colli-	10 20 12 8	83 280 55 136 163	3 6 2 1		9 13 7	25 208 46 58 107	1 7 3 5 5	39 68 16 46 53
C7 16 17 18	sion, derailment, or other accident Fell from engines or cars by reason of defective handholds and sill steps Getting on or off moving engine Caught in frog, guard rail, or switch	3 7	70 39 224	1 7 1		12	12 48 161 15	6	8 4 40
(10	Total	!	1,386	30		71	925	41	331

#### [Public—No. 171.]

AN ACT Requiring common carriers engaged in interstate commerce to make full reports of all accidents to the Interstate Commerce Commission.

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, It shall be the duty of the general manager, superintendent, or other proper officer of every common carrier engaged in interstate commerce by railroad to make to the Interstate Commerce Commission, at its office in Washington, District of Columbia, a monthly report, under oath, of all collisions of trains or where any train or part of a train accidentally leaves the track, and of all accidents which may occur to its passengers or employees while in the service of such common carrier and actually on duty, which report shall state the nature and causes thereof, and the circumstances connected therewith.

SEC. 2. That any common carrier failing to make such report within thirty days after the end of any month shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor and, upon conviction thereof by a court of competent jurisdiction, shall be punished by a fine of not more than one hundred dollars for each and every offense and for every day during which it shall fail to make such report after the time herein specified for making the same.

SEC. 3. That neither said report nor any part thereof shall be admitted as evidence or used for any purpose against such railroad so making such report in any suit or

action for damages growing out of any matter mentioned in said report.

SEC. 4. That the Interstate Commerce Commission is authorized to prescribe for such common carriers a method and form for making the reports in the foregoing section provided.

Approved, March 3, 1901.

#### SPECIAL INFORMATION CONTAINED IN PRECEDING BULLETINS. a

Each accident bulletin contains tables showing the number of passengers and employees killed and injured, and these figures are classified according to cause (see Table No. 1); also tables showing cost of the different classes of train accidents. The causes of accidents to employees in coupling and uncoupling and in falling from cars, etc., are further classified in Tables No. 3 and No. 4. The most serious collisions and derailments are dealt with in a supplementary table (Class A) showing the causes in some detail. Each bulletin is for three months, and No. 1 was for the quarter ending September 30, 1901. The bulletin for the quarter ending June 30 contains, in addition to the quarterly statistics, tables showing the same information for the whole of the fiscal year ending on that date.

Bulletin No. 17 records one collision, killing 6 and injuring 35 persons, and one derailment, killing 15 and injuring 28. The collision, occurring at 1 a.m., was due-to gross negligence on the part of the men in charge of a freight train. The derailment was due to an open draw. The drawbridge was not provided with interlocked signals, and the engineman was not adequately acquainted with the line of the road. A collision and a derailment are reported which were due to the lack of suitable detector bars at switches and a collision which was due to

failure of "controlled manual" block signal working.

Bulletin No. 18 shows total casualties much larger than in the preceding quarters, due largely no doubt to an enormous increase in traffic. Many accidents are reported in which the men had been on duty excessively long hours. One collision, killing 17 persons, was due to the error of an engineman of five months' experience, who ran past five warning signals. Another collision, killing 10 persons, was due to the failure of the men in charge of a freight train to identify opposing passenger trains. One derailment of a passenger train, killing 13 persons, was reported as due to some cause that could not be discovered.

Bulletin No. 19 is like Bulletin 18 in showing a large number of causalties. One butting collision, due to failure of train dispatching, caused 34 deaths and 24 injuries and \$50,000 damages, besides the damages for deaths and injuries of persons. One collision was due to the negligence of men who had been worked flagrantly long hours. Particulars are given of a number of collisions due to complicated

and unusual causes.


Bulletin No. 20 shows total deaths greater than in the corresponding quarter of the previous year, but the number of passengers and employees killed in train accidents was considerably smaller. The most serious accident in this bulletin was a butting collision of passenger trains, due to misinterpretation of a dispatcher's order by a pilot; 10 persons killed, 38 injured. One derailment, unexplained,

train running slowly, caused 9 deaths and 18 injuries.

Bulletin No. 21 contains the record of only one train accident—a collision—in which more than 10 persons were killed, but the totals of casualties of all classes are large, no improvement being shown over preceding quarters. Number of passengers killed in train accidents, 52. One collision, killing 17 and injuring 56, was due to confusion of telegraphic orders; one derailment, killing 9 and injuring 43, was at a misplaced switch, and another, killing 7 and injuring 40, was due to excessive speed.

a For notes on Bulletins 1 to 16, inclusive, see Bulletin No. 17.





**E**0

L.A. Interstate Commerce Commission Washington, D. C.


# Accident Bulletin


No. 23


January, February, and March 1907



Washington
Government Printing Office
1907







# Proposition in the Accident Bulletin No. 23

## Showing

# Collisions and Derailments of Trains

# Casualties to Persons

during the months of

January, February, and March, 1907

INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMMISSION WASHINGTON, D. C.



Washington:: Government Printing Office:: 1907

## THE INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMMISSION.

Hon. MARTIN A. KNAPP, of New York, Chairman.

Hon. JUDSON C. CLEMENTS, of Georgia.

Hon. CHARLES A. PROUTY, of Vermont.

Hon. FRANCIS M. COCKRELL, of Missouri.

Hon. FRANKLIN K. LANE, of California.

Hon. EDGAR E. CLARK, of Iowa.

Hon. JAMES S. HARLAN, of Illinois.

\*EDWARD A. MOSELEY, Secretary.

ACCIDENT BULLETIN No. 23.

## RAILROAD ACCIDENTS IN THE UNITED STATES

DURING THE

### THREE MONTHS ENDING MARCH 31, 1907.

The number of persons killed in train accidents during the months of January, February, and March, 1907, as shown in reports made by the railroad companies to the Interstate Commerce Commission under the "accident law" of March 3, 1901, was 421, and of injured 4,920. Accidents of other kinds, including those sustained by employees while at work, and by passengers in getting on or off the cars, etc., bring the total number of casualties up to 20,563 (1,293 killed and 19,270 injured). These accidents are classified in the following table. These reports deal only with (a) passengers and (b) employees on duty:<sup>a</sup>

TABLE No. 1.—Summary of casualties to persons, January, February, March, 1907. b c

	Passengers (a and b).					- l (a, b, l bb).	Tra	inmen.	Trainmen in yards.	
	Killed.	Injured.	Killed.	Injured.	Killed.	Injured.	Killed.	Injured.	Killed.	Injured.
Collisions Derailments Miscellaneous train accidents, including	46 51	1,189 928	6 7	160 122	52 58	1,349 1,050	116 68	786 483	14 2	247 36
locomotive-boiler explosions	15	<b>6</b> 6	1	9	16	75	41	242	1	57
Total train accidents	112	2,183	14	291	126	2,474	225	1,511	17	340
Coupling or uncoupling. While doing other work about trains or while attending switches.			••••				19 20	256 2,135	12 8	190 845
Coming in contact with overhead bridges, structures at side of track, etc	2	2		2	2	4	15	185	3	86
ting on or off	31 12	414 355	3 10	18 71	34 22	432 426	82 54	1,288 217	25 32	665
Total (other than train accidents)	45	771	13	91	58	862	190	4,081	80	1,891
Total ali classes	157	2,954	27	382	184	3,336	415	5,592	97	2,231

a In Table No. 1 the passengers have been divided into three classes. Class a includes all ordinary passengers. Class b includes passengers traveling on freight trains. Class bb includes persons who are customarily carried on trains under special arrangements, such as postal clerks and express messengers, employees on Pullman cars, newsboys, live-stock tenders, and men in charge of freight.

Table No. 1 is continued on next page.

Accidents to employees resulting in slight injuries which do not prevent the employee injured from performing his accustomed service for more than three days in the aggregate during the ten days immediately following the accident are not reported.

TABLE No. 1.—Summary of casualties to persons, January, February, March, 1907—Continued.

	Yard train- men (switch- ing crews).		Othe	r em- yees.		d em-	Total all persons.	
•	Killed.	Injured.	Killed.	Injured.	Killed.	Injured.	Killed.	Injured.
Collisions Derailments Miscellaneous train accidents, including	12 5	150 46	21 7	248 64	163 82	1, 431 629	215 140	2,780 1,679
locomotive-boiler explosions	3	47	5	40	50	386	66	461
Total train accidents	20	243	33	352	295	2, 446	421	4,920
Coupling or uncoupling.  While doing other work about trains or	26	473	5	28	62	947	62	947
while doing other work about trains or while attending switches.  Coming in contact with overhead bridges,	20	868	30	710	78	4, 558	78	4, 558
structures at side of track, etc	6	120	2	16	26	407	28	411
ting on or off	37 35	914 133	32 351	353 8, 901	176 472	3, 220 4, <b>35</b> 6	210 494	3, 652 4, 782
Total (other than train accidents)	124	2, 508	420	5,008	814	13, 488	872	14, 350
Total, all classes	144	2,751	453	5, 360	1, 109	15, 934	1,293	19, 270

The number of employees killed in coupling accidents in this quarter shows a diminution of 25 per cent as compared with the quarter last preceding or with that of one year ago. This is a gratifying indication of an improvement in safety appliances, which it is to be hoped will be maintained. The other principal items in the present record show no important changes as compared with the last preceding quarter, which was marked by large aggregates of both killed and injured. The number of passengers now reported killed in train accidents (126) is, indeed, 30 per cent smaller; but the record includes two collisions (Table 2a, Nos. 30 and 31) killing 41 persons and two derailments (Nos. 1 and 18) killing 41; and the total of 126 is more than twice the total of this quarter in 1906.

The principal items in the present bulletin, compared with the last preceding quarter and with the quarter one year ago, appear as follows:

	Bulletin 23.	Bulletin 22.	Bulletin 19.
1. Passengers killed in train accidents. 2. Passengers killed, all causes. 3. Employees killed in train accidents. 4. Employees killed in coupling. 5. Total passengers and employees killed, all causes.  1. Total passengers and employees killed, all causes.	184 295	180 234 294 84 1,430	62 114 212 84 1,126

The total number of collisions and derailments in the quarter now under review was 3,991 (2,078 collisions and 1,913 derailments), of which 323 collisions and 229 derailments affected passenger trains. The damage to cars, engines, and roadway by these accidents

amounted to \$3,536,110. Given more in detail, these facts appear as below:

TABLE No. 2.—Collisions and derailments, January, February, and March, 1907.

	Number.	Loss.	Persons killed.	Persons injured.
Collisions, rear Collisions, butting Collisions, trains separating Collisions, miscellaneous	279	\$499,565 630,518 52,977 652,199	50 93 2 70	586 1,101 110 983
Total	2,078	1,835,259	215	2,780
Derailments due to defects of roadway, etc.  Derailments due to defects of equipment.  Derailments due to negligence of trainmen, signalmen, etc.  Derailments due to unioreseen obstruction of track, etc.  Derailments due to malicious obstruction of track, etc.  Derailments due to miscellaneous causes.	771 122 135 16	339, 268 619, 604 73, 673 182, 645 42, 177 443, 484	23 5 32 22 5 5	323 259 227 210 79 581
Total	1,913	1,700,851	140	1,679
Total collisions and derailments	3,991	3,536,110	355	4, 459

Following is the usual list of Class A train accidents—all in which the damage is reported at \$10,000 or over; notable cases in which passengers are killed, and those doing damage less than \$10,000 and down to \$2,000, wherever the circumstances or the cause may be of particular interest:

TABLE 2a.—Causes of fifty-one prominent train accidents (Class A).

[Note.—R stands for rear collision; B, butting collision; M, miscellaneous collisions; D, derailment; P, passenger train; F, freight and miscellaneous trains.]

#### COLLISIONS.

No.	Class.	Kind of train.	Killed.	Injured.	Damage to engines, cars, and roadway.	Reference to record.	Cause.
1	M	F. and F	7	20	\$800	34	Employees killed and injured in a caboose, being pushed on yard track; butting collision; both
2	M	F. and F	O	1	1,250	64	trains disregarded yard speed limit.  Freight train moving from side track to main track at night struck by following freight. Markers had not been turned from green to red, and brakeman had turned switch without looking at electric indicator connected with automatic block signal.
3	В	F. and P	0	2	3,000	98	Empty engine started from interlocking station on wrong main track; intended to run through cross-over and signalman had cleared the signal, but did not throw crossover switch. Signal has but one arm, which is cleared for either of the two routes. Engineman on duty 17 hours.
4	M	P. and F	0	1	3,200	67	Switch out of order; signalman gave clear hand signal, assuming, erroneously, that switch had been spiked by repair man.
5	В	F and F	0	<b>7</b>	4, 118	19	Illegible train order; order written 3d 73; taken to read 2d 73; operator failed to check order when it was read aloud in his presence; dispatcher caused unnecessary confusion by putting two orders in one.
6	В	F. and F	0	1	4,582	33	Engineman misread dispatcher's order. (See note in text below.)
7	В	P. and P	1	18	4,700	23	Engineman misread name of station in dispatcher's order; order legibly written; conductor had not properly delivered order to engineman; gave order to brakeman; brakeman gave it to fireman and he to the two enginemen of the two engines.

Table 2a.—Causes of fifty-one prominent train accidents (Class A)—Continued.

COLLISIONS—Continued.

		1	1		0 . 0	10	1
No.	Class.	Kind of train.	Killed.	Injured.	Damage tengines cars, and roadway.	Reference trecord.	Cause.
8	R	F. and F	2	2	5, 250	16	Engineman ran past two automatic block signals set
9	В	F. and F	o	0	5,970	5	against him. Dispatcher sent order to 2d and 3d No. 50 when it should have been sent to 1st and 2d No. 50. (See
10	В	P. and F	1	26	6, 262	101	note in text below.) Freight train backing into side track; rear part broke loose and ran back down grade into head of passenger train. Conductor set hand brakes but could not stop cars until too late. Air brakes had been bled
11	В	P. and P	4	107	7,745	97	because of the bursting of a hose.  Regular eastbound passenger train ran past meeting
12	M	P. and F	1	42	8,000	4	point.  Misplaced switch. Switch had been opened by man in charge of freight train, intending to enter main track thinking that the passenger train (No. 4) had passed. The train which had passed was No. 2.
13	В	F. and F		2	8,500	53	Conflicting train orders, 12.30 a. m. Dispatcher at fault was 39 years old, experienced in train and telegraph work, but had served only 1 night as dispatcher. He forgot an order which had been issued by the other dispatcher about an hour before. Had not receipted for this outstanding order.
14	M	P	1 .	6	9,567	29	Misplaced switch at station. Target of switch covered with snow.
15	R	P. and P	1 1	15	10,100	30	Approached station (8 p. m.), not under control; faulty flagging.
16 17 18	R R B	F. and F P. and P F. and F	1 0 1	11	11,000 11,025 11,100	21 9 88	Excessive speed, and failure of standing train to flag. False clear block signal. (See note in text below.) Eastbound ran past signal at meeting point at 4 miles an hour.
19	В	P. and F	0	11	11,170	81	Westbound passenger train disregarded walt order. (See note in text below.)
20	В	P. and F	2	12	11,300	63	Westbound extra freight (2 a. m.) neglected to head in at entrance to side track; engineman asleep.
21	R	P. and F	б	1	11,900	6	Freight followed passenger train from station (4 a. m.) within five-minute time limit and ran into passenger train unexpectedly stopped; weather very cold.
22	R	P. and F	i '	16	12,000	55	Passenger train unexpectedly stopped (3 a. m.) run into at rear by freight. (See note in text below.)
23	M	P. and F	5	3	12,400	58	Extra freight entered main track in face of fast train, disregarding automatic indicator at switch. (See note in text below.)
24	В	P. and F	1	47	14,600	100	Eastbound freight backed into side track; neglected to set switch straight though westbound passenger train was then due. Engineman on passenger train, approaching at 50 miles an hour, had his attention diverted from switch by excited actions of freight train men.
25	M	P. and F	2	26	15,000	61	Freight on passing track fouled main track. (See note in text below.)
26	В	F. and F	1	3	15,933	59	Northbound train disregarded meeting order. The order said "meet engine 567." At the meeting point engine 565 was on the side track and this was taken for 567. The northbound train passed without stopping.
27	M	F. and F	1	1	18,844	18	Runaway on steep grade. Engineman continued using steam too long after passing summit.
28	М	P. and F		3		66	Passenger train disregarded distant and home automatic block signals; ran into side of freight train.  Fireman had called clear signals to engineman without seeing signals; engineman also ignored rule requiring an all-right hand signal at this point.
<b>29</b> <b>3</b> 0	B B	F. and F	32	3 75	31,100	8 11	Runaway on grade. (See note in text below.)  Operator failed to deliver order. (See note in text below.)
31	В	P. and F	•		48, 500	<u> </u>	Passenger train ran past block signal and freight dis- regarded time limit. (See note in text below.)
32	M	P. and F			73,625	27	Maliciously misplaced switch. Damage largely due to fire.
33	В	P. and F	5	ļ	75,300	1	Misplaced switch. (See note in text below.)
	Tota	al collisions	87	504	516,843		

TABLE 2a.—Causes of fifty-one prominent train accidents (Class A)—Continued.

DERAILMENTS.

No.	Ciass.	Kind of train.	Killed.	Injured.	Damage to engines, cars, and roadway.	Reference to record.	Cause.
1	Ď	P	19 2	140	\$2,600	79	Unexplained. (See note in text below.)
1 2 3	D D D	P	ő	15 12	5,650	106 77	Broken rail.  Derailing switch thrown under train by repairman
4	D	P	0	2	6,500	78	testing interlocking apparatus.  Broken rail. One passenger car destroyed by fire, which started in oil lamps.
5	D	P	3	3	8,747	73	Engineman (who was killed), disregarding slow order, ran into side track at 50 miles an hour. Engineman thought to have been asleep. Fireman had spoken to him about excessive speed, but not with the necessary determination and energy.
6 7 8	D	F P	1 2 1	40	9,350 10,500	76 121	Open draw. Maliciously misplaced switch.
8	D D D	P		5	11,260	82	Broken rail.
9	D	P	6	ш	15, 119	38	Misplaced switch; occurred 4 a. m. No lamp on switch. (See note in text below.)
10	D	F	0	3	16,000	37	Runaway on 3 per cent grade; negligent management of brakes. Hand brakes were in use, power brakes alone being deemed unsatisfactory for so steep a
11	D	<b>F</b>	1	1	16,750	117	Roadbed washed out at side by flood in river. Engineman is said to have been keeping good lookout and to have thought roadbed intact. Track inspected one hour before and traversed by a train 30
12	D	F	0	1	17,055	42	minutes before. Unexplained.
13 14	D D	P	3	35	18,700	47	Unexplained.
14		4 •••••	•	1	21,500	75	Switch out of order; rod maliciously loosened; switch new and in good condition 2 days before. Wreck mostly destroyed by fire, which started from heater in car or from lamps.
15	D	<b>F</b>	3	0	22,000	118	Middle pier of bridge gave way as train passed over; undermined by flood believed to have been caused by cloudburst. The dam caused by the wreck divided the stream in such a way as to destroy both abutments.
16	D	P	1	23	29, 430	60	Unexplained. Believed some part of engine broke and
17	D	P	0	44	60,000	81	fell to the ground. Speed 28 miles an hour.  Brake beam on rear truck of tender fell on track and
18	D	P	22	116	28,685	115	derailed cars.  Misplaced switch. Engineman failed to keep good lookout and approached yard at too high speed.
		derailments	65	470	299,846		(See note in text below.)
		al collisions and railments	152	974	816,689		

Collision No. 30, killing 32 persons and injuring 75, was caused by the mistake of a telegraph operator. Westbound passenger train No. 29, running from A to B, C and D, etc., had orders to meet eastbound passenger train No. 30 at C and eastbound train No. 14 at B. No. 29 train arrived at B and entered a side track opposite the station, and eastbound train No. 14 proceeded on its way. While No. 29 was on the side track, the operator was called upon by the dispatcher to take an order changing the meeting point with No. 30, making it B instead of C. According to his own statement, the operator, on receiving notice of this order to make a change, and while continuing to give his attention chiefly to the receiving of the message, went through the motion of striking the signal lever at his elbow so as to change it from the clear to the stop position, but he did not make

sure that the signal actually went to that position; and whatever he did or did not do to the lever, the signal was not caused to indicate stop. Before he had finished taking the message No. 29 backed out of the side track and proceeded westward along the main line past the station.

When the train passed his window the operator picked up his lantern and ran out in the attempt to stop it, though not so promptly as he otherwise would have done, because he thought that the train would stop for water a short distance west of the station, as was often or usually done. In giving the stop signal he swung his lantern so violently that the flame was soon extinguished. He then ran to the pump house near by and picked up the pumpman's lantern and tried to use it, but that also went out. He then ran back to the office and found that his signal was not in the stop position. The operator then decamped, first telling the dispatcher that he felt certain that a collision would occur, and that he was afraid of being mobbed. Train No. 29 went on, and a short distance west of the station collided with No. 30. The operator subsequently came back, or was brought back, and made a statement to the county attorney.

According to the rules the despatcher should not issue an order, as, for example, to a westbound train at B, requiring it to wait at B for an eastbound train of the same class, if avoidable. When unavoidable, an order may be thus issued if the superior train (the westbound) has already stopped or is scheduled to stop at that station, or has received a previous order to stop there; and provided the weather is clear and the line is sufficiently straight and level to give an approaching engineman ample time to bring his train to a stop before reaching the signal; and provided further, that in case of a passenger train two torpedoes have been placed on the rail by the operator. As No. 29 was already stopped at B, the despatcher is held by the superintendent blameless so far as this rule is concerned, though the operator, knowing the rule, should either have put down the torpedoes or else have called the conductor into the office before finally accepting the order. The operator had been in the service of the company only 5 days and at this station only He was 18 years of age, though in applying to 2 days (nights). the company for employment (and also to another company at the same time) he gave his age as 23 and averred that he had had several years' experience, when, in fact, he had worked as an operator only The report says that his size and general appearance 18 months. indicated a man much older than 18. The collision occurred about 4.25 a. m., and the operator had been on duty about 10 hours. stated that he had been awake all night, and there is no evidence of anything like intoxication.

Collision No. 31, occurring about 2.14 a. m., killing 9 persons and injuring 8, was between an eastbound passenger train and a westbound freight, the freight being at the time partly in a side track, which it was entering. The passenger train ran past a block signal set against it at F, and the collision occurred a few rods east of the signal. The passenger train was running at high speed, although there was a dense fog at the time which made it impossible to see the signal light more than a few hundred feet; and the signal which was disregarded was on a post 40 feet high and 25 feet to the left of the track. The engineman chargeable with this neglect was a man of experience and his record was one of the best on the road. asserted that the block signal indicated clear and that his speed was low—about 25 or 30 miles an hour; but these statements are both disproved by conclusive evidence to the contrary. The men in charge of the freight train are also held blameworthy in connection with this collision, as, notwithstanding the protection afforded to their movement by the block signal at F, the rule required that freights should in all cases be clear of the main track 5 minutes before the time for the arrival of any passenger train.

Collision No. 6, occurring about 2 a. m., was due to the engineman of a freight train misreading a dispatcher's order. He was running in the inferior direction and received an order making his train superior from A to C. Subsequently he received another order modifying this. This second order contained instructions concerning five meeting or waiting points and mentioned two trains besides his own. tained four complete sentences. The engineman, in reading, ran the second and third sentences together and wrongfully assumed that two superior trains were to wait for him at a certain station, when the order in fact named only one of those trains as being required thus to wait. This second order was not delivered to the conductor of the train. It was on Form 19, not requiring signatures, and was delivered by the operator to a man on the engine of the train as it slowly passed his station, but it was not delivered to the conductor, who was on the rear end of the train, because neither the conductor nor the rear brakeman was in position on the step of the caboose to receive the order as the station was passed. The engineman, though having received his copy of the order, should not have continued on his journey beyond that station without a hand signal from the conductor This he did not receive, the conductor and rear braketo proceed. man having ignored the stop signal.

Collision No. 9 was due to the error of a dispatcher in sending an order to the wrong train. He sent the order to station A and to station D, giving an extra westbound train right over the first and second sections of an eastbound regular train from A to D, but in

sending the order to D he addressed it to the conductor and engineman of the second and third sections of the regular train. The first section had already left D and the dispatcher was aware of the fact. He seems to have assumed that the address of the order as sent to D corresponded with the statement in the body of the order, when in fact it did not correspond. The station operator who received the order at D did not discover the discrepancy, nor was it noticed by the operator at A.

Collision No. 17, occurring in the middle of the night, took place on a line worked by manual block signals, communication from cabin to cabin being by bell code. The signalman at A, 45 years old, and in the service of this company 8 months as signalman (and formerly as brakeman), appears to have given a clear signal to the second train when he was not certain of the information he had received from station B. He claims to have received "four bells," meaning "block clear," but the signalman at B claims that he sent five bells, meaning block not clear. The signalman at A appears to have been in doubt concerning the bell signal and yet he did not ask B to repeat it. Both signalmen are reported as of good habits and good records. A large part of the damage incident to this accident was caused by a fire which was started by coals from the fire box of the locomotive.

Collision No. 19 was due to negligence on the part of both the conductor and the engineman of a passenger train. They had received an order to wait at S until 8.45 a. m., but passed that station at about 8.38, although the order had been given to them only about 13 minutes before. The conductor entirely forgot the order and he was dismissed. The engineman had misread the order and thought that he had a right to go to another station farther on. As he was passing S the fireman looked at his watch and spoke to the engineman; but the engineman, in response to this, simply pulled the order out of his pocket and handed it to the fireman without looking at it, evidently having no doubt that his reading of the order had been correct. Before the fireman had time to finish reading the order the collision occurred. Both the conductor and engineman were men of long experience. They had been on duty about 3 hours.

Collision No. 22 was due to the inefficiency of the flagman of a passenger train. This flagman, 24 years of age, who had been in the service about 3 months, started out to flag the following train, but took neither torpedoes nor fusees. After going a short distance he returned to his train to get his overcoat, and before he could again go out a sufficient distance for his signal to be of any use the following train was upon him.

Collision No. 23, between a fast first-class train and a switching freight, was due to the carelessness of a brakeman of the freight train, who turned the switch from the main track to a siding without heeding the indication of the electric visual signal, which would

have warned him that the fast train was approaching. The line at this point is equipped with automatic track-circuit block signals, and the fast train had already passed the point at which it set the switch indicator when the switch was turned. This train occupied only about 1 minute and 36 seconds in running from the signal at the entrance of the block section to the misplaced switch, and when it came on, at full speed, the freight had just fouled the main track. The brakeman at fault had been in the service of the road about 14 months. The enginemen had told him particularly to look at the indicator before turning the switch. It is possible that he looked at the indicator, but allowed considerable time to elapse after looking before turning the switch, the fast train meantime passing the block signal showing clear. Another collision in this quarter (No. 2 in the table) was due to the neglect of a trainman to make proper use of an automatic indicator at a switch.

Collision No. 25 was due to inefficient management of brakes. The freight train, west bound, running slowly along a passing track while waiting for a passenger train moving in the same direction, was allowed to run a few feet too far at the end of the passing track and so fouled the main line. The passenger train, coming along just at that moment at full speed, struck the freight, and the passenger engine was overturned. The freight train consisted of 23 cars, but had air brakes in use on only 4 cars. The engineman asserted that he was ignorant of the fact that the other 19 cars had been disconnected. At a station about 4 miles back a nonair car had been put in the fore part of the train with the view of saving time at the next station, where that car was to be left. One of the brakemen claimed to have informed the engineman about the change in braking power.

Collision No. 29 was due to a freight train becoming uncontrollable on a steep grade about 2 a. m. The men in charge of the train were experienced, but appear to have exercised poor judgment. It is believed, though not proved, that an angle cock had been shut at the third car from the engine, so that the air brakes were not effective on that part of the train behind the third car, and for this misplacement of the cock the conductor and engineman are held responsible. Aside from this, however, these men had allowed the train to attain too high speed before taking action to check the speed, and, in addition to this, the brakeman at the rear of the train, who should have opened the conductor's brake valve when the engineman sounded the alarm whistle, neglected to do so.

Collision No. 33 was due to a misplaced switch and occurred about 9 p. m. A northbound passenger train, running at full speed, entered a siding and struck a southbound freight train which was standing there. Both engines were demolished and from their fire boxes the wreck took fire, 3 Pullman cars and 11 freight cars being

completely destroyed. The switch had been left wrong by an employee of another road, the side track being used in common by the two roads as a connecting track.

Derailment No. 1, killing 19 persons and injuring 149, is reported as "cause unknown," the railroad company stating that its investigation into the circumstances of the accident has not yet been completed. The train derailed consisted of five passenger cars, drawn by two electric motors. It was running at full speed on a curve of 3°, the outer rail of which was superelevated 4½ inches. cars were overturned. The track consisted of rails weighing 100 pounds to the yard, laid on 21 ties to each 33 feet, with tie plates. The ballast was stone and the whole track was well built and maintained. In the cab of the leading motor were four men, the engineman, his helper, an electrical inspector, and the assistant superintendent of the division. These men estimate the speed of the train at the time of the derailment at 45 to 50 miles an hour, which estimate is corroborated by the record at the last block signal station, compared with that at the power house, where note of the time was made when power was automatically shut off by the breaking of the thirdrail electrical conductor at the moment when the cars jumped the track. The report of the railroad company further says that in making a test run some time after the accident, with a train made up like that which was wrecked and with all conditions similar, the speed proved to be 48 miles an hour at the point of the accident. A careful examination was made of the track and wreckage immediately after the derailment, but although indentations were found on wheels and rails, it was impossible to determine whether these marks had anything to do with the cause of the derailment, or were only effects.

Derailment No. 18 appears to have resulted from gross negligence on the part of a number of different persons. A passenger train approaching an important station at high speed was derailed at a misplaced switch. The train was run not only in disregard of a rule requiring trains to be run within the yard limits with speed under control, but also apparently with recklessness as regards the switch, which was misplaced and which caused the derailment; for it appears that the air brakes on the train which, according to all the available evidence, were in good order, had not been applied before the engine ran off the track. The engineman was fatally injured, dying eleven days after the accident, and he made no intelligible statement. The train consisted of an engine and 14 cars. Six of these cars were completely broken up, and three others were badly wrecked. Most of the passengers who were killed were riding in two ordinary cars, not vestibuled, which were the first two cars in the train, while the cars behind these were not only heavier but were, most of them, vestibuled. The train, running at from 50 to 65 miles an hour, ran over the misplaced switch

and entered the side track at such high speed that the engine was overturned at a point a few feet beyond the point where it left the main track. This switch was 1,585 feet within the yard limit. There was a good view of the switch from the approaching train. The engineman of the passenger train was an experienced employee of this road, but the men in charge of the switching engine, who had left the switch set in the wrong position and unattended, were comparatively new to their work. The foreman of the crew had been employed at this point only four weeks, though he had had railroad experience before. The switchman who was immediately responsible had worked in this yard about six weeks, but had had several years' experience in railroad work. The engineman and fireman of the switching engine had worked in this yard only three days.

Derailment No. 9, occurring about 4 a. m. and causing the death of 4 passengers and of the engineman and fireman, happened at a misplaced facing-point switch, the speed of the train at the time being about 35 miles an hour. The switch was found locked in position for the side track. It had been used by a freight train about 40 minutes before, but the question who was blameworthy for the misplacement has not been settled. The switch had no lamp, being a new one. The lamp had been received for it, and it was to have been put in position the next day. The engine was equipped with an electric headlight, by the aid of which the engineman could undoubtedly have seen the position of the switch target in season to stop the train before reaching the switch; but from the position in which the dead body of the engineman was found after the derailment it is concluded that he was not keeping a good lookout. There is evidence that he had crouched down behind the boiler head to light a cigar.

Explosion.—One of the most serious train accidents occurring in the quarter under review was due to an explosion. It is not classed either as a collision or a derailment, and therefore does not appear in Table 2a. In this accident 14 passengers and two other persons were killed and 33 passengers and six other persons were injured. The victims were on a passenger train approaching a small station, at low speed, and the deaths and injuries were due to an explosion of powder in a car of a freight train standing on a side track. The explosion, from some cause unknown, occurred just at the moment that the express car of the passenger train passed the powder car. The passenger cars were wrecked and the total amount of damage to the cars and locomotive was \$11,300. The freight car in question contained 500 kegs of powder. It was stationary at the time and had been so for at least 12 minutes. There had been heavy continuous rains for several hours previous. The car containing the powder was comparatively new. After an exhaustive investigation by officers of the road the cause of the explosion still remained a mystery.

Table. No. 3.—Details of Table No. 1—Causes of accidents to employees in coupling and uncoupling cars.

Sub-	Causes.		rain- ien.	m	rain- en in irds.	Yard trainmen (switch- ing crews.)		Other employees.	
class.		Killed.	Injured.	Killed.	Injured.	Killed.	Injured.	Killed.	Injured.
1 2 3 4	Adjusting coupler with foot		16 5 1	 	9 6 2 2	i i	33 13 4 2		1 1
5 6 7	Coupler broken, using link and pin or chain		7 11	1	10	8	6 <b>26</b>	1	2
8	on curve too sharp for automatic coupling		6		1	2	8	1	
9 10	Coupling or uncoupling safety chains.  Fingers or hand caught between uncoupling lever and body of car.		<b>4 50</b>		3 43		91		8
11 12		1	33	<b>,</b>	21		8 64	'	1
13 14	Foot caught in frog, switch, or guard rail Opening or closing knuckle when cars were near together, miscalculated speed	1 1	3 24	1 3	13	<b>2</b>	5 38	1 1	2
15	Opening knuckle when cars were near together, engine accidentally started		2	1	3		7	•	1
16 17	Opening knuckle, part of defective coupler fell on foot	 	3 7	· i	9	· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·	9 16	ا : 1	2 2
18 19	Riding on car to uncouple, slipped off	1	13		5 5	1	12 15		
20 21	Caught by unexpected movement of car, due to slack running in	2	20		17	1	28		2
22 23	nals. Uncoupling moving cars and lost footing. Parts hard to move, causing delay.	3 2	104		5 3 6	2 1	7 19 6		<b>2</b>
24 25	Went between cars unnecessarily and contrary to rule	4	14	2	7	1	32	1	1
26 27 28	next car. No witness (fatal injury) Other causes (see detailed list below) Unexplained	•••	1 8 1	3	3 5	4	8 7 3	• • • •	••••
	Total	19	256	12	190	26	473	5	28

#### Details of injuries included in Table No. 3, subclass 27.

- J. 1. Torpedo exploded and piece cut leg.
- J. 2. Lumber on car shifted, catching man's head.
- J. 3. Head caught by projecting log on car. Killed.
- J. 4. End gate of car fell on foot.
- J. 5. Car ran over torpedo which exploded, cutting thigh.
- J. 6. Lump of coal fell on foot.
- J. 7. Brake wheel fell off car, striking man on head.
- J. 8. Lump of coal fell on hand.
- J. 9. Carelessly left foot on rail and wheel ran over it.
- J. 10. Cars accidentally uncoupled and steam from steam pipe scalded man.
- F. 1. Piece of coal fell off car on foot.
- F. 2. Rail projecting from car caught head.
- F. 3. Cut hand on projecting bolt.
- F. 4. Riding on car and load shifted, cutting hand.
- F. 5. Struck by car on adjacent track.
- M. 1. Lump of coal fell from car on head.
- M. 2. Torpedo exploded and piece flew, cutting abdomen.
- M. 3. Lump of coal fell from car on head.
- M. 4. Piece of coal rolled off tender and struck man on head.
- M. 5. On viaduct; fell through viaduct to ground below.

TABLE 3A.—Nature of injuries to employees in coupling and uncoupling cars.

Injuries.	Train- men.	Train- men in yards.	Yard train- men.	Other em- ployees.
oss of feet	2	3 3	6	
oss of arms	5	1	7	
oss of fingers	2 11	7	20	
oss of toes	1		1	
ractured skullractured leg	2	2	4	
ractured armractured collar bone or ribs	3 9	3	8 10	
ractured other bones	6	4	13	
ontusion of head or body	40 24	35 14	74 40	
ontusion or laceration of toes	5	8 1	8	1 1
ontusion or laceration of legs	5 12	8 10	36 24	
ontusion or laceration of hands.	35 73	26	55 133	1
ontusion or laceration of fingers.	13	60 1	133	
nternal injuries	7 8	2 3	5 17	
hock				
(iscellaneous	5		1	
Total injuries	256 19	190 12	473 26	2
Total killed and injured	275	202	499	3:
RECAPITULATION otal killed	· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·			6

TABLE No. 4.—Details of Table No. 1—Causes of accidents to employees classified (C6 and C7) as falling from and getting on or off cars and engines.

Sub-	Causes.		rain- nen.	Train- men in yards.		Yard trainmen (switch- ing crews).		Other employees.	
class.		Killed.	Injured.	Killed.	Injured.	Killed.	Injured.	Killed.	Injured.
1 2 3 4	Fell from roof of box car by reason of— Defect in car. Ice or snow. Parting of train. Derailment, collision, or shock due to abnormal movements of cars other than those in	2	1 18 14		2 10 9	1	15 8		1 3 3
C6 5	mai movements of cars other than those in subclass 3	3	41 35	1	27 32	5 2	73 57	2	4 2
6 7 8 9	Coal car. Freight car other than box or coal car. Engine or tender. Passenger car. Engines, tenders, or cars (all kinds) not in mo-	1 12	36 130 16	2 5	3 19 90 5	1 4	10 20 50 3	3 1 3	10 13 19 5
11 12 13 14	tion  Miscellaneous causes  Not clearly explained  Slipped getting on moving trains or cars  Jumping off moving trains  Jumping from engines or cars anticipating colli-	1 17 20 7	233 68 124	3 5	50 99 25 72 66	. 8 4	26	2 ;	48 65 6 64 59
C7 16	sion, derailment, or other accident Fell from engines or cars by reason of defective handholds and sill steps Getting on or off moving engine	···.	45	4,	8 24 121	3	17 36 132	4	5 4 41
(18	Caught in frog, guard rail, or switch  Total			25	665	37	914	32	353

#### [Public—No. 171.]

AN ACT requiring common carriers engaged in interstate commerce to make full reports of all accidents to the Interstate Commerce Commission.

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, It shall be the duty of the general manager, superintendent, or other proper officer of every common carrier engaged in interstate commerce by railroad to make to the Interstate Commerce Commission, at its office in Washington, District of Columbia, a monthly report, under oath, of all collisions of trains or where any train or part of a train accidentally leaves the track, and of all accidents which may occur to its passengers or employees while in the service of such common carrier and actually on duty, which report shall state the nature and causes thereof and the circumstances connected therewith.

SEC. 2. That any common carrier failing to make such report within thirty days after the end of any month shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor and, upon conviction thereof by a court of competent jurisdiction, shall be punished by a fine of not more than one hundred dollars for each and every offense and for every day during which it shall fail to make such report after the time herein specified for making the same.

SEC. 3. That neither said report nor any part thereof shall be admitted as evidence or used for any purpose against such railroad so making such report in any suit or action

for damages growing out of any matter mentioned in said report.

SEC. 4. That the Interstate Commerce Commission is authorized to prescribe for such common carriers a method and form for making the reports in the foregoing section provided.

Approved, March 3, 1901.

#### SPECIAL INFORMATION CONTAINED IN PRECEDING BULLETINS.4

Each accident bulletin contains tables showing the number of passengers and employees killed and injured, and these figures are classified according to cause (see Table No. 1); also tables showing cost of the different classes of train accidents. The causes of accidents to employees in coupling and uncoupling and in falling from cars, etc., are further classified in Tables No. 3 and No. 4. The most serious collisions and derailments are dealt with in a supplementary table (Class A) showing the causes in some detail. Each bulletin is for three months, and No. 1 was for the quarter ending September 30, 1901. The bulletin for the quarter ending June 30 contains, in addition to the quarterly statistics, tables showing the same information for the whole of the fiscal year ending on that date.

Bulletin No. 17 records one collision, killing 6 and injuring 35 persons, and one derailment, killing 15 and injuring 28. The collision, occurring at 1 a. m., was due to gross negligence on the part of the men in charge of a freight train. The derailment was due to an open draw. The drawbridge was not provided with interlocked signals, and the engineman was not adequately acquainted with the line of the road. A collision and a derailment are reported which were due to the lack of suitable detector bars at switches and a collision which was due to failure of

"controlled manual" block signal working.

Bulletin No. 18 shows total casualties much larger than in the preceding quarters, due largely, no doubt, to an enormous increase in traffic. Many accidents are reported in which the men had been on duty excessively long hours. One collision, killing 17 persons, was due to the error of an engineman of five months' experience, who ran past five warning signals. Another collision, killing 10 persons, was due to the failure of the men in charge of a freight train to identify opposing passenger trains. One derailment of a passenger train, killing 13 persons, was reported as due to some cause that could not be discovered.

Bulletin No. 19 is like Bulletin 18 in showing a large number of casualties. One butting collision, due to failure of train dispatching, caused 34 deaths and 24 injuries and \$50,000 damages, besides the damages for deaths and injuries of persons. One collision was due to the negligence of men who had been worked flagrantly long hours. Particulars are given of a number of collisions due to complicated and

unusual causes.

Bulletin No. 20 shows total deaths greater than in the corresponding quarter of the previous year, but the number of passengers and employees killed in train accidents was considerably smaller. The most serious accident in this bulletin was a butting collision of passenger trains, due to misinterpretation of a dispatcher's

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>a</sup> For notes on Bulletins 1 to 16, inclusive, see Bulletin No. 17.

order by a pilot; 10 persons killed, 38 injured. One derailment, unexplained,


train running slowly, caused 9 deaths and 18 injuries.

Bulletin No. 21 contains the record of only one train accident—a collision—in which more than 10 persons were killed, but the totals of casualties of all classes are large, no improvement being shown over preceding quarters. Number of passengers killed in train accidents, 52. One collision, killing 17 and injuring 56, was due to confusion of telegraphic orders; one derailment, killing 9 and injuring 43, was at a misplaced switch, and another, killing 7 and injuring 40, was due to excessive speed.

Bulletin No. 22 shows 180 passengers killed in train accidents—a number larger than that in any other bulletin, except No. 13. One rear collision in the District of Columbia caused the death of 43 passengers and the injury of 63. A butting collision killed 43 persons and injured 155, the bodies of the killed being consumed by fire. In the derailment of a passenger train at a drawbridge 57 persons were

killed and 36 injured.

O



U5 IS

			•	
	,			
•				
			•	
		•		
		•		
•				

## Showing

# Collisions and Derailments of Trains

and

# Casualties to Persons

during the months of

April, May, and June, 1907

with

Tables for the year ending June 30, 1907

INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMMISSION WASHINGTON. D. C.



Washington:: Government Printing Office:: 1907

## THE INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMMISSION.

Hon. MARTIN A. KNAPP, of New York, Chairman.

Hon. JUDSON C. CLEMENTS, of Georgia.

Hon. CHARLES A. PROUTY, of Vermont.

Hon. FRANCIS M. COCKRELL, of Missouri.

Hon. FRANKLIN K. LANE, of California.

Hon. EDGAR E. CLARK, of Iowa.

Hon. JAMES S. HARLAN, of Illinois.

EDWARD A. MOSELEY, Secretary.

#### ACCIDENT BULLETIN No. 24.

### RAILROAD ACCIDENTS IN THE UNITED STATES

DURING THE

### THREE MONTHS ENDING JUNE 30, 1907.

The number of persons killed in train accidents during the months of April, May, and June, 1907, as shown in reports made by the rail-road companies to the Interstate Commerce Commission, under the "accident law" of March 3, 1901, was 250, and of injured 4,124. Accidents of other kinds, including those sustained by employees while at work and by passengers in getting on or off cars, etc., bring the total number of casualties up to 19,711 (1,065 killed and 18,646 injured). These accidents are classified in the following table. These reports deal only with (a) passengers and (b) employees on duty.<sup>a</sup>

TABLE No. 1.—Casualties to persons—April, May, and June, 1907. a b c

	Passengers (a and b).		Persons carried under agreement or contract (bb).		Total (a, b, and bb).		Trainmen.		Trainmen in yards.	
	Killed.	Injured.	Killed.	Injured.	Killed.	Injured.	Killed.	Injured.	Killed.	Injured.
Collisions.  Derailments  Miscellaneous train accidents, includ-	5 34	626	2 7	102 132	7 41	728 1,293	50 63	501 445	13 6	198 54
ing locomotive boiler explosions  Total train accidents	39	1,816	9	238	48	2,054	19	1,219	19	76 328
Coupling or uncoupling							19 21	260 1,954	13 13	179 6 <b>6</b> 9
bridges, structures at side of track, etc. Falling from cars or engines or while getting on or off. Other causes.	1 43 11	542 505	6 2	3 16 67	1 49 13	558 572	31 65 44	198 1,157 176	3 34 29	65 574 78
Total (other than train accidents)	55	1,051	8	86	63	1,137	180	3,745	' !	1,565
Total all classes	94	2,867	17	324	111	3, 191	312	4,964	111	1,893

a In Table No. 1 the passengers have been divided into three classes. Class a includes all ordinary passengers. Class b includes passengers traveling on freight trains. Class bb includes persons who are customarily carried on trains under special arrangements, such as postal clerks and express messengers, employees on Pullman cars, newsboys, live-stock tenders, and men in charge of freight.

b Table No. 1 is continued on next page.
c Accidents to employees resulting in slight injuries which do not prevent the employee injured from performing his accustomed service for more than three days in the aggregate during the ten days immediately following the accident are not reported.

TABLE No. 1.—Casualties to persons—April, May, and June, 1907—Continued.

	n (swi	train- nen tching ws).	Other employees.		Total employees.		Total all persons.	
	Killed.	Injured.	Killed.	Injured.	Killed.	Injured.	Killed.	Injured.
Collisions.  Derailments  Miscellaneous train accidents, including	9 5	92 77	24	200 97	96 83	991 673	103 124	1,719 1,966
locomotive boiler explosions	1	32	3	25	23	406	23	439
Total train accidents	15	201	36	322	202	2,070	250	4, 124
Coupling or uncoupling.	35	502	5	32	72	973	72	973
While doing other work about trains or while attending switches.  Coming in contact with overhead bridges,	15	805	27	815	76	4,243	76	4, 243
structures at side of track, etc	6	93	· i	21	40	377	41	384
ting on or off	56 23	880 100	39 274	413 4, 414	194 370	3,024 4,768	243 383	3, 582 5, 340
Total (other than train accidents)	135	2,380	345	5, 695	752	13,385	815	14, 522
Total all classes	150	2, 581	381	6,017	954	15, 455	1,065	18,646

The quarter ending with June usually shows lighter accident records than any other quarter of the year, and this is generally true in the present instance; but the principal totals are all larger than in the same quarter one year ago, as appears from the table next following. This may in large measure be accounted for by the marked and constant increase in railroad traffic. The number of passengers killed in train accidents, which fluctuates more than any other item, is very much larger than one year ago; but there is a marked diminution from the high figure reported three months ago. In the present bulletin, derailment No. 6 (Table 2a), killing 33 and injuring 19, and collision No. 1, killing 8 and injuring 37, are the extraordinary items.

Comparison of principal items with last bulletin and with one year back.

<del></del>	•		
	Bulletin 24.	Bulletin 23.	Bulletin 20.
1. Passengers killed in train accidents 2. Passengers killed, all causes 3. Employees killed in train accidents 4. Employees killed in coupling. 5. Employees killed, all causes 6. Total passengers and employees killed, all causes	111 202 72 954	126 184 295 62 1,109 1,293	27 81 167 68 882 933

The total number of collisions and derailments in the quarter now under review was 3,777 (1,806 collisions and 1,971 derailments), of which 220 collisions and 221 derailments affected passenger trains. The damage to cars, engines, and roadway by these accidents amounted to \$3,232,673. Given more in detail, these facts appear as below:

TABLE No. 2.—Collisions and derailments, April, May, and June, 1907.

	Number.	Loss.	Killed.	Injured.
Collisions, rear Collisions, butting Collisions, train separating Collisions, miscellaneous	228	\$472,031 368,239 63,521 427,453	26 45 3 29	419 717 44 539
Total	1,806	1,331,244	103	1,719
Derailments due to defects of roadway, etc	821 106 91 11 516	394, 970 672, 783 63, 682 154, 640 67, 480 547, 874	13 15 10 16 3 67	625 276 178 112 46 729
Total	1,971	1,901,429	124	1,966
Total collisions and derailments	3,777	3, 232, 673	227	3,685

Note.—Collisions and derailments which cause no death or personal injury and which cause not over \$150 damage to the property of the railroad are not reported.

Following is the usual list of Class A train accidents—all in which the damage is reported at \$10,000 or over; notable cases in which passengers are killed, and those doing damage less than \$10,000 and down to \$2,000, wherever the circumstances or the cause may be of particular interest:

TABLE 2a.—Causes of thirty-two prominent train accidents (Class A).

[Note.—R stands for rear collision; B, butting collision; M, miscellaneous collisions; D, derailment; P, passenger train; F, freight and miscellaneous trains.]

#### - COLLISIONS.

No.	Class.	Kind of train.  Pand F 8 37	Damage to engrines, cars, and roadway.	Cause.
	В	P and F 8 37 F and F 0 0	\$695 9	Disregard of telegraphic orders. See note in text below.
2		·	i i	Collision on side track. Train moving only one mile an hour, but engineman fell asleep and slept two minutes; had been on duty 21 hours.
3		P and F 0   13	!	Eastbound freight encroached on time of westbound passenger train (1 a.m.). Engineman did not know road; had taken this run by making misrepresentation.
4	В	F and F 4   33	7,000 1	6 Runaway on steep grade 3 a. m. See note in text below.
5		- '	,	Passenger train scheduled for only two days in the
6	R	F and F 0 2	10,000	7 Flagman of pushing engine failed to signal following train.

Table 2a.—Causes of thirty-two prominent train accidents (Class A)—Continued.

COLLISIONS—Continued.

_							
30	В	F and F	0	4	10, 600	72	Preight train entered yard 1 a.m with speed not un- der control.
11	В	Fand F	1	2	10, 935	33	Butting collision at water station; engineman astrep.
12	R	P and F	2	21	12,000	5	Failure of block eignaling and flagging. See note in text below
13	R	P and P	0	2	13,000	9	Runaway, due to failure of air pump, neglect to
	!	1					slacken speed on passing over summit, and failure to apply hand brakes.
14	В	P and F	1	7	13,000	12	Empty engine encroached on time of passenger train.
							Engineman's watch slow, not having been wound; engineman's experience as a runner, six months.
15	R	F and F	0	1	16,000	18	Signal cleared when track was not clear. This was
		1	ľ				made possible by the breakage of a connection at an interlocking cabin Signalman held negligent.
16	В	F and F	6	4	36, 670	14	Operator accepted order after train had passed. See
17	R	F and F	0	2	56, 889	6	note in text below.  Rear collision of freight trains in tunnel. A compara-
	K	F BOO F	۱,۰	*	00, ace		tively light train overtook a heavier one. Tune
		<i>'</i>	ļ			İ	interval at last station 10 minutes. Leading train held blameworthy for not signaling by fusce, and
		ı					the following train for running too fast. Tunnel
		1		_			lining took fire and was damaged \$50,070.
	Tota	d collisions	27	144	234, 309		
						1	
					111	ER.	AILMENTS.
_					. —	_	
1	₽	P	21	0	\$5,400	31	Excessive speed; engine running tender first.
1 2 3 4	D	F	1 0	2 26	11,000	52	Spreading of rails; roadbed softened by rain. Unknown.
4	Б	P	ĭ	20	13,000	51	Truck distorted by solar heat.
6	D	P	ŏ	0			Dook on Games Thousand ages seemaked a harden
6	The second			·	14,000	82	Broken flange. Derailed care wrecked a bridge.
7	1 2	P	33	19	14, 200	63	Unknown. See note in text below
•	Þ	1 = '					Unknown. Bee note in text below Unknown. Damage due mainly to explosions of
8	b D	1 = '	33	19	14, 200	63	Unknown. See note in text below Unknown. Damage due mainly to explosions of naphths and gunpowder Failure of bridge; bridge damaged by blasting near
8	1 10	P	33	19	14, 200 15, 900 19, 930	63 88 59	Unknown. See note in text below Unknown. Damage due mainly to explosions of naphtha and gunpowder Failure of bridge; bridge damaged by blasting near by at the moment the train entered upon it
8		P	33	19	14, 200 15, 900 19, 936 20, 032	63 88	Unknown. See note in text below Unknown. Damage due mainly to explosions of naphths and gunpowder Failure of bridge; bridge damaged by blasting near by at the moment the train entered upon it Rails maliciously loosened
10 8	D D D	P	33 0 0	19 1 1 26 1	14, 200 15, 900 19, 930 20, 032 25, 000	63 86 59 62 28	Unknown. See note in text below Unknown. Damage due mainly to explosions of naphtha and gunpowder Failure of bridge; bridge damaged by blasting near by at the moment the train entered upon it Rails maliciously loosened Landsilde in the night. Inspector had detected no indication of trouble.
8	D D	P	33 0 1	19 1 1 26	14, 200 15, 900 19, 936 20, 032	63 86 59 62	Unknown. Bee note in text below Unknown. Damage due mainly to explosions of naphtha and gunpowder Failure of bridge; bridge damaged by blasting near by at the moment the train entered upon it Rails maliciously loosened Landsilde in the night. Inspector had detected no indication of trouble. Roadbed undermined by water from springs not be-
8 9 10 11 12	D D D	P	33 0 1 0 1 2	19 1 26 1 26 5	14,200 15.900 19,930 20,032 25,000 30,000 32,000	63 86 59 62 28 23	Unknown. Bee note in text below Unknown. Damage due mainly to explosions of naphtha and gunpowder Failure of bridge; bridge damaged by blasting near by at the moment the train entered upon it Rails maliciously loosened Landslide in the night. Inspector had detected no indication of trouble. Roadbed undermined by water from springs not be- fore known to exist. Switch maliciously misplaced.
8 10 11	D D D	P	33 0 1 0 1 2	19 1 1 26 1 26	14,200 15,900 19,930 20,032 25,000 30,000	63 86 59 52 28 23	Unknown. Bee note in text below Unknown. Damage due mainly to explosions of naphtha and gunpowder Failure of bridge; bridge damaged by blasting near by at the moment the train entered upon it Rails maliciously loosened Landslide in the night. Inspector had detected no indication of trouble. Roadbed undermined by water from springs not be- fore known to exist. Switch maliciously misplaced. Rock slide. This occurred on an old railroad. It is
8 9 10 11 12	D D D	P	33 0 1 0 1 2	19 1 26 1 26 5	14,200 15.900 19,930 20,032 25,000 30,000 32,000	63 86 59 62 28 23	Unknown. Bee note in text below Unknown. Damage due mainly to explosions of naphtha and gunpowder Failure of bridge; bridge damaged by blasting near by at the moment the train entered upon it Rails maliciously loosened Landsilde in the night. Inspector had detected no indication of trouble. Roadbed undermined by water from springs not he- fore known to exist. Switch maliciously misplaced. Rock slide. This occurred on an old railroad. It is believed that blasting 1,000 feet distant had frac- tured the rock so as to permit vegetation to disinte-
9 10 11 12 13	D D D D D	P	33 0 1 0 1 2 2	19 1 26 1 26 5	14,200 15.900 19,930 20,032 25,000 30,000 32,000 34,000	63 86 59 52 28 23 30 58	Unknown. Bee note in text below Unknown. Damage due mainly to explosions of naphths and gunpowder Failure of bridge; bridge damaged by blasting near by at the moment the train entered upon it Rails maliciously loosened Landsilde in the night. Inspector had detected no indication of trouble. Roadbed undermined by water from springs not he- fore known to exist. Switch maliciously misplaced. Rock slide. This occurred on an old railroad. It is believed that blasting 1,000 feet distant had frac- tured the rock so as to permit vegetation to disinte- grate it.
8 9 10 11 12 13	D D D D D	P	33 0 1 0 1 2	19 1 26 1 26 5	14,200 15.900 19,930 20,032 25,000 30,000 32,000 34,000	63 88 59 52 28 23 30 58	Unknown. Bee note in text below Unknown. Damage due mainly to explosions of naphtha and gunpowder Failure of bridge; bridge damaged by blasting near by at the moment the train entered upon it Rails maliciously loosened Landsilde in the night. Inspector had detected no indication of trouble. Roadbed undermined by water from springs not be- fore known to exist. Switch maliciously misplaced. Rock slide. This occurred on an old railroad. It is believed that blasting 1,000 feet distant had frac- tured the rock so as to permit vegetation to disinte- grate it. Defective track. See note in text below.
9 10 11 12 13	D D D D D D D	P	33 0 1 0 1 2 2 1	19 1 26 1 26 5 10 35 21	14,200 15.900 19,930 20,032 25,000 30,000 32,000 34,000 61,224 84,500	63 86 59 52 28 23 30 58	Unknown. Bee note in text below Unknown. Damage due mainly to explosions of naphtha and gunpowder Failure of bridge; bridge damaged by blasting near by at the moment the train entered upon it Rails maliciously loosened Landsilde in the night. Inspector had detected no indication of trouble. Roadbed undermined by water from springs not be- fore known to exist. Switch maliciously misplaced. Rock slide. This occurred on an old railroad. It is believed that blasting 1,000 feet distant had frac- tured the rock so as to permit vegetation to disinte- grate it.
8 9 10 11 12 13	D D D D D D D	P	33 0 1 0 1 2 2 1	19 1 26 1 26 5 10 35 21	14,200 15.900 19,930 20,032 25,000 30,000 32,000 34,000	63 88 59 52 28 23 30 58	Unknown. Bee note in text below Unknown. Damage due mainly to explosions of naphtha and gunpowder Failure of bridge; bridge damaged by blasting near by at the moment the train entered upon it Rails maliciously loosened Landsilde in the night. Inspector had detected no indication of trouble. Roadbed undermined by water from springs not be- fore known to exist. Switch maliciously misplaced. Rock slide. This occurred on an old railroad. It is believed that blasting 1,000 feet distant had frac- tured the rock so as to permit vegetation to disinte- grate it. Defective track. See note in text below.
8 9 10 11 12 13	D D D D D D D D D D	P	33 0 1 0 1 2 2 1	19 1 26 1 26 5 10 35 21 193	14,200 15.900 19,930 20,032 25,000 30,000 32,000 34,000 61,224 84,500	63 88 59 52 28 23 30 58	Unknown. Bee note in text below Unknown. Damage due mainly to explosions of naphtha and gunpowder Failure of bridge; bridge damaged by blasting near by at the moment the train entered upon it Rails maliciously loosened Landsilde in the night. Inspector had detected no indication of trouble. Roadbed undermined by water from springs not he- fore known to exist. Switch maliciously misplaced. Rock slide. This occurred on an old railroad. It is believed that blasting 1,000 feet distant had frac- tured the rock so as to permit vegetation to disinte- grate it. Defective track. See note in text below.
8 9 10 11 12 13	D D D D D D Tot	P. F. P. P. P. P. P. P. P. P. P. P. P. P. P.	33 0 1 0 1 2 2 1	19 1 26 1 26 5 10 35 21 193	14,200 15,900 19,930 20,032 25,000 30,000 32,000 34,000 61,224 84,500	63 88 59 52 28 23 30 58	Unknown. Bee note in text below Unknown. Damage due mainly to explosions of naphtha and gunpowder Failure of bridge; bridge damaged by blasting near by at the moment the train entered upon it Rails maliciously loosened Landsilde in the night. Inspector had detected no indication of trouble. Roadbed undermined by water from springs not be- fore known to exist. Switch maliciously misplaced. Rock slide. This occurred on an old railroad. It is believed that blasting 1,000 feet distant had frac- tured the rock so as to permit vegetation to disinte- grate it. Defective track. See note in text below.

Derailment No. 6, by far the worst accident in the present record. causing the death of 33 persons and the injury of 19, is reported as due to some cause undiscovered. A passenger train, running at regular

speed, was derailed at a facing point split switch and the two cars next behind the engine were completely wrecked. When these came to rest they were lying close to the engine, so that steam escaping from the boiler scalded the occupants of the cars. The engine appears to have passed over the switch in safety, and the two cars next following evidently were thrown off by the partial movement of the switch. Of the 7 cars in the train the two at the rear passed over the switch without being derailed. It would appear that some part of the engine broke and fell to the track, causing the movement of the switch rails, but it was impossible to discover any positive evidence of this. The side track leading from the switch diverged to the left, and the switch rail on the left side of the track was found after the accident in proper position and undamaged. The engine and tender, though they passed over the switch without being derailed, were knocked off the track in some way, presumably by the derailed car next behind them, and the tender was pushed against the engine in such a way as to overturn it. It is possible that the leading truck of the tender was the one that caused the damage to the switch and that first left the track. The switch was fitted with a circuit breaker so adjusted as to set an automatic block signal against an approaching train if the switch point were more than one-quarter of an inch away from the stock rail. This circumstance affords additional evidence that the switch was in proper position when the leading wheels of the engine ran onto it.

Collision No. 1 was between a westbound passenger train and an eastbound work train, and all of the victims were employees, except three passengers slightly injured. All of the 8 killed and 32 of the injured were laborers riding in the leading car of the work train, the engine of this train being at the rear end. The collision occurred on a line where, although the railroad is double-tracked, one of these tracks for a few miles is used for suburban trains in both directions and the other one for other trains. On the day in question, which was Sunday, the suburban trains were run on the track usually used by other trains, in order to facilitate repairs on the suburban track. This temporary arrangement was to last from 7 a. m. to 7 p. m. The collision occurred at 6.50 p.m. A supplementary order had just been issued extending the temporary arrangement, but it appears to have been misunderstood. The passenger train was made up on the proper track, but it was run through a crossover to the other track, the conductor adjusting the switch himself, and it proceeded on the wrong track in disregard of the special orders, which were clear and which no one claims to have misunderstood. The collision occurred before the passenger train had run more than a half mile. The

conductor of the passenger train is reported as having left for parts unknown soon after the accident.

Collision No. 4, causing the death of a fireman 21 years old and the serious injury of one other trainman, was due to inefficient management of the air brakes on a heavy freight train descending a 21 per cent grade at 3 a. m., the engineman at that time having been on duty about 21 hours. The grade in question is 26 miles long, and the train had been run safely for 23 miles when the engineman appears to have allowed the speed to increase to such a rate that there was not sufficient time to recharge the air-brake main reservoir. He had made repeated applications of the brakes, and finally was unable to apply them with sufficient force. The train consisted of 18 cars, weighing about 600 tons, and after it became uncontrollable it collided with an engine standing at a water tank. The engineman at fault had been in the employ of this company about two months, but had been an engineman elsewhere three and one-half years and had served as a fireman, before that, for over five years. One of the cars in the train had no air brakes working, and two others had leaky brake cylinders. Although the engineman had been on duty 21 hours, he avers that he did not feel sleepy. This crew had been assigned to a work train during the day, and the men had had some time to sleep while the engine was at rest waiting for the laborers to load material. The report says that the brakeman on the forward end of this train was intoxicated at the time of the runaway, so that his services were of little or no value in controlling the speed of the train.

Collision No. 12 was due to an erroneous signal given by a blocksignal operator and to the failure of the conductor and the rear brakeman of a freight train to flag a following passenger train. collision occurred at 2.20 a.m. The freight train was standing partly in a yard, and the block-signal operator reported it as having gone out of the block section, thus allowing the passenger train to come on from the block station in the rear, when in fact a part of the freight train had not cleared the block. The signalman, who had been in the service three years, offered the inadmissible excuse that he had been assured by the yardmaster that the block section was The rear brakeman of the freight endeavored to excuse himself by asserting that the conductor had passed the rear end of the train, apparently going to signal the passenger train. The conductor, who had been in the service four years, refused to attend the hearing on the accident. He, as well as the brakeman and the block signalman, was dismissed from the service, as was the engineman also, for not sounding a whistle signal to notify the rear brakeman to back with a red signal.

Collision No. 16, causing 6 deaths and 4 injuries, occurred at 3 a. m., and was due to wrong information given by a telegraph operator to the train dispatcher. This operator was 18 years 8 months of age, and had been in the service 11 months. The train passed his station at 2.50 a. m., and he made the proper entry in his book; but 10 minutes later, when the dispatcher inquired if that train had passed, the operator, without looking at the book, replied that it had not, whereupon the dispatcher sent an order for this train to meet another one, and a few minutes afterwards permitted the opposing train to proceed from the other station. The operator at fault soon discovered his mistake, but not in time to prevent the collision.

Derailment No. 14 is reported as due to defective track. An eastbound passenger train, running about 35 miles an hour on an easy curve, ran off the track, and the whole train, consisting of an engine and eight cars, fell down a bank about 20 feet high. As soon as the train left the track a gas tank attached to the bottom of the dining car exploded, setting fire to the train, and all of the cars, except the mail car, were burned up. Another passenger train had gone over this track in the opposite direction about 30 minutes before the occurrence of the accident, and the engineman and fireman of that train say that they felt a slight irregularity in the track, apparently a low joint, but did not deem it dangerous. It is believed, however, that as there was not quite enough ballast in the track on the outside of the curve the rails were thrown out of line by the rear end of the west-bound train. One 75-pound rail, 9 years old, was found broken, but it is not certain that this break occurred before the train ran off the track.

Derailment No. 15, causing the death of 3 passengers and the injury of 19 passengers and 2 trainmen, is reported as due to some cause unknown. The train consisted of an engine and eight passenger and baggage cars, and it was running at about 50 miles an hour. The derailment occurred at 1.20 a. m. The wreck took fire from an explosion of illuminating gas, and was destroyed by fire, with the exception of one sleeping car. The report says that the track, which consisted of rails weighing 75 pounds per yard and sleepers in first-class condition, was in good line and surface, and that there were no indications either of a broken rail or of loosened spikes.

Table No. 3.—Details of Table No. 1—Causes of accidents to employees in coupling and uncoupling cars.

Sub-	Causes.		rain- nen.	me	ain- n in rds.	trai (sw			er em- oyees.
class.		Killed.	Injured.	Killed.	Injured.	Killed.	Injured.	Killed.	Injured.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7	Adjusting coupler with foot. Adjusting coupler, cars accidentally started. Careless manipulation of uncoupling lever. Cars not equipped with automatic coupler. Coupler broken, using link and pin or chain. Coupling damaged cars. Coupling with chain or other emergency appliance on curve too sharp for automatic coupling. Coupling with chain or other emergency appliance because of uneven track.	1	20 6 7 3 7 15	2	17 3 5 1 4 10 6	1 1 1 2	42 8 23 3 10 31 14		1
9 10 11	Coupling or uncoupling safety chains  Fingers or hand caught between uncoupling lever and body of car		2 54 8		33 5		10 93 5		9
12 13 14 15	Uncoupling without using lever, uncoupling lever not in working order.  Foot caught in frog, switch, or guard rail.  Opening or closing knuckle when cars were near together, miscalculated speed.  Opening knuckle when cars were near together, en-	1	27 2 23	1 5	17 2 14	1 4	55 7 44	1 2	3
16 17 18 19 20	gine accidentally started.  Opening knuckle, part of defective coupler fell on foot.  Opening knuckle, lost footing.  Riding on car to uncouple, slipped off.  Struck by object at side of track.  Caught by unexpected movement of car, due to slack	2 1	2 1 9 3 12	      1	3 2 3 5	1   2   3   1	7 7 4 7 17		1
21 22 23 24	running in  Caught by unexpected movement of car, due to mistake or misunderstanding in giving hand signals.  Uncoupling moving cars and lost footing  Parts hard to move, causing delay.  Went between cars unnecessarily and contrary to rule	1	25 3 5 7	1	17 3 10 1	1 3 	3 21	1	3 i 3
25 26 27 28	Hand caught between projecting load and end of next car.  No witness (fatal injury).  Other causes (see detailed list below)	_1	2 5 4		2 3	6	7	i 	i 1
	Total	19	260	13	179	35	502	5	32

## Details of injuries included in Table 3, subclass 27.

- A. 1. Roof boards fell on head.
- A. 2. On trestle; fell to ground.
- A.3. Struck by steam hose which blew off.
- A. 4. Stepped on lump of coal.
- A. 5. Piece of iron fell off tank on head. A. 6. Stepped in hole.

- A. 6. Stepped in hole.

  M. 1. Apron of car fell on foot.

  M. 2. Struck by air hose which flew up.

  M. 3. Stepped in hole.

  M. 4. Coupler broke and piece flew, striking hand.

  M. 5. Closing knuckle with iron bar, bar slipped and struck head.

  M. 6. Piece of iron fell off car on foot.

  M. 7. Coat caught on car; fell under wheels.

  M. 8. Lever flew up and struck face.

  M. 9. Continuous rod flew out and hit face.

  J. 1. Anglecock broke and struck leg.

  J. 2. Stepped on nail.

  J. 3. Tie fell off car on head.

  J. 4. Apron of car fell on foot.

  J. 5. Lump of coal rolled off car, striking chest.

  J. 6. Hose flew up and struck leg.

  J. 7. Stepped on nail in plank.

  J. 8. Air hose flew up, striking leg.

TABLE 3A.—Nature of injuries to employees in coupling and uncoupling cars.

Injuries.	Train- men.	Train- men in yards.	Yard train- men.	Other em- ployees.
Loss of feet	5	5	9	
Loss of legs	5 3 2	4	3	
Loss of arms	2	2	6	2
Loss of hands	2	1	2	
Loss of fingers.	16	8	13	3
Loss of toes	3	2	4	
Fractured skull		2		
Fractured leg	2		1	2
Fractured arm	5	4	6	l ī
Fractured collar bone or ribs	4	6	11	1
Fractured other bones	8	Ă	19	
Contusion of head or body	3Ŏ	19	68	4
Contusion or laceration of feet	17	17	41	•
Contusion or laceration of toes.	7	3	10	'
Contusion or laceration of legs.	7	4	33	•
Contusion or laceration of arms.	13	9	18	
Contusion or laceration of hands	40	24	78	12
Contusion or laceration of fingers.	71	48 1	151	5
Dislocation.	• •	=	2	1
Internal injuries	4	4	é	
Sprains.	9	10	18	1
Shock		10	10	1
Miscellaneous	3	3	i	,
Total injuries.	260	179	502	32
Killed	19	13	35	5
Total killed and injured	279	192	537	37
RECAPITULATION  Fotal killed  Fotal injured	· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·			72 973

Table No. 4.—Details of Table No. 1.—Causes of accidents to employees classified (C6 and C7) as falling from and getting on or off cars and engines.

Sub-	Сапаса		rain- nen.	me	Yard Train- trainmen Otl men in (switch- pl yards. ing crews).		· Oth	er em-	
class.		Killed.	Injured.	Killed.	Injured.	Killed.	Injured.	Killed.	Injured.
1 2 3 4	Fell from roof of box car by reason of— Defect in car. Ice or snow. Parting of train Derailment, collision, or shock due to abnormal	1	2	2	1 1 2		10 8	1	
C6 5	movements of cars other than those in sub- class 3	4	i .	• - ;		6 9	_		11 2
6 7 8 9	Coal car Freight car other than box or coal car Engine or tender Passenger car	10	53 118 11	2 2 5	5 14 54 2	1 1 4	5 12 48 4	7	8 23 14 6
11 12 (13 14 15	Engines, tenders, or cars (all kinds) not in motion  Miscellaneous causes.  Not clearly explained.  Slipped getting on moving trains or cars.  Jumping off moving trains.  Jumping from engines or cars anticipating colli-	13 5 3	77 216 58 137 124	6 2 3	112	6 '	216 37 84	3	57 85 13 70 76
C7 16	sion, derailment, or other accident.  Fell from engines or cars by reason of defective handholds and sill steps.  Getting on or off moving engine.  Caught in frog, guard rail, or switch.	2	31		10 21 104	1	33	8	4 37
(18	Caught in frog, guard rail, or switch  Total		5 1,157	34	574	56	880	39	413

#### YEARLY TABLES.

This bulletin completes the publication of the accident records under the law of March 3, 1901, for six years, and the table next following, Table A, gives the aggregates for the year ending June 30, 1907, of the items which are given in Table No. 1 of the quarterly returns. The total number of casualties shown in Table A is 81,286 (5,000 killed and 76,286 injured).

This table includes the following statistics which did not appear in the quarterly bulletins, the reports from which they are taken having been received after the bulletins were printed: Eight passengers and 22 employees killed and 103 passengers and 85 employees injured; damage to railroad companies' property (25 collisions and 28 derailments), \$64,931.

The totals of these yearly tables are not comparable with those given in the Commission's Annual Statistical Reports, for the reason that the monthly reports deal only with accidents to passengers and to employees while actually on duty. The monthly reports take no account of accidents to "other persons." These appear in the Annual Reports and include casualties at highway crossings, to trespassers, to persons walking along the track, accidents to employees in shops remote from the railroad, and all other accidents not occurring to passengers and to employees actually on duty.

The salient facts in the tables for the year are, first, that there have been heavy increases in all of the items, except accidents in car coupling and from striking against overhead obstructions, and, second, that the number of passengers killed and injured in collisions and derailments has increased to an alarming degree. (See Table B, first item.) In this item the very large total reported in 1905 is now exceeded by 17 per cent.

The general increase in all classes has already been referred to, in this and preceding bulletins, as connected with the great expansion of railroad traffic, though this is not to be regarded as the complete explanation.

The comparative smallness of the increases in casualties due to coupling cars and in accidents occurring to men on the tops of freight cars is undoubtedly due in large measure to improvement in the maintenance and care of automatic couplers, and to increased use of air brakes on freight trains, relieving trainmen, in some degree, from the duty of riding on the tops of cars. Both of these features—couplers and brakes—have been the subject of regulating laws, passed by Congress, the beneficent effect of which is here again observable.

The disastrous record of casualties to passengers in train accidents 410 killed) is due in large measure to ten accidents which caused the

deaths of 291 persons. These have been explained in the four quarterly statements. Nine of the ten accidents occurred in six States—California, Indiana, Kansas, New Jersey, New York, North Carolina—and one in the District of Columbia.

Following is a list of these ten cases:

Ten prominent accidents in the year ending June 30, 1907.

Quarter.		KШed.	Injured.	State.
First	Collision—Confusion of dispatcher's orders.	17	<b>.</b>	North Carolina.
Second	Collision—Disregard of rules and signals			District of Columbia
Do	Collision—Neglect in connection with whis- tle signals.	43	155	Indiana.
Do	Derailment—Defective or unfastened track at drawbridge.	57	36	New Jersey.
Third	Collision—Operator failed to deliver meeting order.	32	75	Kansas.
Do	Collision—Engineman disregarded block signal.	8	8	Indiana.
Do	Derailment—Unexplained	19	149	New York.
	Explosion—Unexplained	16	39	Indiana.
Do	Derailment—Misplaced switch	16 22		California.
	Derailment—Unexplained	33	19	Do.

Table A.—Summary of casualties to persons, year ending June 30, 1907.
[Note.—The table letters refer to the corresponding totals for the last preceding year, printed below.]

		Collisions Derallment Miscellaneous train accidents, in- cluding locomotive boiler explo- nions	Total train sockdents	4100	ewitches, iverhead	and a	while getting on or off.	Total (other than train accidents)	Total, all classes		1		
Pass	Killed.	281 150 51 51	98			5	94.8°	202 	220		8208	- 985	380
Passengurs.	.beaulat	3,718	8,079			8	2,044	4,171	12,250		88,5 1,8,4 1,8,0,0 86,0,0	2,178 2,178 4,170	10,138
Fersons carled unde	Riffed	28 →	1	:	:	-	17	8	E		調整を発	-458	8
l'ersons car- ried under ugreement or contract	.bemlni	506 19 19	188			13	8 77	358	1,34		32.25	16 85 816 816	1,064
Total a,	Kitled.	200 185 16			:	DD)	20	237	\$	Tot	88 4 88 18	**************************************	817
в. b.	.byttt@I	4,133	9,070		:	#	2,113	4,507	13,597	Totals for	4,006 2,856 117 6,778	4,40 4,40 4,40 4,40 4,40 4,40	11,186
Trafumen.	Кішеа.	2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00	707	<u>라</u> 참				Charles .	1,507		331 918 101 76	888	1,380
men.	.bsrn{nI	1,786	5,540	44				Espias	21,754	preceding year.	25 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5	25 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14	18,912
Trainmen in yards.	Killed.	E2	. 1	<u> </u>				2	\$	E.	27.02.2	_	007
·	Injured.	3 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8	1,334	2				- I seem da	8, 100		2000 1,000 2,000 1	2 2 3 3 4 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5	7,586
Yard train- men (switch- ing crews).	Killed.	. 25 E	ا ا	221	8	ĸ	28	123	089		##5888		676
d train- (switch- crews).	.bezulnī	100 E32 001	198	1,985	3,182	979	3,525	9,590 1,	10,488 1,		3 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5	April 2000	1, 990, 9
Other cm- ployees.	Killed.	25 25 25	!	#   81	105	ΝĠ	354 16		1,767		10 de 4 de 8		1, 27, 16
	.betuinl	752 721 721		115	3,087	3	1,497	21, 105 3,	22,250 4,		201 101 101 101 101 101 101 101	1,400 14,536 19,104 2,	196'61
Total sm ployees.	Killed.	1 88 1 1 88 1		8	310 1	134	P 2	3,342 5	4,353	!	512 513 513 513 513 513 513 513 513 513 513	152	3,807 6
÷ ž	.berujnI	4,808 2,511 1,605	8,924	3,948	11,711	1,591	12,565	53,765	62,680		8 4 4 5 8 8 8 4 4 5 8 8 8 4 4 5 8 8 8 6 8 8 8 8 8 8		68,824
Total, all persons.	Killed	776 515 130		200	310	142	873	3,579	2,000			1,6887 7,6887 3,164	4,286
l, all	,banntal	9,541 6,096 1,758	17,994	3,948	17,711	1,635	20,320	58,282	76,286		444445 91144 1144 1144 1144 1144 1144 11	1,54,8 13,280 18,988 58,448	66,700

From Table B, next following, comparisons may be made for the last four years.

TABLE B.—Casualties to passengers and employees, years ending June 30.

	19	007.	19	906.	<b>j</b> 19	905.	· 19	904.
	Killed.	Injured.	Killed.	Injured.	Killed.	Injured.	Killed.	Injured.
Passengers:								
In train accidents Other causes	410 237	9,070 4,527	182 <b>23</b> 6	6,778 <b>4,407</b>	350 187	6, <b>498</b> 3, <b>542</b>	270 150	4, 945 3, 132
Total	647	13, 597	418	11, 185	537	10,040	420	8,077
Employees:								
In train accidents In coupling accidents Overhead obstructions,	1,011 302	8, 924 3, 948	879 311	7, <b>483</b> 3, 503	798 243	7, 052 3, 110	844 278	6,990 3,441
etc	134	1,591	132	1,497	92	1, 185	116	1,210
Falling from cars, etc Other causes	790 2, 116	12, 565 35, 661	713 1,772	11, 253 31, 788	633 1, 495	9, 237 24, 842	700 1, <b>429</b>	9, 371 22, 254
Total	4, 353	62,689	3,807	55, 524	3, 261	45, 426	3, 367	43, 266
Total passengers and employees	5,000	<b>76, 28</b> 6	-4, 225	66,709	3, 798	55 <b>, 4</b> 66	3, 787	51, 343

The following tables are self-explanatory, being consolidations of the quarterly tables giving the same classes of facts:

Table C.—Collisions and derailments, damage to cars, engines, and roadway, years ending June 30.

		1907.			<b>!</b>	1906.		
	Num- ber.	Loss.	Killed.	In- jured.	Num- ber.	Loss.	Killed.	In- jured.
Collisions, rear	1,957 1,065	\$2,003,509 1,935,505	233 327	2, <b>423</b> 3, 616	1,722 866	\$1,720,365 1,599,568	169 251	2, <b>427</b> <b>2</b> , 733
Collisions, train separating Collisions, miscellaneous	695 <b>4, 309</b>	259, 495 2, 101, 059	13 203	322 3, 180	901 3, 705	359, 156 1, 640, 669	9 175	378 2, 379
Total	8,026	6, 299, 568	776	9, 541	7. 194	5, 319, <b>758</b>	604	7, 914
Derailments due to defects of roadway, etc.	1 528	1, 255, 114	58	1, 983	1, 287	918, 056	38	1, 608
Derailments due to defects of equipment	3, 178	2.490,028	59	<b>92</b> 6	2, 811	2, 226, 153	42	802
of trainmen, signalmen, etc Derailments due to unforesseen	495	396, 626	130	756	391	318,067	54	494
obstruction of track, etc Derailments due to malicious	387	556, 725	68	658	300	472,653	76	456
obstruction of track, etc Derailments due to miscella-	59	153, 6 <b>94</b>	14	176	65	106,859	16	94
neous causes	1,785	1,713,947	186	2, 196	1, 407	1, 297, 643	147	1,318
Total	7, 432	6, 566, 134	515	6,695	6, 261	5, 339, 431	373	4,772
Total collisions and de- railments.	15, <b>45</b> 8	12, 865, 702	1, 291	16, 236	13, 455	10,659,189	977	12,686

TABLE D.—Causes of accidents to employees in coupling and uncoupling cars, year ending June 30, 1907.

Sub-	Causes.	1	rain- nen.	me	ain- n in rds.	trai (sv	ard inmen witch- ing ews).		er em-
class.		Killed.	Injured.	Killed.	Injured.	Killed.	Injured.	Killed.	Injured.
1 2 3 4 5 6	Adjusting coupler with foot. Adjusting coupler, cars accidentally started. Careless manipulation of uncoupling lever. Cars not equipped with automatic coupler. Coupler broken, using link and pin or chain. Coupling damaged cars. Coupling with chain or other emergency appliance	3 1 4	17	3	11 6 16	6 6 16	10	1 1 2	5 4 2 6 3 8
8	on curve too sharp for automatic coupling Coupling with chain or other emergency appliance		18		13	6	42	2	3
9	because of uneven track	1	2 11	i	1 7	`	6 32		·····2
11	and body of car	i.	238 30		140 21	۱ <u>i</u> .			23 1
12	Uncoupling without using lever, uncoupling lever not in working order	3	145	1	91	10		· · <u>·</u> -	7
13 14	Foot caught in frog switch, or guard rail	3	100	1	6	14	25	2	1
15	gether, miscalculated speed	6	103	10	59	14		4	12
16	gine accidentally started	1	10	1	9 16	3	•	 	3 3 2
17	Opening knuckle, lost footing	6 7	32	8	17	6	51 42	1 1	2
18 19	Riding on car to uncouple, slipped off	í	36	2	14 14	3	60		4
20	Caught by unexpected movement of car, due to slack running in	9	88	3	61	2	102		8
21	Caught by unexpected movement of car, due to mistake or misunderstanding in giving hand signals	8	16	4	14	4	22		3
22	Uncoupling moving cars and lost footing	8	29	3	22	8	79		ĭ
23 24	Parts hard to move, causing delay	1	22	1	15		44	١	•
	rule	8	46	5	31	5	91	4	8
25	Hand caught between projecting load and end of next car		14	ļ	7		24	Į.	
<b>2</b> 6	No witness (fatal injury)	10		9		21		3	
27 28	Other causes (see detailed list below)	2	34	1;-	12	· · · · · ·	59 33	`	5 1
20		-	·i		<del></del>	\- <del></del>			
	Total	88	1, 130	57	718	135	1,985	22	115

Table Dx.—Nature of injuries to employees in coupling and uncoupling cars, year ending June 30, 1907.

Injuries.	Train- men.	Train- men in yards.	Yard train- men.	Other em- ployees.
Loss of feet.	12	13	29	
Loss of legs		8	15	į į
Loss of arms		8	22	
Loss of hands		6	7	
Loss of fingers	61	29	75	) (
Loss of toes	10	3	11	
Fractured skull	1	2	2	 
Fractured leg	9	3	12	:
Fractured arm	14	7	28	
Fractured collar bone or ribs	30	15	38	,
Fractured other bones	31	14	57	
Contusion of head or body		108	289	1
Contusion or laceration of feet	83	59	165	1
Contusion or laceration of toes	27	17	40	į
Contusion or laceration of legs		27	125	1
Contusion or laceration of arms		31	107	
Contusion or laceration of hands		109 '	265	2
Contusion or laceration of fingers	339	224	588	2
Dislocation	5	2	7	}
Internal injuries		9	29	
<b>Sprai</b> ns	25	18	64	J

Table Dx.—Nature of injuries to employees in coupling and uncoupling cars, year ending June 30, 1907—Continued.

Injuries.	Train- men.	Train- men in yards.	Yard train- men.	Other em- ployees.
Shock Miscellaneous	10	8	10	1 3
Total injuries. Killed	1, 130 88	718 57	1,985 135	115 22
Total killed and injured	1,218	775	2, 120	137

#### RECAPITULATION.

otal killed	Total kil Total in
· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·	
Total killed and injured 4.250	To

TABLE E.—Causes of accidents to employees classified (C6 and C7) as falling from and getting on or off cars and engines, year ending June 30, 1907.

Sut	_	Causes.		rain- nen.	m	rain- en in ards.	tra (sv	(ard inmen witch- ing ews).	Otherem- ployees.	
class.			Killed.	Injured.	Killed.	Injured.	Killed.	Injured.	Killed.	Injured.
	1 2 3 4	Fell from roof of box car by reason of— Defect in car. Ice or snow. Parting of train. Derailment, collision, or shock due to abnormal movements of cars other than those in	4 2 4	26 30 47	1 3	10 19 21	3 1 3	35 21 28	i	7 9 5
C6	5	subclass 3. While setting brakes	16 10	199 132	9 8	130 111	21 18	317 218	6	31 11
	6 7 8 9	Fell from— Coal car. Freight car other than box or coal car. Engine or tender. Passenger car. Engines, tenders, or cars (all kinds) not in mo-	3 20 45 5	30 183 524 48	3 6 21	15 65 264 12	4 4 22 4	36 61 182 8	6 14 10 1	32 77 64 26
( (	11 12 13 14 15	tion  Miscellaneous causes  Not clearly explained  Slipped getting on moving trains or cars  Jumping off moving trains  Jumping from engines or cars anticipating colli-		327 986 251 532 563	10 17 12 7	181 464 100 237 270	1 33 35 20 9	90 861 172 274 438	3 14 11 31 23	193 283 50 251 249
<b>C7</b>		sion, derailment, or other accident			• • • •	37		57	••••	24
Į.	17 18	handholds and sill steps	2 23	820	1 21 1	89 423 18	26 1	158 542 27	23 1	17 165 3
		Total	319	5,077	120	2, 466	206	3, 525	145	1, 497

#### [Public—No. 171.]

AN ACT requiring common carriers engaged in interstate commerce to make full reports of all accidents to the Interstate Commerce Commission.

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, It shall be the duty of the general manager, superintendent, or other proper officer of every common carrier engaged in interstate commerce by railroad to make to the Interstate Commerce Commission, at its office in Washington, District of Columbia, a monthly report, under oath, of all collisions of trains or where any train or part of a train accidentally leaves the track, and of all accidents which may occur to its passengers or employees while in the service of such common carrier

and actually on duty, which report shall state the nature and causes thereof and the circumstances connected therewith.

SEC. 2. That any common carrier failing to make such report within thirty days after the end of any month shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor and, upon conviction thereof by a court of competent jurisdiction, shall be punished by a fine of not more than one hundred dollars for each and every offense and for every day during which it shall fail to make such report after the time herein specified for making the same.

SEC. 3. That neither said report nor any part thereof shall be admitted as evidence or used for any purpose against such railroad so making such report in any suit or action

for damages growing out of any matter mentioned in said report.

SEC. 4. That the Interstate Commerce Commission is authorized to prescribe for such common carriers a method and form for making the reports in the foregoing section provided.

Approved, March 3, 1901.

#### SPECIAL INFORMATION CONTAINED IN PRECEDING BULLETINS.4

Each accident bulletin contains tables showing the number of passengers and employees killed and injured, and these figures are classified according to cause (see Table No. 1); also tables showing cost of the different classes of train accidents. The causes of accidents to employees in coupling and uncoupling and in falling from cars, etc., are further classified in Tables No. 3 and No. 4. The most serious collisions and derailments are dealt with in a supplementary table (Class A) showing the causes in some detail. Each bulletin is for three months, and No. 1 was for the quarter ending September 30, 1901. The bulletin for the quarter ending June 30 contains, in addition to the quarterly statistics, tables showing the same information for the whole of the fiscal year ending on that date.

Bulletin No. 17 records one collision, killing 6 and injuring 35 persons, and one derailment, killing 15 and injuring 28. The collision, occurring at 1 a. m., was due to gross negligence on the part of the men in charge of a freight train. The derailment was due to an open draw. The drawbridge was not provided with interlocked signals, and the engineman was not adequately acquainted with the line of the road. A collision and a derailment are reported which were due to the lack of suitable detector bars at switches and a collision which was due to failure of

"controlled manual" block signal working.

Bulletin No. 18 shows total casualties much larger than in the preceding quarters, due largely, no doubt, to an enormous increase in traffic. Many accidents are reported in which the men had been on duty excessively long hours. One collision, killing 17 persons, was due to the error of an engineman of five months' experience, who ran past five warning signals. Another collision, killing 10 persons, was due to the failure of the men in charge of a freight train to identify opposing passenger trains. One derailment of a passenger train, killing 13 persons, was reported as due to some cause that could not be discovered.

Bulletin No. 19 is like Bulletin 18 in showing a large number of casualties. One butting collision, due to failure of train dispatching, caused 34 deaths and 24 injuries and \$50,000 damages, besides the damages for deaths and injuries of persons. One collision was due to the negligence of men who had been worked flagrantly long hours. Particulars are given of a number of collisions due to complicated and

unusual causes.

Bulletin No. 20 shows total deaths greater than in the corresponding quarter of the previous year, but the number of passengers and employees killed in train accidents was considerably smaller. The most serious accident in this bulletin was a butting collision of passenger trains, due to misinterpretation of a dispatcher's order by a pilot; 10 persons killed, 38 injured. One derailment, unexplained.

train running slowly, caused 9 deaths and 18 injuries.

Bulletin No. 21 contains the record of only one train accident—a collision—in which more than 10 persons were killed, but the totals of casualties of all classes are large, no improvement being shown over preceding quarters. Number of passengers killed in train accidents, 52. One collision, killing 17 and injuring 56, was due to confusion of telegraphic orders; one derailment, killing 9 and injuring 43, was at a misplaced switch, and another, killing 7 and injuring 40, was due to excessive speed.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>a</sup> For notes on Bulletins 1 to 16, inclusive, see Bulletin No. 17.

Bulletin No. 22 shows 180 passengers killed in train accidents—a number larger than that in any other bulletin, except No. 13. One rear collision in the District of Columbia caused the death of 43 passengers and the injury of 63. A butting collision killed 43 persons and injured 155, the bodies of the killed being consumed by fire. In the derailment of a passenger train at a drawbridge 57 persons were killed and 36 injured.

Bulletin No. 23 shows 126 passengers killed in train accidents. It contains the record of two collisions killing 41 persons, and two derailments killing the same number. The number of employees killed in coupling accidents is 25 per cent less than in

the last preceding quarter.

				•
				•
			•	
•	•			
			•	
		•		

11. 8.

Interstate Commerce Commission Washington, D. C.

BAILY, OF M

AN O

# Accident Bulletin

No. 25

July, August, and September 1907



Washington

Government Printing Office

1908

. 1 ·

## ACCIDENT BULLETIN NO. 25

## Showing

# Collisions and Derailments of Trains

and

# Casualties to Persons

during the months of

July, August, and September, 1907

INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMMISSION WASHINGTON, D. C.



Washington:: Government Printing Office:: 1908

### THE INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMMISSION.

MARTIN A. KNAPP, of New York, Chairman. JUDSON C. CLEMENTS, of Georgia. CHARLES A. PROUTY, of Vermont. FRANCIS M. COCKRELL, of Missouri. FRANKLIN K. LANE, of California. EDGAR E. CLARK, of Iowa. JAMES S. HARLAN, of Illinois.

EDWARD A. MOSELEY, Secretary.

#### ACCIDENT BULLETIN No. 25.

## RAILROAD ACCIDENTS IN THE UNITED STATES

DURING THE

## THREE MONTHS ENDING SEPTEMBER 30, 1907.

The number of persons killed in train accidents during the months of July, August, and September, 1907, as shown in reports made by the railroad companies to the Interstate Commerce Commission, under the "accident law" of March 3, 1901, was 346, and of injured, 4,990. Accidents of other kinds, including those sustained by employees while at work and by passengers in getting on or off the cars, etc., bring the total number of casualties up to 23,063 (1,339 killed and 21,724 injured). These accidents are classified in the following table. These reports deal only with (a) passengers and (b) employees on duty.

TABLE No. 1.—Casualties to persons, July, August, and September, 1907.a

	Passen- gers.		der me			Total (a, b, and bb).		Trainmen.		Trainmen in yards.	
	Killed.	Injured.	Killed.	Injured.	Killed.	Injured.	Killed.	Injured.	Killed.	Injured.	
Collisions Derailments Miscellaneous train accidents, including	73 31	1,439 945	4 2	124 131	77 33	1,563 1,076	<b>64</b> 61	617 504	18	<b>224</b> 61	
locomotive boiler explosions	104	18 2, 402	6	261	110	24 2,663	28 153	294 1,415	30	351	
Coupling or uncoupling		2, 202				2,000	23	288	25	212	
while attending switches.  Coming in contact with overhead bridges, structures at side of track, etc.  Falling from cars or engines or while get-	2	15	 	3	2	18	25 26	2,396 233	12	807 66	
ting on or off. Other causes.	58 20	656 800	2 3	16 72	60 23	672 872	83 <b>69</b>	1,441 264	40 29	700 100	
Total (other than train accidents)	80	1,471	5	91	86	1,562	226	4,622	110	1,885	
Total all classes	184	3, 873	11	352	195	4, 225	379	6,037	140	2,236	

s In Table No. 1 the passengers have been divided into three classes. Class a includes all ordinary passengers. Class b includes passengers traveling on freight trains. Class bb includes persons who are customarily carried on trains under special arrangements, such as postal clerks and express messengers, employees on Pullman cars, newsboys, live-stock tenders, and men in charge of freight.

Table No. 1.—Casualties to persons, July, August, and September, 1907.ab—Contd.

	men (	train- switch- rews).		er em- yees.	Total employees.			al all sons.
	Killed.	Injured.	Killed.	Injured.	Killed.	Injured.	Killed.	Injured.
Collisions	15 8	139 62	22 3	202 86	119 80	1, 182 713	196 113	2,745 1,789
locomotive boiler explosions	2	45	3	27	37	432	37	456
Total train accidents	25	246	28	315	236	2,327	346	4,990
Coupling or uncoupling	35	455	4	31	87	986	87	986
while attending switches	18	892	26	815	81	4,910	81	4,910
structures at side of track, etc	5	109	2	16	37	424	39	442
ting on or off	50 32	967 112	54 346	426 4, 842	227 476	3,534 5,318	287 499	4, 206 6, 190
Total (other than train accidents)	140	2,535	432	6,130	908	15, 172	993	16,734
Total all classes	165	2,781	460	6, 445	1, 144	17, 499	1, 339	21,724

That the enormous activity in traffic, which has been a factor in the explanation of previous bulletins, was still undiminished in the period here reported on, is indicated by the marked increase in casualties to passengers from causes not connected with train accidents (85 now, 58 a year before); for this item undoubtedly contains a proportion larger than others in the table, of accidents which, from the railroad standpoint, are to be classed as unavoidable, and therefore in the long run showing totals more directly proportionate to the number of persons traveling.

Increases are shown in the other principal items (see Table 1a below), except item No. 1; but in this connection it is to be borne in mind that Bulletin No. 24 represents a quarter in which the volume of traffic, and consequently the number of casualties, usually is lighter than in either of the other quarters of the year.

As to item No. 1—passengers killed in train accidents—a black record is again presented. Three collisions (Nos. 26, 27, and 30, in Table 2a) and one derailment being responsible for 80 deaths in this class, an average of 20 passengers to each of the four accidents. Particulars of these and other notable collisions and derailments are given, following Table 2a.

TABLE No. 1a.—Comparison of principal items with last bulletin and with one year back.

	Bulletin 25.	Bulletin 24.	Bulletin 21.
1. Passengers killed in train accidents 2. Passengers killed, all causes 3. Employees killed in train accidents 4. Employees killed in coupling 5. Employees killed, all causes 6. Total passengers and employees killed, all causes	195 236 87 1, 144	48 111 202 72 954 1,065	52 110 215 81 1,072 1,182

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>a</sup> Table No. 1 is continued below.
<sup>b</sup> Accidents to employees resulting in slight injuries which do not prevent the employee injured from performing his accustomed service for more than three days in the aggregate during the ten days immediately following the accident are not reported.

The total number of collisions and derailments in the quarter now under review was 4,279 (2,245 collisions and 2,034 derailments), of which 320 collisions and 222 derailments affected passenger trains. The damage to cars, engines, and roadway by these accidents amounted to \$3,605,696. Given more in detail, these facts appear as below:

TABLE No. 2.—Collisions and derailments.

[Nove.—Collisions and derailments which cause no death or personal injury and which cause not over \$150 damage to the property of the railroad are not reported.]

	Number.	Loss,	Persons killed.	Persons injured.
Collisions, rear Collisions, butting Collisions, trains separating Collisions, miscellaneous	277	\$524,607 570,473 52,848 617,613	31 124 41	605 1,229 68 843
Total	2,245	1,765,541	196	2,745
Derailments due to defects of roadway, etc.  Derailments due to defects of equipment  Derailments due to negligence of trainmen, signalmen, etc  Derailments due to unioreseen obstruction of track, etc  Derailments due to malicious obstruction of track, etc  Derailments due to miscellaneous causes	411 865 141 87 24 506	417, 761 627, 287 119, 574 135, 020 64, 061 476, 452	17 16 17 12 7 44	601 297 176 122 65 528
Total	2.034	1,840,155	113	1,789
Total collisions and derallments	4, 279	3,605,696	309	4, 534

Following is the usual list of Class A train accidents—all in which the damage is reported at \$10,000 or over; notable cases in which passengers are killed, and those doing damage less than \$10,000 and down to \$2,000, wherever the circumstances or the cause may be of particular interest:

Table 2a. - Causes of forty-nine prominent train accidents (Class A).

[Note.—R stands for rear collision; B, butting collision; M, miscellaneous collisions; D, derailment; P, passenger train; F, freight and miscellaneous trains.]

#### COLLISIONS.

No.	Class.	Kind of train.	Killed.				
1	R	F and F	0	0	\$2,300	83	Engineman on duty 17 hours, and asleep, passed au- tomatic block signal set against him; also passed flagman.
2	В	P and F	0	23	2,000	12	Freight train wrongfully admitted to block section; struck passenger train standing at station. In freight, part of air brakes had been cut off, but trainmen had not discovered the fact; had not tested at proper time.
3	R	F and F	0	3	3, 252	98	Engineman asleep; approached station at uncontrollable speed, 2 a. m.
4					3,900	1	Error in dispatcher's order, two words, including name of station, written twice and thus wrong- fully repeated by receiving operator. Dispatcher did not detect error when order was repeated.
5	B	F and F	5		4,300	85	Approached station at uncontrollable speed. Vic- tims were employees in caboose of work train.
6	В	P and F	8	32	4,600	7	Engine, in charge of hostler, encroached on time of passenger train; eight passengers killed. Hostler had been misinformed as to lateness of passenger train by operator, who had misread an order.

TABLE 2a.—Causes of forty-nine prominent train accidents (Class A)—Continued.

COLLISIONS—Continued.

							145—Continued.
No.	Class.	Kind of train.	Killed.	Injured.	Damage to engrines, cars, and roadway.	Reference to record.	Cause.
7	R	F and F	0	0	4, 800	2	Failure of air brakes, angle cock having been shut between first and second engines of "double- header." Angle-cock lever had been moved by
8 9	R B	F and F F and F	0	0	5, 000 5, 550	101 52	cylinder-cock rod, which pressed against it. False clear telegraph block signal. Dispatcher's order copied incorrectly (1.384 for
10	M	Fand F	2	8	6, 500	54	1,382); was repeated correctly. Freight, waiting on side track, 2 a.m.; men failed to see green signals carried by passing train; signals dim; train on side track 50 feet from main track; not seen by men on passing train and whistle signal consequently not given.
11	В	F and F	0	6	7, 469	14	Careless management of block signals and failure to deliver meeting order. Responsible operators had had only five months' experience.
12	В	Pand P	1	11	7, 700	99	Engineman forgot meeting point (Sunday schedule though he had been cautioned by conductor at beginning of trip. Engineman killed.
13	R	F and F	0	2	7, 704	88	Engineman, on duty 17 hours in last 19 hours, fell asleep and passed automatic block signal set against him; also passed flagman.
14	В	Pand P	1	7	8, 200	10	Dispatcher completed meeting order to inferior train before properly placing order for superior train.
15	В	F and F	1	2	9, 300	58	Failure to deliver meeting order. Operator, without leave, had put substitute in his place for 30 minutes and had not properly informed substitute
16	R	P and F	1	1	10,000	91	about the order.  Freight train, 1 a. m., unexpectedly stopped. was not protected by flagman.
17	В	F and F	(	I	10, 185	51	Conductor and engineman of extra freight over- looked schedule of regular train.
18	M	F and F		2	11,350	92	Cars escaped from yard and ran on main track; had been left unsecured by negligent switchmen.
19	В	P and F		58	11, 433	17	Freight train ran over misplaced switch and through crossover track into passenger train.
20	M	F and F	1	0 2	12,963	8.	uncontrollable speed.
21	R	r and r	0	2   	13,710	18	Runaway on 3 per cent grade. Carelessness in starting from side track on grade, three trainmen being on the ground instead of at their posts on the cars or engine.
22	В	F and F		l	14, 261	86	Operator (in service one month) accepted meeting order after train had passed, having been asleep.
23	R	Fand F			14, 350	40	Runaway on 14 per cent grade; insufficient brake power. In taking on cars trainmen had neglected to connect and test air brakes.
24 25	B M	P and F	3	27 36	15,000 16,000	59 95	Conductor and engineman forgot meeting order. Approached station at uncontrollable speed. (See
26	В	P and F	10	32	16, 496	87	text below.)  Operator turned east-bound passenger train to wrong diverging track. Six passengers killed.
27	В	P and F		1	17,785	6	(See text below.) Conductor and engineman of freight misread dispatcher's order. (See text below.)
28 29	B	Fand F	0	2 7	18, 558 24, 600	97 3	Meeting order not delivered. (See text below.) Freight ran past appointed meeting station.
30 31	B	F and F F and F P and F P and P	26 4	33 4	25, 000 40, 000	<b>89</b> 57	Mistake in dispatcher's order. (See text below.) Meeting order not delivered. (See text below.)
	Tota	d	105	424	354, 857	Ì	
			<u> </u>	}	<u> </u>		

TABLE 2a.—Causes of forty-nine prominent train accidents (Class A)—Continued.

DERAILMENTS.

						_	
					Damage to engines, cars, and roadway.	\$	
Ma	Class	What of two in			200	82	Comeo
140.	CIMBB.	Kind of train.	_;	8	<b>30</b> 8 2		Cause.
	<u> </u>		Killed.	5	HAP	9.	
	<u>;</u>		Ki	Injured.	Q 200 20	Reference record.	
1	' <b>D</b>	P	5	13	\$1,125	122	Failure of 100-pound rail, nine veers old cracked
_				ļ	1	1	Failure of 100-pound rail, nine years old; cracked between ball and web. Four passengers killed.
2	' D	P	0	0	5,448	35	Interlocked switch thrown under moving train, detector bar having failed. Bar one-half inch thick, 2½ inches wide, was supported by "motion-plate" clips.
3	D	P	3	8	7,300	29	Cause unexplained. Engine running tender first. Two passengers killed.
4	D	P	1 3	8	8,223	79	Excessive speed on 10-degree curve.
5	D	<b>F</b>	3	0	9,370	112	Runaway on steep grade; air pump had stopped. Engineman (killed) was capable and experienced.
6	Ď	<b>F</b>	0		10,176	111	Spreading of rails.
7	D	P	0	9	10,450	75	Track distorted by solar heat. Track inspected one hour before.
8	D	P	14	19 0	13,700	116	Unexplained. (See text below.)
y	D		U	. <b>U</b>	14,660	78	Runaway of 38 freight cars; had been left on side track without being secured by hand brakes. Cars ran 27 miles and were then sidetracked by telegraphic order, and all were wrecked.
10	D	P	0	31	16,000	82	Unexplained.
11 12	D	P	5	18 27	18,200 18,800	24 81	Misplaced switch.  Passenger train wrecked by running into parts of cars which had fallen upon its track in consequence of the derailment of a freight train on an adjoining track, caused by a broken flange.
13	D	P	0	9	23,000	63	Ran into hand car left on track by careless repair-
		777	9				men.
14	D	F	3	5	25,100	106	Runaway on steep grade; bad management of air brakes.
15	D	F	0	0	32, 200	62	Runaway of freight cars left standing on grade with- out hand brakes being set.
16	D	P	0	25	45,100	120	Rail turned over, tie plates having been broken. The rail, when no weight rested on it, stood in perfect position, though probably it had been loose some little time. Track walker had just inspected the line.
17 18	D D	P	2	13 32	56,000	124 114	Breakage of flange of wheel of tender.  Broken rail. Train running 50 miles an hour on
10			•	04	63,000	113	straight line. Rail, 12 years old, had interior defect. Greater part of loss due to fire from explosion of gas tank of sleeping car.
	Tota	1	36	217	377,852		
	Tata	d collisions and		<u> </u>		<b>,</b>	
		railments	141	641	732, 709		

Collision No. 27 was between a westbound local freight train and an eastbound passenger excursion train of 11 cars. Twenty-eight passengers and 2 trainmen were killed and 102 passengers and 3 trainmen were injured. The freight train was running about 30 miles an hour and the passenger train about 40 miles an hour immediately before the collision. Both engines, 6 passenger cars, and 3 freight cars were wrecked. The men in charge of the freight train misread an order which they had received from the dispatcher giving them the time at which the excursion train was due at the several stations. This order read:

But these men read it "Salem......9.25," and therefore allowed themselves fifteen minutes more time in which to reach Salem than

they could rightfully do; consequently they met the excursion train 1½ miles before reaching Salem. The figures "9.10" were not exactly opposite the word Salem, and this appears to be the explanation of the mistake in reading, though the operator in writing the order had made dotted lines from the name of the station to the figures showing the time, in order to insure a correct reading. In consequence of the figures being nearer the top of the sheet, as related to the words, these lines inclined upward from left to right. The engineman did not read the order aloud to the conductor, nor was it read either by the fireman or by any brakeman, though all these readings are required by the company's rules. The station operator who delivered the order (but who was not the same one who had written it) says that the conductor in his presence read the order correctly.

· Butting collision No. 30, between eastbound passenger train No. 30 and a westbound freight train about 4 o'clock on a very foggy morning, killing 26 and injuring 33 persons, was due to an error in sending or receiving the number designating one of the trains in a dispatcher's order. Two passenger trains running in the same direction, Nos. 30 and 34, being behind time, the train dispatcher sent an order to the freight train giving it notice that the passenger trains would be a certain number of minutes late, respectively, between certain stations, thus permitting the freight to continue on its journey to meeting points different from those at which it would have met the passenger trains normally. One order was sent and delivered correctly. A second order, dealing with only one of the two passenger trains, was wrong. As delivered, it named the passenger train as "No. 30 thirty;" but it should have read "No. 34 thirty-Being read "30," it gave a wrong number of minutes as regards that train, and this led to the collision. Train No. 30 was represented to be an hour and ten minutes late, when, in fact, it was but forty minutes late. A number of other orders were sent about the same time, so that the dispatcher had both these train numbers in his mind; and the State railroad commissioners, who investigated the case, believe that the preponderance of evidence is in favor of the theory that the dispatcher made the error in sending; but, so far as can be learned from the records at the dispatcher's office and in the station telegraph office, and the testimony of the dispatcher and of the station operator, the officers of the road say that it is impossible to decide which of these two persons committed the error. operator wrote "No. 30 thirty," and declares that in repeating the order to the dispatcher he sent in the same way that he had written. The dispatcher, on the other hand, declares that he sent "No. 34 thirty-four," and that the operator in repeating wrote "No. 34 thirty-four." The operator had been in the service of the company at different stations for twenty-three years, and the dispatcher

had served as dispatcher six years. The company gives good reputations to both of these men.

Derailment No. 8, causing the death of 14 persons and the injury of 19, is reported as due to some cause undiscovered. The train was running about 35 miles an hour on a 3-degree curve, and it was thrown off the track just as it was passing a station. The cars in the front portion of the train ran to one side and were crushed against a locomotive standing on a side track, and the baggage car, reported as one of strong construction, penetrated the first passenger car—a smoking car—and killed or injured every person in this car, all the deaths being of persons riding in this car. The track was reported as in excellent condition, the rails weighing 80 pounds per yard. The weight of the engine was 44 tons.

Collision No. 26, causing the death of 10 persons and the injury of 32, was due to a misplaced switch. The telegraph operator at S. turned an eastbound passenger train coming from single track to the left hand instead of the right hand of the two main tracks extending eastward from S.; that is, to the westbound track; and, after proceeding about three-fourths of a mile on the westbound track, this train collided with a westbound freight train. Under a general rule it is allowable for the operator at S. to send trains eastward to B. on the westbound track, and therefore the engineman took it for granted that the operator, in turning the train to the left-hand track, was acting in accordance with instructions from the dispatcher; but in point of fact no such order had been given, and the operator had given a "proceed" signal under the mistaken assumption that the switch was set for the eastbound track. As soon as the train had passed his office he endeavored to telegraph to B., the next station east, and prevent the collision, but he was too late to do so. This operator had been in service at this office fifteen days and in the service of the company five months seventeen days. He had been on duty twenty hours, fifty minutes.

Collision No. 25 was due to the carelessness of an engineman in not keeping in mind a detail of a meeting order. Northbound train No. 38 and southbound train No. 35 were to meet at C. at about 10 p.m. The order required the southbound train to enter the side track at a certain switch, and the train was passing from the main line to the siding at this point when it was struck in the side by the northbound train. The engineman of the northbound, contrary to the terms of the order, assumed that the southbound was to enter the side track at another switch, and, although he saw it approaching, he thought that it was already on the side track. The northbound engine and four cars were badly damaged, and the wreck took fire from an explosion of gas in the tank of one of the passenger cars. Of the total damage of \$16,000, more than one-half is estimated as having been

due to the fire, which includes the damage to five freight cars standing on the side track.

Collision No. 28 between a northbound and a southbound freight train was due principally to the failure of an operator to deliver a meeting order. He accepted the order from the dispatcher after the freight train to which it was addressed had gone beyond his control. This operator, at L., had delivered a meeting order to two sections of a northbound regular freight train, but on account of damage to one of the engines, which necessitated changing them, so that the engine and engineman of the second train were assigned to the first one, both trains were delayed about an hour. In consequence of this delay, the dispatcher sent a second order changing the meeting point, but this later order was not delivered. The men of both the freight trains claim that, just before departing, they asked the operator if he had further orders for them, and that he replied that he had none. The operator denies this conversation. The operator, a few minutes after receiving the second order, was relieved by the night operator, and in transferring his orders to the nightman, informed him that the trainmen would come back to the office to sign for the order. This they did not do. The train dispatcher is also held blameworthy for allowing the northbound train to pass another station 10 miles farther north, about an hour afterwards, without taking measures to stop it.

Collision No. 31, causing the death of 2 passengers and 2 trainmen, was due to errors in the writing of a telegraphic order. leading to its nondelivery, thus allowing a train to run past the meeting point fixed by the order. The order was to the conductor and engineman of train No. 412, and the train to be met was No. 611. In copying the order, the last number, 611, was copied 411. The order was received by the manager of the telegraph office, in place of Operator B., who usually receives such orders, but who was temporarily out of the office. Just as the manager had finished, B. returned and took up the work of repeating the order to the dispatcher. When he reached the last line and sent "411," the dispatcher broke him and said "for 611." The operator acknowledged the correction but he did not properly correct his manuscript. He thought it was the address of the order (412) which was to be changed to read 611. After acknowledging the correction he sent the conductor's signature. An apparently correct repetition having thus been received at the dispatcher's office, the dispatcher authorized the order to be delivered to the inferior train at another station, so that it proceeded and met train 412. While the order was being written and repeated, the conductor of train 412 was standing at the window waiting for whatever orders the operator might have to give him; but he had not signed this order, and the operator committed a gross breach of the rules in telegraphing the conductor's name before the conductor had signed the order. After finishing with the dispatcher, Operator B. gave to the waiting conductor two other orders, but omitted to deliver the one which he had just repeated. Operator B. decamped and would not appear at the investigation of the accident which was held by the superintendent. He wrote, however, to the superintendent of telegraph, claiming that he had not sent the conductor's signature over the wire. In the wastebasket of the office there was found the original order, with the address of the order, "To train 412," changed to read "To train 411," while on the table was a new order addressed to 411 which, evidently, Operator B. had made in place of the original, on the assumption that the correction which he had received from the dispatcher referred, not to the train number at the end of the order, but to that in the address.

TABLE No. 3.—Details of Table No. 1—Causes of accidents to employees in coupling and uncoupling cars.

Sub- class.	Causes.	_	rain- nen.	me	ain- on in ords.	trai (sw	ard nmen vitch- ng ws).	Other employees.	
		Killed.	Injured.	Killed.	Injured.	Killed.	Injured.	Killed.	Injured.
1 2 3 4	Adjusting coupler with foot Adjusting coupler, cars accidentally started Careless manipulation of uncoupling lever Cars not equipped with automatic coupler		30 10 8 3		23 2 2 3	2	47 13 12	1	1
5 6 7	Coupler broken, using link and pin or chain Coupling damaged cars Coupling with chain or other emergency appliance on curve too sharp for automatic coupling	5 1	8	4	7	5	8 22 8	1	3 2 3
9	Coupling with chain or other emergency appliance because of uneven track.  Coupling or uncoupling safety chains	• • • •	1 5		4		3	• • • • ',	1
10 11 12	Fingers or hand caught between uncoupling lever and body of car.  Uncoupling without using lever (unnecessary) Uncoupling without using lever, uncoupling lever		50 9	1	<b>40</b> 5	2	108 15		
13 14	not in working order.  Foot caught in frog, switch, or guard rail.  Opening or closing knuckle when cars were near together, miscalculated speed.	2	37 5 19	1 2	26 3 19	3	59 8 22	'   ' 	 2
15 16	Opening knuckle when cars were near together, engine accidentally started.  Opening knuckle, part of defective coupler fell on foot		2 6	1	2 2		7	1	1
17 18 19 20	Opening knuckle, lost footing	2	9 8 1	4	6 7 5	1 2	10 9 8		2
21	running in.  Caught by unexpected movement of car, due to mistake or misunderstanding in giving hand signals.	5	19 2	1	15 1	7	22 1		2 1
22 23 24	Uncoupling moving cars and lost footing	2	6 8 14	1	5 6 12	3	15 12 22	1	 
25 26	Hand caught between projecting load and end of next car.  No witnesses (fatal injury)	1	3	5	1	1	8		
27 28	Other causes (see detailed list below)	1	3 9	2	4	i	8 3		1
	Total	23	288	25	212	35	455	4	31

#### Details of injuries included in Table 3, subclass 27.

- J. 1. Block from under car flew up striking mouth.
  J. 2. Torpedo exploded and cut leg.
  J. 3. Air hose struck kneecap.
  J. 4. Knuckle block caught finger.
  J. 5. Lump of coal fell off tank on head.
  J. 6. Lump of coal fell off tender crushing toe.
  J. 7. Brake wheel came off car and fell on foot.
  A. 1. Stepped on pail.

- A. 1. Stepped on nail.
  A. 2. Lump of ore fell from car striking head.
  A. 3. Stepped on nail.
  A. 4. Cut on head by timber falling from car.
  S. 1. Stepped on nail.
  S. 2. Scalded by steam from hose.
  S. 3. Air hose flew up cutting chin.
  S. 4. Struck by broken plant.

- S. 4. Struck by broken plank.

#### Table 3a.—Nature of injuries to employees in coupling and uncoupling cars.

Injuries.	Train- men.	Train- men in yards.	Yard train- men.	Other em- ployees.
Loss of feet	5	1	8	<u> </u>
Loss of legs	2		2	7
Loss of arms	4	1	4	
Loss of hands	1	1	1	
Loss of fingers	14	10	10	•
Loss of toes	1	2	4	
Fractured skull		2	• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •	'
Fractured leg	3 ]	1 1	3	
Fractured arm	4	<b>3</b> ,	7	}
Fractured collar bone or ribs	5,	4	4	1 3
Fractured other bones	9	7 '	10	
Contusion of head or body	25	22	54	' 7
Contusion or laceration of feet	29	25	49	;
Contusion or laceration of toes	10	2	5	
Contusion or laceration of legs	9,	5	16	
Contusion or laceration of arms	6	7	24	
Contusion or laceration of hands	47	38	74	
Contusion or laceration of fingers	92	62	148	
Dislocation	2	4	I	
Internal injuries	6	5 '	4	
Sprains	12	4	19	
Shock Miscellaneous	······································	6	8	•••••••••
Total injuries	288	212	455	31
Killed	23	25	35	
Total killed and injured	311	237	490	35
RECAPITULATION.				

Total injured	986
-	
Total killed and injured	1.073

TABLE No. 4.—Details of Table No. 1.—Causes of accidents to employees classified (C6 and C7) as falling from and getting on or off cars and engines.

Sub- class.		Causes.		rain- nen.	Train- men in yards.		Yard trainmen (switch- ing crews).		Other employees.	
			Killed.	Injured.	Killed.	Injured.	Killed.	Injured.	Killed.	Injured.
	1 2	Fell from roof of box car by reason of— Defect in car. Ice or snow.		7		1		6		1
	3 4	Parting of train  Derailment, collision, or shock due to abnormal  movements of cars other than those in sub-	3			7		6		••••
C 6	5	class 3. While setting brakes Fell from—	6 3	67 29	5 2	49 28	6 2	97 47	2	15 4
	6 7 8 9	Coal car. Freight car other than box or coal car. Engine or tender. Passenger car.	2 8 14 1	11 51 168 12	3 1 6 1	7 24 72 3	3 6	10 18 55 3	4 6 4 1	11 23 16 5
1	10 11	Engines, tenders, or cars (all kinds) not in mo- tion.  Miscellaneous causes.	13	72 315	1 3	41 129		17 258	3 5	64 71
C 7	12 13 14 15	Not clearly explained Slipped getting on moving trains or cars Jumping off moving trains. Jumping from engines or cars anticipating collision,	5	64 154 139	5 2 3	15 85 91	9 5 2	48 78 - 120	2 9 8	16 67 78
	16	derailment, or other accident  Fell from engines or cars by reason of defective hand holds and sill steps.	2	63 52	1 1	9 29	1	24 56	1	4
	17 18	Getting on or off moving engine. Caught in frog, guard rail, or switch	6	200 14	8	98 12	6	119 5	8	47 1
		Total	83	1,441	40	700	50	967	54	426

#### [Public—No. 171.]

AN ACT Requiring common carriers engaged in interstate commerce to make full reports of all accidents to the Interstate Commerce Commission.

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, It shall be the duty of the general manager, superintendent, or other proper officer of every common carrier engaged in interstate commerce by railroad to make to the Interstate Commerce Commission, at its office in Washington, District of Columbia, a monthly report, under oath, of all collisions of trains or where any train or part of a train accidentally leaves the track, and of all accidents which may occur to its passengers or employees while in the service of such common carrier and actually on duty, which report shall state the nature and causes thereof and the circumstances connected therewith.

SEC. 2. That any common carrier failing to make such report within thirty days after the end of any month shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor and, upon conviction thereof by a court of competent jurisdiction, shall be punished by a fine of not more than one hundred dollars for each and every offense and for every day during which it shall fail to make such report after the time herein specified for making the same.

SEC. 3. That neither said report nor any part thereof shall be admitted as evidence or used for any purpose against such railroad so making such report in any suit or action for damages growing out of any matter mentioned in said report.

SEC. 4. That the Interstate Commerce Commission is authorized to prescribe for such common carriers a method and form for making the reports in the foregoing section provided.

Approved, March 3, 1901.

#### SPECIAL INFORMATION CONTAINED IN PRECEDING BULLETINS.a

Each accident bulletin contains tables showing the number of passengers and employees killed and injured, and these figures are classified according to cause (see Table No. 1); also tables showing cost of the different classes of train accidents.

The causes of accidents to employees in coupling and uncoupling and in falling from cars, etc., are further classified in Tables No. 3 and No. 4. The most serious collisions and derailments are dealt with in a supplementary table (Class A) showing the causes in some detail. Each bulletin is for three months, and No. 1 was for the quarter ending September 30, 1901. The bulletin for the quarter ending June 30 contains, in addition to the quarterly statistics, tables showing the same information for the whole of the fiscal year ending on that date.

Bulletin No. 17 records one collision, killing 6 and injuring 35 persons, and one derailment, killing 15 and injuring 28. The collision, occurring at 1 a. m., was due to gross negligence on the part of the men in charge of a freight train. The derailment was due to an open draw. The drawbridge was not provided with interlocked signals and the engineman was not adequately acquainted with the line of the road. A collision and a derailment are reported which were due to the lack of suitable detector bars at switches, and a collision which was due to failure of

"controlled manual" block signal working.

Bulletin No. 18 shows total casualties much larger than in the preceding quarters, due largely, no doubt, to an enormous increase in traffic. Many accidents are reported in which the men had been on duty excessively long hours. One collision, killing 17 persons, was due to the error of an engineman of five months' experience, who ran past five warning signals. Another collision, killing 10 persons, was due to the failure of the men in charge of a freight train to identify opposing passenger trains. One derailment of a passenger train, killing 13 persons, was reported as due to some cause that could not be discovered.

Bulletin No. 19 is like Bulletin 18 in showing a large number of casualties. One butting collision, due to failure of train dispatching, caused 34 deaths and 24 injuries and \$50,000 damages, besides the damages for deaths and injuries of persons. One collision was due to the negligence of men who had been worked flagrantly long hours. Particulars are given of a number of collisions due to complicated and

unusual causes.

Bulletin No. 20 shows total deaths greater than in the corresponding quarter of the previous year, but the number of passengers and employees killed in train accidents was considerably smaller. The most serious accident in this bulletin was a butting collision of passenger trains, due to misinterpretation of a dispatcher's order by a pilot; 10 persons killed, 38 injured. One derailment, unexplained,

train running slowly, caused 9 deaths and 18 injuries.

Bulletin No. 21 contains the record of only one train accident—a collision—in which more than 10 persons were killed, but the totals of casualties of all classes are large, no improvement being shown over preceding quarters. Number of passengers killed in train accidents, 52. One collision, killing 17 and injuring 56, was due to confusion of telegraphic orders; one derailment, killing 9 and injuring 43, was at a misplaced switch, and another, killing 7 and injuring 40, was due to excessive speed.

Bulletin No. 22 shows 180 passengers killed in train accidents—a number larger than that in any other bulletin except No. 13. One rear collision in the District of Columbia caused the death of 43 passengers and the injury of 63. A butting collision killed 43 persons and injured 155, the bodies of the killed being consumed by fire. In the derailment of a passenger train at a drawbridge 57 persons were

killed and 36 injured.

Bulletin No. 23 shows 126 passengers killed in train accidents. It contains the record of two collisions, killing 41 persons, and two derailments, killing the same number. The number of employees killed in coupling accidents is 25 per cent less than in

the last preceding quarter.

Bulletin No. 24, though representing that quarter of the year which is usually the lightest in traffic, showed all of the principal totals of casualties larger than in the same quarter of the year preceding, and the number of passengers killed in train accidents was very much larger. One derailment killed 33 persons and one collision 8. The tables for the year ending June 30, 1907, showed heavy increases in all items except accidents in car coupling and from striking against overhead obstructions, and the number of passengers killed and injured in collisions and derailments showed an alarming increase, the number of killed in this class being 17 per cent higher than the very large total reported in the year ending June 30, 1905. A condensed list is given of 10 prominent accidents in the year ending June 30, 1907, to which are charged an aggregate of 291 deaths.

a For notes on Bulletins 1 to 16, inclusive, see Bulletin No. 17.

## ACCIDENT BULLETIN NO. 26

## Showing

# Collisions and Derailments of Trains

# Casualties to Persons

during the months of

October, November, and December, 1907

INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMMISSION WASHINGTON, D. C.



Washington:: Government Printing Office:: 1908

### THE INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMMISSION.

MARTIN A. KNAPP, of New York, Chairman.
JUDSON C. CLEMENTS, of Georgia.
CHARLES A. PROUTY, of Vermont.
FRANCIS M. COCKRELL, of Missouri.
FRANKLIN K. LANE, of California.
EDGAR E. CLARK, of Iowa.
JAMES S. HARLAN, of Illinois.
EDWARD A. MOSELEY, Secretary.

#### ACCIDENT BULLETIN No. 26.

## RAILROAD ACCIDENTS IN THE UNITED STATES

DURING THE

## THREE MONTHS ENDING DECEMBER 31, 1907.

The number of persons killed in train accidents during the months of October, November, and December, 1907, as shown in reports made by the railroad companies to the Interstate Commerce Commission, under the "accident law" of March 3, 1901, was 220 and of injured 4,187. Accidents of other kinds, including those sustained by employees while at work and by passengers in getting on or off cars, etc., bring the total number of casualties up to 20,458 (1,092 killed and 19,366 injured). These accidents are classified in the following table. These reports deal only with (a) passengers and (b) employees on duty.<sup>a</sup>

TABLE No. 1.—Casualties to persons, October, November, and December, 1907.bc

		ssen- gers and b).	der me	ersons ried un- eagree- ent or ntract (bb).	Total (a, b, and bb).		Trainmen.		Train- men in yards.	
	Killed.	Injured.	Killed.	Injured.	Killed.	Injured.	Killed.	Injured.	Killed.	Injured.
Collisions Derailments Miscellaneous train accidents, including lo-	10 5	1,358 516	4 2	119 113	14 7	1,477 629	77 48	664 352	11 6	238 44
Total train accidents	15	1,889	6	236	21	19 2, 125	16 141	254 1,270	18	55 337
Coupling or uncoupling. While doing other work about trains or while attending switches. Coming in contact with overhead bridges,							22 16	2,403	13 15	175 805
structures at side of track, etc. Falling from cars or engines or while get- ting on or off. Other causes.	35 21	552 559	1 3	1 16 67	36 24	5 568 626	16 86 51	1,385 221	2 24 34	91 665 140
Total (other than train accidents)	56	1, 115	4	84	60	1, 199	191	4,509	<b>R8</b>	1,876
Total all classes	71	3,004	10	320	81	3, 324	332	5,779	106	2,213

a The casualties to passengers have been divided into three classes. Class a includes all ordinary passengers. Class b includes passengers traveling on freight trains. Class bb includes persons who are customarily carried on trains under special arrangements, such as postal clerks and express messengers, employees on Pullman cars, newsboys, live-stock tenders, and men in charge of freight.

Table No. I is continued on next page.

Accidents to employees resulting in slight injuries which do not prevent the employee injured from performing his accustomed service for more than three days in the aggregate during the ten days immediately following the accident are not reported.

TABLE No. 1.—Casualties to persons, October, November, and December, 1907—Cont'd.

•	men	d train- (switch- crews).		er em- yees.		al em- yees.	Total per- sons re- ported.		
•	Killed.	Injured.	Killed.	Injured.	Killed.	Injured.	Killed.	Injured.	
Collisions.  Derailments  Miscellaneous train accidents, including lo-	10 10	159 77	7	127 46	105 71	1, 188 519	119 78	2,665 1,148	
comotive boiler explosions	2	29	4	17	23	355	23	374	
Total train accidents	22	265	18	190	199	2,062	220	4, 187	
Coupling or uncoupling	40	466	2	16	77	945	77	945	
while attending switches	15	919	18	644	64	4, 771	64	4,771	
structures at side of track, etc	4	107	4	12	26	422	26	427	
Falling from cars or engines or while get- ting on or off	49 37	1,019 126	22 342	<b>326</b> 3,960	181 464	3, 395 4, 447	217 488	3, 963 5, 073	
Total (other than train accidents)	145	2,637	388	4, 958	812	13,980	872	15, 179	
Total all classes	167	2,902	406	5,148	1,011	16,042	1,092	19, 366	

This bulletin shows marked decreases in nearly every item of Table No. 1, reflecting the marked falling off in traffic which began last autumn on practically every railroad in the country. The largest proportional decrease, that in the number of passengers killed in train accidents, is in an item which is not so directly proportionate to the volume of traffic; this for reasons which have been noticed in previous bulletins; while the fatal accidents to passengers from other causes—largely from their own negligence or want of caution—have not decreased (61 now, 54 a year before). This probably indicates that the decrease in the total number of passengers traveling was not large; while, on the other hand, the diminution in the number or the severity of accidents affecting only trainmen undoubtedly is due, not alone to a falling off in traffic, but also to the diminished pressure under which the trainmen do their work. With the reduction in the volume of traffic there has been less of overwork and excessive hours, and also probably a weeding out of the less competent men.

The list of train accidents notable by their magnitude, heretofore of considerable length in each quarter, is now happily much reduced, the chief items in Table 2a being collisions 1, 9, and 11. Derailment No. 1, though comparatively of small magnitude, is noticeable as being one of a new class. It was a derailment of an electric car, running alone. Electric railroads doing interstate business have been so few that hitherto their reports have not been prominent in the accident records. Cars running alone are subject to accidents

from defective brake apparatus which in trains of cars would not cause serious trouble.

Notwithstanding the improvement as regards results, the causes of accidents, as shown in Table 2a, are as varied as ever, and demand no less serious consideration than in the past. In the amount of damage done to cars and engines it is also observable that there is no important decrease, as compared with the corresponding quarter in the preceding year.

TABLE No. 1a.—Comparison of principal items with last bulletin and with one year back.

		. <del></del>	
_	Bulletin 26.	Bulletin 25.	Bulletin 22.
1. Passengers killed in train accidents. 2. Passengers killed, all causes. 3. Employees killed in train accidents. 4. Employees killed in coupling. 5. Employees killed, all causes. 6. Total passengers and employees killed, all causes.	81 199 77	110 195 236 87 1,144 1,339	180 234 294 84 1,196 1,430

The total number of collisions and derailments in the quarter now under review was 3,964 (2,094 collisions and 1,870 derailments), of which 337 collisions and 202 derailments affected passenger trains. The damage to cars, engines, and roadway by these accidents amounted to \$2,962,470. Given more in detail, these facts appear as below:

Table No. 2.—Collisions and derailments, October, November, and December, 1907.

	Number.	Loss.	Killed.	Injured.
Collisions, rear	508	\$472,847	39	705
Collisions, butting	264	474, 144	46	1,051
Collisions, train separating	166	58, 869	2	88
Collisions, miscellaneous.	1, 156	530,863	<b>32</b>	821
Total	2,094	1, 536, 723	119	2,665
Derailments due to defects of roadway, etc	404	243, 272	10	299
Derailments due to defects of equipment	819	<b>650, 538</b>	9	224
Derailments due to negligence of trainmen, signalmen, etc	129	86, 874	9	85
Derailments due to unforeseen obstruction of track, etc	84	92,720	17	169
Derailments due to malicious obstruction of track, etc	23	27, 521	7	38
Derailments due to miscellaneous causes	411	324, 822	26	333
Total	1,870	1, 425, 747	78	1,148
Total collisions and derailments	3,984	2,962,470	197	3,813

Following is the usual list of Class A train accidents—all in which the damage is reported at \$10,000 or over; notable cases in which passengers are killed, and those doing damage less than \$10,000 and down to \$2,000, wherever the circumstances or the cause may be of particular interest:

TABLE 2a.—Causes of forty-one prominent train accidents (Class A).

[Note.—R stands for rear collision; B, butting collision, M, miscellaneous collisions; D, detailment; P, passenger train; F, freight and miscellaneous trains.]

#### COLLISIONS.

						COLL	IBIONS.
					· Cut at water, a married	Reference to record.	Canse.
1	В	Pand F	5	0	\$2, 125	76	Passenger train ran over misplaced switch and into head of freight train standing on side track, dense fog. Man in charge of switch in service only 5 days, but had been employed by this company
2	B	Pand F	0	18	2,215	46	two years before.  Eastbound passenger collided with westbound standing freight. Passenger ordered to run on westbound track; operator wrongfully reported that the freight had cleared that track. It was standing near his cabin, but he thought, or as-
8	R	Fand F	1	2	2, 500	71	sumed, that it had passed.  Engineman (killed) disregarded flag; had been on duty 28 hours.
4	В	F and F	2	4	2,500	81	Misplaced switch. Misplaced by brakeman of 7 months' experience; on duty 18 hours 20 minutes.
5	R	Fand F	0	3	2,520	82	Failure to protect standing freight train by flag. Conductor asleep in cab; flagman also in caboone; these men on duty 13 hours 57 minutes; following
6	R	F and F	3	0	3,275	41	train had been warned by two torpedoes. Freight standing at water station not protected by
7	R	P and P	1	4	5,075	5	flag; 3 men in caboose killed.  Block signal (telegraph block system) wrongfully displayed at clear; signalman in service 5 years.  (See note in text below.)
8	В	P and F	0	11	5, 725	20	Conductor held order giving him until 6:15 to reach a certain station; took it for 6:50 and so told en- gineman. Engineman did not read order; order not shown to fireman or brakeman.
9	ĸ	P and P	8	36	5,920	57	Three passengers killed. Passenger train ran past automatic block signal indicating stop and struck passenger train standing at station. Engineman on duty 14 hours 20 minutes.
10-	В	P and F	1	165	6,042	12	Conductor and engineman of empty engine over- looked schedule of regular passenger train; en- gineman's experience, 6 months. Engineman de- pended on conductor; conductor forgot.
11	R	P and P	3	22	6, 500	68	Three passengers killed; train in yard not protected by flag; other train approached at uncontrollable speed in dense fog.
12	В	Pand P   	0	45	6,660	43	Misplaced switch; southbound train ran through cross over in dark tunnel and engineman did not discover that he was on wrong routs. Switch not in working condition; had been spiked, but was loosened and turned by employee of contractor
33	м	Pand F	1	4	6,980	9	without authority. Freight approached crossing not under control.
14	В	Pand F	0	10	7,100	75	(See note in text below) Order misread by engineman; conductor did not deliver order to engineman in person as required
15	В	Pand F	1	3	7,927	79	by rule.  Freight had ! hour 10 minutes on time of passenger train, conductor and engineman unaccountably calculated 2 hours 10 minutes, though they had
16	M	F and F	0	1	9,262	56	Cars ran out of siding at night. Derailing switch 290 feet from fouling point; cars had been left outside of derailing switch
17	В	P and F	2	11	9,900	46	outside of derailing switch.  Conductor and sugineman of freight overlooked schedule of passenger train.

TABLE 2a.—Causes of forty-one prominent train accidents (Class A)—Continued.

#### COLLISIONS—Continued.

No.	Class.	Kind of train.	Killed.	Injured.	Damage to enginee, cars, and roadway.	Reference to record.	Causs.
18	<b>B</b>	F and F	3	2	10, 150	7	Cars ran out of side track. Contrary to orders, cars had been left on an unsuitable temporary track. Believed brakes had been maliciously loosened.
19	В	F and F	1	1	10, 170	13	Northbound train approached station at uncon- trollable speed; engineman, experienced, did not manage air brakes properly.
20	В	F and F	1	4	10,500	8	Southbound met one northbound train, but men forgot that order specified two trains. Conductor (10 years' experience as brakeman) was on his first trip as conductor.
21	В	Fand F	2	1	10, 800	51	Operator neglected to deliver one of four orders. Conductor accepted other orders knowing his signature had been prematurely and wrongfully sent to dispatcher. Operator in service at this place 12 days.
22	В	Pand F	3	53	12, 400	16	Misplaced switch at meeting point. Brakeman, 8 months' experience, on duty 20 hours 40 minutes; should have closed switch, and claims that he had done so.
23	В	Fand F	1	2	12,800	4	Disregard of distant and home signals approaching station (2 a. m.). Engineman believed to have been asleep; brakeman in cab also probably asleep; fireman not well acquainted with road.
24	В	Pand P	1	10	13, 650	42	Collision opposite station, both enginemen disobeying rule to approach under control. (See note in text below.)
25	R I	F and F	0	3	15,789	72	Standing freight not protected by flag; flagman's experience I year 6 months. Damage largely due to fire started from broken stove in caboose and from overturned engine.
26	В	F and F	1	5	17,000	40	Operator accepted order after train had passed. (See note in text below.)
27	M	Fand F	0	2	20,700	84	Westbound freight backed through cross over into eastbound freight. Brakeman, in service 2 months, set cross-over switch instead of side-track switch as ordered.
28	В	P and F	3	30	45, 700	44	Conductor and engineman northbound freight encroached on time of regular southbound passenger train; men on duty 19 hours 52 minutes. They knew that they were on the time of the passenger; detached engine and tried to reach station, evidently depending on possibility of passenger being a little behind time.
	Tota	<b>al</b>	38	457	271,875		

#### DERAILMENTS.

		<del></del>			<del></del>		
1	D	P	_ [	35	\$350	63	Excessive speed on curve due to broken brake beam (electric car running alone).
2	D .	<b>F</b>		3	2,700	29	Runaway on 2.2 per cent descending grade; bad management of air; train pipeleaky; hand brakes not promptly used. Engineman, on duty 28 hours, did not seasonably signal to apply hand brakes.
3	D	P	1	13	3, 100	32	Accidental obstruction. (Wreck caused by derailment No. 10.)
4	D	<b>F</b>	1	0	5,865	35	Excessive speed on curve and steep descending grade; engineman making his first trip on this branch; conductor applied air brakes in caboose, but applied them too suddenly and broke coupling between engine and tender.
5	D	P	ł	10	7,894	93	Two cars of passenger train blown off track by high wind.
6	D	P	0	3	10, 287	97	Unknown.
6 7	D D	P	Ŏ	3 2	10, 400	95	Runaway on descending grade. (See note in text below.)
8	D	F	0	2	10,977	65	Mast of steam shovel struck overhead bridge, and bridge was weakened and fell. Height of shovel 19 feet 6j inches; clearance at bridge had formerly been 19 feet 7 inches, but new and thicker ties had been put in, raising the rails.

TABLE 2a.—Causes of forty-one prominent train accidents (Class A)—Continued.

DERAILMENTS—Continued.

No.	Class.	Kind of train.	Killed.	Lajured.	Damage to engines, cars, and roadway.	Reference to record.	Cause.
9	D	P	1	12	11,100	57	Accidental obstruction. (Wreck of freight train on adjacent track derailed by shock due to automatic application of air brakes. Triple valve on one car too sensitive.)
10 11 12	D D D	F F	0 1 1	0 3 4	13, 210 16, 545 17, 250	31 25 30	Broken flange. Unknown. Runawayondescendinggrade. Enginemaninservice on this steep grade 2 weeks; 7 years' experience elsewhere; had run 4 trips over this section
13	D	F	o	0	19,950	89	as learner. Broken flange.
•	Tota	1	7	87	129, 628		
		l collisions and cailments.	45	544	401,503		

Collision No. 7 was caused by an error of a signalman. The signalman at A allowed a passenger train to leave A for B before a preceding passenger train had reached B. This signalman is 25 years old, and has been employed in that capacity for five years. His explanation is that he was busy setting the switches and signals for switching movements which were going on at his station at the time when he was called upon to give the signal for the passenger train.

Collision No. 13 was at a crossing, a freight train of road A running into the side of a passenger train of road B. One sleeping-car conductor was killed and 4 passengers were injured. The collision occurred at 5:45 a.m. The freight train approached the crossing at uncontrollable speed, either on account of the air pressure in the airbrake system having been excessively reduced, or by reason of defective judgment on the part of the engineman. This freight train had begun its trip without proper inspection, the air brakes not having been tested; and besides this, the rule requiring 75 per cent of the train to be air-braked had been disobeyed, only 22 cars out of 34 having their air brakes connected to the engine. Road A asserts that the passenger train did not comply with the law requiring a full stop before passing over this crossing, and that if this stop had been made the collision would not have happened. The men in charge of the other train declare that they had made the stop. The conductor of the freight train had been on duty 21 hours and the engineman 13 hours; the experience of the conductor, as such, was 5 months, and of the engineman 2 years and 4 months.

Collision No. 24 was between a regular westbound and a regular eastbound passenger train, and it occurred exactly opposite a block-signal station. According to the rule, both trains should have approached the block-signal station with speed under such control that a stop could be made before reaching the signal in case it was not clear. It is stated in the report that the block signal was obscured by fog and also by smoke from an engine standing nearby on a side track.

Collision No. 26, a butting collision between freight trains at 9:36 p. m., and causing the death of a fireman, was due to the error of a telegraph operator, 19 years of age, who had been in the service of the road 2 months, though, according to the report, he had had 4 years' experience as an operator. An order having been sent to this operator for train No. 6 and it having become desirable to change this order, the dispatcher asked the operator if the train had passed, and was told in reply that it had not, whereupon he sent an order restricting the right of train No. 6. It appears that when the dispatcher asked his question the operator looked out of his window and saw the headlight of a locomotive and took it for train No. 6, but afterwards found that No. 6 had already passed and that the light was that of a switching engine. Train No. 6 had passed this station some minutes ahead of time, this having been authorized by the dispatcher.

Derailment No. 7 was due to the mismanagement of the air brakes, a heavy freight train becoming uncontrollable on a steep descending grade. The train had two engines. The leading engineman is held responsible, having neglected to use "straight air" to apply the brakes when he found the train was eluding control; and the engineman of the helping engine is held at fault for not having been watchful so as to take an opportunity to recharge the "train line" (air pipes and cylinders) and apply the brakes. The leading engineman had been in the service on this division only 3 months, but is reported as having had one year's experience elsewhere. He had been on duty 21 hours, with 5 hours' intermission. The other engineman had been on duty 17 hours, with 5 hours' intermission.

TABLE No. 3.—Details of Table No. 1—Causes of accidents to employees in coupling and uncoupling cars.

Sub-	Causes.		rain- cen.	11110	rain- en in ards.	tral (sw	ard nmen ritch- ing	ployees.	
<b></b>		Killed.	Injured.	Killed.	Injured.	Killed.	Injured.	Killed.	Injured.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21	Adjusting coupler with foot. Adjusting coupler, cars accidentally started. Careless manipulation of uncoupling lever. Cars not equipped with automatic coupler. Coupling broken, using link and pin or chain. Coupling damaged cars. Coupling with chain or other emergency appliance on curve too sharp for automatic coupling. Coupling with chain or other emergency appliance because of uneven track. Coupling or uncoupling safety chains. Fingers or hand caught between uncoupling lever and body of car. Uncoupling without using lever (unnecessary). Uncoupling without using lever, uncoupling lever not in working order. Foot caught in frog, switch, or guard rail. Opening or closing knuckle when cars were near together, miscalculated speed. Opening knuckle, part of defective coupler fell on foot. Opening knuckle, lost footing. Riding on car to uncouple, slipped off. Struck by object at side of track. Caught by unexpected movement of car, due to slack running in. Caught by unexpected movement of car, due to mis-	3 1 1 2 2 5	24 10 3 2 6 9 3 10 39 2 28 3 6 9 3 6	1	17 6 1 12 3 1 1 1 33 2 24 2 11 1 3 11 3 11 3	2 7 4 1 7 2 8	31 14 9 3 5 26 10 6 91 16 50 6 33 7 7 9 7 11		1 2 1 1
22 23 24	take or misunderstanding in giving hand signals. Uncoupling moving cars and lost footing.  Parts hard to move, causing delay.  Went between cars unnecessarily and contrary to rule.	2	18 18	3	3 3 6 13	1	34 10 31		1 1 2
25 26 27 28	Hand caught between projecting load and end of next car. No witness (fatal injury) Other causes (see detailed list below) Unexplained Total	3  22	2 6 2 288	13	3 1 1 175	40	11 1 466	2	16

#### Details of injuries included in Table 3, subclass 27.

- O. 1. Adjusting knuckle; ties rolled off car. O. 2. Piece of coal fell from car on foot.
- O. 3. Steel billet fell on foot...
- O. 4. Stake on flat car broke and struck hand.
- O. 5. Wheel ran over piece timber, which flew up cutting eye and nose.
- O. 6. Stepped on nail.
- O. 7. Stepped on sharp piece of steel.
- N. 1. Stepped in ditch, spraining foot.
- N. 2. Brake staff fell from car on head. N. 3. Torpedo exploded and cut neck.
- N. 4. Stepped on nail.
- N. 5. Stepped on spike, spraining ankle.
- N. 6. Air hose flew up, striking nose.
  D. 1. Adjusting knuckle; caught hand.
  D. 2. Air hose burst, striking hand.
  D. 3. Glove caught on drawbar; finger cut off.
  D. 4. Opening knuckle, caught thumb.
  D. 5. Fell off bridge.

TABLE 3A.—Nature of injuries to employees in coupling and uncoupling cars.

Injurieș.	Train- men.	Train- men in yards.	Yard train- man.	Other em- ployees.
Loss of feet Loss of legs Loss of arms Loss of hands Loss of fingers Loss of toes	2 5 3 2 17 2	5 2 2 1 7	5 1 3 2 18 2	1 1 1 1
Fractured leg. Fractured arm Fractured collar bone or ribs Fractured other bones Contusion of head or body Contusion or laceration of feet. Contusion or laceration of legs Contusion or laceration of legs Contusion or laceration of arms Contusion or laceration of hands Contusion or laceration of fingers Dislocation Internal injuries Sprains	4 8 8 26 23 5 9 16 47 98 1	3 11 3 4 17 14 2 6 11 31 43 1	5 10 9 11 68 42 8 31 21 55 136 2 6	1 1 3 1 1 2 1
Shock	4	3	8	
Total injuries. Killed.	288 22	175 13	466 40	16 2
Total killed and injured	310	198	506	. 18
RECAPITULATION Total killed Total injured				77
Total killed and injured	• • • • • • • • • •	•••••		1,022

TABLE No. 4.—Details of Table No. 1.—Causes of accidents to employees classified (C6 and C7) as falling from and getting on or off cars and engines.

Sub-	Causes.	_	rain- nen.	me	ain- n in rds.	tra (sv	ard inmen vitch- ing ws).	Other employees.	
class.		Killed.	Injured.	Killed.	Infured.	Killed.	Injured.	Killed.	Injured.
1 2 3 4	Ice or snow	1	4 9 28		4 3 . 6	1	10 7 6		1 i
C6 5	class 3.  While setting brakes.  Fell from—	3	64 52	2	26 23	8 3	105 70	4	8
6 7 8 9	Freight car other than box or coal car	20	15 49 164 11	2 2 4	6 23 83 5	5 5		1 1	20 12 1
11 12 (13 (14	tion.  Miscellaneous causes.  Not clearly explained.  Slipped getting on moving trains or cars.  Jumping off moving trains.	18 14 7	264 70 112		14	5 8 2 1	45	3 2 5 3	53 67 13 36 53
C7 16	sion, derailment, or other accident	1 11	47 40 202 11	1 4	16 32 119 13	9		4	3 48 2
	Total	86	1,385	24	665	49	1,019	22	326

#### [Ривыс-No. 171.]

AN ACT Requiring common carriers engaged in interstate commerce to make full reports of all accidents to the Interstate Commerce Commission.

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, It shall be the duty of the general manager, superintendent, or other proper officer of every common carrier engaged in interstate commerce by railroad to make to the Interstate Commerce Commission, at its office in Washington, District of Columbia, a monthly report, under oath, of all collisions of trains or where any train or part of a train accidentally leaves the track, and of all accidents which may occur to its passengers or employees while in the service of such common carrier and actually on duty, which report shall state the nature and causes thereof, and the circumstances connected therewith.

SEC. 2. That any common carrier failing to make such report within thirty days after the end of any month shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor and, upon conviction thereof by a court of competent jurisdiction, shall be punished by a fine of not more than one hundred dollars for each and every offense and for every day during which it shall fail to make such report after the time herein specified for making the same.

SEC. 3. That neither said report nor any part thereof shall be admitted as evidence or used for any purpose against such railroad so making such report in any suit or

action for damages growing out of any matter mentioned in said report.

SEC. 4. That the Interstate Commerce Commission is authorized to prescribe for such common carriers a method and form for making the reports in the foregoing section provided.

Approved, March 3, 1901.

#### SPECIAL INFORMATION CONTAINED IN PRECEDING BULLETINS.

Each accident bulletin contains tables showing the number of passengers and employees killed and injured, and these figures are classified according to cause (see Table No. 1); also tables showing cost of the different classes of train accidents. The causes of accidents to employees in coupling and uncoupling and in falling from cars, etc., are further classified in Tables No. 3 and No. 4. The most serious collisions and derailments are dealt with in a supplementary table (Class A), showing the causes in some detail. Each bulletin is for three months, and No. 1 was for the quarter ending September 30, 1901. The bulletin for the quarter ending June 30 contains, in addition to the quarterly statistics, tables showing the same information for the whole of the fiscal year ending on that date.

Bulletin No. 17 records one collision, killing 6 and injuring 35 persons, and one derailment, killing 15 and injuring 28. The collision, occurring at 1 a. m., was due to gross negligence on the part of the men in charge of a freight train. The derailment was due to an open draw. The drawbridge was not provided with interlocked signals and the engineman was not adequately acquainted with the line of the road. A collision and a derailment are reported which were due to the lack of suitable detector bars at switches, and a collision which was due to failure of

"controlled manual" block signal working.

Bulletin No. 18 shows total casualties much larger than in the preceding quarters, due largely, no doubt, to an enormous increase in traffic. Many accidents are reported in which the men had been on duty excessively long hours. One collision, killing 17 persons, was due to the error of an engineman of five months' experience, who ran past five warning signals. Another collision, killing 10 persons, was due to the failure of the men in charge of a freight train to identify opposing passenger trains. One derailment of a passenger train, killing 13 persons, was reported as due to some cause that could not be discovered.

Bulletin No. 19 is like Bulletin 18 in showing a large number of casualties. One butting collision, due to failure of train dispatching, caused 34 deaths and 24 injuries and \$50,000 damages, besides the damages for deaths and injuries of persons. One collision was due to the negligence of men who had been worked flagrantly long hours. Particulars are given of a number of collisions due to complicated and

unusual causes.

a For notes on Bulletins 1-16, see Bulletin No. 17.

Bulletin No. 20 shows total deaths greater than in the corresponding quarter of the previous year, but the number of passengers and employees killed in train accidents was considerably smaller. The most serious accident in this bulletin was a butting collision of passenger trains, due to misinterpretation of a dispatcher's order by a pilot; 10 persons killed, 38 injured. One derailment, unexplained, train running slowly, caused 9 deaths and 18 injuries.

Bulletin No. 21 contains the record of only one train accident—a collision—in which more than 10 persons were killed, but the totals of casualties of all classes are large, no improvement being shown over preceding quarters. Number of passengers killed in train accidents, 52. One collision, killing 17 and injuring 56, was due to confusion of telegraphic orders; one derailment, killing 9 and injuring 43, was at a misplaced switch, and another, killing 7 and injuring 40, was due to

excessive speed.


Bulletin No. 22 shows 180 passengers killed in train accidents—a number larger than that in any other bulletin except No. 13. One rear collision in the District of Columbia caused the death of 43 passengers and the injury of 63. A butting collision killed 43 persons and injured 155, the bodies of the killed being consumed by fire. In the derailment of a passenger train at a drawbridge 57 persons were killed and 36 injured.

Bulletin No. 23 shows 126 passengers killed in train accidents. It contains the record of two collisions, killing 41 persons, and two derailments, killing the same number. The number of employees killed in coupling accidents is 25 per cent less than in

the last preceding quarter.

Bulletin No. 24, though representing that quarter of the year which is usually the lightest in traffic, showed all of the principal totals of casualties larger than in the same quarter of the year preceding, and the number of passengers killed in train accidents was very much larger. One derailment killed 33 persons and one collision 8. The tables for the year ending June 30, 1907, showed heavy increases in all items except accidents in car coupling and from striking against overhead obstructions, and the number of passengers killed and injured in collisions and derailments showed an alarming increase, the number of killed in this class being 17 per cent higher than the very large total reported in the year ending June 30, 1905. A condensed list is given of 10 prominent accidents in the year ending June 30, 1907, to which are charged an aggregate of 291 deaths.

Bulletin No. 25 shows 110 passengers killed in train accidents, three collisions and one derailment being responsible for 80 deaths in this class. The number of passengers killed from other causes (mostly their own negligence) also shows a large increase. One of the most serious collisions was due to the misreading of a dispatcher's order, and another to a mistake in sending or receiving the order.



M. Interstate Commerce Commission Washington, D. C.

# Accident Bulletin No. 27


January, February, and March 1908



Washington

Government Printing Office

1908



#### ACCIDENT BULLETIN NO. 27

### Showing

# Collisions and Derailments of Trains and

# Casualties to Persons

during the months of

January, February, and March, 1908

INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMMISSION WASHINGTON, D. C.



Washington:: Government Printing Office:: 1908

#### THE INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMMISSION.

MARTIN A. KNAPP, of New York, Chairman.

JUDSON C. CLEMENTS, of Georgia.

CHARLES A. PROUTY, of Vermont.

FRANCIS M. COCKRELL, of Missouri.

FRANKLIN K. LANE, of California.

EDGAR E. CLARK, of Iowa.

JAMES S. HARLAN, of Illinois.

EDWARD A. MOSELEY, Secretary.

ACCIDENT BULLETIN No. 27.

#### RAILROAD ACCIDENTS IN THE UNITED STATES

DURING THE

#### THREE MONTHS ENDING MARCH 31, 1908.

The number of persons killed in train accidents during the months of January, February, and March, 1908, as shown in reports made by the railroad companies to the Interstate Commerce Commission under the "accident law" of March 3, 1901, was 125, and of injured 2,770. Accidents of other kinds, including those sustained by employees while at work, and by passengers in getting on or off the cars, etc., bring the total number of casualties up to 15,441 (728 killed and 14,713 injured). These accidents are classified in the following table. These reports deal only with (a) passengers and (b) employees on duty:

TABLE No. 1.—Summary of casualties to persons, January, February, March, 1908.6c

		sengers and b).			Total (a, b, and bb).		Trai	inmen.	Trainmen in yards.	
	Killed.	Injured.	Killed.	Injured.	Killed.	Injured.	Killed.	Injured.	Killed.	Injured.
Collisions Deraitments Miscellaneous train accidents, including	10	603 654	2	93 49 2	10 11	696 703	35 33	{	8 2	142 33
Total train accidents	19	19 1,276	2	144	21	1,420	78	`	10	231
Coupling or uncoupling While doing other work about trains or while attending switches	••••	••••					13 12	207 1,716	5	183
Coming in contact with overhead bridges, structures at side of track, etc		2	1	• • • •	1	2	17	118	1	64
ting on or off	32 16	556 520	1	18 41	33 17	574 561	54 22	1,003	17 25	582 128
Total (other than train accidents)	48	1,078	3	59	51	1, 137	118	3, 233	55	1,551
Total all classes	67	2, 354	5	203	72	2, 557	196	4, 032	65	1,782

The casualties to passengers have been divided into three classes. Class a includes all ordinary passengers. Class b includes passengers traveling on freight trains. Class bb includes persons who are customarily carried on trains under special arrangements, such as postal clerks and express messengers, employees on Pullman cars, newsboys, live-stock tenders, and men in charge of freight.

Table No. I is continued on next page.

Accidents to employees resulting in slight injuries which do not prevent the employee injured from performing his accustomed service for more than three days in the aggregate during the ten days immediately following the accident are not reported.

TABLE No. 1.—Summary of casualties to persons, January, February, March, 1908.—Continued.

	mon (	train- switch- rews).		er em- yees.	Total employees.			persons rted.
•	Killed.	Injured.	Killed.	Injured.	Killed.	Injured.	Killed.	Injured.
Collisions Derailments Miscellaneous train accidents, including	5 4	84 51	4 2	67 69	52 41	641 415	62 52	1, 337 1, 118
locomotive-boiler explosions	1	31		18	11	294	11	315
Total train accidents	10	166	6	154	104	1,350	125	2,770
Coupling or uncoupling	23	277	3	16	44	633	44	633
while attending switches	13	663	12	536	44	3, 559	44	3, 55 <del>9</del>
structures at side of track, etc	1	70	3	8	22	260	23	262
ting on or off	25 23	830 116	81 245	321 3, 185	127 315	2, 736 3, 618	160 332	3, 310 4, 179
Total (other than train accidents)	85	1,956	294	4,066	552	10,806	603	11,943
Total all classes	95	2, 122	300	4, 220	656	12, 156	728	14,713

The total number of casualties to passengers and employees reported in the quarter under review (15,441) is smaller than in any quarter since that ending with March, 1905; the total number of passengers and employees killed by all causes (last item in Table No. 1a) is smaller than in any quarter since June, 1904, and the total killed in train accidents (125) is smaller than in any quarter since the monthly records were established, in July, 1901. The number of employees killed in coupling accidents (44) is smaller than in any quarter since June, 1902. These gratifying reductions in the lists of deaths and injuries are all due primarily to the reduction in the volume of traffic on practically all of the railroads of the country. The condition was indicated, though in a lesser degree, in the last bulletin. Reduced traffic has resulted also in easier work and shorter hours.

The following table (No. 1a) shows the usual comparisons with the last preceding bulletin and with one year back, and below it is a list showing the totals of passengers and employees killed in train accidents, each quarter, since the monthly records were established:

TABLE No. 1a.—Comparisons of principal items.

	Bulletin 27.	Bulletin 26.	Bulletin 23.
1. Passengers killed in train accidents. 2. Passengers killed, all causes. 3. Employees killed in train accidents. 4. Employees killed in coupling. 5. Employees killed, all causes. 6. Total passengers and employees killed, all causes.	72 104 44 656	21 81 199 77 1,011 1,092	126 184 295 62 1,109 1,293

Passengers and employees	killed in	train	accidents.
--------------------------	-----------	-------	------------

Bulletin No. 27		Bulletin No. 13	
25	220   346	12 11	221
<b>24</b>		10	
	474	8	230
	194	6 5	266
18	320	4	
17 16	262	3	272
	232 242	1	240

The total number of collisions and derailments in the quarter now under review was 2,632 (1,190 collisions and 1,442 derailments), of which 199 collisions and 220 derailments affected passenger trains. The damage to cars, engines, and roadway by these accidents amounted to \$1,977,419. Given more in detail, these facts appear as below:

TABLE No. 2.—Collisions and derailments, January, February, and March, 1908.

	Number.	Loss.	Killed.	Injured.
Collisions, rear	235 153	\$188, 731 231, 394	12 22	271 418
Collisions, train separating	78 724	31, 108 335, 047	2 26	38 610
Total	1, 190	786, 280	62	1, 337
Derailments due to defects of roadway, etc.  Derailments due to defects of equipment.  Derailments due to negligence of trainmen, signalmen, etc  Derailments due to unforeseen obstruction of track, etc  Derailments due to malicious obstruction of track, etc  Derailments due to miscellaneous causes.	75 87	210, 255 498, 429 44, 195 103, 102 29, 470 305, 688	13 6 3 7 4 19	382 143 63 92 48 390
Total	1, 442	1, 191, 139	52	1,118
Total collisions and derailments	2, 632 3, 991	1, 977, 419 3, 536, 110	114 355	2, 455 4, 45£

Following is the usual list of Class A train accidents—all in which the damage is reported at \$10,000 or over; notable cases in which passengers are killed and those doing damage less than \$10,000 and down to \$2,000, wherever the circumstances or the cause may be of particular interest.

TABLE 2a.—Causes of twenty-six prominent train accidents (Class A).

[Note.—R stands for rear collision; B, butting collision; M, miscellaneous collisions; D, derailment; P, passenger train; F, freight and miscellaneous trains.]

#### COLLISIONS.

No.	Class.	Kind of train.	Killed.	Injured.	Damage to engines, cars, and roadway.	Reference to record.	Cause.
1	'R	F and F	0	0	\$1,467	19	False clear manual block signal. Operator's experience 4 years. This operator says that when the train approached he "was working on his books and unconsciously pulled" off the signal
2	В	F and F	1	3	3,075	51	without consulting the block sheet.  Operator failed to deliver meeting order; also train
3	В	P and F	l		4, 500	3	ran past an automatic block signal set against it. Mistake in dispatcher's order. (See note in text
4		F and F	1	0			below.)
4	R	F and F	U		5,000	1	Air brakes inoperative; angle cock on front end of first car partly closed; cause not discovered. At the last station where the air brakes should have been tested, the duty was neglected.
5	M	F and F	1	1	5,000	56	Northbound train ran past switch at end of double
6	$\mathbf{R}$	P and F	2	23	6, 400	22	track. (See note in text below.) Extra passenger train (11 p. m.) ran past distant
. 7	M	P and P	8	17	8,000	26	and home automatic block signals; dense fog. Careless management of street car at crossing. (See
8	В	F and F	0	7	9, 220	4	note in text below.) Conductor and engineman misread name of station
9	В	F and F	0	0	10, 250	5	in meeting order. Conductor in service 8 months. Engineman of empty engine overlooked meeting
10	В	P and F	1	20	11,852	46	order. Conductor and engineman of northbound passenger train overlooked meeting order; engineman also
11	В	F and F	0	4	14,914	53	ran past automatic block signal set against him. Misunderstanding between conductors of west- bound and eastbound trains as to the station for meeting the second part of a separated train.
12	В	F and F	5	2	18,600	50	(See note in text below.)  Mistake in dispatcher's order. Operator. 2 years in service, omitted the word "East" from the name of the meeting station, though in repeating the order back to the dispatcher he had given the
13	В	P and F	1	13	21,000	27	name correctly.  Mistake in dispatcher's order, the forms of the orders being substantially as follows: The order read "Run from A to C. Meet 7 at B." It was written out and delivered, "Run from A to C. Meet 7 at C." The operator had had 5 years experience and is reported as having a very good
	Tota		21	103	119,278		record.

#### DERAILMENTS.

1	D D	P	$\begin{bmatrix} 1 & 2 \\ 3 & 2 \end{bmatrix}$	3 \$1,310	68	Accidental obstruction.
2	D	1	$\begin{array}{c c} 1 & 2 \\ 3 & 2 \end{array}$	8 3,400	<b>3</b> 0	Broken rail; speed 18 miles an hour. Rail weighing 56 pounds per yard; made in 1883.
3	D	P	2   4	3 4,795	43	Bolts in track had been loosened by the derailment of an engine 9 hours before; defect in track had not been discovered. Rails partly covered by snow.
4	D	P	L	5 6,580	31	Unexplained; speed 45 miles an hour. Driving wheels of locomotive first to leave track.
5	D	P		0 11,400	33	
6	D	<b>F</b>		0   11,400	57	Bridge fell under coal train. Wooden Howe truss 150-foot span. Reported in good condition. Bc- lieved clamps had been broken in consequence of severe application of brakes.
7	D	P		2   11,600	67	Malicious obstruction. (Two-inch hexagonal nut on rail, on outside of curve.) Engine and one car broke through bridge 28 feet high.
8	$\mathbf{D}$	<u>P</u>	1   6	8   11,630	<b>3</b> 8	Broken 80-pound rail.
8 9 10	D D D	P F	0	0   14,000	10	Broken wheel.
10	D	F	0	0   14,800	61	Brake rod dropped on track, having become loosened by the working out of the key bolt.

TABLE 2a.—Causes of twenty-six prominent train accidents (Class A)—Continued.

DERAILMENTS—Continued.

No.	Class.	Kind of train.	Killed.	Injured.	Damage to engines, cars, and roadway.	Reference to record.	Cause. ·
11	D	P	0	5	21,900	45	Soft roadbed; speed (1 a. m.) 18 miles an hour.  Damage due largely to fire from Baker heater in sleeping car 3 hours after derailment. Sleeping car was not owned by the railroad company, and its conductor had given assurance that there was no fire in the car.
12	, D	F	0	1	28,700	63	Broken wheel. Wheel cast iron, 33 inches in diameter, 8 years old. Flaw had existed some time.
13	D	P	3	87	46,000	14	Unexplained. Speed 25 miles an hour on curve of 6°. Grade 1 per cent descending. Part of train fell through trestle bridge and bridge was wrecked.
	Tota	d	12	272	187,515		
;		d collisions and railments.	33	375	306,793		

Collision No. 3 was due to the mistake of a telegraph operator in writing out a meeting order. The order, as recorded in the dispatcher's office, named "12:15" as the time at which a certain train must be at a certain station, but the operator, in writing the order for delivery, wrote "12:50." Two or three operators, who were listening at the time, testified that the order was transmitted over the wire as recorded by the dispatcher, namely, "12:15;" and the report indicates the belief on the part of the Superintendent that the station operator, not being satisfied with the copy which he had made, rewrote the whole order, and, in rewriting, made the mistake. The collision occurred about 12:30 a.m. The station operator had been on duty since 8 p. m., and had worked nearly all the preceding day at another station. At this other station he went on duty at 7 a. m., was relieved at 3:30 p. m., and then went to the station where the error occurred. The dispatcher who ordered the operator from one station to the other did not know that he had been on duty during the day, but appears to have understood that he had been relieved at that station in the morning.

Collision No. 5 occurred at end of double track. A train running from double to single track fouled the switch just as a train from the opposite direction came along. The collision occurred just after sundown. It was due to the fact that the double track had been extended and the engineman not informed of the fact. The switches had been moved about 1,500 feet, and the tower containing the telegraph office had also been moved; and the engineman regulated, or attempted to regulate, the speed of his train with reference to the location of the signal light on the tower. Besides running 1,500 feet farther than he was accustomed to running, he passed a cross-over track, which had been put in at the former location of the tower. He asserted that he did not notice the switch at this cross over.

The fireman, as well as the engineman, of this train is held blameworthy, because he did not inform the engineman that the engine was fouling the single track, the view of the track being better from the fireman's than from the engineman's side of the engine.

The ignorance of the engineman concerning the change in the location of the switches and tower was due to the omission of himself and the conductor to read a telegraphic bulletin which had been issued at a station 16 miles back. The operator at this station had three bulletins for these men to read and sign. Two of the bulletins were properly read and receipted for, but the other was neglected and the operator did not notice this neglect. Thereafter the operator, in gross disregard of rules, sent to the dispatcher the names of the conductor and engineman as having been signed to the overlooked bulletin, although they had not signed it.

All these men had had ample experience in their respective departments. The men in charge of the train had been on duty thirteen hours and fifty minutes.

Collision No. 7, fatally injuring 8 passengers in an electric car, occurred at a street crossing where two standard (steam) railroads are crossed by a street, which is traversed by an interurban electric line. standard railroads lie parallel to each other, about 65 feet apart and the direction of their lines is north and south; the direction of the street is east and west. This double crossing has gates with an attendant, such as are generally used at grade crossings of streets over railroads, and two electric alarm bells, one at each railroad. On the day when this collision occurred the gates were out of order because the pneumatic pipes, by means of which they are operated, and which lie underground, had been ruptured in consequence of moisture freezing in one of them, and the attendant at the crossing gave his signals with a yellow flag in the day time and a yellow lantern The electric alarm bells are reported as in good working order at the time of the accident. The bell at the track on which the accident occurred rings from the time an approaching train is within 2,000 feet of the crossing until it has passed the crossing. The regulations of the electric line require that the cars shall stop before crossing the steam railroad, and that the conductor shall go ahead on foot and assure himself that no steam railroad train is approaching, before the electric car passes over the crossing.

This collision occurred at 8:03 p. m., and the night was quite dark.

According to the report of the company operating the electric car, the conductor of that car went across both steam railroads with a red lantern in his hand; he saw no train coming and signaled to the motorman to proceed, but before the car had reached the first of the steam railroad tracks the conductor saw a train approaching rapidly on the second railroad and signaled to the motorman to stop, but it was then too late to avoid the collision. The electric car was struck in the middle and competely demolished.

According to the report of the steam railroad, the conductor of the electric car gave the proceed signal to his motorman before crossing the second railroad; and when he gave the signal the crossing watchman called to him that a train was coming. Both watchman and conductor then signaled the motorman to stop, but the motorman disregarded these signals.

Collision No. 11 was between a part of a westbound extra freight train, drawn by two engines, and a regular eastbound train. One of the engines and a part of the cars of the westbound train were sent forward from B to C and at C met the eastbound train. The two brakemen in charge of the part of the westbound train gave some information to the conductor of the eastbound concerning the point at which he was to meet the second part of the westbound train, and the eastbound proceeded; but the information was inaccurate or insufficient, and the conductor of the westbound, having one engine and the rear portion of his train, started from B before the eastbound reached there, and his train collided with the eastbound.

TABLE No. 3.—Details of Table No. 1—Causes of accidents to employees in coupling and uncoupling cars.

Sub-	Causes.			me	rain- en in erds.	Yard trainmen (switch- ing crews).		Other employees.	
ciass.	•	Killed.	Injured.	Killed.	Injured.	Killed.	Injured.	Killed.	Injured.
1 2 3 4 5 6	Adjusting coupler with foot	1	20 3 4 4 7 5		6 6 3 1 2 5	1	20 6 3 5 6 17	2	1 1 2
7 8	Coupling with chain or other emergency appliance on curve too sharp for automatic coupling  Coupling with chain or other emergency appliance	1	6		1		5		1
9 10 11	Coupling or uncoupling safety chains Fingers or hand caught between uncoupling lever and body of car Uncoupling without using lever (unnecessary)		1 45 5		1 23 6	1	4 55 7		i
12 13 14	Uncoupling without using lever, uncoupling lever not in working order.  Foot caught in frog, switch, or guard rail.  Opening or closing knuckle when cars were near to-	i	19 3		20 5	4	30 4		
15	gether, miscalculated speed.  Opening knuckle when cars were near together, engine accidentally started.	2	16	••••	7 3	5 1	16		5
16 17 18 19	Opening knuckle, part of defective coupler fell on foot Opening knuckle, lost footing.  Riding on car to uncouple, slipped off	2	3 6 3 3	1	1 1 4 2	1	7 13 7 7		
20 21	Caught by unexpected movement of car, due to slack running in  Caught by unexpected movement of car, due to mis-		18		4		16		1
22 23 24	take or misunderstanding in giving hand signals Uncoupling moving cars and lost footing Parts hard to move, causing delay Went between cars unnecessarily and contrary to	1	6 3	1	3 6 4	2 2	18 4	i	
25	rule. Hand caught between projecting load and end of next car	3	9	1	7		17		
26 27 28	No witness (fatal injury)		6 3		5 2	2	3		• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •
,	Total	13	207	5	133	23	277	3	16

#### Details of injuries included in Table 3, subclass 27.

- J. 1. Burned by steam from heating hose.
  J. 2. Struck by corner of car.
  J. 3. Hand caught in knuckle of coupler.
  J. 4. Hand caught between drawheads.
  F. 1. Scalded by steam from steam hose.
  F. 2. Hand caught between drawheads.
  M. 1. Struck on head by lump of coal.
  M. 2. Lump of coal fell off car, cutting head.
  M. 3. Cut on head by piece of coal.
  M. 4. Stepped on nail.
  M. 5. Brake staff fell from car.
  M. 6. Stepped on piece of coal.

- M. 6. Stepped on piece of coal.
  M. 7. Head cut by stone falling off car.
  M. 8. Cut wrist on sharp piece of iron on drawbar.

TABLE 3A.—Nature of injuries to employees in coupling and uncoupling cars.

Injuries.	Train- men.	Train- men in yards.	Yard train- men.	Other em- ployers.
Loss of feet	8	1	3	1
Loss of legs	1		. 3	, 1
Loss of arms.	5	1	. 6	,
Loss of hands.		1	3	*******
Loss of fingers	7	8	12	
Loss of toes	1	1 1	1	1
Fractured skull	1	<sup>]</sup>	<b></b>	. '
Fractured leg	2	2 ]	1	
Fractured arm	5	1	5	
Fractured collar bone or ribs	5	` <b>.</b>	8	1
Fractured other bones	4	1	9	
Contusion of head or body	20	16	39	
Contusion or laceration of feet	18	12	25	
Contusion or laceration of toes	3	3	2	
Contusion or laceration of legs	3	. 3	17	
Contusion or laceration of arms.	8	8 1	13	1
Contusion or laceration of hands	31	26	27	
Contusion or laceration of fingers	63	41	81	
Dislocation	3	ī	2	
Internal injuries	4	2	$\bar{2}$	1
Sprains	8	2	16	
Shock				
Miscellaneous	7	3	2	
Total injuries	207		277	-
Killed	13	5	23	,
Total killed and injured	220	138	300	1
RECAPITULATION.				<del>'</del>

Tota Tota	al killed	44 633
	•	
•	Total killed and injured	677

TABLE No. 4.—Details of Table No. 1.—Causes of accidents to employees classified (C6 and C7) as falling from and getting on or off cars and engines.

- ]	Causes.	117	ain- en.	me	ain- sa in rds.	(sw	nmen itch- ng wa).	Other employees.	
В.		Kulled. Kulled.			Injured.	Killed.	Injured.	Killed.	Injumd.
1 2 3 4	Fell from roof of box car by reason of— Defect in car	2	10 9 12		4 8 6	1	3 19 2		2 1
5	subclass 3	8	<b>3</b> 5 25	1	23 23	3	71 56	2	4 3
7 R 9	Freight car other than box or coal ear Engine or tender Passenger car	1 3 6 1	12 35 108 13	3	5 17 60 6	1	12 40 2	3 1 1	14 19 2
	1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8	Fell from roof of box car by reason of—  Defect in car. Ice or snow. Parting of train. Derailment, collision, or shock due to abnormal movements of cars other than those in subclass 3. While setting brakes. Fell from— Coal car Freight car other than box or coal car. Engine or tender. Passenger car. Engines, tenders, or cars (all kinds) not in	Fell from roof of box car by reason of—  Defect in car Ice or snow. Parting of train. Derailment, collision, or shock due to abnormal movements of cars other than those in subclass 3. While setting brakes. Fell from— Coal car Freight car other than box or coal car. Passenger car.	Fell from roof of box car by reason of—  Defect in car.  Ice or snow. Parting of train. Derailment, collision, or shock due to abnormal movements of cars other than those in subclass 3. While setting brakes. Fell from— Coal car Freight car other than box or coal car. Freight car other than box or coal car. Passenger car. Fassenger car. Fell from— Coal car Freight car other than box or coal car. Freight car other than box or coal car. Freight car other than box or coal car. Freight car other than box or coal car. Freight car other than box or coal car. Freight car other than box or coal car. Freight car other than box or coal car. Freight car other than box or coal car. Freight car other than box or coal car. Freight car other than box or coal car. Freight car other than box or coal car. Freight car other than box or coal car. Freight car other than box or coal car. Freight car other than box or coal car.	Fell from roof of box car by reason of—  Defect in car  I ce or snow Parting of train Perailment, collision, or shock due to abnormal movements of cars other than those in subclass 3. While setting brakes.  Fell from— Coal car Freight car other than box or coal car. Froight car other than box or coal car. Passenger car Fell properties of the setting brakes.  Fell from— Coal car Freight car other than box or coal car.	Fell from roof of box car by reason of—	Fell from roof of box car by reason of—   Defect in car	Fell from roof of box car by reason of—	Fell from roof of box car by reason of—   Defect in car

TABLE No. 4.—Details of Table No. 1.—Causes of accidents to employees, etc.—Cont'd.

Sub-	Causes.	_	rain- nen.	me	rain- en in erds.	trai (sw	ard nmen vitch- ng ws).	Other employees.	
€3## <b>#</b> -		Killed.	Injured.	Killed.	Injured.	Killed.	Injured.	Killed.	Injured.
11 12 13 14 15	Miscellaneous causes. Not clearly explained. Slipped getting on moving trains or cars. Jumping off moving trains. Jumping from engines or cars anticipating collision, derailment, or other accident.	6 18 4 3	179 49 95 132	2 4 2	62 14 62 86	2 10 1 2	204 34 62 128	4 6 5	64 16 45 43
C7 16 17 18	Fell from engines or cars by reason of defective handholds and sill steps.  Getting on or off moving engine.  Caught in frog, guard rail, or switch.	5	36 149 7	4	19 126 1	3	43 121 2	3	3 32 1
	Total	54	1.003	17	582	25	830	31	321

#### [Public-No. 171.]

AN ACT Requiring common carriers engaged in interstate commerce to make full reports of all accidents to the Interstate Commerce Commission.

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, It shall be the duty of the general manager, superintendent, or other proper officer of every common carrier engaged in interstate commerce by railroad to make to the Interstate Commerce Commission, at its office in Washington, District of Columbia, a monthly report, under oath, of all collisions of trains or where any train or part of a train accidentally leaves the track, and of all accidents which may occur to its passengers or employees while in the service of such common carrier and actually on duty, which report shall state the nature and causes thereof and the circumstances connected therewith.

SEC. 2. That any common carrier failing to make such report within thirty days after the end of any month shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor and, upon conviction thereof by a court of competent jurisdiction, shall be punished by a fine of not more than one hundred dollars for each and every offense and for every day during which it shall fail to make such report after the time herein specified for making the same

SEC. 3. That neither said report nor any part thereof shall be admitted as evidence or used for any purpose against such railroad so making such report in any suit or action for damages growing out of any matter mentioned in said report.

SEC. 4. That the Interstate Commerce Commission is authorized to prescribe for such common carriers a method and form for making the reports in the foregoing section provided.

Approved, March 3, 1901.

#### SPECIAL INFORMATION CONTAINED IN PRECEDING BULLETINS.

Each accident bulletin contains tables showing the number of passengers and employees killed and injured, and these figures are classified according to cause (see Table No. 1); also tables showing cost of the different classes of train accidents. The causes of accidents to employees in coupling and uncoupling and in falling from cars, etc., are further classified in Tables No. 3 and No. 4. The most serious collisions and derailments are dealt with in a supplementary table (Class A), showing the causes in some detail. Each bulletin is for three months, and No. 1 was for the quarter ending September 30, 1901. The bulletin for the quarter ending June 30 contains, in addition to the quarterly statistics, tables showing the same information for the whole of the fiscal year ending on that date.

a For notes on Bulletins 1-16, see Bulletin No. 17.

Bulletin No. 17 records one collision, killing 6 and injuring 35 persons, and one derailment, killing 15 and injuring 28. The collision, occurring at 1 a. m., was due to gross negligence on the part of the men in charge of a freight train. The derailment was due to an open draw. The drawbridge was not provided with interlocked signals and the engineman was not adequately acquainted with the line of the road. A collision and a derailment are reported which were due to the lack of suitable detector bars at switches, and a collision which was due to failure of "controlled manual" block signal working.

Bulletin No. 18 shows total casualties much larger than in the preceding quarters, due largely, no doubt, to an enormous increase in traffic. Many accidents are reported in which the men had been on duty excessively long hours. One collision, killing 17 persons, was due to the error of an engineman of five months' experience, who ran past five warning signals. Another collision, killing 10 persons, was due to the failure of the men in charge of a freight train to identify opposing passenger trains. One derailment of a passenger train, killing 13 persons, was reported as

due to some cause that could not be discovered.

Bulletin No. 19 is like Bulletin 18 in showing a large number of casualties. One butting collision, due to failure of train dispatching, caused 34 deaths and 24 injuries and \$50,000 damages, besides the damages for deaths and injuries of persons. One collision was due to the negligence of men who had been worked flagrantly long hours. Particulars are given of a number of collisions due to complicated and unusual causes.

Bulletin No. 20 shows total deaths greater than in the corresponding quarter of the previous year, but the number of passengers and employees killed in train accidents was considerably smaller. The most serious accident in this bulletin was a butting collision of passenger trains, due to misinterpretation of a dispatcher's order by a pilot; 10 persons killed, 38 injured. One derailment, unexplained,

train running slowly, caused 9 deaths and 18 injuries.

Bulletin No. 21 contains the record of only one train accident—a collision—in which more than 10 persons were killed, but the totals of casualties of all classes are large, no improvement being shown over preceding quarters. Number of passengers killed in train accidents, 52. One collision, killing 17 and injuring 56, was due to confusion of telegraphic orders; one derailment, killing 9 and injuring 43, was at a misplaced switch, and another, killing 7 and injuring 40, was due to excessive speed.

Bulletin No. 22 shows 180 passengers killed in train accidents—a number larger than that in any other bulletin except No. 13. One rear collision in the District of Columbia caused the death of 43 passengers and the injury of 63. A butting collision killed 43 persons and injured 155, the bodies of the killed being consumed by fire. In the derailment of a passenger train at a drawbridge 57 persons were

killed and 36 injured.

Bulletin No. 23 shows 126 passengers killed in train accidents. It contains the record of two collisions, killing 41 persons, and two derailments, killing the same number. The number of employees killed in coupling accidents is 25 per cent less than in

the last preceding quarter.

Bulletin No. 24, though representing that quarter of the year which is usually the lightest in traffic, showed all of the principal totals of casualties larger than in the same quarter of the year preceding, and the number of passengers killed in train accidents was very much larger. One derailment killed 33 persons and one collision 8. The tables for the year ending June 30, 1907, showed heavy increases in all items except accidents in car coupling and from striking against overhead obstructions, and the number of passengers killed and injured in collisions and derailments showed an alarming increase, the number of killed in this class being 17 per cent higher than the very large total reported in the year ending June 30, 1905. A condensed list is given of 10 prominent accidents in the year ending June 30, 1907, to which are charged an aggregate of 291 deaths.

Bulletin No. 25 shows 110 passengers killed in train accidents, three collisions and one derailment being responsible for 80 deaths in this class. The number of passengers killed from other causes (mostly their own negligence) also shows a large increase. One of the most serious collisions was due to the misreading of a dispatcher's order, and another to a mistake in sending or receiving the order.

Bulletin No. 26 shows a marked decrease in casualties as compared with preceding quarters, a large falling off in railroad traffic having taken place. The list of "prominent" train accidents includes only three cases which may be classed as

notable.



			•
		•	
	•		
		•	

#### ACCIDENT BULLETIN NO. 28

## Showing

# Collisions and Derailments of Trains

and

# Casualties to Persons

during the months of

April, May, and June, 1908

with

Tables for the year ending June 30, 1908

INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMMISSION WASHINGTON, D. C.



Washington:: Government Printing Office:: 1908

#### THE INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMMISSION.

MARTIN A. KNAPP, of New York.

JUDSON C. CLEMENTS, of Georgia.

CHARLES A. PROUTY, of Vermont.

FRANCIS M. COCKRELL, of Missouri.

FRANKLIN K. LANE, of California.

EDGAR E. CLARK, of Iowa.

JAMES S. HARLAN, of Illinois.

EDWARD A. MOSELEY, Secretary.

#### ACCIDENT BULLETIN NO. 28.

#### RAILROAD ACCIDENTS IN THE UNITED STATES

DURING THE

#### THREE MONTHS ENDING JUNE 30, 1908.

The number of persons killed in train accidents during the months of April, May, and June, 1908, as shown in reports made by the rail-road companies to the Interstate Commerce Commission, under the "accident law" of March 3, 1901, was 112, and of injured 2,277. Accidents of other kinds, including those sustained by employees while at work and by passengers in getting on or off cars, etc., bring the total number of casualties up to 13,689 (591 killed and 13,098 injured). These accidents are classified in the following table. These reports deal only with (a) passengers and (b) employees on duty.<sup>a</sup>

TABLE No. 1.—Casualties to persons—April, May, and June, 1908. b c

		Persons carried under agreement or contract (bb).			l (a, b, i bb).	Trai	n men.	Train men in yards.		
	Killed.	Injured.	Killed.	Injured.	Killed.	Injured.	Killed.	Injured.	Killed.	Injured.
Coilisions. Derailments. Miscellaneous train accidents, including locomotive-boiler explosions.	9 1 0	499 561 23	1 2 0	45 83 2	10 3 0	544 644 25	13 60 5	199 287 157	8 0 1	86 30 49
Total train accidents	10	1,083	3	130	13	1,213	78	643	6	165
Coupling or uncoupling. While doing other work about trains or while attending switches.	••••					• • • • • •	12 7	171 1,271	2 6	121
Coming in contact with overhead bridges, structures at side of track, etc.  Falling from cars or engines or while getting	1	8	0	4	1	12	12	116	5	54
on or off	29 11	667 557	1 2	17 56	30 13	684 613	55 18	775 157	14 15	406 70
Total (other than train accidents)	41	1,232	3	77	44	1,309	104	2,490	42	1,093
Total (all classes)	51	2,315	6	207	57	2,522	182	3, 133	48	1,258

The casualties to passengers have been divided into three classes. Class a includes all ordinary passengers. Class b includes passengers traveling on freight trains. Class bb includes persons who are customarily carried on trains under special arrangements, such as postal clerks and express messengers, employees on Puliman cars, newsboys, live-stock tenders, and men in charge of freight.

b Table No. I is continued on next page.

c Accidents to employees resulting in slight injuries which do not prevent the employee injured from performing his accustomed service for more than three days in the aggregate during the ten days immediately following the accident are not reported.

TABLE No. 1.—Casualties to persons—April, May, and June, 1908—Continued.

	trair (swit	Yard train men (switching crews).		Other employees.		otal loyees.	Total persons reported.	
	Killed.	Injured.	Killed.	Injured.	Killed.	Injured.	Killed.	Injured.
Collisions Derailments Missellaneous train accidents including loss	1 4	40 44	5	86 48	24 67	411 409	34 70	955 1,053
Miscellaneous train accidents, including loco- motive-boiler explosions	1	24	1	14	8	244	8	289
Total train accidents	6	106	9	148	99	1,064	112	2,277
Coupling or uncoupling.	16	235	0	22	30	549	30	549
While doing other work about trains or while attending switches.	2	511	1	518	16	2,742	16	2,742
Coming in contact with overhead bridges, structures at side of track, etc.	8	59	5	15	25	244	26	256
Falling from cars or engines or while getting on or off. Other causes.	28 14	558 89	30 190	319 3,603	127 237	2,058 3,919	1.57 <b>250</b>	2,742 4,532
Total (other than train accidents)	63	1,452	226	4,477	435	9,512	479	10, 821
Total (all classes)	69	1,560	235	4, 625	534	10,576	591	13,096

This bulletin covers the quarterly period ending with the ninth month of light freight traffic on most of the principal railroads. This depression, which diminished the number of freight trains run and caused the dismissal of many railroad employees, showed itself in some degree in Bulletin No. 26 (quarter ending December 31, 1907). Bulletin No. 27 showed gratifying reductions in the number of casualties in all of the different classes, the number of persons (passengers and employees) killed in train accidents being the smallest reported since the monthly records were established. In the present bulletin the improvement is carried still farther. The number of passengers killed in train accidents (13) is the smallest ever reported in the quarterly records, the lowest previous record (18) being that in Bulletin No. 4 (June 30, 1902). The total of passengers and employees killed in this class (112) is 13 less than the previous low record (125, Bulletin 27). The number of employees killed in coupling or uncoupling cars now reported (30) is smaller than in any other quarter except that ending September 30, 1901 (Bulletin No. 1), when the number was exactly the same.

The following table (No. 1a) shows the usual comparisons with the last preceding bulletin and with one year back, and below it is a list showing the totals of passengers and employees killed in train accidents, each quarter, since the monthly records were established:

TABLE	No.	1A.—	Compo	risons	of	principal	items.
-------	-----	------	-------	--------	----	-----------	--------

	Bulletin 28.	Bulletin 27.	Bulletin 24.
1. Passengers killed in train accidents. 2. Passengers killed, all causes. 3. Employees killed in train accidents. 4. Employees killed in coupling. 5. Employees killed, all causes. 6. Total passengers and employees killed, all causes.	57 90	21 72 104 44 656 728	48 111 202 72 954 1,065

TABLE No. 1B.—Passengers and employees killed in train accidents.

Bulletin.	Passen- gers.	Em- ployees.	Total.	Bulletin.	Passen- gers.	Em- ployees.	Total.
No. 28	13	99	112	No. 14.	53	189	242
27	21	104	125	13	228	183	411
26	21	199	220	12	23	144	167
25	110	236	346	11	40	181	221
24	48	202	250	10	147	299	446
23	126	295	421	9	60	220	280
22	180	294	474	8	31	199	230
21	52	215	267	7	52	248	300
20	27	167	194	6	40	226	260
19	. 62	212	274	5	41	222	263
18	50	270	320	4	18	122	140
17	43	229	272	3	41	171	212
16	41	221	262	2	51	221	272
15	28	204	232	1	57	183	240

The total number of collisions and derailments in the quarter now under review was 2,130 (820 collisions and 1,310 derailments), of which 130 collisions and 198 derailments affected passenger trains. The damage to cars, engines, and roadway by these accidents amounted to \$1,617,398. Given more in detail, these facts appear as below:

TABLE No. 2.—Collisions and derailments, April, May, and June, 1908.

	Number.	Loss.	Killed.	Injured.
Collisionsgrear	141	\$109,044	5	155
Collisions, butting	98	194, 757	18	442
Collisions, train separating	64	23, 025		20
Collisions, miscellaneous	517	210, 147	11	338
Total	820	<b>53</b> 6, 973	34	955
Derailments due to defects of roadway, etc	274	215, 790	6	314
Derailments due to defects of equipment	529	398, 140	6	162
Derailments due to negligence of train men, signalmen, etc.	61	<b>22</b> , 395	2	52
Derailments due to unforeseen obstruction of track, etc	120	224,999	30	202
Derailments due to malicious obstruction of track, etc	19	23,851	6	64
Derailments due to miscellaneous causes	307	195, 250	20	259
Total	1,310	1,080,425	70	1,053
Total collisions and derailments	2,130	1,617,398	104	2,008

NOTE.—Collisions and derailments which cause no death or personal injury and which cause not over \$150 damage to the property of the railroad are not reported.

Following is the usual list of Class A train accidents—all in which the damage is reported at \$10,000 or over; notable cases in which passengers are killed and those doing damage less than \$10,000 and down to \$2,000, wherever the circumstances or the cause may be of particular interest.

TABLE No. 2A.—Causes of twenty prominent train accidents (Class A).

[Note.—R stands for rear collision; B, butting collision; M, miscellaneous collisions; D, derailment; P, passenger train; F, freight and miscellaneous trains.]

#### COLLISIONS.

No	Class.	Kind of train.	Killed.	Injured.	Damage to engrines, cars,	Reference to record.	Cause.
1	R	Pand F	1	6	\$1,085	1	Passenger train ran 9,044 feet past automatic block signal (indicating stop) and at 40 miles an hour struck freight train moving at about 15 miles an hour. One passenger in the freight train was
2	В	P and P	1	29	2,300	21	killed. The engineman at fault was experienced. Butting collision of special trains. Engineman of excursion train disregarded stop signal at a registering station. Conductor applied air brakes, but too late.
3	В	Pand F	0	2	2,500	22	Eastbound freight and westbound passenger; 10.35 p. m. Telegraph wire being out of order, trainmaster (on freight train) attempted to modify dispatcher's order, but his directions were thwarted by a mistake of an inexperienced operator who had been in service only that night. The engines of both trains were equipped with electric headlights, and one or both of the enginemen misjudged the distance between the trains.
4	M	Pand F	1	9	3,350	19	Engineman of extra freight misread watch, making a mistake of 1 hour. Discovering that he was on the time of a special passenger train, he set back, but too late. The conductor of the freight was dismissed for carelessness.
5	В	Pand F	0	0	4,000	43	Extra train was run without orders. (See note in text below.)
6	В	Pand F	0	32	6, 380	40	Engineman forgot order; error also in block signal-
7	В	Fand F	0	25	12,874	41	ing. (See note in text below.)  Conductor and engineman forgot or overlooked 1  of 3 orders which they held; met 1 train but failed to wait for another one, covered by another order.
8	В	Pand P	1	31	13, 184	39	Operator neglected to deliver order to eastbound train. Had 4 orders, delivered only 3. Operator's experience, 6 years.
9	В	Pand F	2	54	20, 845	20	Conductor and engineman of northbound freight encroached on time of southbound passenger. These men had leave to use 40 minutes of the time of the passenger train, but made a mistake in calculating from the time table. They allowed themselves until 12.56 p. m. to reach a certain station, when, according to the order and the time table, they should have been there at 11.56. These men were experienced.
10	В	Pand P	9	21	25,000	46	Of the 9 persons killed, 7 were passengers. The cause was disregard of a dispatcher's order. (See note in text below.)
	Tota	collisions	15	209	91,518		

TABLE No. 2A.—Causes of twenty prominent train accidents (Class A)—Continued.

DERAILMENTS.

No.	Class.	Kind of train.	Killed.	Infured	Damage to engines, cars, and roadway.	Reference to record.	Cause.
1	D	P	0	4	\$400	55	Ran off derail at approach to drawbridge, 10 p. m. Signal light was extinguished, the filament of an electric lamp having been burned out. Engineman said he was deceived by a green light on the draw. This light, displayed for the benefit of boats in the river, turns with the draw, and the draw had not been opened.
3	D	P	0	0	<b>63</b> 5	54	Switch at power interlocking thrown while train was passing over it; movement of detector bar was forced in spite of presence of wheels of train.
8	В	F	0	0	2,000	8	Runaway of work train on descending grade, due to air brakes being inoperative. Laborers in getting aboard train stepped on angle cock, closing it.
4 5	D	P	1	1	2,500 3,350	<b>29</b> 58	Dynamite maliciously placed on track.  Washout. Roadbed weakened by flood which had been diverted from a mountain stream 200 feet above the road by a fallen tree.
6	D	<b>F</b>	0	3	13, 477	30	Arch, 9 feet radius, beneath track, partly washed out by flood. Surface of roadbed showed no indication of weakness.
7	D	F	2	1	20, 550	9	Embankment washed away by flood, due to cloud- burst.
8	D	P	3	61	25,000	56	Burned bridge, 6 p. m. No blaze visible from approaching train.
9	D	P	0	7	56, 600	17	Embankment 25 feet high gave way. Cause apparently seepage, which had been going on some time, but had not been discovered. Track in good condition. Fire in wreck ignited gas from broken tank and all but 1 of the cars of the train were destroyed.
10	D	F	0	0	10,900	35	Broken flange; derailed cars destroyed a bridge.
	Total	derailments	8	81	135, 412		
		i collisions and alknents	23	290	226, 930		

Collision No. 5 was due to the attempt of a conductor and engineman to run on a foreign line without train orders; they meant to protect their train by flag, but failed to do so. These men, running a train of the A & B road, were to run over the X & Y, on account of the track of their own line being impassable. When leaving a registering station on the X & Y they did so without authority, making no communication with the telegraph operator; they neither registered nor asked for a clearance card and they had no train order. They sent a flagman ahead, but their instructions to him were not in writing and he did not get to the proper point to stop the approaching train. He should have stopped at a certain switch, but instead of doing this he went to the telegraph office and the passenger train, with which his train subsequently collided, left the station before he could convey to the engineman the order to wait.

Collision No. 6 was caused by the engineman of a passenger train forgetting a dispatcher's order, requiring him to wait at a certain station for an opposing freight train. He put this order in his pocket while oiling his locomotive, and forgot it. The conductor, who should

have read the order aloud in the presence of the engineman, neglected to do so. The block system, more or less modified, was in use on the line and the passenger train should have been held at the entrance of the block section in which the collision occurred, but the signal-man gave it a clear signal, "thinking that the train was to run to the far end of the siding, there to wait for the opposing train." All of the men concerned are reported as experienced.

Collision No. 10, a butting collision of electric cars, was due to the violation of a dispatcher's order by the conductor and motorman of one of the cars, which was running "extra." The stations on the line where the collision occurred are A, C, B, and N. The regular car was running from N to A. About the time that it left N the extra car was ready to start from A to N, and the dispatcher (sending train orders by telephone) dictated an order for both trains, directing that the extra meet the regular train at B. Finding that it was too late to deliver the order to the regular train, he instructed the operator at A to change it. As originally sent it read: "Car 2 will run extra A to N and meet train 3 at B." He ordered it changed to read: "\* \* will run extra A to N and report at B."

The authority to run as an extra train, when given in this unqualified form, means that the extra must keep clear of the schedules of all regular trains in either direction, and therefore (in this case) must keep off the time of No. 2. This movement could have been made, as there were two places at which the extra could have cleared the regular trains before reaching the point at which it would encroach on the regular train's schedule; but the men in charge of the extra car proceeded toward B, apparently without considering the schedule of the regular train, and collided with it near C.

The operator at A, when ordered to change the train order, did not destroy the one that he had written, but simply drew his pen through the words "and will meet 3 at B," and wrote the new part of the order below the obliterated line. The conductor claims that the operator informed both himself and the motorman that they "had a clear track to B." This statement is denied by the operator. For such a movement as this the conductor had no authority to accept other than a written order from the operator. The motorman, who was injured in the collision, left for parts unknown while still under the doctor's care, and no statement was obtained from him.

This motorman, 33 years old, had been in the service of the company about six weeks, but is said to have been employed on single-track interurban railroads for the past eight years. The officers of the road regarded him as one of the best of their motormen. The conductor had been in the service of the company six weeks, but had been in the employ of other electric companies; kind of service not stated. The operator is reported as having a clear record.

TABLE No. 3.—Details of Table No. 1—Causes of accidents to employees in coupling and uncoupling cars.

Sub-	Causes.		rain en.		n men ards.	Yard train men (switch- ing crews).		Other employees.	
		Killed.	Injured.	Killed.	Injured.	Killed.	Injured.	Killed.	Injured.
1 2 8 4 5 6 7	Adjusting coupler with foot  Adjusting coupler, cars accidentally started  Careless manipulation of uncoupling lever  Cars not equipped with automatic coupler  Coupler broken, using link and pin or chain  Coupling damaged cars  Coupling with chain or other emergency appliance on curve too sharp for automatic coupling  Coupling with chain or other emergency appliance	i	18 5 1 2 2 8		14 1 2 4	1	20 8 3 1 7	••••	i
9 10 11 12	because of uneven track.  Coupling or uncoupling safety chains.  Fingers on hand caught between uncoupling lever and body of car.  Uncoupling without using lever (unnecessary).  Uncoupling without using lever, uncoupling lever	• • • •	30 5	•	24 1		1 48 6	••••	1 7 1
13 14 15	not in working order.  Foot caught in frog, switch, or guard rail.  Opening or closing knuckle when cars were near together, miscalculated speed.  Opening knuckle when cars were near together, angine accidentally started.	1 2	23 2 13 4	1	15 4 5 2	2 1 1	29 4 18 8	•	2
16 17 18 19 20	Opening knuckle, part of defective coupler fell on foot.  Opening knuckle, lost footing. Riding on car to uncouple, slipped off.  Struck by object at side of track.  Caught by unexpected movement of car, due to slack running in	1	1 4 2 19	1	2 8 4 4	3	5 2 11 3		
22 23 24 25	Caught by unexpected movement of car, due to mistake or misunderstanding in giving hand signals.  Uncoupling moving cars and lost footing  Parts hard to move, causing delay.  Went between cars unnecessarily and contrary to rule.  Hand caught between projecting load and end of	1	2 3 6 12	• • • •	2 6 1 8	1	1 10 5	••••	1
26 27 28	next car. No witness (fatal injury) Other causes Unexplained	12	6 2	2	3 1 121	2  16	12 1 235		2

#### Details of injuries included in Table 3, subclass 27.

A. 1. Lumber fell off car.
A. 2. Manhole cover fell off engine tank.
A. 3. Air hose flew up.
A. 4. Engine struck rail, which swung around.
M. 1. Struck by pin lifter.
M. 2. Burned by steam from hose.
M. 3. Board fell from top of car.
M. 4. Piece of pipe fell off car.
M. 5. Cut by piece of steel projecting from rail.
M. 6. Scalded by steam.
M. 7. Iron pulley was jarred off end sill of car.
M. 8. Push pole fell on foot.
M. 9. Finger caught in pin hole.
M. 10. Slipped on tie which was lying between tracks.
M. 11. Load of bridge iron shifted, catching feet.
M. 12. Stepped on nail.
J. 1. Lump of coal fell off engine.
J. 2. Trap door of car fell.
J. 3. Caught "brake club" in drawbar and it flew up.
J. 4. Stepped on nail.
J. 5. Lever came loose from car.
J. 6, Lump of coal fell off car.

TABLE No. 3A.—Nature of injuries to employees in coupling and uncoupling cars.

Injuries.	Train men.	Train men in yards.	Yard train men.	Other em- ployees.
Loss of feet Loss of legs Loss of arms	6 1	2 3 2	<b>3</b> 2	
Loss of hands Loss of fingers Loss of toes	12 2	2 10	6	
Fractured skull Fractured leg Fractured arm Fractured collar bone or ribs Fractured other bones Contusion of head or body Contusion or laceration of feet Contusion or laceration of toes Contusion or laceration of legs Contusion or laceration of arms	2 1 3 6 18 8 4 5 6	1 2 2 12 14 2 7	5 3 2 28 25 4 12 10	
Contusion or laceration of hands Contusion or laceration of fingers Dislocation Internal injuries Sprains Shock Miscellaneous	16 64 3 4 3	26 25 5	32 82 2 4 11	
Total injuries	171	121	235	2
Killed	12	2	16	
Total killed and injured	183	123	251	2

Total killed	<b>30</b>
Total injured	5 <b>4</b> 9
Total killed and injured	<del></del>

TABLE No. 4.—Details of Table No. 1—Causes of accidents to employees classified (C6 and C7) as falling from and getting on or off cars and engines.

Sul		Causes.		rain ien.	me	rain en in .rds.	trai (sw	ard n men ritch- ng ws).	•	ther m- yees.
			Killed.	Injured.	Killed.	Injured.	Killed.	Injured.	топт	Injured.
	1 2	Fell from roof of box car by reason of— Defect in car Ice or snow		4		••••	1	5 2		1
	3 4	Parting of train		12	••••	7		2	•	••••
<b>C</b> 6	5	subclass 3. While setting brakes Fell from—	···2	41 18	1	20 12	5	57 39	1	11 2
	6 7 8 9	Coal car Freight car other than box or coal car Engine or tender Passenger car	5 12 2	31 80 6	i	2 8 47 2	1 8	2 8 45	1 5 3 2	5 19 11 4
	10 11 12	Engines, tenders, or cars (all kinds) not in motion  Miscellaneous causes  Not clearly explained	9	44 128 29 94	5	22 57 6 44	442	9 121 30 51	2	51 49 16
	13 14 15	Slipped getting on moving trains or cars  Jumping off moving trains  Jumping from engines or cars anticipating col-  lision, derailment, or other accident	1 4	115		79	8	66	5	48 54 3
C 7	16 17 18	Fell from engines or cars by reason of defective hand holds and sill steps.  Getting on or off moving engine.  Caught in frog, guard rail, or switch.	8	34 110 8		20 72 2	4	39 75	4	8 41
	<b>, 10</b>	Rotal	55	775	14	406	28	558	30	319

### YEARLY TABLES.

This bulletin completes the publication of the accident records under the law of March 3, 1901, for seven years, and the table next following, Table A, gives the aggregates for the year ending June 30, 1908, of the items which are given in Table No. 1 of the quarterly returns. The total number of casualties shown for the year in Table A is 72,753 (3,764 killed and 68,989 injured).

This table includes the following statistics which did not appear in the quarterly bulletins, the reports from which they are taken having been received after the bulletins were printed: One passenger and 13 employees killed and 17 passengers and 71 employees injured; damage to railroad companies' property (14 collisions and 15 derailments), \$20,677.

The totals of these yearly tables are not comparable with those given in the commission's annual statistical reports, for the reason that the monthly reports deal only with accidents to passengers and to employees while on duty. The monthly reports take no account of accidents to "other persons." These appear in the annual reports, and include casualties at highway crossings, to trespassers, to persons walking along the track, accidents to employees in shops remote from the railroad, and all other accidents not occurring to passengers and to employees actually on duty.

The salient facts of the records of casualties for the year are shown in Table B. From this it will be seen that the number of passengers killed in train accidents is much less than half as large as it was in the year before; and it is only a little over half the average for the preceding three years (1905-1907). The total of passengers and employees killed in train accidents equals only 63 per cent of the previous record. The number of fatal coupling accidents (239) is 20 per cent less than last year. That the diminution in this class is not so marked as in some of the others is to be explained largely by the fact that those dangers incident to coupling operations which can be guarded against, either by prescribing automatic couplers or by the establishment of adequate regulations, have been done away with by law. The fatal casualties now reported are largely due either to breakage or failure of parts or to carelessness or disregard of rules on the part of employees. For example, in Table D, "coupling damaged cars," subclass 6, and "defective uncoupling lever," subclass 12, account for 35 of the deaths of the year. Some of these defects of apparatus may be charged to unavoidable accident, while others are due to inefficient maintenance. In this connection it is proper to say that the beneficent effects of the safety-appliance laws which have been passed by Congress, and which have within the past few years been greatly strengthened by decisions of the federal courts, continue to evidence themselves. It is regrettable that in the work of switching freight cars so many operations have to be made hurriedly, under circumstances in which men, ordinarily reasonably cautious, are led to take great risks. Subclasses 14 and 15 in Table D, also subclass 13, and many instances under subclasses 17 and 20, cover accidents where too much risk was taken; and the items in subclasses 22 and 24 are almost invariably explained in this way. These seven subclasses account for 130 fatal accidents in the yearly record under review.

Table A.—Summary of casualties to persons, year ending June 30, 1908.
[Nove.—The Italia letters refer to the corresponding totals for the last preceding year, printed below.]

		40	•	70	•	•	•	4"	-	*
Total per- sons reported,	bemini	7,712 5,122	1,410	14,248	8, 121	15,991	1,38	14, 236 20, 003	64,741	08,989
10 to 10 to	Eined.	314	8	807	230	202	114	1,577	2,957	₽ 7€
Total em-	Injured.	8, 428 2, 046	1,325	6,818	3, 121	16,901	1, 253	11,736	40,526	56,344
Tota	Кшюд.	200	8	23	8	Ř	110		2,716	3,358
Other em-	benefal	<b>3</b> 18	12	813	23	2,515	25	15, 514		8,43
15 g	Killed.	22	00-	25	•	E .	14	137 1, 124	1,341	1, 402
Yard train span (awitob- ing craws).	benelai	93	651	785	1,43	2,986	**	3,376	8,585	9,370
Y a.m.	Killed	#8	*	8	H	\$	**	152	£3	98
Train men in yarda.	bernini	168	22	1,064	26	2,700	278	2,356	6, 412	7,496
- E B	KIII0G"	92	40	2	3	9	2	98 103	296	쮔
Train men.	beruţal	1,832	ž	4,138	3	7,790	138	4, 607 831	14,868	19,006
Ę	Killed.	191	23	683	E	15	Ľ	281 160	2	1,097
Total (a, b, and b b).	.bernigi	4, 284 8, 047	*	7,430			li,	2,501	5, 215	12,045
Pote	Killed.	===	•	165			•	159	241	\$
Persons carried under agreement or contract (b b).	.benuful	25.5	14	77.5			*	is in	212	1,087
THE STATE OF THE S	Elliod.		•	17			-	10 00	12	22
Passentium (a and b).	<b>Des</b> ulat	3,903	12	6,655			8	6,5 4,5	4,903	11,558
23	Killed.	Sa Sa	•	148		•	m	<u>7</u> 8	226	374
		Collisions Deraliments Miscellaneous train accidents, in-	cluding locamotive boller explo-	Total train socidents	,			• •	Total (other than train agedents)	Total, all cisases
		9.0 4		79	*	- 94	-	-	100	*

TABLE A.—Totals for preceding year.

	`	ဗ ဝ ဗ	7	a pock a	•	<b>A</b>
Total per- sons reported.	.bezuţuI	9, 541 6, 696 1, 758	17,994	3,948 17,711 1,636 14,678 20,330	58, 292	76, 286
Tote se repe	Killed.	776 615 130	1,481	308 310 148 962 1,873	3, 579	6,000
Total em- ployee.s	.beaulaI	4.808 2,511 1,605	8,924	3,948 17,711 1,591 18,665 17,950	63,785	68, 689
Tot	Killed.	557 550 114	1,011	308 310 134 790 1,806	3,348	4,363
Other employees.	.berutaI	758 276 187	1,164	3,087 61 1,497 16,546	21, 105	22, 259
Oth plo	Ki lled.	88 31 13	128	22 106 5 146 1,354	1,631	1,757
Yard train nen (switch- ng screws).	.berutal	504 255 160	968	1,885 3,188 446 3,625 453	8,690	10,486
Yar men ing s	Killed.	84 188 15	7.9	136 69 806 118	199	630
in men Færds.	.berutaI	850 218 208	1,334	2,012 2,888 2,488 372	8,856	8, 190
Trai in y	Killed.	584	88	73 35 35 35 35 35 35 35 35 35 35 35 35 35	<i>09</i> 6	69†
Train men.	.bəzutaI	8,70£ 1,786 1,068	6,540	1,130 8,430 797 6,077	18,814	\$1,764
	Killed.	753 753 753 753 753 753	707	85.9.9.88 818.9.98	900	1,507
Total (a, b, and b b).	.bezulaI	4, 785 4, 184 165	9,070	2, 113 2, 570	4,587	15, 597
Tota	Killed.	90 <del>9</del> 185 16	410	8 168 67	257	279
Persons carried under agreement or contract (b b).	.borutaI	808 468 19	166	21 69 472	356	1,847
Perse con con con con con con con con con con	Killed.	28.1	\$7	1 16 17	38	u
Passengers (a and b).	.beruţaI	4, 227 3, 718 154	8,079	8,044 2,086 2,086	4,171	12,250
<b>M 4</b>	Killed.	185 169 16	367	14.6	808	670
		д. Б	d			

From Table B, next following, comparisons may be made for the last four years:

TABLE B .- Casualties to passengers and employees, years ending June 30.

	19	908.	1	907.	1	906.	1966.		
	Killed.	Injured.	Killed.	Injured.	Killed.	Injured.	Killed.	Injured.	
Passengers: In train accidents Other causes	165 241	7, <b>43</b> 0 <b>5</b> , 215	410 237	9,070 4,527	182 236	6,778 4,407	<b>250</b> 187	6, 488 3,542	
Total	406	12,645	647	13,597	418	11, 185	537	10,040	
Employees: In train accidents In coupling accidents Overhead obstructions,	642 239	6,818 3,121	1,011 302	8, 924 3, 948	879 311	7, 483 2, 508	796 263	7,052 8,110	
etc	110 668 1,699	1,353 11,735 33,317	134 790 2,116	1,591 12,565 35,661	132 713 1,772	1, 497 11, 253 31, 788	92 633 1,495	1, 185 9, 237 24, 842	
Total	3, 358	56, 344	4,353	62, 699	. 3,807	55,524	3, 261	45,436	
Total passengers and employees	3, 764	68, 989	5,000	76, 286	4, 225	66,700	3,796	<b>55, 466</b>	

The following tables are self-explanatory, being consolidations of the quarterly tables giving the same classes of facts:

TABLE C.—Collisions and derailments, damage to cars, engines, and roadway, years ending
June 30.

		190	<b>6</b> .			190	7.	
	Num- ber.	Loss.	Killed.	Injured.	Num- ber.	Loss.	Killed.	Injured.
collisions, rear	1,397 795	\$1,298,044 1,473,618	88 210	1,742 3,143	1,957 1,065	\$2,003,509 1,935,505	223 227	2, 42 3, 61
ting	436 3, 735	165,850 1,697,687	112	214 2,613	695 4, 309	259, 495 2, 101, 059	13 203	32 3, 18
Total	6, 363	4, 635, 199	414	7,712	8,026	6, 299, 568	776	9,54
Perailments due to defects of roadway, etc Perailments due to defects	1, 426	1,088,261	46	1,598	1,528	1, 255, 114	56	1,90
of equipment	2,796	2, 176, 194	37	831	3, 178	2, 490, 028	-	92
naimen, etc	406	273,038	31	376	495	396, 626	130	77
track, etc Perailments due to mali-	381	562, 441	67	590	887	566,725	68	a
cious obstruction of track, etc	90	144,903	24	215	59	153, 694	14	r
lancous causes	1,572	1,303.624	109	1,512	1,785	1,713,947	186	2, 1
Total	6,671	5,548,461	314	5, 122	7,432	6, 556, 134	515	6, 0
Total collisions and derailments	13,034	10, 183, 660	728	12, 834	15, 458	12, 685, 702	1,291	16, 2

TABLE A.—Totals for preceding year.

		800	70		><.	•	~
Total per- sons reported.	.berutaI	9, 541 6, 695 1, 758	17,994	5,948	14,678	58, 292	78, 286
Tota sc repo	Killed.	776 515 130	1,481	\$08 \$10	952	3,579	5,000
Total em- ployee.s	.bezuluI	4, 808 2, 511 1, 606	8,924	3,948	18, 565 17, 950	68,786	62,689
Tot plo	Killed.	587 550 114	1,011	308 310	1,896	3,348	4,363
Other em- ployees.	.berulaI	752 275 127	1,154	3,087	1, 497	21, 105	22, 259
Oth plo	Ki iled.	88 51 13	126	22 105	1,354	1,631	1,767
Yard train men (switch- ing screws).	.bərutaI	504 252 160	898	1,985 <b>3</b> ,182	5, 525 453	9,590	10,488
Yar men fng s	Killed.	ळे छ र	7.0	135	208 118	199	989
in men Færds.	.betutaI	850 218 268	1,334	<b>9</b> 5	8,466 378	8,866	8, 190
Tradi in y	Killed.	524	88	79	188	380	89 <del>†</del>
Train men.	.berutaI	8,702 1,786 1,068	6,540	1, 150 8, 450	6,077	18,814	\$1,764
Trai	Killed.	788 788 788	707	88	\$19 \$09	800	1,607
Total (a, b, and b b).	.beruţaI	4, 735 4, 184 165	9,070		2, 113 2, 570	4,527	13, 597
Tota	Killed.	908 185 16	017		168	257	279
Persons carried under greement or contract (b b).	.berutaI	606 488 19	166		282	386	1,547
Perse ried agree con ()	Killed.	28	\$\$		12 12	35	11
snd b).	.beruţaI	4, 227 3, 718 154	8,079	•	**************************************	4, 171	12,250
Paul (a. 1	Killed.	193 169 16	367		14.08	203	670
		d b	<b>d</b>			<i>j</i>	

From Table B, next following, comparisons may be made for the last four years:

TABLE B.—Casualties to passengers and employees, years ending June 30.

	1	908.	1	907.	19	906.	1905.		
·	Killed.	Injured.	Killed.	Injured.	Killed.	Injured.	Killed.	Injured.	
Passengers:									
In train accidents	165	7,430	410	9,070	182	6,778	350	6, 498	
Other causes	241	5, 215	237	4,527	236	4, 407	187	8,542	
Total	406	12, 645	647	13,597	418	11, 185	537	10,040	
Employees:									
In train accidents.	642	6,818	1,011	8, 924	879	7,483	798	7,052	
In coupling accidents  Overhead obstructions,	239	8, 121	302	3, 948	311	3,503	243	8, 110	
etc	110	1,353	134	1,591	132	1,497	92	1, 185	
Falling from cars, etc	668	11,735	790	12, 565	713	11, 253	633	9, 237	
Other causes	1,699	<b>3</b> 3, 317	2, 116	35,661	1,772	31,788	1,495	24, 842	
Total	3, 358	56, 344	4, 353	62, 689	3,807	55,524	3, 261	45, 426	
Total passengers and employees	3, 764	68, 989	5,000	76, 286	4, 225	66, 709	8,798	55, 466	

The following tables are self-explanatory, being consolidations of the quarterly tables giving the same classes of facts:

TABLE C.—Collisions and derailments, damage to cars, engines, and roadway, years ending June 30.

		190	<b>)8</b> .			190	7.	
	Num- ber.	Loss.	Killed.	Injured.	Num- ber.	Loss.	Killed.	Injured.
Collisions, rear	1,397 795	\$1,298,044 1,473,618	88 210	1,742 3,143	1,957 1,065	\$2,003,509 1,935,505	233 327	2, 423 3, 616
tingCollisions, miscellaneous	436 3, 735	165, 850 1, 697, 687	112	214 2,613	695 4, 309	259, 495 2, 101, 059	13 203	322 <b>3,</b> 180
Total	6, 363	4, 635, 199	414	7,712	8,026	6, 299, 568	776	9,541
Derailments due to defects of roadway, etc Derailments due to defects	1,426	1,088,261	46	1,598	1,528	1, 255, 114	58	1,983
of equipment	2, 796	2, 176, 194	37	831	3, 178	2, 490, 028	59	920
nalmen, etc	406	273,038	31	376	495	396, 626	130	750
track, etc	381	562, 441	67	590	387	556, 725	68	658
track, etc	90	144, 903	24	215	59	153, 694	14	176
laneous causes	1,572	1,303,624	109	1,512	1,785	1,713,947	186	2, 196
Total	6,671	5,548,461	314	5,122	7, 432	6, 556, 134	515	6,69
Total collisions and derailments	13,034	10, 183, 660	728	12,834	15, 458	12, 685, 702	1, 291	16, 236

TABLE D.—Causes of accidents to employees in coupling and uncoupling cars, year ending June 30, 1908.

Sub-	Causes.	Train	ımen.		imen ards.	m (swit	train- en ching ws).	Ori	
class.	•	Killed.	Injured	Killed.	Injured.	Kmed.	Injured.	Killed.	Injured
1 2 8 4 5 6 7	Adjusting coupler with foot Adjusting coupler, cars accidentally started. Careless manipulation of uncoupling lever Cars not equipped with automatic coupler Coupler broken, using link and pin or chain Coupling damaged cars. Coupling with chain or other emergency ap-	1 1 9	92 28 17 11 22 26	1 4	60 15 8 4 6 28	6 1 1 11	118 41 27 12 20 72	1	2 2 3 5 4 5
8	pliance on curve too sharp for automatic coupling.  Coupling with chain or other emergency appliance because of uneven track.  Coupling or uncoupling safety chains	2 1	17 1 7		9 2 6	1	26 14	•••••	1
10 11	Fingers or hand caught between uncoupling lever and body of car. Uncoupling without using lever (unnecessary)	1	188 80	2	120 14	. 8	302 44		15
12 18 14	Uncoupling without using lever, uncoupling lever not in working order.  Foot caught in frog, switch, or guard rail  Opening or closing knuckle when cars were	2 8	118 12	2 8	85 14	4 16	168 22	••••	4
15	near together, misc cludated speed  Opening knuckle when cars were near together, engine accidentally started	6	76 10	1	<b>6</b> 2	10 <b>3</b>	89 17	1	10 <b>3</b>
16 17 18 19	Opening knuckle, part of defective coupler fell on foot.  Opening knuckle, lost footing.  Riding on car to uncouple, slipped off  Struck by object at side of track.	4 3 2	15 25 18 12	5 1	8 21 18 13	11 5	23 34 84 29		<b>3</b>
20 21	Caught by unexpected movement of car, due to slack running in	10	73	1	44	13	84		0
22 23 24	hand signals	2 8	12 24 21	<b>2</b> 5	9 20 17	8 7	14 77 81	2	4 2
25 26 27	trary to rule.  Hand caught between projecting load and end of next car.  No witness (fatal injury).  Other causes.	9	53 13 21	11	41 9 18	11	83 14 84	2	1
28	Unexplained	71	959	45	642	114	6 1, <b>43</b> 5	9	85

TABLE Dx.—Nature of injuries to employees in coupling and uncoupling cars, year ending June 30, 1908.

Injuries.	Train- men.	Train- men in yards.	Yard train- men.	Other em- ployees.
Loss of legs Loss of legs Loss of arms Loss of hands Loss of fingers Loss of toes Fractured akull Fractured leg Fractured collar bone or ribs Fractured other bones Contusion of head or body Contusion or laceration of feet Contusion or laceration of legs Contusion or laceration of arms Contusion or laceration of hands Contusion or laceration of fingers Dislocation Internal injuries Sprains Miscellaneous	78 22	9 5 5 5 35 4 2 7 15 9 14 68 65 9 21 30 121 171 6 11 15 14	19 8 13 6 41 7 9 28 24 82 189 141 19 76 68 188 448 7 16 74 22	1 2 2 1 7 1 5 1 8 2 1  5 9 20 4 1 3
. Total injuries	969 71	642 45	1,435 114	85 9
Total killed and injured	1,030	687	1,549	94

RECAPITULATION.	
Total killed	. 239
Total injured	3. 121
Total killed and injured	2 260

TABLE E.—Causes of accidents to employees classified (C6 and C7) as falling from and getting on or off cars and engines, year ending June 30, 1908.

	1 <b>b</b> -	Causes.	Trai	nmen.		nmen ards.	(swit	train- en ching ws).	Other employees.	
cla	106.		Killed.	Injured.	Killed.	Injured.	Killed.	Injured.	Kuled.	Injured
	1 2 3 4	Fell from roof of box car by reason of— Defect in car. Ice or snow Parting of train Derailment, collision, or shock due to abnormal movements of cars other	3 6	25 18 75		9 11 26	1 2	24 19 16	•••••	5 1 1
<b>cs</b>	5	than those in subclass 3	12 10	207 124	7 6	118 86	<b>22</b> 7	330 212	6	<b>38</b> 12
	6 7 8 9	Coal car Freight car other than box or coal car. Engine or tender. Passenger car. Engines, tenders, or cars (all kinds)	52	41 167 520 42	5 4 13 1	20 73 263 16	2 9 15	25 58 210	9 15 9 4	26 76 88 12
(	11 12 13 14 15	not in motion  Miscellaneous causes  Not clearly explained  Slipped getting on moving trains or cars.  Jumping off moving trains  Jumping from engines or cars anticipating	46 62	252 886 212 456 550	1 13 8 11 8	158 348 49 242 346	21 31 10 8	74 827 157 268 423	12 9 25 21	263 261 61 196 229
<b>C7</b>	16 17 18	collision, derailment, or other accident. Fell from engines or cars by reason of defective hand holds and sill steps Getting on or off moving engine	1 26	169 162 661 40	1 2 38	100 426 28	22	186 460 13	1 19 1	19 12 169 5
		Total	281	4, 697	98	2,356	1.82	3, 376	137	1,306

#### Public—No. 171.]

AN ACT Requiring common carriers engaged in interstate commerce to make full reports of all accidents to the Interstate Commerce Commission.

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, It shall be the duty of the general manager, superintendent, or other proper officer of every common carrier engaged in interstate commerce by railroad to make to the Interstate Commerce Commission, at its office in Washington, District of Columbia, a monthly report, under oath, of all collisions of trains or where any train or part of a train accidentally leaves the track, and of all accidents which may occur to its passengers or employees while in the service of such common carrier and actually on duty, which report shall state the nature and causes thereof and the circumstances connected therewith.

Sec. 2. That any common carrier failing to make such report within thirty days after the end of any month shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor and, upon conviction thereof by a court of competent jurisdiction, shall be punished by a fine of not more than one hundred dollars for each and every offense and for every day during which it shall fail to make such report after the time herein specified for making

the same.

Sec. 3. That neither said report nor any part thereof shall be admitted as evidence or used for any purpose against such railroad so making such report in any suit

or action for damages growing out of any matter mentioned in said report.

Sec. 4. That the Interstate Commerce Commission is authorized to prescribe for such common carriers a method and form for making the reports in the foregoing section provided.

Approved, March 3, 1901.

#### SPECIAL INFORMATION CONTAINED IN PRECEDING BULLETINS.

Each accident bulletin contains tables showing the number of passengers and employees killed and injured, and these figures are classified according to cause (see Table No. 1); also tables showing cost of the different classes of train accidents. The causes of accidents to employees in coupling and uncoupling and in falling from cars, etc., are further classified in Tables No. 3 and No. 4. The most serious collisions and derailments are dealt with in a supplementary table (Class A), showing the causes in some detail. Each bulletin is for three months, and No. 1 was for the quarter ending September 30, 1901. The bulletin for the quarter ending June 30 contains, in addition to the quarterly statistics, tables showing the same information for the whole of the fiscal year ending on that date.

Bulletin No. 17 records one collision, killing 6 and injuring 35 persons, and one derailment, killing 15 and injuring 28. The collision, occurring at 1 a. m., was due to gross negligence on the part of the men in charge of a freight train. The derailment was due to an open draw. The drawbridge was not provided with interlocked signals and the engineman was not adequately acquainted with the line of the road. A collision and a derailment are reported which were due to the lack of suitable detector bars at switches, and a collision which was due to failure of

"controlled manual" block signal working.

Bulletin No. 18 shows total casualties much larger than in the preceding quarters, due largely, no doubt, to an enormous increase in traffic. Many accidents are reported in which the men had been on duty excessively long hours. One collision, killing 17 persons, was due to the error of an engineman of five months' experience, who ran past five warning signals. Another collision, killing 10 persons, was due to the failure of the men in charge of a freight train to identify opposing passenger trains. One derailment of a passenger train, killing 13 persons, was reported as due to some cause that could not be discovered.

Bulletin No. 19 is like Bulletin 18 in showing a large number of casualties. One butting collision, due to failure of train dispatching, caused 34 deaths and 24 injuries and \$50,000 damages, besides the damages for deaths and injuries of persons. One collision was due to the negligence of men who had been worked flagrantly long hours. Particulars are given of a number of collisions due to complicated and

unusual causes.

Bulletin No. 20 shows total deaths greater than in the corresponding quarter of the previous year, but the number of passengers and employees killed in train accidents was considerably smaller. The most serious accident in this bulletin was a butting collision of passenger trains, due to misinterpretation of a dispatcher's order by a pilot; 10 persons killed, 38 injured. One derailment, unexplained,

train running slowly, caused 9 deaths and 18 injuries.

Bulletin No. 21 contains the record of only one train accident—a collision—in which more than 10 persons were killed, but the totals of casualties of all classes are large, no improvement being shown over preceding quarters. Number of passengers killed in train accidents, 52. One collision, killing 17 and injuring 56, was due to confusion of telegraphic orders; one derailment, killing 9 and injuring 43, was at a misplaced switch, and another, killing 7 and injuring 40, was due to excessive speed.

Bulletin No. 22 shows 180 passengers killed in train accidents—a number larger than that in any other bulletin except No. 13. One rear collision in the District of Columbia caused the death of 43 passengers and the injury of 63. A butting collision killed 43 persons and injured 155, the bodies of the killed being consumed by fire. In the derailment of a passenger train at a drawbridge 57 persons were

killed and 36 injured.

Bulletin No. 23 shows 126 passengers killed in train accidents. It contains the record of two collisions, killing 41 persons, and two derailments, killing the same number. The number of employees killed in coupling accidents is 25 per cent less than in

the last preceding quarter.


Bulletin No. 24, though representing that quarter of the year which is usually the lightest in traffic, showed all of the principal totals of casualties larger than in the same quarter of the year preceding, and the number of passengers killed in train accidents was very much larger. One derailment killed 33 persons and one collision 8. The tables for the year ending June 30, 1907, showed heavy increases in all items except accidents in car coupling and from striking against overhead obstructions, and the number of passengers killed and injured in collisions and derailments showed an alarming increase, the number of killed in this class being 17 per cent higher than the very large total reported in the year ending June 30, 1905. A condensed list is given of 10 prominent accidents in the year ending June 30, 1907, to which are charged an aggregate of 291 deaths.

Bulletin No. 25 shows 110 passengers killed in train accidents, three collisions and one derailment being responsible for 80 deaths in this class. The number of passengers killed from other causes (mostly their own negligence) also shows a large increase. One of the most serious collisions was due to the misreading of a dispatcher's order, and another to a mistake in sending or receiving the order.

Bulletin No. 26 shows a marked decrease in casualties as compared with preceding quarters, a large falling off in railroad traffic having taken place. The list of "prominent" train accidents includes only three cases which may be classed as

notable.

Bulletin No. 27 shows further marked decreases in casualties, incident to the large falling off in railroad traffic. The number of passengers and employees killed in train accidents (125) is the smallest since the monthly records were established. The most fatal accident in this quarter was a collision at a street crossing, where 8 passengers in an electric car were killed.



M. D. Interstate Commerce Commission Washington, D. C.


# Accident Bulletin No. 29

RAILROAD ACCIDENTS
IN THE UNITED STATES

During July, August, and September 1908



Washington
Government Printing Office
1909



#### ACCIDENT BULLETIN NO. 29

# Collisions and Derailments of Trains

and

# Casualties to Persons

during the months of

July, August, and September, 1908

INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMMISSION WASHINGTON, D. C.



WASHINGTON
GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
1909

#### THE INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMMISSION.

MARTIN A. KNAPP, of New York.

JUDSON C. CLEMENTS, of Georgia.

CHARLES A. PROUTY, of Vermont.

FRANCIS M. COCKRELL, of Missouri.

FRANKLIN K. LANE, of California.

EDGAR E. CLARK, of Iowa.

JAMES S. HARLAN, of Illinois.

EDWARD A. MOSELEY, Secretary.

## RAILROAD ACCIDENTS

IN THE UNITED STATES DURING THE THREE MONTHS ENDING SEPTEMBER 30, 1908.

The number of persons killed in train accidents during the months of July, August, and September, 1908, as shown in reports made by the railroad companies to the Interstate Commerce Commission, under the "accident law" of March 3, 1901, was 191, and of injured, 3,046. Accidents of other kinds, including those sustained by employees while at work and by passengers in getting on or off the cars, etc., bring the total number of casualties up to 17,279 (734 killed and 16,545 injured). These accidents are classified in the following table. These reports deal only with (a) passengers and (b) employees on duty.<sup>a</sup>

TABLE No. 1.—Casualties to persons—July, August, and September, 1908.b

	Passen- gers (a and b).		Persons carried under agree- ment or con- tract (bb).		(a,	otal b, and ob).	Trai	inmen.	Train- men in yards.	
	Killed	Injured.	Killed.	Injured.	Killed.	Injured.	Killed.	Injured.	Killed.	Injured.
Collisions Derailments Miscellaneous train accidents, including locomotive boiler explosions.	35 7	915 742 41	8 3	110 80 5	<b>43</b> 10	1,025 822 46	42 52 11	300 244 174	7 5	116 27 46
Total train accidents	42	1,698	11	195	53	1,893	105	718	13	189
Coupling or uncoupling. While doing other work about trains or while attending switches.					••••		9	198 1,750	11 5	108
Corning in contact with overhead bridges, structures at side of track, etc	1	22		1	1	23	14	169	2	71
on or off	33 14	810 870	<b>4</b> 5	23 60	37 19	833 930	59 31	1,015 236	11 18	512 91
Total (other than train accidents)	48	1,702	0	84	57	1,786	120	3,368	47	1,388
Total all classes	90	3,377	20	279	110	3,656	225	4,086	60	1,577

a The casualties to passengers have been divided into three classes. Class a includes all ordinary passengers. Class b includes passengers traveling on freight trains. Class bb includes persons who are customarily carried on trains under special arrangements, such as postal clerks and express messengers, employees on Pullman cars, newsboys, live-stock tenders, and men in charge of freight.

Accidents to employees resulting in slight injuries, which do not prevent the employee injured from performing his accustomed service for more than three days in the aggregate during the ten days immediately

following the accident, are not reported.

b Table No. 1 is continued on the next page.

TABLE No. 1.—Casualties to persons—July, August, and September, 1908—Continued.

	men (	l train- switch- crews).		ther loyees.		otal loyees.	Total persons reported.		
	Killed.	Injured.	Killed.	Injured.	Killed.	Injured.	Killed.	Injured.	
Collisions.  Derailments.  Miscellaneous train accidents, including loco-	1 5	64 31	8	66 34	58 65	546 336	101 75	1,571 1,158	
motive boiler explosions		35	3	17	15	272	15	318	
Total train accidents	6	130	14	117	138	1,154	191	3,046	
Coupling or uncoupling	16	256	3	11	39	573	39	573	
attending switches	1	579	6	589	19	3, 524	19	3, 524	
structures at side of track, etc	1	91		13	17	344	18	367	
on or off	27 16	655 84	30 219	366 4,313	127 284	2,548 4,724	164 303	3. 381 5, 654	
Total (other than train accidents)	61	1,665	258	5, 292	486	11,713	543	13, 499	
Total all classes	67	1,795	272	5, 409	624	12,867	734	16, 545	

The very marked diminution in the number of casualties of all kinds, which continued through the last three quarterly bulletins, and which was due to the falling off in railroad traffic and other well-known collateral causes, seems now to be checked. The last bulletin (No. 28) was for the April-June quarter, which always is lighter in traffic and in accidents than the other quarters of the year; and the present bulletin would therefore show casualty lists heavier than that one under ordinary circumstances; but the difference between that quarter and this is made larger, without doubt, by reason of the fact that between July 1 and October 1 the business of the country began to recover from the depression which began in October, 1907.

The totals of the present record, as shown in Table 1A, below, are indeed far smaller than in the corresponding quarter of a year ago (Bulletin 25), and it is to be hoped that this apparent increase in the safety of railroad travel and railroad operation is not wholly to be accounted for by the decrease in the number of trains run or in passengers carried or employees in service.

But in comparing Bulletin 29 with Bulletin 28 the main lesson which is to be derived from all accident statistics—the need of preventing accidents in the future—again confronts us. The number of employees killed increased 17 per cent; employees killed in train accidents, 39 per cent; and passengers killed from causes other than train accidents, 30 per cent; but the increase in the number of passengers killed in train accidents was no less than 307 per cent. Nothing could more clearly enforce the lesson of the necessity of heeding the record of the causes of collisions as set forth in Table 2A, for four-fifths of the passengers killed in train accidents

were the victims of collisions. Of the eight most serious collisions (Nos. 1, 2, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, and 11), five occurred on lines where the block system was not in use; one, No. 8, on a line where it was ostensibly in use, but was abandoned temporarily to save the time of passenger trains; and one, No. 1, on a line where it appears to have been used "permissively" for freight trains carrying passengers (drovers); leaving only one, No. 5, which appears to have been in no wise due to lack of the space-interval rules.

TABLE No. 1A.—Comparison of principal items.

	Bulletin 29.	Bulletin 28.	Bulletin 25.
1. Passengers killed in train accidents. 2. Passengers killed, all causes. 3. Employees killed in train accidents. 4. Employees killed in coupling. 5. Employees killed, all causes. 6. Total passengers and employees killed, all causes.	110 138 39	13 57 99 30 534 591	110 195 236 87 1,144 1,339

The total number of collisions and derailments in the quarter now under review was 2,567 (1,170 collisions and 1,397 derailments), of which 192 collisions and 184 derailments affected passenger trains. The damage to cars, engines, and roadway by these accidents amounted to \$1,950,408. Given more in detail, these facts appear as below:

TABLE No. 2.—Collisions and derailments.

[Note.—Collisions and derailments which cause no death or personal injury and which cause not over \$150 damage to the property of the railroad are not reported.]

	Number.	Loss.	Killed.	Injured.
Collisions, rear	213	\$233,733	15	500
Collisions, butting	129	203, 376	55	683
Collisions, train separating	123	53,067	2	42
Collisions, miscellaneous	705	282, 148	29	346
Total	1,170	772,324	101	1,571
Derailments due to defects of roadway, etc	253	165,851	11	183
Derailments due to defects of equipment	621	534, 213	15	205
Derailments due to negligence of trainmen, signalmen. etc	79	52, 149	5	130
Derailments due to unforeseen obstruction of track, etc	73	86, 289	16	127
Derailments due to malicious obstruction of track, etc	17	13, 139	5	25
Derailments due to miscellaneous causes	354	326, 443	23	488
Total	1,397	1,178,084	75	1, 158
Total collisions and derailments	2,567	1,950,408	176	2,729

Following is the usual list of Class A train accidents—all in which the damage is reported at \$10,000 or over, notable cases in which passengers are killed, and those doing damage less than \$10,000 and down to \$2,000, wherever the circumstances or the cause may be of particular interest:

TABLE 2A.—Causes of twenty-three prominent train accidents (Class A).

[Note.—R stands for rear collision; B, butting collision; M, miscellaneous collisions; D, derailment; P, passenger train; F, freight and miscellaneous trains.]

#### COLLISIONS.

No.	Class.	Kind of train.	Killed.	Injured.  Damage to engines, cars. and roadway.	Reference to record.	Cause.
1	R	F and F	3	1 \$1,860	19	Excessive speed and negligent flagging. Occurred 3.40 a. m.; 3 passengers in caboose killed.
2 3	M	F and F	4	40 3,000 4 5,283		Confusion of orders. (See note in text below.) Train approached station 3 a. m. at uncontrollable speed. Air brakes not properly applied; one an-
4	M	F	0	0 5,300	22	gle cock closed; cause of this not discovered.  Train separated and rear part ran into forward part.  Cause of parting not discovered. Only 14 cars out of 37 cars had air brakes working. Whole crew
5	M	P and P	7	20 5, 760	5	held at fault for failure to test brakes. Engineman disregarded signals at crossing. (See
6	В	P and F	3	6,000	28	note in text below.)  Agent failed to deliver order; trusted an inexperienced assistant, who made only three copies o
7	В	Pand F	20	14 11,000	52	order when he should have made five. Westbound freight encroached on time of regular eastbound passenger. Freight reached entrance to siding at meeting point at 8.01 or 8.02, one or two minutes behind passenger's time, instead of five minutes before that time, as required by rule
	•					Men in charge of freight admitted before coroner that regulation speed from last station, as shown on time table, was not sufficient to enable them to reach the meeting point at 8 o'clock. Passenger engineman's view of road was obscured by snow-storm.
8	В	P and F	5	49 12,000	2	Mistake in writing telegraphic order. (See note in text below.)
9	В	P and F	4	2 13,300	53	Operator accepted order after train had passed. (See note in text below).
10 11	R B	F and F P and P	8	0 16,000 59 22,297	20 1	Excessive speed.  Operator accepted order after train had passed. (See note in text below.)
	Total	l <b></b>	54 2	226 101,800	-	•

#### DERAILMENTS.

1		P		2	\$3,000	41	Malicious obstruction. A person was arrested and held for trial on a charge of murder.
2		P				37	Malleable-iron brake-lever jaw on tender broke, allowing rod to fall and throw wheel off track.
3 4	D	P	1	9 16	3, 300 4, 900	13 9	Washout, due to flood from broken reservoir.  Track spread; cause of spreading not determined.  Rails 100 pounds per yard, oak ties, broken-stone ballast, all in first-class condition. Train consisted of 2 electric locomotives, weighing 95 tons each, and 9 cars. Line straight. Train was run-
5	D	F	2		10,000	61	ning at regular speed. Breakage of flange of wheel of tender.
5 ' 6 '		F		1		31	Broken wheel. Wheel was put under a drop test and found to be of poor material.
7 · 8	$\mathbf{D}$	P	2	60	12,000	62a	Undiscovered. Believed to have been fast running.
8	D	P	2	4	12,700	38	Worn rail on curve; curve, 5 degrees; supereleva- tion, 4j inches; speed, 40 miles an hour.
9 10	D	F	0	0	13,400	34	Broken truck.
	1)		1	•	}	18	Undiscovered; believed that a truck was broken when air brakes were suddenly applied on a deck-girder bridge 88 feet long.
11	D	P	0	38	16, 393	58	Maliciously misplaced switch; speed, 50 miles an hour.
12	D	, P	2	37	20,000	<b>3</b> 5	Burning bridge. Cause of fire not discovered. No person blamed.
	Tota	u	17	166	123, 993	ļ	
	Tota de	ol collisions and railments	71	392	225, 793		

Collision No. 2, killing two passengers, was due to a confusion of orders by the conductor and motorman of an electric car (train No. 9). The case may be explained by supposing the movement of train No. 9 as eastward from A to B, C, D, E, F, and so on. Order No. 3 was issued directing train No. 9 to proceed to E. Later, order No. 5 was issued directing No. 9 to report at D; but the first order was received last and the conductor and motorman acted on it, and thus the collision occurred between D and E. Order No. 5 was received by the conductor and motorman of No. 9 at A, direct by telephone from the dispatcher. Proceeding to B, they received order No. 3 from the conductor of a westbound train, to whom the dispatcher had sent it at C six minutes before he sent order No. 5. The conductor and engineman of No. 9 are held negligent in not observing the sequence of numbers on the orders and in not noticing the recorded times, which showed that the order received last had been sent first. The dispatcher, in sending order No. 5, did not put into it the words "instead of," and in telephoning it to the conductor and motorman of No. 9 he said nothing to them about having issued an earlier order which was to be disregarded.

Collision No. 5 occurred at a crossing where two lines, both belonging to the same railroad company, cross each other diagonally. Passenger train No. 7, approaching the crossing on line B at excessive speed, was thrown off the track at the derailing switch and ran upon the ground across line A, stopping with the smoking car athwart the main track of A, in which position it was wrecked by the engine of train No. 4 on line A. Seven passengers were killed and 19 passengers and one trainman were injured. The engineman of train No. 7, who is a man of experience, appears to have been oblivious to the signals. The derailing switch was 281 feet from the crossing and his engine ran to a point 170 feet beyond the crossing. The signal was 50 feet in the rear of the derailing switch and was in plain view for 885 feet farther in the rear. It is estimated that the speed of the train when derailed was at least 50 miles an hour, though the schedule speed of this train over that part of the line is only 22 miles an hour, the rate being limited by a city ordinance. The engineman of No. 7 "claimed" that the signal was clear when he first came within view of it, but the superintendent regards the evidence as conclusive that it was in the stop position and had been so for some time before this train came within sight of it.

Collision No. 8, causing five deaths, was due to an error in a train order. It was between an eastbound passenger train and a westbound freight. The engines and cars of both trains were badly damaged. The order as issued directed the passenger train to wait at B. until "five fifteen 5.15 a. m." This authorized the freight to run to B. if it had time to reach that point in time to properly clear the passenger

train. The order as delivered to the freight read "five fifty-five 5.55 a. m." instead of "five fifteen 5.15 a. m.," and the freight therefore encroached on the time of the passenger, having apparent authority to do so, to the extent of forty minutes, and in consequence met the passenger east of B. The operator at L., who took the order for the freight, destroyed the first order she made and in place of it wrote a second copy. In making this second copy the error occurred. This operator had been in the service of the company at L. four days. She had had instruction in a telegraph school twelve months and had been examined by the chief train dispatcher after being under the tutelage of a station operator eleven days. It is assumed that the first order written out at L. was correctly worded, as the operator had repeated it to the dispatcher. Where a telegraphic order is rewritten it is the duty of the operator, under the rules, to again repeat it by telegraph to the dispatcher, but this was not done. The telegraph block system is in use on the line where this collision occurred, but the block stations are far apart and to avoid delay to the trains the block system was supplanted by a time order, as above explained. With the block system thus modified or suspended the westbound freight train, under the rules, would be required to be sidetracked at some station before the passenger train was due, and the passenger train in this case being behind time the order was issued so as to permit the freight train to go farther west before turning out.

In collision No. 9 there was negligence by both dispatcher and operator. It occurred about 1.30 a. m. The operator accepted an order for the passenger train after it had passed his station. By reason of having been asleep, or otherwise negligent, he did not know whether the passenger train had passed or not, and assumed that it had; assumed that the dispatcher would not offer the order to him if the train had already passed. The order was sent on Form 19, contrary to the rule, and it was acknowledged in a form applicable only to Form 31; and the dispatcher did not require the operator to display his signal before taking the order; for these irregularities both men are blamed. The dispatcher had ground for suspicion that the operator had not been vigilantly attending to duty and is blamed for not taking extra precautions on that account. The dispatcher had had seven years' experience as such. operator, 23 years old, had served on this road less than two months but is said to have had several years' experience elsewhere.

Collision No. 11, causing fatal injury to 5 passengers, was due to the acceptance by a station operator of a train order for a train which had passed his office. Train No. 3, westbound, and No. 12, eastbound, held orders to meet at K. When No. 12 arrived at K., No. 3 being then at L., the next station east and 7 miles distant, the train dispatcher undertook to change the meeting point

from K. to L. This order was accepted by the operator at L. before he had made certain that No. 3, which had passed his train-order signal, had been held—a violation of the rule. The train dispatcher then gave the order to No. 12 at K., which immediately proceeded to act upon it, and before the operator at L. could reach No. 3, which was at the west end of the siding, it left there for K. under the order originally given, and the trains met at a point where, by reason of the curvature, neither train could be seen from the other until they were quite close together. The operator at L. is held at fault in accepting the order after the train had passed his train-order signal, and the dispatcher is held at fault for giving the order to No. 12 without knowing definitely that No. 3 had been held. The services of these men had been satisfactory up to the time of this collision.

TABLE No. 3.—Causes of accidents to employees in coupling and uncoupling cars.

	Causes.		rain- ien.		inmen vards.	Yard trainmen (switch- ing crews).		Other employees.	
Subclass.		Killed.	Injured.	Killed.	Injured.	Killed.	Injured.	Killed.	Injured.
1 2 3 4 5 6	Adjusting coupler with foot  Adjusting coupler, cars accidentally started  Careless manipulation of uncoupling lever.  Cars not equipped with automatic coupler.  Coupler broken, using link and pin or chain  Coupling damaged cars.	1  1 1	2 2 6	1	15 2 3 2 3 2	1 2	29 11 9 1 3 9	••••	1
7 8	Coupling with chain or other emergency appliance on curve too sharp for automatic coupling.  Coupling with chain or other emergency appliance because of uneven track.		4		2	2	1		
9 10	Coupling or uncoupling safety chains.  Fingers or hand caught between uncoupling lever and body of car.		32		1 21		4 55	• • • •	1 5
11 12	Uncoupling without using lever (unnecessary)		5 20		•		4 16	• • • •	<b>2</b>
13 14	Foot caught in frog, switch, or guard rail		13	3	2 6	2	13	••••	
15 16	Opening knuckle when cars were near together, engine accidentally started.  Opening knuckle, part of defective coupler fell on foot.	<i>.</i>	1 3		2 4	2	3 5	1	i
17 18 19	Opening knuckle, lost footing	1 4	6 6 1	3	3 2 5	1 1 	10 9 9	· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·	• • • • • •
20 21	running in	•••	23 4	•••	6		14 5		<b></b>
22 23 24	Uncoupling moving cars and lost footing		6 4	1	1 2 8	2 1 	13	2	·····i
25 26	Hand caught between projecting load and end of next car.  No witness (fatal injury)			<b>2</b>				١	
27 28	Other causes. Unexplained.	١ ا	9		2		4		
	Total	9	198	11	108	16	256	3	11

#### Details of injuries included in Table 3, subclass 27.

- J. 1. Standing on car holding up lever; load of trucks shifted.
  J. 2. Stepped on knuckle.
  J. 3. Lump of coal fell from car.
  J. 4. Stepped on piece of glass.
  A. 1. Lever flew up, cutting eye.
  A. 2. Arranging knuckles and caught hand.
  A. 3. Struck by stick of timber used as chock under car wheel.
  A. 4. Struck hand against corner of car.
  A. 5. Lever flew over.
  A. 6. Lumber fell off car.

- A. 6. Lumber fell off car.

- 8. 1. Struck in face by lever.
  8. 2. Stepped on nail.
  8. 3. Struck elbow against end sill of car.
  8. 4. Scalded when cylinder cocks were suddenly opened.
- 8. 5. Struck knee against car.

#### Table No. 3a.—Nature of injuries to employees in coupling and uncoupling cars.

Train- men.			Other em- ployees.
3 3 3 1 11 4	1 7 2	6 2 6 1	
3 5 14 19 10 8 7 24 64 3 4 2 5	1 2 2 6 13 14 3 5 3 15 27 1	2 2 3 5 36 30 7 18 13 36 64 2 4 17 2	
198 9	108 11	256 16	
207	119	272	1
		• • • • • • • • •	
	men.  3 3 3 1 11 4 3 5 14 19 10 8 7 24 64 3 4 2 5 198 9	men. in yards.  3 3 3 1 1 11 17 4 2 3 5 6 14 13 19 14 10 3 8 7 24 15 64 27 3 1 4 2 198 9 108 9 11 207 119	men.     in yards.     trainmen.       3

TABLE NO. 4.—Causes of accidents to employees classified (C6 and C7) as falling from and getting on or off cars and engines.

Sub- class.		Causes.	Tra	inmen.		nmen vards.	Yard train- men (switch- ing crews).		Other employees.	
			Killed.	Injured.	Killed.	Injured.	Killed.	Injured.	Killed.	Injured.
(°6 {	1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16	Feli from roof of box car by reason of— Defect in car. Ice or snow. Parting of train. Derailment, collision, or shock due to abnormal movements of cars other than those in subclass 3. While setting brakes. Feli from— Coal car Freight car other than box or coal car. Engine or tender. Passenger car. Engines, tenders, or cars (all kinds) not in motion. Miscellaneous causes. Not clearly explained. Slipped getting on moving trains or cars. Jumping off moving trains. Jumping from engines or cars anticipating collision, derailment, or other accident. Fell from engines or cars by reason of defective	11 15 12 2 2 12	9 16 54 33 11 42 124 10 53 166 33 101 133 37	1 2 2	7 25 14 7 13 64 2 32 44 15 61 91	1 2 5 9 2 2	6 63 49 4 10 43 2 17 145 30 70 68	3 2 2 2 1 3 1 10 4	9 1 25 26 1 64 65 21 55 55
,	17 18	hand-holds and sill steps Getting on or off moving engine. Caught in frog, guard rail, or switch.  Total	5	141 1 1,015	3 11	26 96 2 512	27	49 88 1 655	30	366

#### [Public—No. 171.]

AN ACT Requiring common carriers engaged in interstate commerce to make full reports of all accidents to the Interstate Commerce Commission.

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, It shall be the duty of the general manager, superintendent, or other proper officer of every common carrier engaged in interstate commerce by railroad to make to the Interstate Commerce Commission, at its office in Washington, District of Columbia, a monthly report, under oath, of all collisions of trains or where any train or part of a train accidentally leaves the track, and of all accidents which may occur to its passengers or employees while in the service of such common carrier and actually on duty, which report shall state the nature and causes thereof and the circumstances connected therewith.

SEC, 2. That any common carrier failing to make such report within thirty days after the end of any month shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor and, upon conviction thereof by a court of competent jurisdiction, shall be punished by a fine of not more than one hundred dollars for each and every offense and for every day during which it shall fail to make such report after the time herein specified for making the same.

SEC. 3. That neither said report nor any part thereof shall be admitted as evidence or used for any purpose against such railroad so making such report in any suit or action for damages growing out of any matter mentioned in said report.

SEC. 4. That the Interstate Commerce Commission is authorized to prescribe for such common carriers a method and form for making the reports in the foregoing section provided.

Approved, March 3, 1901.

#### SPECIAL INFORMATION CONTAINED IN PRECEDING BULLETINS.

Each accident bulletin contains tables showing the number of passengers and employees killed and injured, and these figures are classified according to cause (see Table No. 1); also tables showing cost of the different classes of train accidents. The causes of accidents to employees in coupling and uncoupling and in falling from cars, etc., are further classified in Tables No. 3 and No. 4. The most serious collisions and derailments are dealt with in a supplementary table (Class A), showing the causes in some detail. Each bulletin is for three months, and No. 1 was for the quarter ending September 30, 1901. The bulletin for the quarter ending June 30 contains, in addition to the quarterly statistics, tables showing the same information for the whole of the fiscal year ending on that date.

Bulletin No. 17 a records one collision, killing 6 and injuring 35 persons, and one derailment, killing 15 and injuring 28. The collision, occurring at 1 a. m., was due to gross negligence on the part of the men in charge of a freight train. The derailment was due to an open draw. The drawbridge was not provided with interlocked signals and the engineman was not adequately acquainted with the line of the road. A collision and a derailment are reported which were due to the lack of suitable detector bars at switches, and a collision which was due to failure of

"controlled manual" block signal working.

Bulletin No. 18 shows total casualties much larger than in the preceding quarters, due largely, no doubt, to an enormous increase in traffic. Many accidents are reported in which the men had been on duty excessively long hours. One collision, killing 17 persons, was due to the error of an engineman of five months' experience, who ran past five warning signals. Another collision, killing 10 persons, was due to the failure of the men in charge of a freight train to identify opposing passenger trains. One derailment of a passenger train, killing 13 persons, was reported as due to some cause that could not be discovered.

Bulletin No. 19 is like Bulletin 18 in showing a large number of casualties. One butting collision, due to failure of train dispatching, caused 34 deaths and 24 injuries and \$50,000 damages, besides the damages for deaths and injuries of persons. One collision was due to the negligence of men who had been worked flagrantly long hours. Particulars are given of a number of collisions due to complicated and

unusual causes.

Bulletin No. 20 shows total deaths greater than in the corresponding quarter of the previous year, but the number of passengers and employees killed in train accidents was considerably smaller. The most serious accident in this bulletin was a butting collision of passenger trains, due to misinterpretation of a dispatcher's order by a pilot; 10 persons killed, 38 injured. One derailment, unexplained.

train running slowly, caused 9 deaths and 18 injuries.

Bulletin No. 21 contains the record of only one train accident—a collision—in which more than 10 persons were killed, but the total of casualties of all classes are large, no improvement being shown over preceding quarters. Number of passengers killed in train accidents, 52. One collision, killing 17 and injuring 56, was due to confusion of telegraphic orders; one derailment, killing 9 and injuring 43, was at a misplaced switch, and another, killing 7 and injuring 40, was due to excessive speed.

Bulletin No. 22 shows 180 passengers killed in train accidents—a number larger than that in any other bulletin except No. 13. One rear collision in the District of Columbia caused the death of 43 passengers and the injury of 63. A butting collision killed 43 persons and injured 155, the bodies of the killed being consumed by fire. In the derailment of a passenger train at a drawbridge 57 persons were

killed and 36 injured.

Bulletin No. 23 shows 126 passengers killed in train accidents. It contains the record of two collisions, killing 41 persons, and two derailments, killing the same number. The number of employees killed in coupling accidents is 25 per cent less than in

the last preceding quarter.

Bulletin No. 24, though representing that quarter of the year which is usually the lightest in traffic, showed all of the principal totals of casualties larger than in the same quarter of the year preceding, and the number of passengers killed in train accidents was very much larger. One derailment killed 33 persons and one collision 8. The tables for the year ending June 30, 1907, showed heavy increases in all items except accidents in car coupling and from striking against overhead obstructions, and the number of passengers killed and injured in collisions and derailments showed an alarming increase, the number of killed in

this class being 17 per cent higher than the very large total reported in the year ending June 30, 1905. A condensed list is given of 10 prominent accidents in the year ending June 30, 1907, to which are charged an aggregate of 291 deaths.

Bulletin No. 25 shows 110 passengers killed in train accidents, three collisions and one derailment being responsible for 80 deaths in this class. The number of passengers killed from other causes (mostly their own negligence) also shows a large increase. One of the most serious collisions was due to the misreading of a dispatcher's order, and another to a mistake in sending or receiving the order.


Bulletin No. 26 shows a marked decrease in casualties as compared with preceding quarters, a large falling off in railroad traffic having taken place. The list of "prominent" train accidents includes only three cases which may be classed as

notable.

Bulletin No. 27 shows further marked decreases in casualties, incident to the large falling off in railroad traffic. The number of passengers and employees killed in train accidents (125) is the smallest since the monthly records were established. The most fatal accident in this quarter was a collision at a street crossing, where 8

passengers in an electric car were killed.

Bulletin No. 28 recorded the smallest number of passengers killed in train accidents (13) ever reported in the quarterly records. The total of passengers and employees killed in train accidents (112) was 13 less than the previous low record (125, Bulletin 27). Of the 13 passengers killed in train accidents, 7 were victims of a butting collision on an electric railroad.



#### ACCIDENT BULLETIN NO. 30

# Collisions and Derailments of Trains

and

# Casualties to Persons

## on the Railroads of the United States

during the months of

October, November, and December, 1908

INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMMISSION
WASHINGTON, D. C.



WASHINGTON
GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
1909

#### THE INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMMISSION.

MARTIN A. KNAPP, of New York, Chairman.

JUDSON C. CLEMENTS, of Georgia.

CHARLES A. PROUTY, of Vermont.

FRANCIS M. COCKRELL, of Missouri.

FRANKLIN K. LANE, of California.

EDGAR E. CLARK, of Iowa.

JAMES S. HARLAN, of Illinois.

EDWARD A. MOSELEY, Secretary.

## RAILROAD ACCIDENTS

IN THE UNITED STATES DURING THE THREE MONTHS ENDING DECEMBER 31, 1908.

The number of persons killed in train accidents during the months of October, November, and December, 1908, as shown in reports made by the railroad companies to the Interstate Commerce Commission, under the "accident law" of March 3, 1901, was 184 and of injured 2,924. Accidents of other kinds, including those sustained by employees while at work and by passengers in getting on or off cars, etc., bring the total number of casualties up to 17,644 (798 killed and 16,846 injured). These accidents are classified in the following table. These reports deal only with (a) passengers and (b) employees on duty.<sup>a</sup>

TABLE No. 1.—Casualties to persons, October, November, and December, 1908.bc

Causes.		Passengers (a and b).		Persons carried un- der agree- ment or contract (bb).		Total (a, b, and bb).		Trainmen.		Trainmen in yards.	
		Injured.	Killed.	Injured.	Killed.	Injured.	Killed.	Injured.	Killed.	Injured.	
Collisions  Derailments  Miscellaneous train accidents, including loco- motive-boiler explosions	15 14	835 430 8	1	97 27 6	19 15	932 457	51 30 11	480 228 200	18 2	152 43 49	
Total train accidents	29	1,273	5	130	34	1,403	92	908	20	244	
Coupling or uncoupling. While doing other work about trains or while attending switches.			••••				16	207 1, 989	11	144 645	
Coming in contact with overhead bridges, structures at side of track, etc	1	3		2	1	5	15	188	4	66	
on or off	41 15	7 <b>54</b> <b>63</b> 5	84	16 <b>9</b> 5	44 19	770 7 <b>3</b> 0	61 29	1,109 243	26 27	567 102	
Total (other than train accidents)	57	1, 892	7	113	64	1,505	124	3, 736	72	1,524	
Total, all classes	86	2, 665	12	243	98	2,908	216	4, 644	92	1,768	

The casualties to passengers have been divided into three classes. Class A includes all ordinary passengers. Class B includes passengers traveling on freight trains. Class BB includes persons who are customarily carried on trains under special arrangements, such as postal clerks and express messengers, employees on Pullman cars, newsboys, live-stock tenders, and men in charge of freight.

employees on Pullman cars, newsboys, live-stock tenders, and men in charge of freight.

Table No. 1 is continued on next page.

Accidents to employees resulting in slight injuries which do not prevent the employee injured from performing his accustomed service for more than three days in the aggregate during the ten days immediately following the accident are not reported.

TABLE No. 1.—Casualties to persons, October, November, and December, 1908—Cont'd.

_	men (	train- (switch- rews).		ther loyees.	_	otal loyees.	Total persons reported.	
Causes.	Killed.	Injured.	Killed.	Injured.	Killed.	Injured.	Killed.	Injured.
Collisions  Derailments  Miscellaneous train accidents, including loco-	3 4	92 37	<b>25</b> 6	151 44	97 42	875 352	116 57	1,807 809
motive-boiler explosions		24		21	11	294	11	308
Total train accidents	7	153	31	216	150	1,521	184	2,924
Coupling or uncoupling	16	307	1	18	44	676	44	676
attending switches.  Coming in contact with overhead bridges,	3	749	9	565	19	3,948	19	3,948
structures at side of track, etc	2	90	3	12	24	356	25	361
on or off	33 25	873 120	28 234	332 4,091	148 315	2,881 4,556	192 334	3,651 5,286
Total (other than train accidents)	79	2, 139	275	5,018	550	12, 417	614	13,922
Total, all classes	86	2,292	306	5, 234	700	13,938	798	16,846

The number of passengers here recorded as killed in collisions and derailments, 34, is only two-thirds as large as in the last preceding quarter (when there were 8 notable collisions); and the present record, for the purposes of comparison, might fairly be reduced still further by deducting the 15 casualties charged to derailment No. 4, Table 2a, which, as will be seen, occurred under very unusual circumstances. Making this deduction the present record would be reduced from 34 passengers to 21 passengers, or exactly the same number as that shown in Bulletin No. 26, one year ago. In the present record the only accident which is notable, as regards fatalities to passengers, is collision No. 23; but there were two which together caused the deaths of 16 employees—collisions No. 10 and No. 26.

Aside from item No. 1, as noted in the foregoing paragraph, the figures given in Table No. 1a, below, show generally considerable increases when compared with the last preceding quarter, but decreases when compared with the corresponding quarter one year ago.

TABLE No. 1a.—Comparison of principal items with last bulletin and with one year back.

	Bulletin 30.	Bulletin 29.	Bulletin 26.
1. Passengers killed in train accidents. 2. Passengers killed, all causes. 3. Employees killed in train accidents. 4. Employees killed in coupling. 5. Employees killed, all causes. 6. Total passengers and employees killed, all causes.	98 150 44	53 110 138 39 624 734	21 81 199 77 1,011 1,092

The total number of collisions and derailments in the quarter now under review was 2,684 (1,373 collisions and 1,311 derailments), of which 206 collisions and 130 derailments affected passenger trains. The damage to cars, engines, and roadway by these accidents amounted to \$1,940,133. Given more in detail, these facts appear as below:

TABLE N	No.	2.—Collisions	and	derailments.
---------	-----	---------------	-----	--------------

	Number.	Loss.	Killed.	Injured.
Collisions, rear Collisions, butting Collisions, train separating Collisions, miscellaneous	151	\$339, 217 292, 124 47, 336 351, 172	45 43 1 27	498 581 68 660
Total	1,373	1,029,849	116	1,807
Derailments due to defects of roadway, etc  Derailments due to defects of equipment  Derailments due to negligence of trainmen, signalmen, etc  Derailments due to unforeseen obstruction of track, etc  Derailments due to malicious obstruction of track, etc  Derailments due to miscellaneous causes.	68	138, 145 437, 640 49, 757 78, 003 20, 548 186, 191	1 5 11 24 3 13	273 131 64 127 47 167
Total	1,311	910, 284	57	809
Total collisions and derailments	2,684	1,940,133	173	2,616

[Note.—Collisions and derailments which cause no death or personal injury and which cause not over \$150 damage to the property of the railroad are not reported.]

Following is the usual list of Class A train accidents—all in which the damage is reported at \$10,000 or over, notable cases in which passengers are killed, and those doing damage less than \$10,000 and down to \$2,000, wherever the circumstances or the cause may be of particular interest:

TABLE 2a.—Causes of thirty-four prominent train accidents.

COLLISIONS.

No.	Class.	Kind of train.	Killed.	Injured.	Damage to engines, cars, and road-way.	Reference to record.	Cause.
1	M	Pand F	0	0	\$300	13	Collision at crossing at 2 a.m. Crossing not equipped with fixed signals. Passenger train, having stopped 200 feet from crossing, was started forward and ran into side of freight train, the engineman not seeing the freight cars.
2	M	F and F	1	0	865	14	Collision occurred in yard. Engineman of empty engine negligent. One passenger killed.
3	M	F and F	1	0	1,700	40	Engine backing onto sidetrack bumped standing cars, which ran out on main track and collided with another train. Conductor and brakeman applied hand brakes, but were unable to prevent collision. One passenger killed.
4	R	Fand P	4	14	2,200	1	Passenger train standing at station run into at rear by following freight; passenger brakeman neg- lected flagging; freight was running at excessive speed. Four passengers killed.
5	R	F and F	0	1	2,400	50	Two trains had been coupled together to get over a hill; were separated at the summit. Leading train had among its cars a dead engine, and by this operator at next station was deceived. He thought that there were 2 trains, and thereupon authorized the station in the rear to send on another train.

TABLE 2a.—Causes of thirty-four prominent train accidents—Continued.

#### COLLISIONS—Continued.

No.	Class.	Kind of train.	Killed.	Injured.	Damage to engines, cars, and road-way.	Reference to record.	Cause.
6	R	F and F	1	1	2,835	3	Standing train not protected by red signal; was run into by a train which was not properly controlled. One drover killed.
7	В	F and F	0	3	3,152	10	Operator accepted order after train had left. (See note in text below.)
8	В	F and F	0	7	3,739	39	Operator, having two orders, one Form 19, one Form 31, delivered Form 19 only. Operator in service at this place one week; had had ten years' experience elsewhere.
9	В	F and P	1	16	4,068	32	Freight train ran out of siding because not under control. (See note in text below.)
10	В	F and F	7	11	4,616	55	Conductor and engineman of freight held an order to run one hour and thirty minutes late; forgot the order and ran one hour and fifteen minutes late. Six carpenters and one brakeman killed.
11	В	P and P	2	11	6,075	31	Misreading of dispatcher's order. (See note in text below.)
12	В	P and F	2	25	7,314	7	Failure to observe wait order; conductor and engine- man both apparently forgot that the order had been delivered to them. Failure to observe wait order and failure of inferior
13	В	F and F	2	5	8,000	8 38	train to clear time of superior five minutes.
14 15	В	P and F	0	9	9,000	33	Conductor accepted orders from operator and re- ceipted for them, yet left them in the office and moved his train regardless of their instructions. Conductor and engineman, having an order that the
16	M	F and F	0	0	9,600	15	second section of a train would be one hour late, carelessly assumed that both the first and second sections would be that much late.  Train backing in on siding pushed boarding cars out on main line; these ran 2 miles uncontrolled and collided with work train; wreck took fire and was
17	В	F and F	1	4	10,000	53	burned up.  Conductor and engineman misread or assumed name of station in telegraphic order; order was plainly written and the two names were utterly unlike.
18 19	RB	F and F P and F	0	8 7	10, 200 11, 020	27 6	Failure to flag when backing out of siding.  Conductor and engineman saw engine 605 standing on sidetrack and mistook it for engine 602, which
20	В	F and F	4	3	12, 148	37	they were to meet. Entire crew of northbound train forgot or ignored
21	В	P and F	1	47	12,550	52	schedule of southbound.  Freight encroached on time of passenger train. Engineman disregarded schedule of passenger train. It was Christmas day and his ignoring of the passenger train was due to his mistaken impression that the day was Sunday, on which that passenger train did not run.
22	В	F and F	2	5	14,700	40a	
23 24	B R	F and F P and P	1 8	27	15, 200 20, 000	34 24	Engineman forgot order. (See note in text below.) Engineman disregarded time interval. Eight per
25	R	P and F	0	7	21, 145	25	sengers killed. (See note in text below.) Freight train, delayed while entering sidetrack, encroached on time of following passenger train. Report indicates that this freight had left last preceding station when there was not sufficient time so that the delay at the sidetrack was not the only contributing cause of the collision.
26	R	F and F	9	4	24,700	80	Runaway; mismanagement of air brakes on 79-food descending grade. Nine employees in work train killed.
	Total	i, collisions	48	218	225, 827		

<sup>[</sup>Note.—R stands for rear collision; B, butting collision; M, miscellaneous collisions; D, derailment; P, passenger train; F, freight and miscellaneous trains.]

TABLE 2a.—Causes of thirty-four prominent train accidents—Continued.

#### DERAILMENTS.

No.	Class.	Kind of train.	Killed.	Injured.	Damage to engines, cars, and road-way.	Reference to record.	Cause.
1	D	F	2	13	\$250	20	Caboose occupied by track laborers overturned by
2 3 4	D D D	P F P.	1 1 15	6 0 15	2,300 2,500 5,000	66 63 18	wind. Misplaced switch. Broken flange. One passenger killed. Track destroyed or weakened by fire. (See note in text below.)
<b>5</b>	D D	P	0 2	13 0	5,644 6,000	21 22	Rail maliciously removed.  Switch maliciously misplaced. Engineman and fireman killed.
7	D	<b>F</b>	0	0	6,990	68	Log on car projected and struck and demolished
8	D	P	0	<b>25</b>	11,984	19	bridge; bridge and 9 cars fell to river.  Trestle bridge weakened by fire. Engineman saw smoke a half mile away but misjudged its location. Superintendent apparently does not blame engineman, but the track department is held blameworthy for not having burned weeds and grass to safeguard bridge against fire.
	Total, derailments			72	40,678		
	Collis mer	ions and derail- nts	69	<b>290</b>	266,505		

Derailment No. 4, causing the death of 15 persons, occurred near Metz, Mich., on the Detroit and Mackinac Railway, October 15, in the midst of extensive forest fires, and its immediate cause was the distortion of the track by the heat from a pile of burning sleepers, which lay near the track. The train, consisting of an engine and 6 freight cars, had been made up hastily to carry to a place of safety the inhabitants of a small village (Metz), this being the only chance of saving their lives. The atmosphere was filled with smoke so dense that the engineman could not see far ahead, and there was great danger; but it was impossible to go in the other direction, and it would have been fatal to remain at Metz. The refugees, numbering about 75, were in a steel gondola car. When the engine was derailed, about 1½ miles from Metz, in consequence of the weakness or displacement of the track, the cars, of course, could not be moved farther, and thus were left close to the burning sleepers and at the mercy of the flames; and 12 persons in the gondola car, unable to escape, were burned to death. One man, riding on the engine, escaped from the engine, but was burned to death on the ground a few feet away. Two trainmen were killed, and the list of injured persons includes 13 refugees and 2 trainmen. One of these latter, Conductor John Kinville, was severely burned in trying to save some of the persons in the gondola car. In the accident record these victims, except those who were employees of the railroad, are classed as passengers;

but in view of the peculiar circumstances of the case this note is added to explain that the deaths and injuries do not come within the ordinary classification. It does not seem proper, however, to class the refugees as trespassers, and, therefore, the compiler has not felt at liberty to exclude the figures from the record.

Collision No. 24, killing 8 and injuring 27 passengers, was due to disregard of the 10-minute time-interval rule. Both trains were passenger trains, southbound, one due to leave S at 7 a. m. and the other at 7:30 a.m. The latter train came on to the main line from a branch at this point. The leading train was 30 minutes late leaving S. The second train was recorded by its conductor as leaving S at 7:30, which was exactly the time that the leading train left; but from testimony given before a coroner it appears that the actual time of departure was 7:35, making an interval of 5 minutes between the The rule requires that this time interval shall be 10 two trains. minutes. The junction being a registering station, the station agent or operator was not required to hold the second train to keep it 10 minutes behind the first, but this duty rested on the conductor and engineman, who were required always to examine the train register before leaving junctions.

The collision occurred at L, which is 17½ miles south of S. According to the men on the leading train, it occurred at 8 a.m., indicating that this train had run about 7 minutes faster than its schedule. According to the men on the other train, it occurred at 8:04 a.m. The leading train had made two stops of 30 seconds each for passengers; had stopped to open and close a switch at a station, and had reduced speed to about 10 miles an hour at one other point. It had started from L and was moving about 10 miles an hour when the collision occurred.

The second train was warned twice by drawbridge tenders of its proximity to the leading train, but the report says that the engineman inquired of the draw tender why he was stopped, and, on being informed, replied with derisive remarks; and he passed the draw-bridge without having received the proceed signal. The report says that this reckless conduct on the part of the engineman of the second train was repeated at the second drawbridge, and that the train was running at a high speed when it struck the leading train. Its engine crushed 3 cars of the leading train and damaged a fourth, and did not stop until it had run 635 feet beyond the point where it first struck. There was a dense fog at the time, making it impossible to see more than about 500 feet. The engineman says that he saw the preceding train about 500 feet before he reached it, but it is believed by the officers that he did not see it until his engine struck it. The evidence of two witnesses, one at L and one some distance back, is

quoted to show that the engineman was not keeping a good lookout. He was facing backward, and apparently talking with another engineman who was riding in the cab. The brakes of both trains were set automatically as soon as the collision occurred, rupturing the air pipes; but in spite of this the distance run was 635 feet, as before stated.

The schedule time of the second train from S to L, about 29 minutes, was 8 minutes less than that of the leading train.

Collison No. 7, occurring about 2 a. m., was due to misinformation given to the dispatcher by the operator at A. A freight train with 2 engines arrived at A at 1:20 a. m., and the operator, assuming that the helping engine was the regular engine of the train, made a mistake in reporting the numbers—the train being an extra freight, and trains being identified by the number of the engine—and continued to assert to the dispatcher that the regular engine of the train—that is, the train itself—had not arrived. Accepting this information, the dispatcher gave the right to the road to a train coming from the opposite direction. The operator in this case was 18 years old and had been in the service only 1 month. The dispatcher was 21 years old. He had been a dispatcher for about 6 months and an operator 4 years.

Collision No. 9 was between a southbound passenger train and a northbound local freight train. It occurred at 6:35 p.m., November 13. The freight train had entered the side track at the station to make way for the passenger train, but in consequence of the engine not being properly controlled the train ran through the side track and out upon the main line at the north end, and the collision occurred about 400 feet north of the north switch. The freight was to stop at that station long enough for the trainmen to eat supper, and the engineman had got off the engine a little distance short of the station, to go to a hotel. According to the testimony of this engineman the engine (moving) was left in charge of the fireman, but the fireman denies having received instruction to that effect, and he was on the front of the engine, covering the headlight, and therefore did not shut off steam or apply the brakes. The headlight being covered, the engineman of the passenger train did not see that the main track was obstructed until he was almost at the point of collision. The conductor of the freight train was also held at fault for allowing the train to move so far after it had entered the side track.

Collision No. 11 was due to a mistake of an engineman in reading a telegraphic order. This engineman, running southbound train No. 3, went past the appointed meeting station at full speed, having unaccountably taken the order to mean the next station south, the two names beginning with the same letter. The conductor had neglected to require the engineman to read the order aloud in his

presence. The conductor had read the order to the baggageman, but the baggageman appears to have taken no pains to keep the meeting place in mind, as the train passed that station without his knowing it.

The collision occurred 2½ miles beyond the appointed meeting place. The northbound train, No. 4, was running faster than its schedule, the dispatcher having ordered it to reach the meeting point, if possible, 5 minutes ahead of its schedule time. For giving this order the dispatcher is blamed. All of the men at fault have been in the service several years, with good records, except the baggageman, who had been in the service only 1 year.

Collision No. 23 was caused by the engineman of the southbound train disregarding a meeting order and running 1½ miles beyond the station where he should have met the northbound train. The engineman and conductor had both read the order, and the conductor, the flagman, and the fireman testify that they understood the meeting point to be as it was written in the order; but the engineman, although he received the order and read it with the others, got the impression, in some way, that it named another station farther on. The fact that the train was running beyond the meeting point was first discovered by the flagman. The testimony of the conductor concerning his endeavors to stop the train is confused; but at any rate he did not succeed in reducing the speed materially before the collision occurred. Both trains were running at about 30 miles an hour when they struck each other.

TABLE 3.—Causes of accidents to employees in coupling and uncoupling cars.

	Causes.		rain- nen.		inmen vards.	Yard trainmen (switching crews).		Other employees.	
Subclass.		Killed.	Injured.	Killed.	Injured	Killed.	Injured.	Killed.	Injured.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8	Adjusting coupler, cars accidentally started.  Careless manipulation of uncoupling lever.  Cars not equipped with automatic coupler.  Coupler broken, using link and pin or chain.  Coupling damaged cars.  Coupling with chain or other emergency appliance on curve too sharp for automatic coupling.  Coupling with chain or other emergency appliance because of uneven track.  Coupling or uncoupling safety chains.  Fingers or hand caught between uncoupling lever and	1	1 8 6 4	2	10 8 2 4 2 8	3	28 12 4 4 2 12 9	1	1 1 1 1
11 12	body of car. Uncoupling without using lever (unnecessary). Uncoupling without using lever, uncoupling lever not	2	41 4	••••	80 10	• • • •	55 6	•	3
13 14	in working order.  Foot caught in frog, switch, or guard rail.  Opening or closing knuckle when cars were near together, miscalculated speed.	2 2 1	12 4 18	1	16 2 15	8	29 5		•••••
15	Opening knuckle when cars were near together, engine accidentally started	1	2		4	1	7		1
16	Opening knuckle, part of defective coupler fell on foot.		8		8		7		
17	Opening knuckle, lost footing		8	1	Ĩ	.1	12		1
18	Riding on car to uncouple, slipped off	2	ļ ğ		1	,	15		
19	Struck by object at side of track		1 1		2		6		• • • • •
20	Caught by unexpected movement of car, due to slack running in		21		10		20		2
21	Caught by unexpected movement of car, due to mis- take or misunderstanding in giving hand signals	1	4	1	1		7		• • • • •
22	Uncoupling moving cars and lost footing		8	2	3	2	23	• • • •	
22 23	Parts hard to move, causing delay		7		2	• • • •	4		• • • • •
24	Went between cars unnecessarily and contrary to rule.	2	16		10	2	11		1
25	Hand caught between projecting load and end of next				1		1		
26	No witness (fatal injury)	2		8	• • • • •	8	1		
27	Other causes		7		5		5		1
28	Unexplained	••••	1	••••	2	••••	4	••••	•••••
	Total	16	207	11	144	16	307	1	18

#### Details of injuries included in Table 3, subclass 27.

0.	1.	<b>Foot</b>	caught	between	plank	and	brake	beam.
----	----	-------------	--------	---------	-------	-----	-------	-------

O. 2. Stepped on broken bottle.

O. 3. Struck by lever.
O. 4. Piece of scantling fell from top of car.
O. 5. Struck head against side of car.
O. 6. Shaker lever fell from tank of engine.

O. 6. Shaker lever fell from tank of engine.
O. 7. Piece of coal fell from car.
O. 8. Air hose flew up.
N. 1. Glove caught on knuckle.
N. 2. Opening knuckle, caught hand.
N. 3. Lump of coal fell off car.
N. 4. Struck hand against angle cock.
N. 5. Struck in face by lever.
N. 6. Struck by air hose.
N. 7. Struck by end sill of car.
D. 1. Struck in eye by piece of iron broken off drawhead D. 2. Coat sleeve caught on bolt.
D. 3. Lump of coal fell off tank.

TABLE 3a.—Nature of injuries to employees in coupling and uncoupling cars.

Injuries.	Train- men.	Train- men in yards.	Yard train- men.	Other em- ployees.
Loss of feet Loss of legs Loss of arms Loss of hands Loss of fingers Loss of toes Fractured leg Fractured arm Fractured collar bone or ribs Fractured other bones Contusion of head or body Contusion or laceration of feet Contusion or laceration of legs Contusion or laceration of legs Contusion or laceration of arms Contusion or laceration of hands Contusion or laceration of hands Contusion or laceration of fingers Dislocation Internal injuries Sprains	21 5 6 11 26 67	1 2 3 2 4 1 6 10 13 5 4 8 33 40 1 4 2	4 3 3 1 2 1 2 1 8 40 24 9 19 15 41 84 4 6 20	
Sprains. Miscellaneous	· 7	2 4	20 8	
Total injuries	<b>207</b> 16	144 11	307 16	18
		155	323	19

Table 4.—Causes of accidents to employees classified (C6 and C7) as falling from and getting on or off cars and engines.

Total killed and injured.....

8ub-	Causes		rain- nen.		inmen vards.	Yard trainmen (switch- ing crews).		Other employ- ees.	
class.		Killed.	Injured.	Killed.	Injured.	Killed.	Injured.	Killed.	Jajurel.
C6 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 C7 16 17 18	Fell from roof of box car by reason of— Defect in car. Ice or snow. Parting of train. Derailment, collision, or shock due to abnormal movements of cars other than those in subclass 3 While setting brakes. Fell from— Coal car. Freight car other than box or coal car. Engine or tender. Passenger car. Engines, tenders, or cars (all kinds) not in motion. Miscellaneous causes. Not clearly explained. Slipped getting on moving trains or cars. Jumping off moving trains. Jumping from engines or cars anticipating collision, derailment, or other accident. Fell from engines or cars by reason of defective handholds and sill steps. Getting on or off moving engine. Caught in frog, guard rail, or switch.	1 1 2 4 8 2 10 19 6 4	66 42 6 43 122 11 70 179 52 102 133 44 37 166 6	3 1 2 3 1 3 4	21 119 3	1 2 4 1 8 1  5		1 113 28361	1
	Total	61	1, 109	26	567	33	873	28	332

#### [Public-No. 171.]

AN ACT Requiring common carriers engaged in interstate commerce to make full reports of all accidents to the Interstate Commerce Commission.

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, It shall be the duty of the general manager, superintendent, or other proper officer of every common carrier engaged in interstate commerce by railroad to make to the Interstate Commerce Commission, at its office in Washington, District of Columbia, a monthly report, under oath, of all collisions of trains or where any train or part of a train accidentally leaves the track, and of all accidents which may occur to its passengers or employees while in the service of such common carrier and actually on duty, which report shall state the nature and causes thereof, and the circumstances connected therewith.

SEC. 2. That any common carrier failing to make such report within thirty days after the end of any month shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor and, upon conviction thereof by a court of competent jurisdiction, shall be punished by a fine of not more than one hundred dollars for each and every offense and for every day during which it shall fail to make such report after the time herein specified for making the same

making the same.

SEC. 3. That neither said report nor any part thereof shall be admitted as evidence or used for any purpose against such railroad so making such report in any suit or action for damages growing out of any matter mentioned in said report.

SEC. 4. That the Interstate Commerce Commission is authorized to prescribe for such common carriers a method and form for making the reports in the foregoing

section provided.

Approved, March 3, 1901.

#### SPECIAL INFORMATION CONTAINED IN PRECEDING BULLETINS.a

Each accident bulletin contains tables showing the number of passengers and employees killed and injured, and these figures are classified according to cause (see Table No. 1); also tables showing cost of the different classes of train accidents. The causes of accidents to employees in coupling and uncoupling and in falling from cars, etc., are further classified in Tables No. 3 and No. 4. The most serious collisions and derailments are dealt with in a supplementary table (Class A), showing the causes in some detail. Each bulletin is for three months, and No. 1 was for the quarter ending September 30, 1901. The bulletin for the quarter ending June 30 contains, in addition to the quarterly statistics, tables showing the same information for the whole of the fiscal year ending on that date.

Bulletin No. 17 records one collision, killing 6 and injuring 35 persons, and one derailment, killing 15 and injuring 28. The collision, occurring at 1 a. m., was due to gross negligence on the part of the men in charge of a freight train. The derailment was due to an open draw. The drawbridge was not provided with interlocked signals and the engineman was not adequately acquainted with the line of the road. A collision and a derailment are reported which were due to the lack of suitable detector bars at switches, and a collision which was due to failure of

"controlled manual" block signal working.

Bulletin No. 18 shows total casualties much larger than in the preceding quarters, due largely, no doubt, to an enormous increase in traffic. Many accidents are reported in which the men had been on duty excessively long hours. One collision, killing 17 persons, was due to the error of an engineman of five months' experience, who ran past five warning signals. Another collision, killing 10 persons, was due to the failure of the men in charge of a freight train to identify opposing passenger trains. One derailment of a passenger train, killing 13 persons, was reported as due to some cause that could not be discovered.

Bulletin No. 19 is like Bulletin 18 in showing a large number of casualties. One butting collision, due to failure of train dispatching, caused 34 deaths and 24 injuries and \$50,000 damages, besides the damages for deaths and injuries of persons. One collision was due to the negligence of men who had been worked flagrantly long hours. Particulars are given of a number of collisions due to complicated and

unusual causes.

a For notes on Bulletins 1-16, see Bulletin No. 17.

Bulletin No. 20 shows total deaths greater than in the corresponding quarter of the previous year, but the number of passengers and employees killed in train accidents was considerably smaller. The most serious accident in this bulletin was a butting collision of passenger trains, due to misinterpretation of a dispatcher's order by a pilot; 10 persons killed, 38 injured. One derailment, unexplained,

train running slowly, caused 9 deaths and 18 injuries.

Bulletin No. 21 contains the record of only one train accident—a collision—in which more than 10 persons were killed, but the total of casualties of all classes are large, no improvement being shown over preceding quarters. Number of passengers killed in train accidents, 52. One collision, killing 17 and injuring 56, was due to confusion of telegraphic orders; one derailment, killing 9 and injuring 43, was at a misplaced switch, and another, killing 7 and injuring 40, was due to excessive speed.

Bulletin No. 22 shows 180 passengers killed in train accidents—a number larger than that in any other bulletin except No. 13. One rear collision in the District of Columbia caused the death of 43 passengers and the injury of 63. A butting collision killed 43 persons and injured 155, the bodies of the killed being consumed by fire. In the derailment of a passenger train at a drawbridge 57 persons were

killed and 36 injured.

Bulletin No. 23 shows 126 passengers killed in train accidents. It contains the record of two collisions, killing 41 persons, and two derailments, killing the same number. The number of employees killed in coupling accidents is 25 per cent less than in

the last preceding quarter.

Bulletin No. 24, though representing that quarter of the year which is usually the lightest in traffic, showed all of the principal totals of casualties larger than in the same quarter of the year preceding, and the number of passengers killed in train accidents was very much larger. One derailment killed 33 persons and one collision 8. The tables for the year ending June 30, 1907, showed heavy increases in all items except accidents in car coupling and from striking against overhead obstructions, and the number of passengers killed and injured in collisions and derailments showed an alarming increase, the number of killed in this class being 17 per cent higher than the very large total reported in the year ending June 30, 1905. A condensed list is given of 10 prominent accidents in the year ending June 30, 1907, to which are charged an aggregate of 291 deaths.

Bulletin No. 25 shows 110 passengers killed in train accidents, three collisions and one derailment being responsible for 80 deaths in this class. The number of passengers killed from other causes (mostly their own negligence) also shows a large increase. One of the most serious collisions was due to the misreading of a dispatcher's order, and another to a mistake in sending or receiving the order.

Bulletin No. 26 shows a marked decrease in casualties as compared with preceding quarters, a large falling off in railroad traffic having taken place. The list of "prominent" train accidents includes only three cases which may be classed as

notable.

Bulletin No. 27 shows further marked decreases in casualties, incident to the large falling off in railroad traffic. The number of passengers and employees killed in train accidents (125) is the smallest since the monthly records were established. The most fatal accident in this quarter was a collision at a street crossing, where 8

passengers in an electric car were killed.

Bulletin No. 28 recorded the smallest number of passengers killed in train accidents (13) ever reported in the quarterly records. The total of passengers and employees killed in train accidents (112) was 13 less than the previous low record (125, Bulletin 27). Of the 13 passengers killed in train accidents, 7 were victims of a butting collision on an electric railroad.

Bulletin No. 29 showed totals far smaller than the corresponding quarter one year previous, but the diminution in the number of casualties, which had continued during the year of depression, seemed to have been checked. The number of passengers killed in train accidents was 53, and there were 8 notable collisions.

JUL 1 1909

M. Interstate Commerce Commission Washington, D. C.

# Accident Bulletin

No. 31


# Railroad Accidents in the United States

During January, February, and March 1909



Washington
• Government Printing Office
1909

			•	
•				
	• •			
•				
			·	
	•			
		•		



	•	
•		

#### ACCIDENT BULLETIN NO. 31

# Collisions and Derailments of Trains

and

# Casualties to Persons

## on the Railroads of the United States

during the months of

January, February, and March, 1909

INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMMISSION WASHINGTON, D. C.



WASHINGTON
GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
1909

### THE INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMMISSION.

MARTIN A. KNAPP, of New York, Chairman.
JUDSON C. CLEMENTS, of Georgia.
CHARLES A. PROUTY, of Vermont.
FRANCIS M. COCKRELL, of Missouri.
FRANKLIN K. LANE, of California.
EDGAR E. CLARK, of Iowa.
JAMES S. HARLAN, of Illinois.
EDWARD A. MOSELEY, Secretary.

### RAILROAD ACCIDENTS

IN THE UNITED STATES DURING THE THREE MONTHS ENDING MARCH 31, 1909.

The number of persons killed in train accidents during the months of January, February, and March, 1909, as shown in reports made by the railroad companies to the Interstate Commerce Commission under the "accident law" of March 3, 1901, was 177, and of injured 2,618. Accidents of other kinds, including those sustained by employees while at work and by passengers in getting on or off the cars, etc., bring the total number of casualties up to 15,785 (663 killed and 15,122 injured). Accidents to employees resulting in slight injuries which do not prevent the injured employee from performing his accustomed service for more than three days in the aggregate during the ten days immediately following the accident are not reported. These reports deal only with employees on duty and passengers. The casualties to passengers have been divided into three classes: Class a includes all ordinary passengers; class b includes passengers traveling on freight trains; and class bb includes persons who are customarily carried on trains under special arrangements, such as postal clerks, express messengers, employees on Pullman cars, newsboys, live-stock tenders, and men in charge of freight. reported accidents are classified in the following table:

TABLE No. 1.—Casualties to persons, January, February, and March, 1909.

Causes.		engers and b).	Persons carried un- der agree- ment or contract (bb).		(a,	lotal b, and bb).	Trai	nmen.	Trainmen in yards.	
		Injured.	Killed.	Injured.	Killed.	Injured.	Killed.	Injured.	Killed.	Injured.
Collisions Derailments Miscellaneous train accidents, including locomotive boiler explosions	22 6	622 625 35	9	82 96	31 6	704 721 39	38 40	296 230 194	11 4 3	111 29 37
Total train accidents	28	1,282	9	182	37	1,464	88	720	18	177
Coupling or uncoupling. While doing other work about trains or while at tending switches.		•••••	<u></u>		 		14	161	8	101 578
Coming in contact with overhead bridges, structures at side of track, etc	28 13	652 520	2	18 89	28 15	670 609	10 42 22	112 966 214	3 15 19	45 507 107
Other causes	41	1,174	2	107	43	1,281	97	3,127	54	1,338
Total, all classes	69	2,456	11	289	80	2,745	185	3,947	72	1,515

TABLE No. 1.—Casualties to persons, January, February, and March, 1909—Continued.

	men	i train- (switch- rews).		er em- yccs.		al em- yees.	Total persons reported.		
Causes.	Killed.	Injured.	Killed.	Injured.	Killed.	Injured.	Killed.	Injured.	
Collisions.  Derailments.  Miscellaneous train accidents, including loco-	13 2	77 19	8	73 55	70 56	557 333	101 62	1,261 1,054	
motive boiler explosions	1	17		16	14	264	14	303	
Total train accidents	16	113	18	144	140	1,154	177	2, 618	
Coupling or uncoupling	20	257	2	16	44	535	44	535	
attending switches.  Coming in contact with overhead bridges,	1	698	5	552	24	3, 502	24	3, 502	
structures at side of track, etc	1	69	3	14	17	240	17	242	
on or offOther causes	26 23	773 101	20 191	338 <b>3, 94</b> 0	103 255	2, 584 4, 362	131 270	3, 254 4, 971	
Total (other than train accidents)	71	1,898	221	4,860	443	11,223	486	12,504	
Total, all classes	87	2,011	239	5,004	583	12,377	663	15, 122	

In Bulletin No. 27, one year ago, every important item showed marked decreases from the earlier records with which it was compared, the depression in business having continued six months. In some items the present record continues that favorable showing, though it covers a period in which considerable recovery of traffic had been accomplished. The comparisons are shown in the table next following. The present list of passengers killed in train accidents is swelled by one notable collision (Table No. 2a, No. 13).

TABLE No. 1a.—Comparisons of principal items with last bulletin and with one year back.

	Bulletin 31.	Bulletin 30.	Bulletin 27.
1. Passengers killed in train accidents. 2. Passengers killed, all causes. 3. Employees killed in train accidents. 4. Employees killed in coupling. 5. Employees killed, all causes. 6. Total passengers and employees killed, all causes.	80 140 44	34 98 150 44 700 798	21 72 104 44 656 725

The total number of collisions and derailments in the quarter now under review was 2,284 (1,042 collisions and 1,242 derailments), of which 168 collisions and 145 derailments affected passenger trains. The damage to cars, engines, and roadway by these accidents amounted to \$1,847,202. Given more in detail, these facts appear as below:

TABLE No. 2.—Collisions and derailments.

	Number.	Loss.	Killed.	Injured.
Collisions, rear Collisions, butting Collisions, train separating	197 125 70	\$191, 111 260, 205 22, 806	16 54 2	347 426 20
Collisions, miscellaneous	650	298, 100	29	468
Total	1,042	772, 222	101	1, 261
Derailments due to defects of roadway, etc.  Derailments due to defects of equipment.	260 563	225, 948 430, 466	6 3	453 134
Derailments due to negligence of trainmen, signalmen, etc Derailments due to unforeseen obstruction of track, etc Derailments due to malicious obstruction of track, etc	82 93 11	48, 007 140, 261 45, 254	6 17 12	75 82 74
Derailments due to miscellaneous causes	233	185, 044	18	236
Total	1,242	1,074,980	62	1,054
Total collisions and derailments	2, 284 2, 632 3, 991	1,847,202 1,977,419 3,536,110	163 114 355	2, 315 2, 455 4, 459

[Note.—Collisions and derailments which cause no death or personal injury and which cause not over \$150 damage to the property of the railroad are not reported.]

Following is the usual list of Class A train accidents—all in which the damage is reported at \$10,000 or over, notable cases in which passengers are killed, and those doing damage less than \$10,000 and down to \$2,000, wherever the circumstances or the cause may be of particular interest:

TABLE No. 2a.—Causes of 29 prominent train accidents.

[NOTE.—R stands for rear collision; B, butting collision; M, miscellaneous collisions; D, derailment; P, passenger train; F, freight and miscellaneous trains.]

#### COLLISIONS.

No.	Class.	Kind of train.	Killed.	Injured.	Damage to engines, cars, and road-way.	Reference to record.	Cause.
1	В	F and F	0	0	\$1,394	54	Order delivered by dispatcher at his own office to conductor gave wrong name of station in clause extending the right of the train and thus allowed train to encroach on right of opposing train.
2	В	F and F	0	1	2,925	12	Empty engine ran past train order signal indicating stop. This was a new signal just put in service; old signal had not been taken down; engineman and fireman in charge of this train had been off duty thirty days and so were not acquainted with situation; but the change of signals had been duly bulletined.
3	В	F and F	0	1	3,500	46	Dispatcher, in service of this road eight months, gave order to inferior train before he had restricted the superior. Had two years experience elsewhere.
4	В	F and F	2	1	4,106	50	Occurred 1 a. m. Operator gave clear signal when he should have stopped train for an order which he held. It is believed that the operator had been asleep and on awakening gave the clear signal without due reflection.
5	В	Fand F	1	3	4,565	51	Engineman ran past meeting station; 3.40 a. m.; whole crew of train held blameworthy for not having been attentive to all conditions approaching stations. Engineman was asleep.
6	В	Pand F	O	46	5,200	5	Freight train, at meeting point, encroached on time of opposing freight, also of passenger train; passenger train also disregarded orders by approaching station not under control, passing station at 9.28, though it had been ordered to wait at that point for freight until 9.30.

TABLE No. 2a.—Causes of 29 prominent train accidents—Continued.

#### COLLISIONS—Continued.

No.	Class.	Kind of train.	Killed.	Injured.	Damage to engines, cars, and road-way.	Reference to record.	Cause.
7	В	F and F	2	6	\$5,600	28	Operator 23 years old, in service at this point two weeks, though having had three years' experience elsewhere, made mistake in name of station in copying dispatcher's telegraphic order. Believed that operator repeated the order to dispatcher as copied and that dispatcher failed to notice error.
8	В	Pand P	0	8	7,500	4	Engineman of westbound train forgot part of order telling him to take siding at meeting station and met eastbound train on main line.
9	В	Pand F	0	27	7,995	7	Engineman of passenger train, in reading schedule of opposing train, took the time against wrong station; conductor had trusted to his memory as to the time, but a change of ten minutes had been made in the schedule in question, and the conductor's memory proved defective.
10	В	Fand F	4	2	8,200	9	Conductor and engineman of the northbound train neglected to check register. (See note in text below.)
n	M	P and F	7	4	9,000	31	Occurred at 2.50 a. m. Engine standing on main track near station struck by approaching passenger train. Switch tender at entrance of yard had given clear signal to approaching passenger train wrongfully. Engineman and fireman of standing engine also held blameworthy for not having seen that they were properly protected. There was a fog at the time.
12	В	Fand F	0	4	12,200	53	Operator received an order giving a train right over train 64, but the order which he delivered named train 84. It appears that the operator did not deliver the message which he had originally written, but made a new copy, and it was in making the new copy that the error occurred.
13	В	Pand F	20	28	17,910	6	Westbound passenger train ordered to wait at "D" until 9.55, passed about 9.45 and collided with opposing train a short distance beyond station. Engineman's explanation is that he thought that the order gave him until 9.55 to reach the next station ahead; the conductor did not take sufficiently
14	В	P and F	1	14	21,250	47	
15	R	P and P	3	30	27,888	1	nal. (See note in text below.)  Engineman ran past distant and home automatic block signals; also disregarded torpedo warnings. (See note in text below.)
	Total	• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •	40	175	139, 233		

#### DERAILMENTS.

1	D	P			-		Switch maliciously misplaced by a man who desire to kill the fireman of the train in question.
2	D	P			=	42	One passenger killed; cause undiscovered; speed, 19 miles an hour.
3	D D	P	0	10	2,900	60	Tire of wheel of passenger car broken.
3 4	D	P			1	64	Runaway on steep grade, resulting in derailment at derailing switch at junction; air brakes not skill-fully managed.
5	D	P	1	7	9, 500	40	Switch loose by reason of loss of bolt; believed that the bolt was maliciously removed.
6		P			1	23	Misplaced switch due to broken switch lever; be- lieved lever maliciously broken; derailed train struck employees' sleeping cars on side track, killing 6 employees.
7	D	, <b>F</b>	0	0	10.110	43	Cause undiscovered.
8	D	F	0	0	10, 730	19	Broken wheel flange; 100 feet of bridge destroyed.
9		F				<b>3</b> 6	Three passengers killed; broken rail; weight of rail, 85 pounds per yard; no flaw in rail; speed of train, 55 miles an hour.
10	D	P	1	84	13,000	17	

TABLE No. 2a.—Causes of 29 prominent train accidents—Continued.

#### DERAILMENTS-Continued.

No.	Class.	Kind of train.	Killed.	Injured.	Damage to engines, cars, and road-ways.	Reference to	Cause.
11	D	F	0	0	\$14,435	68	Runaway on steep grade of part of train (38 cars) which had been left without sufficient hand brakes set; air had leaked off; train had broken in three parts in consequence of sudden and powerful application of air brakes due to a leakage in train pipe; runaway cars were started by unskillful working in attempt to recouple the detached parts of the train.
12	D	P	1	37	17, 300	39	Maliciously misplaced switch; speed, 45 miles an hour.
13	D	P	2	0	19,600	70	Landsilde in cut, 20 feet deep, through conglomerate gravel; slope \(\frac{1}{2}\) to 1; cut never gave trouble before; was inspected twelve hours previous to derailment, which occurred at 4 a. m.; four cars destroyed by fire, spread by escaping illuminating gas.
14	D	F	4	3	26,000	22	Enormous landslide; work train buried.
	Total	• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •	19	269	159, 046		
	Collis	ion and deruil-	59	444	298, 279		

Collision No. 15, causing the death of three persons, was due to disregard of automatic block signals and of torpedoes, which had been placed on the rails near the block signal and which gave audible warning. The collision occurred on a foggy night. The second section of a westbound passenger train, following the first section of the same train, ran into the rear of the first section while it was at rest (having been stopped at a signal station) and two Pullman cars were destroyed. Measuring back from the point of collision, the home block signal was 2,768 feet distant, 550 feet farther east were the torpedoes, and 2,661 feet farther was the distant signal. The report says that the engineman heard the torpedoes. The fireman, as well as the engineman, is held blameworthy, the rule requiring enginemen and firemen to call one to the other on approaching fixed signals. The speed of the train appears not to have been slackened by the engineman at all. experience of the engineman was twenty-seven years and of the fireman six years. The automatic signals had been properly observed by the engineman of the first section of the train; also by the enginemen of other trains not long before.

Collision No. 14, a butting collision between a passenger train and a freight, causing the death of 1 trainman and the injury of 8 passengers and 6 trainmen, appers to have been due to gross negligence on the part both of a station telegraph operator and of the men in charge of one of the trains. The manual block system was in effect, and the operator was at fault in giving the signals, while at the same time meeting orders had been issued by the train dispatcher, which orders were disregarded by the conductor and engine-

man. The collision was between train 24 southbound, running from M to S and H, and a freight train northbound, running from H to S and M. The operator at S, after having authorized southbound train 24 to leave M, gave a clear signal for the northbound train to leave S for M, and the trains met about 4 miles north of S. The error of the conductor and engineman consisted in reading "No. 33" when the order actually read "No. 32."

Collision No. 10 was between two extra freight trains, a northbound and a southbound. The order making the meeting point for these trains gave the number of the engine and the name of the conductor of each train, Conductor D for the northbound and Conductor S for the southbound; and the collision was due to the wrongful assumption by Conductor D of the northbound train that a southbound train which he met at the appointed meeting station was that of Conductor S, whereas, in fact, it was another train. This assumption by Conductor D was based on his knowledge that the engine which he saw was one which had been used by Conductor S earlier in the same day; but in thus assuming the conductor neglected his plain duty to learn the actual number of the engine in order to see that it corresponded with the number written in the meeting order. Conductor D then gave his engineman instructions to proceed. This was contrary to the rule, under which the conductor and engineman should have checked the register at the station, in which were recorded the arrivals of all trains. Both trains were running from 25 to 35 miles an hour at the moment of the collision. The conductor and engineman at fault both had been in the service of the company for many years.

TABLE No. 3.—Causes of accidents to employees in coupling and uncoupling cars.

	Causes.	Trai	nmen.			trai (swi	ard nmen tching ws).		er em- yees.
Sub lass.		ਚ	8	ڻ.	øđ.	ų.	<b>8</b>	đ.	<b>8</b>
ap		Killed.	Injured	Killed.	Injured.	Killed.	Injured	Killed.	Injured.
		<u> </u>	1		ī	<b>X</b>		<u> </u>	<del></del>
1	Adjusting coupler with foot		13	 	7		20		
2 !	Adjusting coupler, cars acc dentally started		4		2	2	6		1
3	Careless manipulation of uncoupling lever		5		3		9		
4	Cars not equipped with automatic coupler		2				2		1
5	Coupler broken, using link and pin or chain		4				1		
6	Coupling damaged cars		3	1		1	12		2
7	Coupling with chain or other emergency appliance on			_		-			_
	curve too sharp for automatic coupling		3			1	7		
8	Coupling with chain or other emergency appliance be-	1				1	'		••••
١	cause of uneven track.	'	,			ı	ļ		1
9	Coupling or uncoupling safety chains		i		3		3		õ
10	Fingers or hand caught between uncoupling lever and	• • • •	•	• • • •	0		•		•
10	body of car	1	32		18		52		1
			32		10	}	02		
11	Uncoupling without using lever (unnecessary)		7		Z		, ש		• • • • •
12	Uncoupling without using lever, uncoupling lever not		۱ 🚛		••	! _	'		
	in working order	1	12	:-	11	1	17		• • • • •
13	Foot caught in frog, switch, or guard rail	3	•	1	2	3	2	[ • • • <i>•</i>	••••
14	Opening or closing knuckle when cars were near to-	١ .			_	1		i 1	_
	gether, miscalculated speed	1	15		9	1	16		1
15	Opening knuckie when cars were near together, en-	1	1			ŀ		1 1	
\$	gine accidentally started		4		1		1		
16	Opening knuckle, part of defective coupler fell on foot.		2	l	4		5		
17	Opening knuckle, lost footing	1	8	1	5	5	11		
18	Riding on car to uncouple, slipped off	2	6	1	1		4		1
19	Struck by object at side of track		5		1		5		
20	Caught by unexpected movement of car, due to slack		}		i -		1		- · •
	running in	2	7		13	. 1	13	<u> </u>	
21	Caught by unexpected movement of car, due to mis-		1						
	take or misunderstanding in giving hand signals		4	1	4	1	5	1	
22	Uncoupling moving cars and lost footing	2	<b>A</b>	•	3	2			
23	Parts hard to move, causing delay		3		3	_	1 0		
24	Went between cars unnecessarily and contrary to rule.		10	3	J K	2	18		·····ż
25	Hand caught between projecting load and end of next		10	9		-	10		2
20	Trang cangus not a con broles and four and out of the r	I	2		1	1	2		•
20	No witness (fatal injury)	· • • • •				i	•		
26	Other series	, • • • •	2	• • • •		I	····· <mark>8</mark> -		
27	Other causes				2			;.	2 2
28	O nexpained	<b>'</b>	. 2	••••	ı	••••	Z	1	2
ľ	(Data)	•	101		101	-	057		16
l l	TOURI	14	101	8	101	20	257	2	16
28	Unexplained	<u></u>	2	8	1	20	257	2	_

#### Details of injuries included in Table 3, subclass 27.

- J. 1. Hand caught while adjusting knuckle.
- J. 2. Stepped on nail.
- J. 3. Adjusting coupler and glove froze to knuckle.
- J. 4. Coat sleeve caught on knuckle.
- J. 5. Placed foot on rail; run over by car.
- F. 1. Struck by air hose.
- F. 2. Struck by air hose.
- F. 3. Burned by steam from steam hose.
- F. 4. Struck by air hose.
- F. 5. Struck by lump of coal which fell from tender
- M. 1. Stepped in hole.
- M. 2. Fell into hole left by section men.
- M. 3. Scalded by hot water from steam hose.
- M. 4. Adjusting coupler with piece of iron; as cars came together lost hold on iron and it flew up, striking him.

TABLE No. 3a.—Nature of injuries to employees in coupling and uncoupling cars.

Injuries.	Train- men.	Trainmen in yards.	Yard trainmen.	Other em- ployees.
Loss of legs. Loss of arms Loss of hands Loss of fingers. Loss of toes Fractured skull Fractured leg Fractured collar bone or ribs Fractured other bones Contusion of head or body Contusion or laceration of feet Contusion or laceration of toes Contusion or laceration of arms Contusion or laceration of hands Contusion or laceration of fingers Dislocation Internal injuries Sprains Miscellaneous	3 6 5	1 2 9 1 1 4 8 10 2 4 2 17 28 1 3 5	1 5 4 13 2 4 4 5 42 22 5 13 16 32 67 3 3 15 1	
Total injuries	161 14	101	257 20	16
Total kille i and injured	175	109	277	1

Total killed	44
Total injured	535
Total killed and injured	579

TABLE No. 4.—Causes of accidents to employees classified (C6 and C7) as falling from and getting on or off cars and engines.

Sub	Causes.		rain- ien.	Train- men in yards.		Yard trainmen (switch- ing crews).		Other em- ployees.	
VIII.		Killed.	Injured.	Killed.	Injured.	Killed.	Injured.	Killed.	Injured.
	Fell from roof of box car by reason of— Defect in car Ice or snow Parting of train Derailment, collision, or shock due to abnormal	1 1 2	9 18 16		1 10 5	1	3 17 7		2 3
	Derailment, collision, or shock due to abnormal movements of cars other than those in subclass 3.  While setting brakes.  Fell from—	l	40 33	1 2	18 16	1 2	69 41	1	2
	Coal car Freight car other than box or coal car Engine or tender Passenger car Engines, tenders, or cars (all kinds) not in mo-	2 3 6 1	6 29 108 11	2 1	3 9 74 6	3	6 8 33 1	3	7 12 18 1
1 1 1 1 1 1	Miscellaneous causes. Not clearly explained. Slipped getting on moving trains or cars. Jumping off moving trains.	6	73 124 42 92 156	1 1 1 3 3	36 44 12 50 82	2 7 4 2	19 223 26 46 98	1 6	85 78 14 39 88
C7 1	derailment, or other accident  Fell from engines or cars by reason of defective hand- holds and sill steps  Getting on or off moving engine	4 1	32 29 146 3		17 112 4	1 2	58 110 1	3	1 3 31
•	Total	42	966	15	507	26	778	20	338

#### [Public—No. 171.]

AN ACT Requiring common carriers engaged in interstate commerce to make full reports of all accidents to the Interstate Commerce Commission.

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, It shall be the duty of the general manager, superintendent, or other proper officer of every common carrier engaged in interstate commerce by railroad to make to the Interstate Commerce Commission, at its office in Washington, District of Columbia, a monthly report, under oath, of all collisions of trains or where any train or part of a train accidentally leaves the track, and of all accidents which may occur to its passengers or employees while in the service of such common carrier and actually on duty, which report shall state the nature and causes thereof and the circumstances connected therewith.

- SEC. 2. That any common carrier failing to make such report within thirty days after the end of any month shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor, and upon conviction thereof by a court of competent jurisdiction shall be punished by a fine of not more than one hundred dollars for each and every offense and for every day during which it shall fail to make such report after the time herein specified for making the same.
- SEC. 3. That neither said report nor any part thereof shall be admitted as evidence or used for any purpose against such railroad so making such report in any suit or action for damages growing out of any matter mentioned in said report.
- SEC. 4. That the Interstate Commerce Commission is authorized to prescribe for such common carriers a method and form for making the reports in the foregoing section provided.

Approved, March 3, 1901.

#### SPECIAL INFORMATION CONTAINED IN PRECEDING BULLETINS.a

Each accident bulletin contains tables showing the number of passengers and employees killed and injured, and these figures are classified according to cause (see Table No. 1); also tables showing cost of the different classes of train accidents. The causes of accidents to employees in coupling and uncoupling and in falling from cars, etc., are further classified in Tables No. 3 and No. 4. The most serious collisions and derailments are dealt with in a supplementary table (Class A), showing the causes in some detail. Each bulletin is for three months, and No. 1 was for the quarter ending September 30, 1901. The bulletin for the quarter ending June 30 contains, in addition to the quarterly statistics, tables showing the same information for the whole of the fiscal year ending on that date.

- Bulletin No. 25 shows 110 passengers killed in train accidents, three collisions and one derailment being responsible for 80 deaths in this class. The number of passengers killed from other causes (mostly their own negligence) also shows a large increase. One of the most serious collisions was due to the misreading of a dispatcher's order, and another to a mistake in sending or receiving the order.
- Bulletin No. 26 shows a marked decrease in casualties as compared with preceding quarters, a large falling off in railroad traffic having taken place. The list of "prominent" train accidents includes only three cases which may be classed as notable.
- Bulletin No. 27 shows further marked decreases in casualties, incident to the large falling off in railroad traffic. The number of passengers and employees killed in train accidents (125) is the smallest since the monthly records were established.

a For notes on Bulletins 1-16, see Bulletin No. 17; for notes on Bulletins 17-24, see Bulletin No. 30.

The most fatal accident in this quarter was a collision at a street crossing, where 8 passengers in an electric car were killed.

Bulletin No. 28 recorded the smallest number of passengers killed in train accidents (13) ever reported in the quarterly records. The total of passengers and employees killed in train accidents (112) was 13 less than the previous low record (125, Bulletin 27). Of the 13 passengers killed in train accidents, 7 were victims of a butting collision on an electric railroad.

Bulletin No. 29 showed totals far smaller than the corresponding quarter one year previous, but the diminution in the number of casualties, which had continued during the year of depression, seemed to have been checked. The number of passengers killed in train accidents was 53, and there were 8 notable collisions.

Bulletin No. 30 recorded 34 passengers killed in train accidents (including 15 victims of a forest fire). One collision resulted in eight deaths of passengers and two derailments killed 16 employees.

# Collisions and Derailments of Trains

and

## Casualties to Persons

## on the Railroads of the United States

during the months of

April, May, and June, 1909 with

Tables for the year ending June 30, 1909

INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMMISSION WASHINGTON, D. C.



WASHINGTON
COVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
1909

#### THE INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMMISSION.

MARTIN A. KNAPP, of New York.

JUDSON C. CLEMENTS, of Georgia.

CHARLES A. PROUTY, of Vermont.

FRANCIS M. COCKRELL, of Missouri.

FRANKLIN K. LANE, of California.

EDGAR E. CLARK, of Iowa.

JAMES S. HARLAN, of Illinois.

EDWARD A. MOSELEY, Secretary.

## RAILROAD ACCIDENTS

IN THE UNITED STATES DURING THE THREE MONTHS ENDING JUNE 30, 1909.

The number of persons killed in train accidents during the months of April, May, and June, 1909, as shown in reports made by the railroad companies to the Interstate Commerce Commission under the "accident law" of March 3, 1901, was 99, and of injured 2,116. Accidents of other kinds, including those sustained by employees while at work and by passengers in getting on or off cars, etc., bring the total number of casualties up to 15,895 (588 killed and 15,307 injured). Accidents to employees resulting in slight injuries which do not prevent the injured employee from performing his accustomed service for more than three days in the aggregate during the ten days immediately following the accident are not reported. reports deal only with employees on duty and passengers. casualties to passengers have been divided into three classes: Class a includes all ordinary passengers; class b includes passengers traveling on freight trains; and class bb includes persons who are customarily carried on trains under special arrangements, such as postal clerks, express messengers, employees on Pullman cars, newsboys, live-stock tenders, and men in charge of freight. The reported casualties are classified in the following table:

TABLE No. 1.—Casualties to persons, April, May, and June, 1909.

		sengers and b).	der me	ersons ried un- agree- ent or ntract (bb).	Total (a, b, and bb).		Trai	nmen.	Trainmen in yards.	
	Killed.	Injured.	Killed.	Injured.	Killed.	Injured.	Killed.	Injured.	Killed.	Injured.
Collisions.  Derailments.  Miscellaneous train accidents, including locomotive-boiler explosions.	3	327 651	1 3	28 64 4	1 6	355 715	14 49 4	185 286 156	3	87 29 45
•	3	990	4	96	7	1,086	67	627	3	161
Coupling or uncoupling While doing other work about trains or while attending switches					· <del></del>		10	167 1,727		110 516
Coming in contact with overhead bridges, structures at side of track, etc		5		1		6	15	131		60
on or off	26 8	759 793	1 2	28 75	27 10	787 868	32 26	847 1 <b>2</b> 3	22 10	408 84
Total (other than train accidents)	34	1,557	3	104	37	1,661	92	2,995	43	1,177
Total (all classes)	37	2,547	7	200	44	2,747	180	3,622	46	1,388

TABLE No. 1.—Casualties to persons, April, May, and June, 1909—Continued.

	men	i train- (switch- crews).		ther loyees.		Total employees.		Total persons reported.	
•	Killed.	Injured.	Killed.	Injured.	Killed.	Injured.	Killed.	Injured.	
Collisions Derailments Miscellaneous train accidents, including loco-	3	51 38	3 12	55 65	23 64	378 418	24 70	733 1,133	
motive-boiler explosions	1	18		15	5	234	5	250	
Total train accidents	7	107	15	135	92	1,030	99	2,116	
Coupling or uncoupling	15	266	3	23	34	566	34	<b>56</b> 0	
attending switches	5	584	12	506	31	3,333	31	3,333	
structures at side of track, etc	3	84		11	18	286	18	292	
on or off	20 22	649 74	26 211	328 4,833	100 269	2,232 5,114	127 279	3,019 5,982	
Total (other than train accidents)	65	1,657	252	5,701	452	11,530	489	13, 191	
Total (all classes)	72	1,764	267	5,836	544	12,560	588	15,307	

In the total number of passengers and employees killed in train accidents (mainly collisions and derailments) the present record (99) is the lowest that the quarterly bulletins have ever shown. The previous low records were Bulletin 28, one year ago (112), and Bulletin 27 (125). Aside from this feature, the present bulletin shows no marked changes in totals of casualties. In Bulletin No. 31 the number of passengers killed in train accidents (37) was swelled by a single collision killing 20. The revival of business, tending to increase the liability to accident, continued during the quarter now under review; but, as in the quarter ending with June in previous years, conditions favorable to freedom from accident appear to have been more pronounced than at other times of the year. Other comparisons may be made from the table next following.

TABLE No. 1A.—Comparisons of principal items with last bulletin and with one year back.

	Bulletin 32.	Bulletin 31.	Bulletin 2.
1. Passengers killed in train accidents 2. Passengers killed, all causes 3. Employees killed in train accidents 4. Employees killed in coupling 5. Employees killed, all causes 6. Total passengers and employees killed, all causes	92 34	37 80 140 44 583 663	13 57 99 30 534 591

The total number of collisions and derailments in the quarter now under review was 2,100 (817 collisions and 1,283 derailments), of which 100 collisions and 172 derailments affected passenger trains. The damage to cars, engines, and roadway by these accidents amounted to \$1,703,642. Given more in detail, these facts appear as below (collisions and derailments which cause no death or per-

sonal injury and which cause not over \$150 damage to the property of the railroad are not reported):

TABLE No. 2—Collisions and derailment
---------------------------------------

	Number.	Loss.	Killed.	Injured.
Collisions, rear Collisions, butting	145 77	\$164, 214 103, 689	7	211 184
Collisions, train separating	71	22,858	i	29
Collisions, miscellaneous	524	220,073	9	309
Total	817	510, 834	24	733
Derailments due to defects of roadway, etc		177, 109	7	284
Derailments due to defects of equipment	543 64	470, 993 36, 633	5 3	160 59
Derailments due to unforeseen obstruction of track, etc	95	<b>138</b> , 755	. 22	150
Derailments due to malicious obstruction of track, etc  Derailments due to miscellaneous causes	9 343	14, 096 355, 222	29	20 436
Total	1,283	1, 192, 808	67	1,109
Total collisions and derailments	2,100	1,703,642	91	1,842
Total for same quarter of 1908	2, 130 3, 777	1,617,398 3,232,673	104 227	2,008 3,685

Following is the usual list of class A train accidents—all in which the damage is reported at \$10,000 or over, notable cases in which passengers are killed, and those doing damage less than \$10,000 and down to \$2,000, wherever the circumstances or the cause may be of particular interest:

TABLE No. 2A.—Causes of 36 prominent train accidents.

[Note.—R stands for rear collision; B, butting collision; M, miscellaneous collisions; D, derailment; P, passenger train; F, freight and miscellaneous trains.]

#### COLLISIONS.

	CODDISIONS.									
No.	Class.	Kind of train.	Killed.	Injured.	Damage to engines, cars, a n d road-way.	Reference to record.	Cause.			
1	${f R}$	F and F	1	1	\$2,000	3	Train approached yard not under control. One drover in caboose killed.			
2	M	F and F	0	0	2,000	59	False clear signal at interlocking; due to error of			
3	В	F and F	1	2	2,001	31	repairman. (See note in text below.) Collision of northbound freight and southbound empty engine; men in charge of empty engine misread order. Order read "four 4 k a. m." They read it four 4:15 a. m.			
4	В	F and F	0	1	2,100	6	Signalman neglected to deliver order. (See note in text lielow.)			
5	В	F and F	0	3	2, 365	7	Conductor and engineman misread order. (See note			
6	M	P and F	0	0	2, 450	33	in text below.) Failure of automatic block signal. (See note in text			
7	В	P and F	0	6	3, 250	55	below.) Operator failed to deliver meeting order. (See note in test below.)			
8	В	P and F	1	22	3,635	56	Schedule of superior train overlooked. (See note in text below.)			
9	В	F and F	0	3	4,968	32	Mistake in dispatcher's order. (See note in text below.			
10	В	P and P	1	57	5,800	54	Operator made mistake in name of meeting point in writing dispatcher's order.			
11	M	F and F	1	2	7,000	9	Failure to flag; train at rest; flagman killed in ca- boose.			
12 13	B <b>M</b>	P and P	1 0	13 0	7,000 10,850	30 57	Error of dispatcher. (See note in text below.) Cars ran uncontrolled from siding to main line, 11 p. m.; due to rough handling of cars in yard.			
14	R	F and F	0	1	13,500	2	Failure of air brakes; air leaked both in reservoir and in train line; no cause discovered; engineman had not watched gauges.			
	Total		6	111	68, 919					

TABLE No. 2A.—Causes of 36 prominent train accidents—Continued.

#### DERAILMENTS.

No	Class.	Kind of train.	Killed.	Injured.	Damage to engines, cars, a n d road-way.	Reference to record.	Cause.
1	D	P	1	3		19	Automobile, running on track, derailed by running
2	D	<b>F</b>	1	0	<b>\$</b> 375	34	over a dog; one guest killed. Undiscovered; one passenger jumped off caboose and
3	D	P	0	4	2, 100	36	was killed. Train carrying miners; engine running tender first tender was first vehicle to run off the track; cause
4	D	F,	0	0	3,300	25	probably oscillation. Undiscovered; tender was first vehicle to run off the track.
5	D	P	3	46	3,350	50	Engineman (who was killed) disregarded slow orders and flag.
6	D	P	0	27	3,937	40	Steel girder bridge failed; undermined by flood.
7	D	P	0	13	4,800	64	Soft track due to heavy rains: speed 45 miles an hour.
8	D	P	1	۷2	5, 500	35	Undiscovered; possibly oscillation of tender due to succession of low joints.
9	D	P		1	6,000	80	Undiscovered.
10	D	F	0	0	9,040	44	Breakage of driver brakehanger strap.
11 12	D	P		13 19	9, 542 9, 800	21 53	Switch maliciously misplaced. Undiscovered; speed 40 miles an hour on good track;
12				15	8,800	00	believed that tender was first vehicle to run off the track.
13	D	P	ı	23	10,000	22	Excessive speed on 10-degree curve; engineman killed.
14	D	P	2	3	10,800	26	Undiscovered, but believed to be excessive speed over frogs and switches in yard; engineman, of twenty-one years' emperience, was killed.
15	D	<b>F</b>	;	0	11,000	15	Undiscovered; believed either excessive speed or broken brake-shoe.
16	D	F	0	0	11,877	14	Excessive speed.
17	D	P		13	12,000	37	Passenger train derailed by cars which had fallen out of freight train on adjacent track; freight had been derailed by broken wheel.
18	D	<b>F.</b>		8	13,000	75	Landslide. Train was moving 5 miles an hour on bank 50 feet high; bank with train slid into river.
19		P F	1	13		48	Washout. (See note in text below.)
20		F	0	0	14,751	41	Broken axle.
21	į <b>D</b>	F	1	4	20,800	77	Runaway on 3.3 per cent grade; bad management of air brakes; engineman lacked experience on steep grades.
22	D	<b>F</b>	: <b>o</b>	0	31,700	66	Broken truck. Speed 40 miles an hour or higher: 12 cars and contents destroyed by fire.
	Tota	i	. 14	232	207, 995		
	Colli me	sion and derailent	. 20	343	276, 914		

Collision No. 2, due to lack of care on the part of a signal repairman, occurred at 11 p. m. A contact spring having been broken in an electric interlocking machine, the day repairman was called out at this hour to correct the fault. In order to put in a new spring he had to loosen certain wires, and one of these wires accidentally came in contact with another in such a way as to complete the circuit which energized the motor to turn a switch; and this occurred just as a locomotive was approaching the switch. Being turned on to the wrong track, the locomotive collided with another which was passing at that moment.

Collision No. 4 was due to the neglect of a block signalman to display a stop signal. This signalman, at B, on receiving word from A that engine No. 5 was approaching called the signalman at C, and

having received proper authority from him displayed his signal in the positions to permit engine No. 5 to proceed to C. Immediately after doing this he received from the dispatcher an order to be delivered to engine No. 5. In receiving this order he gave to the dispatcher the regulation symbol indicating that he had displayed his signal in the stop position to stop engine No. 5; but in point of fact he had not displayed it, and did not. In a case of this kind he should also have displayed a red flag in addition to the fixed signal, but this also was neglected. The collision was due to the nondelivery of the order. This signalman was 34 years old and had had a number of years experience as a telegrapher, but he had been in the service of this company at this place only one day.

Collision No. 5 was a butting collision between freight trains, due to misreading of a dispatcher's order by the conductor and engineman of one of the trains. This order was to the effect that No. 52 was annulled from E to D; but in reading the order these men read "53" instead of "52." The figure "5" and the figure "2" were run together in such shape that it was possible to take the "2" for a "3." Aside from any question as to the legibility of the writing, the wording of the order was such that it should have put these men on their guard, for train No. 53 was running in the opposite direction from train No. 52. In other words, to say that No. 53 was annulled from E to D was a contradiction in terms, as No. 53 was running from D to E, and odd numbers were used exclusively for trains running in that direction. The number of the train was not written out in words. Neither of the men had read the order aloud to anyone, nor had either of them heard it read aloud.

Collision No. 6 was due to neglect in flagging, coincident with the failure of an automatic block-signal mechanism, which allowed the block signal to indicate clear notwithstanding that the section was occupied by cars.

The collision occurred at about 2 a. m. An eastbound freight train, entering a sidetrack about 1:10 a. m., to make way for a passenger train, which was westbound, was so long that when the engine stopped at the east end of the sidetrack, clear of the main track, the five rear cars of the freight train still fouled the main line. The rear brakeman signaled to the engineman to move farther ahead, and he did move a short distance; but still not enough to clear the main track at the rear. The rear brakeman then went back to signal any train that might be following. The conductor assumed that flagging against the train from the east would be attended to by the brakeman at the front end of the train, but this was not done. The automatic block signal, fixed near the east end of the siding, giving indications for westbound movements, indicated all clear, and the passenger train therefore proceeded past the signal at about 35 miles

an hour, and the engineman did not see the obstructing cars until he was within 400 feet of them.

The failure of the block signal to indicate stop was due to defective insulation on a binding post in the electric motor, the insulating material having become carbonized. With this insulation gone a short-circuit was caused which energized the motor, and thus the signal was held in the clear position notwithstanding that the track relay was open.

Collision No. 7, due to forgetfulness of a telegraph operator, occurred at 6 p. m. The operator had received an order for a certain train, and had set his signal in the proper position to stop the train. The train, however, did not arrive for about twenty minutes, and when it approached the operator changed the signal to indicate "proceed," in entire forgetfulness of the presence of the order. Of this forgetfulness the operator can give no explanation. In this case the office was provided with a "telltale device" intended to prevent just such forgetfulness, but this the operator did not use. The device consists of a metal disk, having the appearance of a flag, which, when there is an order on hand to be delivered, is fastened across the rope which holds the signal in the stop position. The disk is colored red and is intended as a reminder to the operator in case he shall attempt to pull the signal to the proceed position without thinking of the order. When there are no orders on hand the disk is turned to a different position, and shows white instead of red.

Collision No. 8, between an eastbound freight train and a westbound passenger train, was due to a mistake in reading the time table. The passenger train had just left the station at M, when it was met by the freight, which should have reached the station and cleared the main track before 8 p. m. The passenger train was about one and one-half minutes late, and the collision occurred at 8:03. The passenger train was moving slowly and the engineman succeeded in stopping his train, but the freight was running about 30 miles an hour, a curve in the line obscuring the view. The engineman of the freight testified that he read the time of the passenger train at that station as 8:10 instead of 8. The conductor makes the same statement. These men, however, did not compare their readings; one of them claimed to have examined the table two stations back and the other five stations The brakeman on the forward end of the freight claimed to have forgotten all about the passenger train; the brakeman at the rear end says that he heard the conductor say that the passenger train was due at M at 8:10.

Collision No. 9 was a butting collision of freight trains caused by an error in issuing an order from the dispatcher's office. At the time the dispatcher began the preparation of the order for the meeting of these trains, westbound extra No. 9 was proceeding from A to B,

with orders giving it the right of road to B and no farther. Eastbound extra No. 7 was at B without orders to proceed farther. The dispatcher in issuing his order intended to provide that the two trains should meet at B, but in some manner, which is reported as unexplainable, he named A instead of B. The order was sent only to B. It was repeated by the operator there, but even after the repetition the dispatcher did not discover his error. He had not written out the order before transmitting it. Extra No. 7, on receiving the order, started eastward and met extra No. 9 after proceeding a short distance. This dispatcher had been employed on this road about five years and on other roads eleven years. His record up to the time of this accident was absolutely clear.

Collision No. 12 was due to an error on the part of the train dispatcher in issuing meeting orders, and it occurred between the switches at the appointed meeting station. The operators who delivered the meeting orders to the trains were also held responsible, as they should have detected the dispatcher's error. The dispatcher sent an order to the eastbound train at B to run to T, the next telegraph station, "except hold main line and meet" the westbound at D, which is an intermediate nontelegraph station. He then sent an order to the westbound at T to run to B "except hold main line and meet" the eastbound at D. The dispatcher's error was in directing both trains to hold the main line, his intention being to require the westbound to enter the side track. The operators at B and T are required to control the movements of trains between these stations by the telegraph block system, and in cases like this, where trains are to meet at the intermediate nontelegraph station, to give suitable directions as to which train shall take the siding and which shall continue on the main line, doing this in accordance with the instructions in the dispatcher's orders, which go through the station operators' hands. It appears that both operators simply copied the dispatcher's wording without noting the inconsistency of the two orders. The accident happened at 5 a.m., and all three of these men had been on duty about five hours. The operator at T had been in the service on that division four years, and the operator at B seven years. patcher had been in the service on that division about eight months and had had several years' experience as dispatcher, with good records, on other roads.

The collision occurred near the west switch. The westbound train had come to a stop before reaching the switch. The side track, however, is about 3,000 feet long, and, under the rules, the east bound train was not required to stop until it reached the east switch. Approaching from the west, it passed over a 6-degree curve, around a bluff, and the engineman therefore had no opportunity to see the westbound

train until he was close upon it, and his speed was estimated at 35 miles an hour.

Derailment No. 19 occurred at 5:35 a.m. and was due to the weakening of the roadbed by high water, but there was no water visible in the vicinity at the time of the derailment. It appears that the fault was due to a sudden rain which occurred about 11 o'clock the previous evening. At that hour the track foreman in charge of this section, with his men, was absent on another section, where he had been called to help repair damage due to a washout. There had never been any trouble from high water at this point before, and the officers of the road therefore justified the action which was taken in sending the track repairers to another section, as was done in this case. The engineman of this train was killed, and therefore the exact fact as to how the roadbed appeared from the approaching train can not be ascertained.

A butting collision which occurred on June 19, on the Chicago, Lake Shore & South Bend Railway, causing the death of nine passengers and one employee is not included in the tables of this bulletin. This is an electric road, which failed to make a report of the accident as required by law.

TABLE No. 3. Details of Table No. 1—Causes of accidents to employees in coupling and uncoupling cars.

- 1	Causes.		rain- '	me	ain- n in rds.	trai	ard inmen ritch- ing ews).	ULD	er em- yees.
HAY.		<u>-</u> -		   <del>-  </del>	- <b>.</b>	_     <del> </del>	3	ا زجا	<del></del>
Subclass		Killed	Injured	Killed	InJured	Killed.	Injured	Killed.	Injured
	Adjusting couples with foot	_ ,	25		· —		96		
3	Adjusting coupler with foot		<i>E</i> 3	, ; -	4	• • • •	20	• • • •	
2	Adjusting coupler, cars accidentally started	• • • •	7	1 -	1		11		
3	Cars not equipped with automatic coupler	• • • •	2	,	•	,	1	• • • •	•••••
<b>4</b> 5	Coupler broken, using link and pin or chain	,	1	••••	•••••	i	1		•
Б	Counting demand care	·	4	,	1		1 4		
	Coupling damaged carsCoupling with chain or other emergency appliance on	i	•	1,	1	1	•		•••••
7	coupling with cuain of other emergency appualite on		9	}	3	2	8	! <b>!</b>	
8	curve too sharp for automatic coupling	j <sub>i</sub>	2		•	1	0	,	• • • • •
٠ ٠	because of uneven track	}		1		:	, 	1 <b>l</b>	
9	Coupling or uncoupling safety chains	· · · · · ·		,	· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·	• • • •	7	, • • • • i	3
10	Fingers or hand caught between uncoupling lever and	. *!	7	!	-				U
וטנ	body of car	1 1	33	1	17	}	65		•
11	Uncoupling without using lever (unnecessary)	,;-	5	1	2		2		•
12	Uncoupling without using lever, uncoupling lever not	, • 1	J		-				•••••
12	in working order	'	18	1 1	15	2	16		1
13	Foot caught in frog, switch, or guard rail	••••	3		10	_	10		•
14	Opening or closing knuckle when cars were near together		J	1	•		•	, i	• • • • • •
1-2	miscalculated speed.	<u> </u>	9	' 1 I	9	1	22	, 1	1
15	Opening knuckle when cars were near together, engine	i	•	•	•	•	22		
13	accidentally started	,		1	3	1		i	
16	Opening knuckle, part of defective coupler fell on foot	,	3	1	3	<b> </b>	7	,	• • • • • •
17	Opening knuckle, lost footing.		7		3	3			••••
18	Riding on car to uncouple, slipped off.		5		3	! 1	Ř		1
19	Struck by object at side of track	, 🛨	1	i	7	<b>*</b>	8		i
20	Caught by unexpected movement of car, due to slack	!	•		• • • • •	i		- 1	•
<i>a</i> .	running in	2	9	1 1	7		15		3
21	Caught by unexpected movement of car, due to mistake		•		•	į ·			••
	or misunderstanding in giving hand signals	1	4	ļi	1	1	3		1
22	Uncoupling moving cars and lost footing	2 ;	3	1	ŝ	4	ğ	1	î
23	Darta hand to an analysis data	-	7	^	ã	· ·	9		•
24	Went between cars unnecessarily and contrary to rule		á	2	7	i	17	i	3
25	Hand caught between projecting load and end of next car	1	ï	;	i	"	3	_	
26	No witness (fatal injury)		_ 	1 1	<b>-</b>	1			
27	Other causes	!	7	ا ـ آ ـ آ ا	5	j <u>.                                    </u>	4		i
28	Unexplained	, , , , ,	Ĭ		2		2		
	-			<u> </u>					
	Total.	10 ·	167	6	110	15	266	3	23
	Total	10	167	6	110	15	266	3	•

#### Details of injuries included in Table 3, subclass 27.

- A-1. Scalded by steam from steam hose.
- A-2. Hand caught on nail.
- A-3. Foot caught between foot board and crossing plank
- A-4. Foot pinched under wheel.
- A-5. Struck by air hose.
- A-6. Sprained ankle.
- M-1. Struck by hose.
- M-2. Glove caught on coupler.
- M-3. Something flew off of coupler into eye.
- M-4. Caught foot on bolt.
- M-5. Struck by air hose.
- M-6. Struck by door which fell off car.
- J-1. Apron fell on arm.
- J-2. Scalded by steam from feed pipe.
- J-3. Metal splashed out of ladle.
- J-4. Scalded by water from overflow pipe.
- J-5. Struck by coal gate which fell off tank.

Table 3a.—Nature of injuries to employees in coupling and uncoupling cars.

Injuries.	Train- men.	Train- men in yards.	Yard trainmen.	Other eni ployees.
coss of feet	6 2 2	2 2 3	1 3 2	
oss of fingers oss of toes ractured leg	9 1 1 2	3	3 4 2 3	
ractured collar bone or ribs. ractured other bones. ontusion of head or body. ontusion or laceration of feet ontusion or laceration of toes.	2 6 15 25	4 1 11 12 3	3 9 36 26 8	, <b></b>
ontusion or laceration of legs	3 3 17 53	3 6 20 32	9 11 30 90	
Pislocation Internal injuries  prains liscellaneous	1 1 8 2	2 4 2	1 20 3	
Total injuries	167 10	110 6	266 15	:
Total killed and injured	177	116	281	
RECAPITULATION.				

TABLE 4. Details of Table No. 1—Causes of accidents to employees classified (C6 and C7) as falling from and getting on or off cars and engines.

	Causes.	-	rain- ien.	me	ain- n in rds.	train (sw	ard nmen itch- ng ws).	em	ther ploy- es.
Subclass.	•	Killed.	Injured.	Killed.	Injured.	Killed.	Injured.	Killed.	Injured.
	Fell from roof of box car by reason of—	i		<u> </u>	•		_	1	
$\begin{bmatrix} 1\\3\\4 \end{bmatrix}$	Defect in car	i	9 13		4	1	<b>5</b> 5		···· 1
	movements of cars other than those in sub-		41	. 2	31	1	53	7.	
CG 6	While setting brakes	2	32	2	16	3	52	,	3
	Coal car  Freight car other than box or coal car	•••	2		3	i	.8		 15
8	Engine or tender	8	40 83	5	8 47	2	38	3	1:
9	Passenger car. Engines, tenders, or cars (all kinds) not in	1	6		1	'	2		2
11	motion		43 133	'	29 38		16 173	1 1	67 73
12	Not clearly explained	9	46	6	9	9	48	3	11
(13 14	Slipped getting on moving trains or cars		86 132	1	41 75	1   2	<b>38</b> 69	5	1
15	Jumping from engines or cars anticipating collision.	•		` •	•			i -	_
C7	derailment, or other accident	•••	32	,! !	8		13	i •	1
	hand-holds and sill steps.  Getting on or off moving engine.		24	  ••••	14		42	   <u>-</u> -	4
17 18	Getting on or off moving engine	3	125	2	77 6	1	75 1	5	(इ. 1
, -	Total.			22	408	20	649	26	£5.

#### YEARLY TABLES.

This bulletin completes the publication of the accident records under the law of March 3, 1901, for eight years, and the table next following, Table A, gives the aggregates, for the year ending June 30, 1909, of the items which appear in Table No. 1 of the quarterly returns. The total number of casualties shown for the year in Table A is 66,711 (2,791 killed and 63,920 injured).

This table includes the following statistics which did not appear in the quarterly bulletins, the reports from which they are taken having been received after the bulletins were printed: Three passengers and 5 employees killed and 37 passengers and 61 employees injured.

The totals of these yearly tables are not comparable with those given in the commission's annual statistical reports, for the reason that the monthly reports deal only with accidents to passengers and to employees while on duty. The monthly reports take no account of accidents to "other persons." These appear in the annual reports, and include casualties at highway crossings, to trespassers, to persons walking along the track, accidents to employees in shops remote from the railroad, and all other accidents not occurring to passengers and to employees actually on duty.

The salient facts of the records of casualties for the twelve months are shown in Table B. As regards employees, a gratifying diminution is seen in every item. As to passengers, the number killed in train accidents has fallen off materially from the figure of the year preceding, which itself was much less than half of the total of the year before that. In injuries from causes other than train accidents—that is to say, from causes which in large measure are to be classed as the victim's own negligence—the change is the other way. For this no explanation is apparent. Possibly the railroads have adopted standards by which less serious injuries are included. As is well known, the term "injury," as used in statistics of this character, is elastic.

[Nork...The italic letters in the margin refer to the corresponding totals for the last preceding year, printed below.] TABLE A.—Summary of casualties to persons, year ending June 30, 1909.

	Perangers rie (a and b). agre-	Killed. Injured.	Collisions. 72 2,716 22 Derailments. 30 2,450 7	98	102   5.242 29			32	Or off	183 5.843 21	285 11,105 50
	Persons carried under agreement or contract (b b).	.beruinI	317	10	6003		:	₩.	318	! — !	1,011
	Total (s. b, and b b).	Killed.	94 3.003 37 2,717	:	<u>"</u> "	] :     :	:	8	137 3,076 65 3,139	204 6,251	335 12,116
		КШед	145	115 36	m	<b>2</b>	র 	\$ 8	76 196 39 110	51 437	16 789
	Ттывшев.	.bemini	1,286	727	2,969	735	7,147	90	3,947	13, 247	16, 236
	Trainmen in yards.	Клиед.	8=	*	13	8	R	•	T.T.	216	270
		.banatal	ない。	13	77.2	\$	2,346	25	1.8 2.8	5, 430	6, 202
7	Yard train- men (switch- ing crews).	Killed,	ล±	2	   98 	07   1	10 2		198	777 7	313 7
,		Injured Killed.	253	\$	 	1,088	2,610	334	950 378 855	7, 359 1, 006	7, 862   1, 064
	Other em- ployees.	.benuful	24 28 199	3 8	78 6:3	6	32 2,212	6 51	1,368	6 20,891	4 21,504
	Tot	Killed.	222	3	5200	191	\$	22	1,125	1,936	2, 450
	Total em- ployees.	.benuţaI	25.1. 28.4.	1,067	4,877	2,353	14,315	1, 229	10,269 18,771	46, 027	51,804
	Total persons reported.	Kijjeq.	22	毒	199	191	8	<u>pe</u>	1, 190	2,140	3, 791
	otal persons reported.	.betuini	5,395 4,165	1,182	10,742	2,353	14,315	1,265	13, 336 21, 0 0	53, 178	62, 920
			9-4	_	•	-		_			_

	Vear
1	preceding
•	707
•	2 (a (s
Į	

												1														
	1					ľ				ŀ		ŀ								ŀ		ŀ	ľ		ŀ	1
		,						103	3, 905	9	385	111	1. 284	181	1.832	67	000	3.6	887	9	787	-		717	7.718	4
								3		q	480	3	ò	6	414	8	1,428	*	-	2	1			417	A 100	1-5
4			•					ľ		,		-		}		2	3	1		•	107	_		-	,	5
		:					4	0	7.5	0	**	0	æ	3	900	90	200	80	200	40	70			20	1.470	U
	:		:					148	6.056	7.7	776	188	7.450	3	67.79	79	1.084	\$	786	98	811	_		200	877 71	70
:	4						•	-			_		:	=	980	**	679	115	1.436	95	90	_		2	3.121	
				,	:				:		- 1	-		5	7,790	9	£. 700	3	2.966	87	2.616	_		90	16.991	
****	4			,				*>	2		80	-	45	7.1	199	90	276	5	346	7	51	-		717		
	•		٠			+	•	164	2,434	*	16	25	2,80	200	4.007	25	1,350	158	5.576			_		867		udig
		٠	:		+		_	8	3.	9	133	2	6.677	280	83	3	3	90	-	184	16,614	204	P. S	1.671	10,003	-
		٠						94	100g	9	918	7	5,215	170	14, 868	200	8,412	3	8,686	_		_		. 967		_
	,						<u>'-</u>	87.4	11.668	178	1.067	90	12.645	280	19,006	205	967.1	8	9,570 1	807	80,47# 3	898	50,344	3,764	68,980	4
							_	_	-	_				. !		-	-	-	- 1	ď		 			1	í

From Table B, next following, comparisons may be made for the last four years:

TABLE	B.—Casualties	to passe	engers and c	mployees,	years	ending	June 30.
-------	---------------	----------	--------------	-----------	-------	--------	----------

	19	909.	19	908.	1	907.	19	906.
	Killed.	Injured.	Killed.	Injured.	Killed.	Injured.	Killed.	Injured.
Passengers: In train accidents Other causes	131 204	5, 865 6, 251	165 241	7, <b>43</b> 0 5, 215	410 237	9, 070 4, 527	182 236	6, 778 4, 407
Total	335	12, 116	406	12, 645	647	13, 597	418	11, 185
Employees: In train accidents In coupling accidents Overhead obstructions, etc Falling from cars, etc Other causes	520 161 76 481 1,218	4,877 2,353 1,229 10,259 33,086	642 239 110 668 1,699	6, 818 3, 121 1, 353 11, 735 33, 317	1,011 302 134 790 2,116	8, 924 3, 948 1, 591 12, 565 35, 661	879 311 132 713 1,772	7, 483 3, 503 1, 497 11, 253 31, 788
Total	2, 456	51,804	3,358	56,344	4, 353	62, 689	3,807	55, 524
Total passengers and employees	2, 791	63, 920	3,764	68, 969	5,000	76, 286	4, 225	66, 709

Table C, on the next page, shows the totals of the two principal classes of train accidents for three years past. This table includes the following statistics which did not appear in the quarterly bulletins, the reports from which they are taken having been received after the bulletins were printed: Nine collisions; damage, \$23,462; killed, 0; injured, 23. Twenty-six derailments; damage, \$15,356; killed, 0; injured, 11.

TABLE C.—Collisions and derailments, damage to care, engines, and roadway, years ending June 30.

						1908.	ಹ			1907.	7.	
	Num.	Loss.	Killed.	Injured.	Number.	Lossi,	Killed.	Injurad.	Num- ber.	Loss.	Killed.	Injured.
Collisions, rest Collisions, butting. Collisions, train separating Collisions, miscellaneous	869 466 396 2, 681	874, 729 874, 729 146, 067 1, 154, 520	2202	1,856 1,878 1,902	1,307 795 436 3,735	\$1,298,044 1,473,618 165,850 1,007,687	210 210 4 112	1,762 3,143 214 2,613	1,957 1,065 695 4,309	\$2,003,509 1,936,506 259,495 2,101,059	228 727 13	2,8,8,8,8,8,8,8,8,8,8,8,8,8,8,8,8,8,8,8
Total	4, 411	3, 108, 691	342	5,395	6,363	4, 685, 199	414	7,712	8, 026	6, 250, 568	776	9, 541
Decaliments due to defects of roadway, etc.  Decaliments due to defects of equipment signalmen, etc.  Decaliments due to of track, etc.  Decaliments due to fuesto	2,252 2,522 2,52 2,522 2,522 2,522 2,522 2,52 2,522 2,522 2,522 2,522 2,522 2,52 2,522 2,522 2,522 2,522 2,522 2,52 2,52 2,52 2,52 2,52 2,52 2,5	1, 965, 658 1, 875, 646 1,867, 646 1,867, 748 444, 308 1,063, 085	822888	1,195	25.00 25.00	1, 088, 261 2, 176, 194 273, 038 562, 441 144, 903 1, 303, 624	<b>\$</b> 55454\$	1,588 831 376 880 880 880 1,512	3,178 871.5 466 387.1 1,785	2, 255, 114 2, 490,028 396,628 586,725 153,694 1,713,947	328323	1, 983 924 756 656 7, 176
Total		4,371,512	198	4,141	6,671	5, 648, 461	314	5, 122	7, 432	6, 556, 134	515	6,695
Total collisions and derailments	9,670	7, 480, 203	600	9,636	13,034	10, 183, 660	80	12,834	15,458	12, 685, 702	1,201	16, 236

The following tables are self-explanatory, being consolidations of the quarterly tables giving the same classes of facts:

TABLE D.—Causes of accidents to employees in coupling and uncoupling cars, year ending June 30, 1909.

	Causes.		rain- ien.	me	rain- en in erds.	trai (sw	ard nmen vitch- rews).		er em- yees.
Subclass.		Killed.	Injured.	Killed.	Injured.	Killed.	Injured.	Killed.	Injured.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8	Adjusting coupler with foot.  Adjusting coupler, cars accidentally started.  Careless manipulation of uncoupling lever.  Cars not equipped with automatic coupler.  Coupler broken, using link and pin or chain.  Coupling damaged cars.  Coupling with chain or other emergency appliance on curve too sharp for automatic coupling.  Coupling with chain or other emergency appliance be-	1	87 20 15 8 14 22	3	40 11 9 6 6 6	5 1 3	98 40 28 8 7 37	1	2 4 2 3 1 3
9 10 11 12 13	cause of uneven track.  Coupling or uncoupling safety chains.  Fingers or hand caught between uncoupling lever and body of car.  Uncoupling without using lever (unnecessary).  Uncoupling without using lever, uncoupling lever not in working order.  Foot caught in frog, switch, or guard rail.	1 3 3 5	5 138 18 62 12	1 4	10 86 19 50	1 3 8	227 227 22 78 14		10
14 15 16 17 18 19 20	Opening or closing knuckle when cars were near together, miscalculated speed.  Opening knuckle when cars were near together, engine accidentally started.  Opening knuckle, part of defective coupler fell on foot.  Opening knuckle, lost footing.  Riding on car to uncouple, slipped off.  Struck by object at side of track.  Caught by unexpected movement of car, due to slack running in	2 1 4 9	55 7 14 24 23 8 60	1 3 4	39 10 14 12 8 8	10 2	66 15 24 41 34 28 62	1	2 1 1 3 2 1
21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28	Caught by unexpected movement of car, due to mistake or misunderstanding in giving hand signals. Uncoupling moving cars and lost footing. Parts hard to move, causing delay. Went between cars unnecessarily and contrary to rule. Hand caught between projecting load and end of next car. No witness (fatal injury). Other causes. Unexplained	2 4	16 16 21 43 5	2 4 5	6 9 10 30 4	3 9 5 5	20 63 28 61 8 1 21 8	3	1 1 7
	Total	49	735	36	463	67	1,066	9	69

TABLE Dx.—Nature of injuries to employees in coupling and uncoupling cars, year ending June 30, 1909.

Injuries.	Train- men.	Train- men in yards.	Yard trainmen.	Other employees.
Loss of feet Loss of legs Loss of arms Loss of hands Loss of fingers Loss of toes. Fractured skull	15 8 8 3 38 8	4 2 4 5 22 5	12 6 10 8 25 5	1 1
Fractured leg. Fractured arm. Fractured collar bone or ribs. Fractured other bones. Contusion of head or body. Contusion or laceration of feet. Contusion or laceration of toes. Contusion or laceration of legs. Contusion or laceration of arms. Contusion or laceration of hands. Contusion or laceration of fingers. Dislocation. Internal injuries. Sprains. Miscellaneous.	7 13 12 23 66 76 25 24 28 84 236 5 14 25 16	1 6 8 17 42 49 13 16 19 85 127 3 9	8 11 22 27 154 102 29 59 55 139 305 9 14 72 14	2 3 3 1 12 3 1 4 4 9 12 1 2 3
Total injuries	735 49	463 36	1,086 67	69
Total killed and injured	784	499	1, 153	78

Table E.—Causes of accidents to employees classified (C6 and C7) as falling from and getting on or off cars and engines, year ending June 30, 1909.

Total killed and injured.....

Total killed. 161
Total injured. 2,353

<u> </u>		Causes.	_	rain- nen.	m	rain- en in ards.	trai (sv	ard inmen vitch- crews).		er em- yees.
Subclass.			Killed.	Injured.	Killed.	Injured.	Killed.	Injured.	Killed.	Injured.
	1 2 3 4	Fell from roof of box car by reason of— Defect in car Ice or snow. Parting of train. Derailment, collision, or shock due to abnormal movements of cars other than those in sub-	2 1 5	32 23 65	••••	11 14 24	2	17 25 25	••••	2
C6	5	class 3	15 10	202 140	7 4	96 76	5 11	245 206	8	33 \$
	6 7 8 9 10	Coal car. Freight car other than box or coal car. Engine or tender. Passenger car. Engines, tenders, or cars (all kinds) not in mo-	4 10 34 4	25 155 437 38	1 3 12 1	18 49 257 10	2 13 1	20 43 157 7	2 3 11	19 71 71
	11 12 13 14	tion Miscellaneous causes. Not clearly explained. Slipped getting on moving trains or cars. Jumping off moving trains.	10 10	240 603 172 384 555	1 4 11 7 11	137 184 52 199 334	9 33 8 6	79 743 156 229 341	7 8 28 11	283 277 67 157 156
C7	17	Jumping from engines or cars anticipating collision, derailment, or other accident  Fell from engines or cars by reason of defective handholds and sill steps  Getting on or off moving engine  Caught in frog, guard rail, or switch		145 142 578	12	404	1 13	205 408	19	9 11 129
	18	Caught in frog, guard rail, or switch		11 3,947	74	15 1,994	107	5 2,950	104	1,368

#### [Public—No. 171.]

AN ACT Requiring common carriers engaged in interstate commerce to make full reports of all accidenta to the Interstate Commerce Commission.

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, It shall be the duty of the general manager, superintendent, or other proper officer of every common carrier engaged in interstate commerce by railroad to make to the Interstate Commerce Commission, at its office in Washington, District of Columbia, a monthly report, under oath, of all collisions of trains or where any train or part of a train accidentally leaves the track, and of all accidents which may occur to its passengers or employees while in the service of such common carrier and actually on duty, which report shall state the nature and causes thereof and the circumstances connected therewith.

- SEC. 2. That any common carrier failing to make such report within thirty days after the end of any month shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor, and upon conviction thereof by a court of competent jurisdiction shall be punished by a fine of not more than one hundred dollars for each and every offense and for every day during which it shall fail to make such report after the time herein specified for making the same.
- SEC. 3. That neither said report nor any part thereof shall be admitted as evidence or used for any purpose against such railroad so making such report in any suit or action for damages growing out of any matter mentioned in said report.
- SEC. 4. That the Interstate Commerce Commission is authorized to prescribe for such common carriers a method and form for making the reports in the foregoing section provided.

Approved, March 3, 1901.

#### SPECIAL INFORMATION CONTAINED IN PRECEDING BULLETINS.4

Each accident bulletin contains tables showing the number of passengers and employees killed and injured, and these figures are classified according to cause (see Table No. 1); also tables showing cost of the different classes of train accidents. The causes of accidents to employees in coupling and uncoupling and in falling from cars, etc., are further classified in Tables No. 3 and No. 4. The most serious collisions and derailments are dealt with in a supplementary table (Class A), showing the causes in some detail. Each bulletin is for three months, and No. 1 was for the quarter ending September 30, 1901. The bulletin for the quarter ending June 30 contains, in addition to the quarterly statistics, tables showing the same information for the whole of the fiscal year ending on that date.

Bulletin No. 25 shows 110 passengers killed in train accidents, three collisions and one derailment being responsible for 80 deaths in this class. The number of passengers killed from other causes (mostly their own negligence) also shows a large increase. One of the most serious collisions was due to the misreading of a dispatcher's order, and another to a mistake in sending or receiving the order.

Bulletin No. 26 shows a marked decrease in casualties as compared with preceding quarters, a large falling off in railroad traffic having taken place. The list of "prominent" train accidents includes only three cases which may be classed as notable.

For notes on Bulletins 1–16, see Bulletin No. 17; for notes on Bulletins 17–24, see Bulletin No. 30.

- Bulletin No. 27 shows further marked decreases in casualties, incident to the large falling off in railroad traffic. The number of passengers and employees killed in train accidents (125) is the smallest since the monthly records were established. The most fatal accident in this quarter was a collision at a street crossing, where & passengers in an electric car were killed.
- Bulletin No. 28 recorded the smallest number of passengers killed in train accidents (13) ever reported in the quarterly records. The total of passengers and employees killed in train accidents (112) was 13 less than the previous low record (125, Bulletin 27). Of the 13 passengers killed in train accidents, 7 were victims of a butting collision on an electric railroad.
- Bulletin No. 29 showed totals far smaller than the corresponding quarter one year previous, but the diminution in the number of casualties, which had continued during the year of depression, seemed to have been checked. The number of passengers killed in train accidents was 53, and there were 8 notable collisions.
- Bulletin No. 30 recorded 34 passengers killed in train accidents (including 15 victims of a forest fire). One collision resulted in 8 deaths of passengers and two derailments killed 16 employees.
- Bulletin No. 31, in part, continues the favorable showing of the quarter one year previous (Bulletin 27), though it covers a period of considerable revival of business. One collision caused 20 deaths and 28 injuries.

Washington, D. C. FEB 8 1910

## Accident Bulletin


No. 33

# Railroad Accidents in the United States

During July, August, and September 1909



Washington
Government Printing Office
1910



## Collisions and Derailments of Trains

and

## Casualties to Persons

### on the Railroads of the United States

during the months of

July, August, and September, 1909

INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMMISSION WASHINGTON, D. C.



WASHINGTON
GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
1910

#### THE INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMMISSION.

MARTIN A. KNAPP, of New York, Chairman.

JUDSON C. CLEMENTS, of Georgia.

CHARLES A. PROUTY, of Vermont.

FRANCIS M. COCKRELL, of Missouri.

FRANKLIN K. LANE, of California.

EDGAR E. CLARK, of Iowa.

JAMES S. HARLAN, of Illinois.

EDWARD A. MOSELEY, Secretary.

#### RAILROAD ACCIDENTS .

IN THE UNITED STATES DURING THE THREE MONTHS ENDING SEPTEMBER 30, 1909.

The number of persons killed in train accidents during the months of July, August, and September, 1909, as shown in reports made by the railroad companies to the Interstate Commerce Commission, under the "accident law" of March 3, 1901, was 193, and of injured, 3,752. Accidents of other kinds, including those sustained by employees while at work and by passengers in getting on or off the cars, etc., bring the total number of casualties up to 20,093 (852 killed and 19,241 injured). Accidents to employees resulting in slight injuries, which do not prevent the employee injured from performing his accustomed service for more than three days in the aggregate during the ten days immediately following the accident, are not reported. These reports deal only with employees on duty and passengers. The casualties to passengers have been divided into three classes. a includes all ordinary passengers. Class b includes passengers traveling on freight trains. Class bb includes persons who are customarily carried on trains under special arrangements, such as postal clerks and express messengers, employees on Pullman cars, newsboys, livestock tenders, and men in charge of freight. The reported casualties are classified in the following table:

TABLE No. 1.—Casualties to persons—July, August, and September, 1909.

Causes.	Passengers (a and b).		Persons carried under agreement or contract (bb).		Total (a, b, and bb).		Train- men.		Train- men in yards.	
	Killed.	Injured.	Killed.	Injured.	Killed.	Injured.	Killed.	Injured.	Killed.	Injured.
Collisions.  Derailments.  Miscellaneous train accidents, including locomotive boiler explosions.	34 8	1,288 833 37	5 9	105 61	39 17	1,393 894 38	52 40 9	308 316 264	8	126 35 64
Total train accidents	42	2, 158	14	167	56	2, 325	101	888	9	225
Coupling or uncoupling. While doing other work about trains or while attending switches. Corning in contact with overhead bridges, structures at side of track, etc. Falling from cars or engines or while getting on or	1	14		2	1	16	10 7 18	209 2,015 142	9 4 5	130 691 60
offOther causes	30 14	946 1,037	2 1	25 64	32 1ŏ	971 1, 101	51 37	1,107 163	16 22	555 94
Total (other than train accidents)	45	1,997	3	91	48	2,088	123	3,636	56	1,530
Total, all classes	87	4, 155	17	258	104	4, 418	224	4,524	65	1,755

Table No. 1.—Casualties to persons—July, August, and September, 1909—Continued.

	men	i train- (switch- crews).		ther loyee <sub>s</sub> .	-	otal oloyees.	Total persons reported.	
Causes.	Killed.	Injured.	Killed.	Injured.	Killed.	Injured.	Killed.	Injured.
Collisions  Derailments  Miscellaneous train accidents, including locomo-	5 4	63 39	5 10	95 72	70 54	592 462	109 71	1,965 1,356
tive boiler explosions	1	27	2	18	13	373	13	411
Total train accidents	10	129	17	185	137	1,427	193	3,752
Coupling or uncoupling.	18	277	1	17	38	633	38	633
While doing other work about trains or while attending switches	10	685	10	569	31	3,960	31	3.960
tures at side of track, etc	3	69	2	20	28	291	<b>29</b> .	<b>3</b> 07
Falling from cars or engines or while getting on or off	27 25	765 79	42 294	431 5, <b>32</b> 3	136 378	2, 858 5, 659	168 <b>39</b> 3	
Total (other than train accidents)	83	1,875	349	6, 360	611	13, 401	659	15, 489
Total all classes	93	2,004	366	6, 545	748	14,828	852	19.241

The only favorable indication that can be discerned in the foregoing statistics is that afforded by the fact that the totals of employees killed in train accidents and in coupling cars do not show such decided increases as do those of employees killed from other causes. These last-named items might be expected to increase, because of the general increase of traffic, and on this supposition the absence of increase in the others indicates improved conditions. Five accidents—collisions 14, 16, 24, and 1, and derailment No. 19—caused 47 deaths. The causes of these and of others in which the circumstances were notable or unusual are given in connection with Table No. 2A.

TABLE No. 1A.—Comparisons of principal items with last bulletin and with one year back.

	Bu <b>iletin 33</b> .	Bulletin 32.	Bulletin 29.
1. Passengers killed in train accidents. 2. Passengers killed, all causes. 3. Employees killed in train accidents. 4. Employees killed in coupling. 5. Employees killed, all causes. 6. Total passengers and employees killed, all causes.	104 137	7 44 92 34 544 588	53 110 138 39 624 734

The total number of collisions and derailments in the quarter now under review was 2,751 (1,288 collisions and 1,463 derailments), of which 229 collisions and 192 derailments affected passenger trains. The damage to cars, engines, and roadway by these accidents amounted to \$2,316,014. Given more in detail, these facts appear as below (collisions and derailments which cause no death or personal injury and which cause not over \$150 damage to the property of the railroad are not reported):

TABLE No. 2.—Collisions and derailments.

•	Number.	Loss.	Killed.	Injured.
Collisions, rear Collisions, butting Collisions, train separating Collisions, miscellaneous	171 110	\$273, 195 328, 155 61, 924 382, 631	17 63 1 28	516 1,024 39 406
Total	1,288	1,045,905	109	1,985
Derailments due to defect of roadway, etc	671 84 83 14	211, 301 544, 745 37, 996 122, 800 36, 149 317, 118	9 9 3 17 3 30	281 149 75 351 68 432
Total	1, 463	1, 270, 109	71	1,356
Total collisions and derailments  Total for same quarter of 1908	2,751 2,567 4,279	2,316,014 1,950,408 3,605,696	180 176 309	3, 341 2, 729 4, 534

Following is the usual list of class A train accidents—all in which the damage is reported at \$10,000 or over, notable cases in which passengers are killed, and those doing damage less than \$10,000 and down to \$2,000, wherever the circumstances or the cause may be of particular interest:

TABLE No. 2A.—Causes of 43 prominent train accidents.

[Note.—R stands for rear collision; B, butting collision; M, miscellaneous collisions; D, derailment; P, passenger train; F, freight and miscellaneous trains.]

#### COLLISIONS.

No.	Class.	Kind of train.	Killed.	Injured.	Damage to engines, cars, and road-way.	Reference to record.	Cause.
1 2	RB	Pand F	6 1	3 9	\$600 1,820	76a 38	Failure to flag. (See note in text below.) Southbound train ran over misplaced switch and collided with northbound standing on sidetrack. Porter of northbound had set switch straight, and afterwards went back and set it for siding; can not explain. Engineman of standing train was killed. Time, 2 p. m.
3	В	Fand F	0	2	3,000	69	Operator overlooked order; block signal not properly managed. (See note in text below.)
4	M	Pand F	0	0	3,378	74	Passenger train ran into side of freight backing into sidetrack. Passenger had been flagged, but seeing automatic block signal clear, engineman resumed speed, though flagman had not been called in. Automatic signal had been cleared by foreign electric current in rails. It remained clear only a few seconds and, according to the report, had turned again to the stop position before the engine-
5	В	Pand P	0	52	3,500	67	man passed it.  Collision of northbound extra electric car with southbound regular. Conductor of extra, while his car was on sidetrack, tried (by hand motion only) to instruct conductor on regular car passing him, bound in same direction, to hold southbound at next meeting point; but his message was not understood. Communicating orally in this way
6	В	Fand F	4	4	4,500	63	was contrary to rules. Dispatcher gave conflicting meeting orders to extra train running south and work train running north. Dispatcher of two years' experience, but in service at this place only two months.
7	В	F and F	1	2	4,520	73	Mistake in copying dispatcher's order. (See note in text below.)

TABLE No. 2A.—Causes of 43 prominent train accidents—Continued.

#### COLLISIONS—Continued.

		<u>.                                    </u>					·
No.	Class.	Kind of train.	Killed.	Injured.	Damage to engines, cars, and road-way.	Reference to record.	Cause.
8	В	Pand F	2	43	\$4,740	45	Extra engine, eastbound, encroached on time of regular passenger train, No. 51, westbound. Engineman of extra thought the day was Sunday, on which day No. 51 does not run. Conductor was equally negligent, but offered no excuse. Brakeman had neglected to examine time table. One
9	R	Pand P	2	11	6,000	66	passenger killed. Passenger train (4 a. m.) delayed seriously, but flagman did not go back to protect from train following; neither did he use fusees; time interval at last
10	В	Fand F	1	3	6,355	72	preceding station, five minutes.  Dispatcher, in issuing an order to supersede a previous order, sent it to only one of the two trains that had had the first order.
11	В	Fand F	0	4	7,094	37	Conductor and engineman of northbound train forgot
12	В	P and F	3	17	8,600	7	meeting order. Conductor and engineman of westbound extra train neglected to identify themselves and give proper explanation to eastbound. (See note in text below.)
13	M	P and F	0	0	10,000	70	Freight on siding on 3 per cent grade accidentally started and ran against passing passenger train. Engineman moved throttle (same not being latched) when he pulled whistle.
14	В	P and P	16	167	12,300	4	Westbound extra encroached on time of eastbound regular train. (See note in text below.)
15	R	P and P			12,775	35	Failure of block signalman to put signal in stop position after passage of passenger train, combined with inefficient flagging. (See note in text below.)
16 17	$\frac{\mathbf{B}}{\mathbf{R}}$	P and P F and F	9	40	14, 101 14, 200	36 87	Disregard of meeting order. (See note in text below.) Misunderstanding of orders.
18	B	F and F	ő	4	14, 485	76	Operator failed to deliver meeting order. (See note
19	В	P and F	2	7	15,000	6	In text below.) Agent failed to deliver order; fireman misunderstood order as to movement of train, given by word of mouth. (See note in text below.)
20	B	P and P	3	6	19,000	3	Southbound ran over misplaced switch and collided with northbound standing on side track. The northbound usually held the main line at this point, and the brakeman (experienced and of good character), who went forward to the switch, set it
21	В	P and P	0	59	19, 101	64	for the side track; can not explain. Westbound, three hours late, encroached on time of eastbound superior train. Conductor and engineman of westbound overlooked the fact that the eastbound was superior; they also had neglected to stop at B to make entry on register. Eastbound train would have left main line at B.
22	M	F and F	0	O	22,000	32	Train broke in two and rear portion, left on grade without hand brakes being set, ran back and collided with another train.
23	М	F and F	4	1	29,065	43	Runaway on steep grade. Fifteen cars had been taken on at a way station and the angle-cock of the air-brake pipe had not been opened at the rear of the 15 cars. Men in charge of train failed to test brakes as required by rule.
24	В	P and F	8	23	29, 521	75	Conductor, engineman, and fireman of passenger train forgot meeting order. Engineman was killed. Conductor and fireman can give no explanation. Order had been in their hands 17 minutes.
	Tota	l, collisions	62	500	265, 655	`	
				J		1	1

TABLE No. 2A.—Causes of 43 prominent train accidents—Continued.

DERAILMENTS.

No.	Class.	Kind of train.	Killed.	Injured.	Damage to engines, cars, and road-way.	Reference to record.	· Cause.
1	D	P	2	7		11	Train consisted of a single electric car, which became uncontrollable on steep grade because of slippery track and unexplained failure of air brake. One
2	D	F	1	3	\$35	25	passenger killed.  Cars of circus train not fit to run over sharp curve;
3	D	<b>F</b>	2	2	170	20	speed very low. Car of eastbound freight knocked off track by car in westbound freight, which had been derailed by the pulling out of a drawbar, following the sudden application of the air brakes because of the bursting of a hose. Two men riding in car (in charge of horses) killed.
4	<b>D</b>	P	0	96	300	53	Car in excursion train, full of passengers, too heavy on inside of 16-degree curve; sill of car rested on wheels, preventing truck from curving freely. Speed 6 miles an hour.
5	D	P	0	3	2,454	55	High speed on 7½-degree curve; superelevation of outer rail 8 inches. Speed 55 to 60 miles an hour; tender was first vehicle to run off the track. Tender had side bearings for the rear truck but not for the front. It ran 4,700 feet off the rails before the fact was noticed. Track in good condition.
6	D	P	1	61	5,000	22	Washout; 3 p. m. Train moving very slowly. Track
7	D	P	1	14	5,138	19	foreman held at fault for not stopping train. Unexplained. Derailment occurred at switch; tender first vehicle to run off the track. One passen-
8	D	P	0	14	5,845	23	ger killed.  Washout. Engineman and also assistant roadmaster, riding on engine, held at fault for lack of caution in running. Derailment occurred at midnight; section foreman not on duty.
9	D	F		0	10,600	30	Unexplained. Speed 25 miles an hour on 6-degree curve. Bridge damaged.
10 11 12	D D	F	0 0 0	0	11,000 12,250 12,450	27 51 26	Excessive speed. Excessive speed. Runaway on steep grade; 1:40 a.m. Engineman, nine months in service, started train before train pipe of air-brake system was fully charged.
13 14	D D	P	0	13	12,500 13,000	12 24	Broken rail.  Maliciously misplaced switch. Wreck partly destroyed by a fire which started in a car containing matches.
15 16	D	F	1 0	1 3	13, 465 16, 250	21 50	Runaway on steep grade. (See note in text below.) Bridge weakened by fire; situated on curve where view was very short.
17	D	P	3	48	16,375	82	Rail joint maliciously removed and rail pulled out of
18 19	D D	F	0 8	57	24,050 26,730	15 31	
	Total	derailments	19	327	187, 612		
	Total den	collisions and ailments	81	827	453, 267		

Collision No. 14, killing 16 passengers and injuring 165 passengers and 2 trainmen, was between a westbound special passenger train and an eastbound regular passenger train, the special having run only about 1½ miles from its initial point. Both trains were heavily loaded. The special had no right to the road as against the regular. It had received an order from the dispatcher to meet an eastbound special at a point 5 miles farther on, and it appears that the motor-

man, not having read the order with sufficient care, had in his mind the impression that the eastbound train specified in the order was the regular (against which, in fact, he had no rights). When the special train was ready to start, the eastbound regular train, which was already due, had not arrived, and the conductor told the motorman to move forward a short distance (within the yard limits) to the switch at which the incoming regular train would clear the main line, the conductor's intention being to wait there until the eastbound train arrived. Having given this information, and the train having started, the conductor at once went into the first car of the train and began taking up tickets; and while thus engaged, the train went on and passed the switch (at which it should have stopped) without his knowledge. The westbound train was running 20 or 25 miles an hour a moment preceding the collision, and for this speed the motorman is held blameworthy, as he might have seen the eastbound train in time to apply the brakes some 500 feet farther east. The eastbound train had been stopped or nearly stopped before the collision. Both trains having electric motor cars in front, with no separate locomotive, the brunt of the collision was borne by cars occupied by passengers.

Collision No. 16, killing 8 passengers and 1 employee, was due to carelessness on the part of the men in charge of the northbound train. This train, drawn by two engines, was ordered to meet the first section of the southbound at B and the second section at C. On arriving at B the first section of the southbound was found on the siding and passed. On arriving at C no stop was made and the second section of the southbound was met 300 feet beyond the farther switch. men in charge of the northbound train—the conductor and two enginemen—offer the explanation that an engine standing on the side track at C was mistaken by them for the second section (which they were to meet), but this "explanation" still leaves these men chargeable with gross negligence as the engine standing on the sidetrack had white flags displayed (showing that it was not a regular train) and it was of a different number from that of the engine of the regular train which was to be met and the number of which was named in the meeting order. Both trains were running at full speed when they met.

Collision No. 1, in which six drovers, riding in the caboose of a freight train, were killed, occurred about midnight on a line which is used by the trains of several companies, and on which it seems the trains are run under somewhat peculiar rules. The freight train, belonging to road A, and consisting of cars of live stock, was running over the track of line B, its trip over these tracks being for a distance of about 4 miles. It is the duty of the men in charge of

all such freight trains to be constantly on the alert to protect their train from any train following; but it does not appear that they are required to keep themselves posted as to the times when following passenger trains are due. On the other hand, the rules limit the speed of passenger trains to 25 miles an hour. The passenger train belonged to road B. It had left the last preceding station about \* seven minutes behind the freight. According to the testimony before a coroner's jury (as reported by the railroad company) the stock train was running at from 1 to 6 miles an hour at the time of the collision and the passenger train at from 12 to 40 miles an hour. From this last finding it would appear that the jury was unable to reach a definite conclusion, from the testimony, as to the speed of the passenger train. The only witness who thought that it was running at anything like 40 miles an hour was one of the drovers in the caboose of the freight train. The report of the railroad company indicates that the flagman of the freight had neither made any effort to flag the passenger train nor thrown off any fusees; and that the engineman of the passenger train was running his train at a moderate speed, from which he could have stopped within 500 feet if he had been flagged; and that he was keeping a good lookout. He had shut off steam preparatory to reducing speed to 12 miles an hour a little farther on. The conductor and the flagman of the freight appear not to have been well acquainted with the road. They declare that their train was moving at 10 or 12 miles an hour, but the coroner's jury evidently discredited this statement. The engineman of the passenger train and the conductor of the freight were men of long experience; the flagman of the freight, 23 years old, had been in the service about one year.

Collision No. 3 occurred on a double-track road about 3 a. m., and was due to errors of block-signal operators in arranging for the sending of a train east on the westbound track. Extra train 6 was to run eastward from B to C and an order was sent to C which required the telegrapher at C to hold all westbound trains until the arrival of extra train 6 at C. Just as this train left B, the signalman at C allowed a westbound train to pass toward B. The signalman at B accepted this westbound train for the reason, as he said, that he thought it was on the eastbound track. The superintendent, however, holds that there is no reason to justify such an impression on his part. The operator at B was 21 years old and had been in the service about one month. The operator at C was 22 years old and had been in the service about six months.

Collision No. 7 was between southbound and northbound regular freight trains. An order was delivered that the northbound would

wait at F until 12:20 a. m. for the southbound; then another order was sent to the effect that it would wait at B until 12:40 a. m for the southbound; then a third order was sent saying that it would wait at F until 12:50 a. m for the southbound, and "orders 140 and 135 are annulled." In delivering this order the operator wrote "40" • in place of "140," though the superintendent is satisfied that in repeating it to the dispatcher he repeated correctly; and the order was delivered so soon after it was received that it is not likely that the operator had time to rewrite it. The conclusion seems to be that in repeating the order he discovered his error and intended to add the figure "1" before delivering it; but he did not do so. By this mistake order No. 140 was left in force, and this caused the collision, as the other train affected by this annulled order had received a correct copy of the annulling telegram and was thus relieved from complying with that order. The conductor and the engineman of the southbound are held at fault for accepting an order annulling another order which they had not received. It should have occurred to them that something was wrong. The operator who made this mistake had had four months' experience. The conductor and engineman who accepted the suspicious order had had several years' experience.

Collision No. 12, occurring on a single-track line about 3 a. m., was due to the neglect of trainmen to exactly and properly identify each other's trains at a meeting point. Several extra passenger trains were to be run west from G. Some of these were run as sections of a regular train, and then, when the schedule of this train was 12 hours old, four additional passenger trains were run as specials. After the dispatcher had issued his orders, making a number of meeting points for these four specials, it was decided to run a fifth. The fifth was run from one station to another ahead of the third and on the rights of the third. This was an irregular proceeding made apparently by the conductor of the train on his own authority, but in accordance with rule 94 of the standard code. This fifth train, now become the third, may be designated as No. 81. (A special passenger train is designated by the number of its engine.) It was running on the rights of No. 82, and the men in charge of it were taking care that no eastbound train should encroach on the rights of No. 82. On meeting an eastbound extra freight the engineman of No. 81 spoke to the engineman of the freight, describing the situation. The conductor of No. 81 was nearby, but did not participate in this conversation and did not know exactly what was said. The conversation between the enginemen should have been participated in and confirmed also by the conductor of the eastbound freight; but he, with a brakeman, was on the rear of his train, and although they noticed, on passing the westbound, that the engine was not the correct number that they expected, they assumed that their engineman had received suitable assurances from the man on the westbound and they took no action to prevent their engineman from proceeding toward the next station; and the collision occurred in three or four minutes afterwards. The primary trouble appears to be that the engineman of the eastbound had fixed in his mind the four westbound specials which were to be met, and did not realize that he had been informed that there were five trains.

Collision No. 15 was due to the neglect of a block signalman and of a flagman. An eastbound freight train was stalled at S, and a passenger train, following, was coupled to the freight in order to assist it up a grade. While the two trains were being coupled the flagman of the passenger went back with a red light. The coupling having been completed, the engineman of the passenger train sounded two blasts of the whistle, for the release of the brakes, and then repeated the signal. The flagman, wrongfully assuming that the sounds of the whistle authorized him to return to his train, did so return; but the combined train was slow in moving and the flagman went back a second time. Before he had gone far, however, he met a following passenger train, running at 40 miles an hour, and the engineman of this train was unable to stop it before striking the one ahead of it.

The rear of the stalled passenger train was about 1,100 feet ahead of a semaphore signal, which should have been set to stop the second passenger train, but which was left in the clear position. For this the signalman is held grossly negligent. From the next station in the rear, up to this signal, the manual block system was in effect, but that section of the line ahead of the signal and occupied by the stalled trains, being in the yard, was not worked under the block system. The operator who had left the signal wrongfully in the clear position had kept his distant signal set against the approaching train, but as the engineman could plainly see the home signal, he of course did not slacken speed at the distant. The signalman saw the second passenger train in season to have set the home signal against it, but he became confused and did not think to take such action. The engineman of the second passenger train is held blameworthy for not being properly alert approaching the station. The testimony shows that he did not shut off steam until nearly or quite the moment at which he struck the train ahead.

Collision No. 18, between westbound freight train No. 33 and eastbound freight train No. 34, occurred one-half mile west of the station where the trains should have met, and was due to the failure of an operator to deliver the meeting order to the westbound train.

Having a number of orders to deliver to that conductor, he delivered all but one of them. The dispatcher was also held blameworthy because, in receiving the acknowledgement from the station operator of a number of orders for train No. 33, he failed to note that the particular order in question was not acknowledged. This dispatcher had had eighteen years' experience—ten as an operator and eight as a dispatcher. The station operator is 22 years old and has had eight years' experience, during the last four of which he has handled train orders. This collision occurred at 2 o'clock a. m. and the operator had been on duty about two hours. He declared that he was not sleepy.

Collision No. 19 was due to the failure of a station agent to deliver a meeting order, and to a misunderstanding in connection with an oral order given by the conductor to the fireman. Passenger train No. 3, northbound, and freight train No. 6, southbound, were to meet at S. An order had been issued to this effect, to be delivered to the passenger train at D, a station 7 miles short of S; but this order the agent at that point failed to deliver. The collision, however, is not to be charged wholly to this failure, because a part of the freight train had arrived at S before the passenger train reached that point. The freight train had been stalled about 2 miles before reaching S, and a part of its cars had been left standing on the main track, while the engine and the front part of the train went on to S. As this front portion was obliged to pass beyond the station at S, a flagman was sent forward to stop the passenger train, which he did. The passenger train after being flagged moved forward to the station. When ready to start its conductor spoke to the fireman, only about 30 feet away from him, giving instruction that the train should be moved forward and then set back on to the siding to wait for the freight, the engine of which had gone back to haul in the rear portion of its train. The freight flagman, standing with the passenger conductor, also made a hand motion to the fireman, indicating the same thing. The fireman (who was subsequently killed in the collision) nodded his head and the train was started. When its rear end passed the switch, the conductor dropped off to turn the switch and then was astonished to find that the train, instead of stopping, kept on; and it soon collided with the freight train. passenger engineman, as well as the fireman, was killed. Both engineman and fireman were experienced men and had worked together four years. Both men being killed, there is no explanation of how they came to misunderstand the situation and the orders given. The collision occurred at 3:25 p. m.

The agent at D, who failed to deliver the order to the passenger train, had resigned his position and was to leave the service the next day. He took this message and then seems to have depended on

his prospective successor to deliver it, but without telling him to do so; and when the train came was out on the platform talking with an acquaintance, entirely forgetful of the order. There was no train-order signal at the station as, until a short time before that, the universal practice was to send all train orders by telephone direct to conductors, and always simultaneously to both of the conductors for which a meeting order contained instructions. The flagman who flagged the passenger train at S did not explain to the engineman the reason why the flag had been displayed.

Derailment No. 15 was due to mismanagement of the air brakes on a train consisting of 2 engines and 33 cars. The air-brake pipes were properly connected throughout the train. Parts of two trestle bridges were knocked down by the derailed cars, a car in the middle of the train being derailed first, at a curve, causing the derailment of the cars behind it, which were piled up in the ruins of a bridge which was encountered at that point and which was wrecked; and the forward part of the train ran some distance farther, when that also was derailed at a bridge, with the exception of the leading engine, its tender, and the second engine, the tender of the second engine going off the track. Some little time after passing over a summit, the engineman of the leading engine, attempting to apply the brakes, discovered that there was no air pressure available. He sounded his whistle for the application of the hand brakes, and then went back to the second engine, but found that it was impossible to check the speed of the train there. By this time the train was running so fast that it was impossible for the brakemen to get from one car to another. It is the conclusion of the officers of the company that at the time the leading engine was attached to the train, for the purpose of assisting it up a grade, its engineman neglected to "cut in" his brake valve, so that for some distance the brake valves of both engines were cut During this time the air leaked from the train line, but so very slowly that the brakes were not applied by the reduction of pressure. The engineman of the leading engine was blameworthy in not noticing the condition of the air pressure, and also for not making the running test required by the instructions. The engineman of the second engine is at fault for not having seen that the leading engineman made the test as required. The conductor, who was in the caboose, neglected to notice the air gauge. When the whistle was sounded for the application of the brakes, the conductor suddenly discovered that there was no pressure in the train line.

TABLE No. 3.—Details of Table No. 1.—Causes of accidents to employees in coupling and uncoupling cars.

							<u> </u>		
,	Causes.		rain- ien.	מ	rain- nen vards.	trai (sv	ard nmen dtch- ng ws).	•	ther m- yees.
Subclass.		Killed.	Injured.	Killed.	Injured.	Killed.	Injured.	Killed.	Injured.
1 2 3 4 5	Adjusting coupler with foot.  Adjusting coupler, cars accidentally started.  Careless manipulation of uncoupling lever.  Cars not equipped with automatic coupler.  Coupler broken, using link and pin or chain.  Coupling damaged cars.  Coupling with chain or other emergency appliance on	2	, 4	1	13 2 2 2	l	24 7 11 1 2 11	1	3 I 1
7 8 9	Coupling with chain or other emergency appliance on curve too sharp for automatic coupling.  Coupling with chain or other emergency appliance because of uneven track.  Coupling or uncoupling safety chains.  Fingers or hand caught between uncoupling lever and		5 1 4		2	1	7	••••	1 1
10 11 12	body of car	···i		1	26 12 13	1	54 15 20		
13 14 15	Foot caught in frog, switch, or guard rail	i I	2 11		3 5	2	6 20		1
16 17 18 19 20	accidentally started Opening knuckle, part of defective coupler fell on foot Opening knuckle, lost footing Riding on car to uncouple, slipped off. Struck by object at side of track. Caught by unexpected movement of car, due to slack	1	3 2 6 2 6	1	6 5 3	1	3 7 9 1 4	• • • •	1 1 i
21 22 23	running in.  Caught by unexpected movement of car, due to mistake or misunderstanding in giving hand signals.  Uncoupling moving cars and lost footing.  Parts hard to move, causing delay.	2	22 2 7 5	1 2	14 3 2	3	18 4 14 6	,	1
24 25 26 27	Went between cars unnecessarily and contrary to rule Hand caught between projecting load and end of next car. No witness (fatal injury)		12 3 8	1	1 2	2	12		•••••
28	Total		209	9	130	18	277	1	17

#### Details of injuries included in Table 3, subclass 27.

- J. 1. Struck by piece of coke which fell from car.
- J. 2. Foot caught under wheel.
- J. 3. Stumbled over jack.
- J. 4. Struck by car door which fell to the ground.
- J. 5. Stepped on nail.
- J. 6. Struck by coal gate.
- J. 7. Struck by chock which flew up.
- A. 1. Stepped on stone.
- A. 2. Lump of coal fell off car and struck foot.
- A. 3. Glove caught on nail.
- A. 4. Hook on safety chain caught in pocket.
- A. 5. Struck arm against nail.
- A. 6. Board fell from roof of car, striking shoulder.
- A. 7. Struck by corner of car.
- A. 8. Lever flew up, striking hand.
- S. 1. Caught finger in knuckle.
- S. 2. Piece of ice fell from car.
- S. 3. Caught foot under wheel.
- S. 4. Caught finger in knuckle.
- S. 5. Brake shaft fell on foot.
- S. 6. Brake flew around and strained hand.
- 8. 7. Tank shifted, catching hand.

Table 3a.—Nature of injuries to employees in coupling and uncoupling cars.

Injuries.	Trainmen.	Trainmen in yards.	Yard trainmen.	Other em- ployees.
oss of feet	5	1	3	•
loss of legs	3	2	1	
loss of arms	2		4	<b></b> .
oss of hands	1			<b> </b>
oss of fingers	6	4	8	
oss of toes	2	1		j <i></i>
ractured leg	3	1	' 1	[ <i>.</i>
ractured arm	3	1	4	<b></b>
ractured collar bone or ribs	7	2	4	<b> </b>
ractured other bones	5	1	6.	<b></b>
ontusion of head or body	19	11	39	] :
ontusion or laceration of feet	24	9	24	] :
contusion or laceration of toes	3	6	11	<b>l</b>
ontusion or laceration of legs.	8	5	17	
ontusion or laceration of arms	15	7	13	
ontusion or laceration of hands	24	23	36	<b>!</b>
ontusion or laceration of fingers	<b>66</b>	41	86	l .
Dislocation	1	2		<b></b> .
nternal injuries	2	7	2	
prains	6	5	15	
iscellaneous	4	1	3	
Total injuries	209 10	130 9	277 18	17
Total killed and injured	219	139	295	11

Total killed	
Total killed and injured	671

Table 4.—Details of Table No. 1.—Causes of accidents to employees classified (C6 and C7) as falling from and getting on or off cars and engines.

		Causes.	_	rain- nen.	me	rain- n in ards.	trai (sw	ard nmen vitch- ng ws).	Other employ-	
Subvigge			Killed.	Injured.	Killed.	Injured.	Killed.	Injured.	Killed.	Injured.
	1 1	Fell from roof of box car by reason of— Defect in car		4		4		4		
	2 3 4	Ice or snow.  Parting of train  Derailment, collision, or shock due to abnormal	i	12		6		9		i
С6-	5	movements of cars other than those in sub- class 3.  While setting brakes	3 1	52 33	2	38 16	3	88 55	2	11 1
ļ	6 7 8 9	Fell from— Coal car  Freight car other than box or coal car.  Engine or tender  Passenger car  Engines, tenders, or cars (all kinds) not in mo-	1 4 10 2	31 121 12	1 2 2	7 21 58 3	2 2 2	1 14 58 2	2 9 2 3	2 32 14 2
,	11 12 (13 14 15	tion  Miscellaneous causes.  Not clearly explained.  Slipped getting on moving trains or cars.  Jumping off moving trains.  Jumping from engines or cars anticipating collision,	5 1	48 203 69 125 145	1 1 2 1 2	26 46 16 63 95	8 7	7 202 41 39 81	1 6 4 6	59 95 26 74 66
C7-		derailment, or other accident.  Fell from engines or cars by reason of defective handholds and sill steps.  Getting on or off moving engine.  Caught in frog, guard rail, or switch.	2	43 43 162	i	27 123 1	1 1	10 48 104 2	1  5 1	6 37 1
'	(10	Total		1,107	16	555	27	765	42	431

#### [Ривыс-No. 171.]

AN ACT Requiring common carriers engaged in interstate commerce to make full reports of all accidents to the Interstate Commerce Commission.

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, It shall be the duty of the general manager, superintendent, or other proper officer of every common carrier engaged in interstate commerce by railroad to make to the Interstate Commerce Commission, at its office in Washington, District of Columbia, a monthly report, under oath, of all collisions of trains or where any train or part of a train accidentally leaves the track, and of all accidents which may occur to its passengers or employees while in the service of such common carrier and actually on duty, which report shall state the nature and causes thereof and the circumstances connected therewith.

- SEC. 2. That any common carrier failing to make such report within thirty days after the end of any month shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor, and upon conviction thereof by a court of competent jurisdiction shall be punished by a fine of not more than one hundred dollars for each and every offense and for every day during which it shall fail to make such report after the time herein specified for making the same.
- Sec. 3. That neither said report nor any part thereof shall be admitted as evidence or used for any purpose against such railroad so making such report in any suit or action for damages growing out of any matter mentioned in said report.
- SEC. 4. That the Interstate Commerce Commission is authorized to prescribe for such common carriers a method and form for making the reports in the foregoing section provided.

Approved, March 3, 1901.

#### SPECIAL INFORMATION CONTAINED IN PRECEDING BULLETINS.

Each accident bulletin contains tables showing the number of passengers and employees killed and injured, and these figures are classified according to cause (see Table No. 1); also tables showing cost of the different classes of train accidents. The causes of accidents to employees in coupling and uncoupling and in falling from cars, etc., are further classified in Tables No. 3 and No. 4. The most serious collisions and derailments are dealt with in a supplementary table (Class A. showing the causes in some detail. Each bulletin is for three months, and No. 1 was for the quarter ending September 30, 1901. The bulletin for the quarter ending June 30 contains, in addition to the quarterly statistics, tables showing the same information for the whole of the fiscal year ending on that date.


Bulletin No. 25 shows 110 passengers killed in train accidents, three collisions and one derailment being responsible for 80 deaths in this class. The number of passengers killed from other causes (mostly their own negligence) also shows a large increase. One of the most serious collisions was due to the misreading of a dispatcher's order, and another to a mistake in sending or receiving the order.

Bulletin No. 26 shows a marked decrease in casualties as compared with preceding quarters, a large falling off in railroad traffic having taken place. The list of "prominent" train accidents includes only three cases which may be classed as notable.

Bulletin No. 27 shows further marked decreases in casualties, incident to the large falling off in railroad traffic. The number of passengers and employees killed in train accidents (125) is the smallest since the monthly records were established. The most fatal accident in this quarter was a collision at a street crossing, where a passengers in an electric car were killed.

a For notes on Bulletins 1-16, see Bulletin No. 17; for notes on Bulletins 17-24, see Bulletin No. 30.

- Bulletin No. 28 recorded the smallest number of passengers killed in train accidents (13) ever reported in the quarterly records. The total of passengers and employees killed in train accidents (112) was 13 less than the previous low record (125, Bulletin 27). Of the 13 passengers killed in train accidents, 7 were victims of a butting collision on an electric railroad.
- Bulletin No. 29 showed totals far smaller than the corresponding quarter one year previous, but the diminution in the number of casualties, which had continued during the year of depression, seemed to have been checked. The number of passengers killed in train accidents was 53, and there were 8 notable collisions.
- Bulletin No. 30 recorded 34 passengers killed in train accidents (including 15 victims of a forest fire). One collision resulted in 8 deaths of passengers and two derailments killed 16 employees.
- Bulletin No. 31, in part, continues the favorable showing of the quarter one year previous (Bulletin 27), though it covers a period of considerable revival of business. One collision caused 20 deaths and 28 injuries.
- Bulletin No. 32 shows a total of 99 passengers and employees killed in train accidents—the lowest quarterly record thus far shown. It is to be observed, however, that a butting collision, causing the death of 9 passengers and 1 employee, occurring on an electric road, was not included, the railroad company having failed to make a report of the accident, as required by law. The quarter in 1908 with which this one is most naturally compared (Bulletin 28) had one collision on an electric line in which 7 persons were killed.



Interstate Commerce Commission 2: 1910
Washington, D. C.

## Accident Bulletin

No. 34

# Railroad Accidents in the United States

During October, November, and December 1909



Washington
Government Printing Office
1910

•						
	•					
		•				
			•			
	-					
				,		

#### ACCIDENT BULLETIN NO. 34

## Collisions and Derailments of Trains

and

## Casualties to Persons

#### on the Railroads of the United States

during the months of

October, November, and December, 1909

INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMMISSION WASHINGTON, D. C.



WASHINGTON
GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
1910

## THE INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMMISSION.

MARTIN A. KNAPP, of New York, Chairman.

JUDSON C. CLEMENTS, of Georgia.

CHARLES A. PROUTY, of Vermont.

FRANCIS M. COCKRELL, of Missouri.

FRANKLIN K. LANE, of California.

EDGAR E. CLARK, of Iowa.

JAMES S. HARLAN, of Illinois.

EDWARD A. MOSELEY, Secretary.

# RAILROAD ACCIDENTS

IN THE UNITED STATES DURING THE THREE MONTHS ENDING DECEMBER 31, 1909.

The number of persons killed in train accidents during the months of October, November, and December, 1909, as shown in reports made by the railroad companies to the Interstate Commerce Commission, under the "accident law" of March 3, 1901, was 244, and of injured, 4,149. Accidents of other kinds, including those sustained by employees while at work and by passengers in getting on or off the cars, etc., bring the total number of casualties up to 22,922 (1,073 killed and 21,849 injured). Accidents to employees resulting in slight injuries, which do not prevent the employee injured from performing his accustomed service for more than three days in the aggregate during the ten days immediately following the accident, are not reported. These reports deal only with employees on duty and passengers. casualties to passengers have been divided into three classes. a includes all ordinary passengers. Class b includes passengers traveling on freight trains. Class bb includes persons who are customarily carried on trains under special arrangements, such as postal clerks and express messengers, employees on Pullman cars, newsboys, livestock tenders, and men in charge of freight. The reported casualties are classified in Table No. 1, given below.

The statistics here given present the record of the standard railroads, for convenience called "steam roads," in distinction from electric railways. The accident statistics of those electric lines on which interstate traffic is carried, and which, therefore, are subject to the federal accident law, are given in a second table, No. 1E, and in Table No. 2E.

TABLE No. 1.—Casualties to persons—October, November, and December, 1909.

					•						
Causes.	Passengers (a and b).		Persons carried under agree- ment or contract (bb).		Tota	d (a, b, 1 bb).	Trai	nmen.	Trainmen in yards.		
	Killed.	Injured.	Killed.	Injured.	Killed.	Injured.	Killed.	Injured.	Killed.	Injured.	
Collisions  Derailments  Miscellaneous train accidents, including locomotive-boiler explosions.	14 14	1,393 510 41	9 2	168 106	23 16	1,561 616 45	60 47 17	577 314 246	14 3	237 34	
Total train accidents	28	1,944	11	278	39	2,222	124	1,137	21	45 316	
			<u> </u>		<b>—</b>		14	272	16	137	
Coupling and uncoupling While doing other work about trains or while attending switches Coming in contact with overhead bridges, structures at side of track, etc	1	6	1	3	2	9	18	2, 482 137	7	851 60	
Failing from cars or engines or while getting on or off. Other causes	46 12	692 663	4 2	19 83	50 14	711 746	64 54	1, 542 255	23 25	653 132	
Total (other than train accidents)	59	1,361	7	105	66	1,466	169	4,688	77	1,833	
Total, all classes	87	3,305	18	383	105	3,688	293	5, 825	98	2, 149	

TABLE No. 1.—Casualties to persons—October, November, and December, 1909—Cont'd.

•	men	d train- (switch- crews).		er em- yees.		al em- yees.	Total persons reported.		
Causes.	Killed.	Injured.	Killed.	Injured.	Killed.	Injured.	Killed.	Injured.	
Collisions.  Derailments.  Miscellaneous train accidents, including loco-	20 7	145 51	26 4	147 49	120 61	1, 106 448	143 77	2,667 1,064	
motive-boiler explosions	1	41	2	41	24	373	24	418	
Total train accidents	28	237	32	237	205	1,927	244	4,149	
Coupling and uncoupling	34	393	2	35	66	837	66	837	
attending switches	13	1,070	6	641	44	5,044	44	5,044	
structures at side of track, etc	5	134	• • • • •	16	30	347	32	356	
on or off	45 31	1,126 142	35 346	37 <b>5</b> 5, 781	167 456	3,696 6,310	217 470	4,407 7.056	
Total (other than train accidents)	128	2,865	389	6,848	763	16, 234	829	17,700	
Total, all classes	156	3, 102	421	7,085	968	18, 161	1,073	21,849	

The quarter here reviewed was one in which there was a large volume of traffic on the principal railroads of the country, and those classes of casualties which occur mainly in the freight-train service show heavy totals. The only collision in which more than 5 persons were killed was that shown in the table of causes as No. 10, and the victims in that case were not passengers; yet the total of passengers killed in collisions is 23. The only derailment in which more than 3 persons were killed was that shown in the table as No. 12. But though accidents which are very prominent by reason of the large number of fatalities attending them are thus shown to have been comparatively few, the list of causes, as shown in the 15 notes explanatory of causes in Table 2A is more than usually varied. The comparisons of the principal totals follow:

TABLE No. 1A.—Comparisons of principal items with last bulletin and with one year back.

	Bulletin 34.	Bulletin 33.	Bulletin 30.
1. Passengers killed in train accidents 2. Passengers killed, all causes 3. Employees killed in train accidents 4. Employees killed in coupling 5. Employees killed, all causes 6. Total passengers and employees killed, all causes	105 205 66 968	56 104 - 137 38 748 852	34 96 150 44 700 796

The total number of collisions and derailments in the quarter now under review was 3,206 (1,745 collisions and 1,461 derailments), of which 257 collisions and 155 derailments affected passenger trains. The damage to cars, engines, and roadway by these accidents

amounted to \$2,733,830. Given more in detail, these facts appear as below (collisions and derailments which cause no death or personal injury and which cause not over \$150 damage to the property of the railroad are not reported):

		_		
	Number.	Loss.	Killed.	Injured.
Collisions, rear Collisions, butting Collisions, train separating Collisions, miscellaneous	221 119	\$421, 188 542, 737 38, 696 445, 343	47 53 2 41	916 920 57 774
Total	1,745	1, 447, 964	143	2,667
Derailments due to defects of roadway, etc	680 119 82	322, 808 512, 275 76, 297 93, 670 25, 735 255, 081	23 8 4 20 5 17	363 135 97 116 63 290
Total	1,461	1, 285, 866	77	1,064
Total collisions and derailments.  Total for same quarter of 1908	2,684	2,733,830 1,940,133 2,962,470	220 173 197	3,731 2,616 3,813

TABLE No. 2.—Collisions and derailments.

Following is the usual list of class A train accidents—all in which the damage is reported at \$10,000 or over, notable cases in which passengers are killed, and those doing damage less than \$10,000 and down to \$2,000, wherever the circumstances or the cause may be of particular interest:

TABLE No. 2A.—Causes of 44 prominent train accidents.

Note.—R stands for rear collision; B, butting collision; M, miscellaneous collisions; D derailment; P, passenger train; F, freight and miscellaneous trains.]

#### No. Class. Kind of train. Cause. in standing at station (9:15 p. m.) not properly protected at rear; atmosphere very smoky from forest fires. (The list of casualties in this accident includes 25 passengers entered as injured who "claimed" to have been injured.) False clear block signal. (See note in text below.) Engineman of engine without train disregarded order to wait at a certain station. Fireman, 23 F. and F... R 1,700 18 2 3 B F. and F.... 2,085 1 . 1 51 years old, in service one month, was killed. 98 B F. and F..... 2,326 Train standing at water tank (9:45 p. m.) not prop-1 4 erly protected by flagman; men in charge of train under the influence of liquor. F. and F ..... B 0 2,690 52 Conductor and engineman, reading a number of 5 orders, confused them and failed to wait at M, as directed in the order; but they also ran past an automatic block signal indicating stop. F. and F..... B 3,300 100 6 0 Men in charge of train waiting on a siding (1 a. m.) slept, and then mistook or carelessly assumed the identity of a passing train. Freight entering side track delayed; flagman did R P. and F..... 3,407 42 7 15 not go back to signal following passenger train. The persons killed were passengers on the freight

### COLLISIONS.

TABLE No. 2A.—Causes of 44 prominent train accidents—Continued.

### COLLISIONS—Continued.

					cars, road-	\$	
No.	Class.	Kind of train.	Killed.	Injured.	Damage to gines, c s n d re way.	Reference record.	Cause.
8	R	F. and F	o	2	4,000	86	False clear block signal. The leading train had been in block section an hour. Engineman also at fault for excessive speed in yard.
9	В	P. and F	0	14	4,027	12	Air brakes of freight train ineffective approaching station; angle cock on car next to engine had been closed; cause unknown.
10	R	F. and F	15	41	4, 100	1	Work train not protected by flag. (See note in text below.)
11	M	P. and F		4	4, 300	103	Passenger train (4 a. m.) ran into side of freight at crossover; engineman asleep. Fireman did not look for signal. Engineman on duty twelve hours.
12	M	P. and F	4	0	5, 300	54	False clear block signal, due to fault in interlocking machine. (See note in text below.)
13 14	BB	P. and F	2 2	33 4	6, 100 6, 500	90 16	Misplaced switch. (See note in text below.) Engineman of southbound train (who was killed forgot meeting order. Conductor in caboose ostensibly was on the lookout approaching the appointed meeting station, but was not quite so vigilant as he should have been.
15	M	P. and F	5	14	8, 200	92	Switching on main track in face of passenger train. (See note in text below.)
16	M	F. and F	0	4	9,000	104	Eastbound train approached meeting point not under control; air brakes inoperative because angle cock behind tender had been closed by a trespasser.
17	В	F. and F	0	3	10, 377	4	Conductor and engineman westbound forgot an order requiring them to wait at G; both experienced men.
18 19	B R	P. and F F. and F	2 0	20 2	10, 584 10, 875	93 89	Misplaced switch. (See note in text below.)
20 21	B	P. and F F. and F	3	5 3	11,652 12,200	46	Failure to protect by flag. (See note in text below.) Flagman fell asleep. (See note in text below.) Engineman disregarded order from dispatcher and also disregarded stop signal given by a flag
22	В	F. and F	0	0	12, 300	13	man.  Dispatcher, overlooking an order on his record sent out opposing extra trains without making for them a meeting point.
23	<b>B</b>	F. and F	1	5	12,600	11	Operator failed to deliver meeting order and engineman (who was killed) ran past an automatic block signal indicating stop.
24	R	P. and F		25	13,600	85	Engineman of freight ran past automatic block signals. Flagman of standing passenger train also held at fault.
25 <b>2</b> 6	B	P. and P	1 5	2 4	15, 160 20, 000	80 96	Failure to flag. (See note in text below.) Conductor and engineman east bound miscalculated
27	В	P. and P.	1 1	82	21,000	22	time. (See note in text below.) Misreading of time by watch. (See note in text
28	R	P. and P		41	21,500	82	below.) Engineman ran past distant and home stitomatic
29	В	P. and F	4	36	23,800	20	signals indicating stop.  Misplaced switch. (See note in text below.)
80	B	P. and F	0	4	25,000	44	Freight starting out of station ran past fixed signs indicating stop.
31	В	P. and F	3	23	90,000	a 45	Mistake of engineman in reading order. (See note in text below.)
	Total	collisions	57	537	379, 333		

### DERAILMENTS.

1 2	D <b>D</b>	P	1 0	53 5	\$2,242 3,000	36 41	Broken rail. (See note in text below.) Broken tender wheel. Steel tire became loosened by reason of bolts of retaining ring having been
3		F					sheared off from some cause unknown.  Landslide (5 a. m.). Track watchman assigned to this section had deserted his post.
5		P	,				Unstable tender. (See note in text below.) Runaway on steep grade; freight train without engine had been left standing on grade with no hand brakes (or insufficient hand brakes) set.
6	D	P	2	19	11,000	121	Excessive speed through crossover track.

TABLE No. 2A.—Causes of 44 prominent train accidents—Continued.

DERAILMENTS-Continued.

No.	Class.	Kind of train.	Killed.	Injured.	Damage to engines, cars, and road-	Reference to record.	Cause.
7	D	P	1	8	11,300	35	Trestle bridge weakened by fire. Dense fog prevented engineman from seeing fire until very near it.
8	D	P	2	72	11,700	125	Excessive speed (40 miles an hour or faster) entering 10° curve. Track in good condition. Engineman and fireman (who were killed) both experienced men.
9	D D	<b>F</b>	0	0	12,000	117	Broken wheel.
10	D	<b>F</b>	1	6	19,900	76	Runaway on steep grade. Cause not discovered; probably bad management of air brakes; engineman killed.
11	D	P	1	4	23,650	38	Rock on track in cut. Cut was in such good condition that the employment of a track watchman
12	D	P	12	29	48,000	115	had not been deemed necessary.  Broken rail. Speed of train 40 miles an hour; curvature of line 1°; descending grade 1 per cent.  Rail, 85 pound, in service three years. Rail found to have defect apparently due to over-
13	D	P	3	47	63,000	112	heating in manufacture. Ten passengers killed. Spreading of track; straight line; speed, 50 miles an hour. Cause obscure.
	Total	• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •	24	256	223,986		
		collisions and	81	702	) 1		
	uen	MHH-01163	97	793	603, 319		

Collision No. 2 was due primarily to the false clearing of a block signal. An eastbound train, P, was run from block station R to block station N without being announced by one signalman to the other. The "controlled manual" apparatus, which should have prevented the clearing of the signal at R, except after consent had been received from N, was out of order, so that the signalman at R could clear it wrongfully. The unlocking of the lever lock was due to grounding of the wire controlling the electric lock. Train P was held at N because of a preceding train in the block ahead, and while standing there, R sent on another train W, and it appears that this was accepted by N, the signalman at N not being aware that train P was standing a short distance in the rear of his home signal. The flagman of the standing train, P, is held responsible for not having gone back with stop signals. Both this man and the signalman at R had had several years' experience. The signalman had been on duty only fiftyfive minutes. This signalman claims that he announced both trains but his statement is not accepted by the superintendent.

Collision No. 10, killing 14 laborers on a work train and injuring 38, and also killing 1 and injuring 3 trainmen, was caused by the forget-fulness of the conductor and engineman who, while occupying the main track with a work train, neglected to send out a flag to stop trains from the west. The collision occurred about noon. The conductor and engineman of the work train, when starting out in the morning, about 7 o'clock, were handed copies of an order requiring

them to protect their train against a certain eastbound train after 10.30 a.m. This they did not do, both having forgotten the order. Both were experienced men, classed as capable, careful, and intelligent.

Collision No. 12, in which 4 employees were killed, was due to a fault in an electro-pneumatic interlocking machine. An eastbound passenger train, approaching J at ordinary speed, was turned through a cross-over track and collided with a locomotive moving westward on the westbound track, though the signals, both home and distant, approaching the cross-over, indicated that the switch was right for the passenger train to proceed along the main line. A train had passed through this cross-over a few minutes before, and after its passage the signalman in the cabin had moved the proper lever to reset the switches of the cross-over in position for movements along each of the two main tracks. For some reason unknown the switches did not respond to this movement of the lever and remained set for train movements through the cross-over. Assuming that the route was set along the main tracks "straight," the signalman cleared the signals for the passenger train. With the interlocking apparatus in good order he would have been unable to do this, as the signal levers would have been locked immovable; but by the loosening of a contact spring in the machine an improper electrical contact was completed, and the machine therefore failed to perform its function of preventing the wrongful clearing of the signals for a main-track movement. The trouble with the spring was that it was not properly fastened to its base. A more secure method of fastening for apparatus of this kind has now been adopted by the road.

Collision No. 13 was due to the misplacement of a switch by a brakeman 22 years of age, of seventeen months' experience, and of good character. The freight train, eastbound, was standing on a side-track waiting for a westbound passenger train. The brakeman was under the impression that his train had entered the side track because the engine was leaking and for no other reason, and that as soon as the engineman could get up steam the train would proceed. On this presumption he set the switch to connect the siding with the main line; and a few minutes afterwards the passenger train came on at full speed, and, running into the siding, collided with the standing freight train. The line being curved and the view obscured, the passenger engineman had no view of the switch until he was very close to it. The fireman of this train, who could have seen this switch farther away, was killed.

Collision No. 15, occurring very early in the morning, before daylight, was due to the misconduct of a switch tender. The line on which it occurred is equipped with automatic block signals, and at the yard in question the yardmaster, who supervises the operations of switching engines, authorizes such engines to occupy the main track

when a passenger train is due, provided he has received definite information that the train is behind time. Before allowing a switching engine to enter the main track a switch must be set connecting the siding or cross-over with the main track, and the setting of this switch automatically causes the setting of the block signal for that section in position to stop any approaching train. At each switch there is an electric indicator by observing which the attendant, when he is about to set a switch, can see whether or not the block section is already occupied; that is to say, whether or not an approaching train has already passed the block signal. When the indicator thus indicates, he must not set the switch for the siding. In this case the switch tender, a man of three years' experience, set the switch for the siding without looking at the indicator and without having received authority from the yardmaster. His statement that he had received a handmotion signal from the yardmaster is not accepted by the superintendent, the evidence showing that such could not have been the case.

Collision No. 18 was due to a misplaced switch, the lock of which had been taken off and the light of which had been extinguished; and the officers of the road are satisfied that the switch was misplaced by unknown persons intending to wreck the passenger train. The collision occurred at about 9 p. m. The switch was known to have been in the right position and with its light properly burning at 7 p. m. It had been used at 8:25 p. m., but as the switch rail and all the other appurtenances were found in perfect condition, it is concluded that the switch could not have been left misplaced at that time. The approach to the switch is on a curve of 6°, shortening the view, and there was also a dense fog; and, in consequence of the fog, the engineman did not note the absence of the light until he was very close to the switch. This engineman was a runner of twentynine years' experience.

Collision No. 19, occurring on a single-track line, is reported as due to wrongful or careless dependence on an automatic block signal. A freight train about to enter the siding at S was not stopped at the proper place and had to be set back a short distance (on the main line) to be in position to enter the siding. It was moved back so as to foul the next block section in the rear, but no flagman was sent back, and a following train came on and collided with the rear of the first named, the second train having entered the block (under a clear signal) before the backing freight entered it. The men in charge of the backing freight believed or assumed that the signal at their end of the block was clear, indicating that no train was approaching; but the superintendent concludes that this signal changed from "clear" to "stop" before the caboose passed it. The omission of the train to stop before reaching the side-track switch is reported as due to an error on the part of a telegraph operator.

Collision No. 20, between a northbound passenger train and southbound freight, was due to the neglect of a flagman and the failure of a delayed freight train to give suitable notice of its whereabouts. The freight was delayed 5 miles north of D. After about four hours the engine of this freight ran forward to D, carrying a flagman, who was left there to stop the northbound train, the engine then returning to its train, one car of which was off the track. The flagman, after remaining at this station about seven hours, was sitting on the steps of the caboose of a freight train standing on the side track, with his lantern on one of the lower steps of the caboose, between his feet. While so sitting he fell asleep and was not aroused until the northbound passenger train came along and passed him; and then it was too late to give a signal to the passenger train, which passed on and collided with the freight about 4 miles north. The red lantern, being on the steps of the caboose, was hidden from the view of the engineman of the passenger train. It appears that this flagman was wide awake only a few moments before the passenger train passed. He had been in the service seven months. The conductor of the freight train is censured for not having advised the train dispatcher of his movements. The operator at D was authorized by the dispatcher to clear his fixed signal for the passenger train. The conductor and the flagman of the freight had been on duty sixteen hours and fifty-nine minutes, their train having been delayed eleven hours and forty-eight minutes by the breaking down of a car. The operator at D and the dispatcher are held blameless, for the reason that the delayed freight was not obliged to come to D to clear the passenger train, but could use a side track between D and the point where the Both dispatcher and operator therefore were breakdown occurred. held justifiable in assuming that the men in charge of the freight would protect their train adequately by flag.

Collision No. 25 occurred within yard limits, and the responsibility is charged against the conductor and engineman of the northbound train and the engineman of the southbound. The northbound train, belonging to road A, was running on the track of road B, this being its regular route for a short distance within the yard. Its right on the track of road B was the same as that of a yard train—it must keep out of the way of regular passenger trains of road B. this case the passenger train of road B was one hour and fifty minutes late, and the train of road A appears to have occupied the main track without being officially informed as to how late the southbound train The collision occurred at the diverging track where the northbound train was to leave the track of road B. A flagman was sent out to stop the southbound train; but he did not succeed in doing so. Either he did not start soon enough or did not go far enough, or else the southbound engineman did not properly heed the flagman's signals. The report is inconclusive, because of a disagreement between the officers of the two roads as to the facts in the case and the conditions governing. Under the rule the southbound train should have approached this junction with speed under full control.

The train at fault in collision No. 26 was an eastbound regular freight holding an order to run ten minutes late. It ran only three minutes late. The engineman says that he trusted to his memory that he was due at F at 7:39; whereas that was the time by a time table which had expired, and the correct time was 7:49. The conductor says that before reaching F he examined the time table, but by mistake read the time against T, the next station west of F.

Collision No. 27 between a southbound regular and a northbound extra passenger train, occurring about 10 p. m., badly damaged both engines and destroyed three cars carrying passengers. One passenger was killed and 75 passengers and 7 trainmen were injured. The northbound passenger train was running on a telegraphic order, according to the terms of which it should have kept clear of the southbound. The primary reason for its failure to do so, according to the report, was the mistake of the conductor in reading the time by his watch. He says that he gained the impression that he had fifteen minutes more time to reach F than actually was the case. The trains met on a curve at speeds estimated at 30 or 40 miles an hour. The conductor's explanation of his mistake with the watch was that while his regular watch was being repaired he carried one in which the dial was in a different position as related to the top of the case; but it appears that at the time of the accident he had resumed the use of his own watch, and had been carrying it for several days. This conductor had been in the service sixteen years. The engineman was also at fault for disregarding the time order, but the report has no reference to his testimony, as he was badly injured and was confined to the hospital.

Collision No. 29 was due to the careless misplacement of a switch by a brakeman. A westbound freight train stood on the siding waiting for an eastbound passenger train to pass. While it stood there the front brakeman of the train went to the switch, some distance forward from the place where the locomotive stood, unlocked it, and turned it so as to let the passenger train enter the side track. passenger train came on at about 50 miles an hour and collided with the freight engine. Both engines were very badly damaged, and the first two cars in each train were demolished. Two mail clerks, 1 engineman, and 1 fireman were killed, and 30 passengers and 6 employees were injured. The engineman of the freight is held blameworthy for not seeing that the switch near his engine was in the proper position; the passenger engineman is held blameworthy for not observing a semaphore signal which was in the stop position, warning him that the switch was wrong; the conductor and the fireman of the freight are also held responsible, as well as the engineman, and the fireman on the passenger train is held blameworthy for not cooperating with his engineman in keeping a lookout for the semaphore signal. The brakeman primarily at fault has been in the service three years, the passenger engineman twenty-three years, and the others named two years or more each, except the passenger fireman, whose term of service has been only eight months. The semaphore which was in position to warn the passenger engineman that the switch was in the wrong position is situated exactly opposite the switch and is 18 feet high. It moves simultaneously with the switch. It was clearly visible for many hundred feet, the line of the road being straight for 2 miles west. It had been in the warning position two minutes or more before the passenger train arrived.

Collision No. 31, occurring at 12:10 a.m., and causing 3 deaths and 23 injuries, was due to the mistake of an engineman in reading an order. This engine was running without a train and there was no conductor. It was running west, backward, and met an eastbound passenger train at a point where, in consequence of a curve in the line and a hill on one side, there was a very short view. The three men on the engine of the passenger train, engineman, fireman, and pilot, were killed. The westbound engine had been standing for some time at L, on a side track, about 1,200 feet west of the station. On receiving from the telegrapher at the station an order to run to the next station, the engineman directed the fireman to set the switch for the movement to the main line. After this movement the fireman reset the switch for the main line and the engine proceeded. While waiting on the side track the engineman had made some repairs to his engine, one of the driving-wheel springs having got slightly out of place; and in the explanation which he gave after the collision he says that while at work on the engine he sustained a blow by a hammer on his forehead and that, temporarily, he lost his memory; and that he had no recollection of receiving the order or of starting his engine, nor of the collision. The testimony of the fireman, however, indicates that at no time did the engineman behave otherwise than in a rational manner, nor had he said anything to the fireman or to the telegrapher (who delivered the order) about having been hurt.

The order directed the engine to run from L to P, but to meet the eastbound passenger train at L; that is to say, the movement to P could not be begun until after the passenger train had arrived at L. The engineman proceeded, however, in precisely the same way that he would have done had there been no meeting clause in the order.

This engineman is 29 years old and had been in the service of the company about nine months, with a satisfactory record up to the time of this collision. He was thrown out of the cab and sustained some injuries. He had been on duty about sixteen hours and thirty minutes. His regular hours of duty on that day were from 7 a. m. to 7 p. m., on a pushing engine, but he had been delayed about two

hours on account of a blockade of trains due to the failure of the boiler of a locomotive.

The very heavy loss occasioned by this collision is due in part to the destruction of six passenger cars by fire. When the train came to rest after the collision, one of the cars was standing immediately over a large mass of burning coals which had fallen out of the fire box of one of the engines, and before it was possible to extinguish the fire an acetylene tank exploded, spreading the fire and rendering it uncontrollable.

Derailment No. 1 was due to a broken rail. The engine passed over the track at this point in safety, but the engineman felt a jar and applied the brakes so that his train was stopped in about 900 feet. The first seven cars of the train were derailed, and the eighth and ninth (the last) were derailed and overturned. The rail was of a size weighing 100 pounds to the yard, and was 33 feet long, laid in 1904. There was a flaw near one end. It appears that the rail had been broken by a train which passed over the track about thirty minutes ahead of the one which was derailed. In this leading train some disturbance was noticed by a messenger in the tenth car, and also by the conductor. The conductor pulled the cord to give the whistle signal in the cab of the locomotive to stop the train, but the air pipe through which this signal would have to be effected had been broken, evidently at the time the train passed over the broken rail, and therefore no signal reached the engine. The disturbance lasted only two or three seconds, and as the train ran on smoothly the conductor did not attempt to apply the air brakes; but he went to the rear to consult the rear brakeman, and the train ran more than a mile before it was stopped, the stopping being finally effected by the automatic application of the air brakes, due to the bursting of an air hose, caused primarily, no doubt, by something flying up from the track at the time the broken rail was passed. At the same time several pedestals and journal boxes were broken. The flagman of this train was sent back to search for the defect or obstruction, but he did not reach the point of trouble until after the following train had passed over the broken rail and had been derailed.

Derailment No. 4 is attributed to faults in the tender of the locomotive. The report says: "The speed of the train was about 45 miles an hour. The tender was about half full of water, and contained about 18,000 pounds of coal, placed mostly toward the back of the tender, and therefore resting principally on the rear truck, leaving the front truck with a light load only. The center of gravity of the tender is high. The vertical oscillation or galloping of the tender, due to unevenness in track, would tend to still further decrease the weight on the front truck; and this, together with the swinging or rocking of the tender allowed by the side-bearing clearance, which was slightly excessive, caused by the intermittent soft spots or

imperfections in the low rail of the track, further influenced by the surging of the water in the tender, would at the moment when these effects acted in the same direction produce side strain sufficiently intense to relieve some of the wheels of their load, and even lift the wheels, and naturally would first affect the guiding wheels of the truck having the least load, which in this case was the first pair of wheels.

"This derailment can only be attributed to the combination of all or part of the effective causes named. This conclusion is borne out by the fact that there have been quite a number of mysterious tender derailments where the leading wheels left the track, not only on our own railroad, but on others; and while opinions have varied somewhat as to the cause, in many cases it has been attributed to what might be termed the synchronism of the different motions of the tender itself and that of the engine, with the undulations produced by track imperfections."

TABLE 3.—Causes of accidents to employees in coupling and uncoupling cars.

	Causes.		nin- en.	me	ain- n in rds.	trs m (swi	ord din- en ltch- lg ws).	Oti en ploy	<b>2</b> -
enocass.		Killed.	Injured.	Killed.	Injured.	Killed.	Injured.	Killed.	Injured.
1 2 3 4 5	Adjusting coupler with foot.  Adjusting coupler, cars accidentally started.  Careless manipulation of uncoupling lever.  Cars not equipped with automatic coupler.  Coupler broken, using link and pin or chain.		15 6 8 1 5	2	9 5 5	1	30 8 11 1		2
67	Coupling damaged care		7	2	7	3	19 8	• • • •	4
8	too sharp for automatic coupling. Coupling with chain or other emergency appliance because of uneven track				••••		••••		····
0	Coupling or uncoupling safety chains.  Fingers or hand caught between uncoupling lever and body of car	••••	<b>3</b> <b>50</b>	••••	2 25		65		3
1 2	Uncoupling without using lever (unnecessary)	1	3	••••	6		13		••••
3	ing order	1	17	2	16 2	2 2	36 9		' 1
5	miscalculated speed.  Opening knuckle when cars were near together, engine accidentally started.	3	40	3	3	2	35		. 4
6	Opening knuckle, part of defective coupler fell on foot  Opening knuckle, lost footing	1	12	2	1 5	3	14 19		
8 9	Riding on car to uncouple, slipped off	i	8 7	• • • •	5	2	14 13	i	· 1
21	Caught by unexpected movement of car, due to mistake or	2	14	1	10	4	18	<b></b> .	
223	misunderstanding in giving hand signals	1	13	1	4	3 5	6 19		
4 5	Went between cars unnecessarily and contrary to rule  Hand caught between projecting load and end of next car		11	3	1	3	16 2	1	
6 7 8	No witness (fatal injury). Other causes. Unexplained		14 6		4	1.	20 10	• • • •	3
	Total	14	272	16	187	34	393	3	35

### Details of injuries included in Table 3, subclass 27.

O. 1. Clothes caught on corner of car.

O. 2. Car ran over torpedo, which exploded, injuring legs.

O. 3. Lump of coal fell off car, bruising head.

O. 4. Caught hand in brake wheel.

O. 5. Foot caught under pilot of engine.

O. 6. Stepped off culvert.

- O. 7. Slipped and fell, spraining ankle.
- O. 8. Foot mashed under engine. O. 9. Cut finger on sliver of steel.

O. 10. Door fell off car.

- O. 11. Air hose flew up, striking knee.
- O. 12. Struck on knee by air hose.
- O. 13. Coupling engine to tender, caught finger in coupler. O. 14. Finger mashed by air hose flying up.
- N. 1. Lump of coal rolled off car, breaking finger.
- N. 2. Car door fell on hand.
- N. 3. Struck in face by casting which broke off coupler.N. 4. Steam hose uncoupled, scalding hands.
- N. 5. Shoulder bruised by piece of iron falling from car.
- N. 6. Clothing caught on car, causing a fail.
- N. 7. Air hose struck leg.
- N. 8. Air hose struck knee.
- N. 9. Caught finger under coupling pin.
- N. 10. Caught finger under lip of coupler.
- N. 11. Air hose flew up, bruising ankle. N. 12. Bumped head on brake beam.
- D. 1. Hand slipped behind drawbar, cutting off finger.
  D. 2. Foot caught under wheel.
- D. 3. Struck by corner of car.
- D. 4. Hand caught by reason of coupler being covered with ica.
- D. 5. Struck by car; ribs fractured.
- D. 6. Stepped on piece of coal.D. 7. Standing on platform, when platform broke. D. 8. Caught by log which projected over end of car.
- D. 9. Stepped on nail.
- D. 10. Stepped on nail.
- D. 11. Stepped on nail.
- D. 12. Air hose flew up, cutting face.D. 13. Piece of iron fell from car.
- D. 14. Stepped on lump of coal, spraining ankle.

D. 15. Foot caught under wheel.

TABLE 3A.—Nature of injuries to employees in coupling and uncoupling cars.

Injuries.	Trainmen.	Trainmen in yards.	Yard trainmen.	Other employees
Loss of feet	4	1	5	
Loss of legs	3	1	4	
Loss of armsLoss of hands	2		†	1
Loss of fingers.	13	4	15	
Loss of toes.	2		2	
Fractured skullFractured leg		1		1
Fractured arm.		2	8	
Fractured collar bone or ribs	4	3	7	
Fractured other bones	8	2	5	1
Contusion of head or body	30 25	19	69 33	ļ
Contusion or laceration of toes.	4	5	14	
Contusion or laceration of legs	17	6	30	
Contusion or laceration of arms	16	15	19	
Contusion or laceration of flands	37 72	21 36	35 111	
Dislocation	2	1	i	
nternal injuries	3		2	
Sprains	15 8	5	25	į
Liscellaneous		6		
Total injured	272	137	393	3
Killed	14	16	34	
Total killed and injured	286	153	427	3

### RECAPITULATION.

Total killed. Total injured.	66 837
Total killed and injured	002

TAPLE 4.—Causes of accidents to employees classified (C6 and C7) as falling from and getting on or off cars and engines.

Fell from roof of box car by reason of—  Defect in car.  Ice or snow.  Parting of train. Derailment, collision, or shock due to abnormal movements of cars other than those in subclass 3.  While setting brakes.	Killed.	1 =			1	ews).	Other em- ployees.	
Defect in car.  Ice or snow.  Parting of train.  Derailment, collision, or shock due to abnormal movements of cars other than those in subclass 3.	K	Injured	Killed.	Injured.	Killed.	Injured.	Killed.	Injured.
Fell from— Coal car Freight car other than box or coal car. Engine or tender. Passenger car. Engines, tenders, or cars (all kinds) not in motion.  Miscellaneous causes. Not clearly explained. Slipped getting on moving trains or cars. Jumping off moving trains Jumping from engines or cars anticipating collision, derailment, or other accident Fell from engines or cars by reason of defective handholds and sill steps. Getting on or off moving engine Caught in frog, guard rall, or switch.  Total	1 2 3 4 11 2 9 16 4 2 1	8 10 13 61 50 8 56 170 8 79 278 81 158 200 69	2 3 1 1 4 2 1	2 5 8 30 32 3 14 92 7 34 56 21 44 137 5	8 1 2 2 2 6 10	96 60 5 17 42 2 34 307 74 96 133	1 2 3 2 1 2 3 5 6 3	1 5 2 2 15 26 72 74 23 154 4 5 45

### ACCIDENTS ON ELECTRIC RAILWAYS.

TABLE No. 1E.—Casualties to persons, October, November, and December, 1909.

	g	Passen- gers		Persons carried under agreement or contract (bb).		carried under agree- ment or con- tract		otal i, b, i bb).	b, Tra			
	Killed.	Injured.	Killed.	Injured.	Killed.	Injured.	Killed.	Injured.	Killed.	Injured.		
Collisions	3 1 1	138 57 14			3 1 1	138 57 14		12 2 1				
Total train accidents	5	209			5	200		15				
Coupling or uncoupling. While doing other work about trains or while attending switches.						••••	1	1	` <del></del> '	<del></del>		
Coming in contact with overhead bridges, structures at side of track, etc.  Falling from vehicles or while getting on or off  Other causes.	1 6	3 286 47		••••	1 6	3 286 47	2	14 2 12 6		i		
Total (other than train accidents)	7	336			7	336	3	35	1	1		
Total, all classes	12	545			12	545	3	50	1	1		

TABLE No. 1E.—Casualties to persons, October, November, and December, 1909—Cont'd.

	trai (swi	ard nmen tching ws).		er em- yees.		al em- yees.		
	Killed.	Injured.	Killed.	Injured.	Killed.	Injured.	Killed.	Injured.
Collisions. Derailments. Miscellaneous train accidents.			1	7	1	19 2 1	: 4 1 1	157 59 15
Total train accidents			1	7	1	22	6	231
Coupling or uncoupling.  While doing other work about trains or while attending switches.  Coming in contact with overhead bridges, structures at	1	. 1		5	1 2	2 21	1 2	2 21
side of track, etc. Falling from vehicles or while getting on or off. Other causes	ſ	2	1 7	4 25	1 9	19 31	7 9	5 305 78
Total (other than train accidents)	1	5	8	34	13	75	20	411
Total, all classes	1	5	9	41	14	97	26	642

TABLE No. 2E.—Collisions and derailments.

	Number.	Loss.	Killed.	Injured.
Collisions, rear	14	\$1.391 4,250		<b>49</b> 51
Collisions, trains separating	21	7,000	4	61
Total	53	12, 641	4	161
Derailments due to defects of roadway, etc		175		8
Derailments due to negligence of trainmen, signalmen, etc  Derailments due to unforeseen obstruction of track, etc  Derailments due to malicious obstruction of track, etc	1 1	250		5 1
Derailments due to miscellaneous causes	7	6, <b>250</b>	1	47
Total	13	6, 675	1	61
Total collisions and derailments	66	19.316	5	222

### [Ривыс-No. 171.]

AN ACT Requiring common carriers engaged in interstate commerce to make full reports of all accidents to the Interstate Commerce Commission.

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, It shall be the duty of the general manager, superintendent, or other proper officer of every common carrier engaged in interstate commerce by railroad to make to the Interstate Commerce Commission, at its office in Washington, District of Columbia, a monthly report, under oath, of all collisions of trains or where any train or part of a train accidentally leaves the track, and of all accidents which may occur to its passengers or employees while in the service of such common carrier and actually on duty, which report shall state the nature and causes thereof and the circumstances connected therewith.

SEC. 2. That any common carrier failing to make such report within thirty days after the end of any month shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor, and upon conviction thereof by a court of competent jurisdiction shall be punished by a fine of

not more than one hundred dollars for each and every offense and for every day during which it shall fail to make such report after the time herein specified for making the same.

- SEC. 3. That neither said report nor any part thereof shall be admitted as evidence or used for any purpose against such railroad so making such report in any suit or action for damages growing out of any matter mentioned in said report.
- SEC. 4. That the Interstate Commerce Commission is authorized to prescribe for such common carriers a method and form for making the reports in the foregoing section provided.

Approved, March 3, 1901.

### SPECIAL INFORMATION CONTAINED IN PRECEDING BULLETINS.

Each accident bulletin contains tables showing the number of passengers and employees killed and injured, and these figures are classified according to cause (see Table No. 1); also tables showing cost of the different classes of train accidents. The causes of accidents to employees in coupling and uncoupling and in falling from cars, etc., are further classified in Tables No. 3 and No. 4. The most serious collisions and derailments are dealt with in a supplementary table (Class A), showing the causes in some detail. Each bulletin is for three months, and No. 1 was for the quarter ending September 30, 1901. The bulletin for the quarter ending June 30 contains, in addition to the quarterly statistics, tables showing the same information for the whole of the fiscal year ending on that date.

Bulletin No. 25 shows 110 passengers killed in train accidents, three collisions and one derailment being responsible for 80 deaths in this class. The number of passengers killed from other causes (mostly their own negligence) also shows a large increase. One of the most serious collisions was due to the misreading of a dispatcher's order, and another to a mistake in sending or receiving the order.

Bulletin No. 26 shows a marked decrease in casualties as compared with preceding quarters, a large falling off in railroad traffic having taken place. The list of "prominent" train accidents includes only three cases which may be classed as notable.

Bulletin No. 27 shows further marked decreases in casualties, incident to the large falling off in railroad traffic. The number of passengers and employees killed in train accidents (125) is the smallest since the monthly records were established. The most fatal accident in this quarter was a collision at a street crossing, where 8 passengers in an electric car were killed.

Bulletin No. 28 recorded the smallest number of passengers killed in train accidents (13) ever reported in the quarterly records. The total of passengers and employees killed in train accidents (112) was 13 less than the previous low record (125, Bulletin 27). Of the 13 passengers killed in train accidents, 7 were victims of a butting collision on an electric railroad.

Bulletin No. 29 showed totals far smaller than the corresponding quarter one year previous, but the diminution in the number of casualties, which had continued during the year of depression, seemed to have been checked. The number of passengers killed in train accidents was 53, and there were 8 notable collisions.

Bulletin No. 30 recorded 34 passengers killed in train accidents (including 15 victims of a forest fire). One collision resulted in 8 deaths of passengers and two derailments killed 16 employees.

Bulletin No. 31, in part, continues the favorable showing of the quarter one year previous (Bulletin 27), though it covers a period of considerable revival of business. One collision caused 20 deaths and 28 injuries.

a For notes on Bulletins 1-16, see Bulletin No. 17; for notes on Bulletins 17-24, see Bulletin No. 30.

Bulletin No. 32 shows a total of 99 passengers and employees killed in train accidents—the lowest quarterly record thus far shown. It is to be observed, however, that a butting collision, causing the death of 9 passengers and 1 employee, occurring on an electric road, was not included, the railroad company having failed to make a report of the accident, as required by law. The quarter in 1908 with which this one is most naturally compared (Bulletin 28) had one collision on an electric line in which 7 persons were killed.

Bulletin No. 33 shows considerable increases in most of the casualty items, marking the expansion of traffic on all of the principal railroads. Five accidents—4 collisions and 1 derailment—caused 47 deaths.

O



AUG 11 1910

Washington, D. C.

# Accident Bulletin


No. 35

# Railroad, Accidents in the United States

During January, February, and March 1910



Washington
Government Printing Office
1910



## ACCIDENT BULLETIN NO. 35

# Collisions and Derailments of Trains

and

# Casualties to Persons

on the Railroads of the United States

during the months of

January, February, and March, 1910

INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMMISSION WASHINGTON, D. C.



WASHINGTON
COVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
1910

## THE INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMMISSION.

MARTIN A. KNAPP, of New York, Chairman.
JUDSON C. CLEMENTS, of Georgia.
CHARLES A. PROUTY, of Vermont.
FRANCIS M. COCKRELL, of Missouri.
FRANKLIN K. LANE, of California.
EDGAR E. CLARK, of Iowa.
JAMES S. HARLAN, of Illinois.
EDWARD A. MOSELEY, Secretary.

2

51390°

## RAILROAD ACCIDENTS

IN THE UNITED STATES DURING THE THREE MONTHS ENDING MARCH 81, 1910.

The number of persons killed in train accidents during the months of January, February, and March, 1910, as shown in reports made by the railroad companies to the Interstate Commerce Commission under the "accident law" of March 3, 1901, was 352, and of injured, 3,717. Accidents of other kinds, including those sustained by employees while at work and by passengers in getting on or off the cars, etc., bring the total number of casualties up to 22,332 (1,100 killed and 21,232 injured). Accidents to employees resulting in slight injuries, which do not prevent the employee injured from performing his accustomed service for more than three days in the aggregate during the ten days immediately following the accident, are not reported. These reports deal only with employees on duty and passengers. The casualties to passengers have been divided into three Class a includes all ordinary passengers. Class b includes passengers traveling on freight trains. Class bb includes persons who are customarily carried on trains under special arrangements, such as postal clerks and express messengers, employees on Pullman cars, newsboys, live-stock tenders, and men in charge of freight. The reported casualties are classified in Table No. 1, given below.

The statistics here given present the record of the standard railroads, for convenience called "steam roads," in distinction from electric railways. The accident statistics of those electric lines on which interstate traffic is carried, and which, therefore, are subject to the federal accident law, are given in a second table, No. 1z, and in Table No. 2z.

TABLE No. 1.—Casualties to persons—January, February, and March, 1910.

			•								
Camous.	Pass (c s	engers nd b).	OOL SACI Met OOL	sons ried der ree- at or tract b).	Tota and	d (c. i 1 šš).	Tra	inmen.	Trainmea in yards.		
	Killed.	Injured	Killed.	Injured.	Killed.	Injured.	Killed.	Injured.	Killed.	Injured.	
Collisions Derailments Miscellaneous train accidents, including loco-	46	757 687	7	1 <b>65</b> 78	11 47	92 76		<b>53</b> 8 <b>33</b> 5	12	189	
motive-boiler explosions	52	30	• • • •	12	52	4	2 37	298	1	71	
Total train accidents	102	1,474	8	255	110	1,72	9 170	1,171	1.5	290	
Coupling or uncoupling		•••••			••••		21	228	9	133	
attending switches	<b> </b>	• • • • •				<b> </b>	11	2,516	9	839	
structures at side of track, etc		2	<b> </b>	• • • • •		,	2 13	190	3	66	
Falling from cars or engines or while getting on or off. Other causes	27 14	502 591	<b>4</b>	19 93	27 18	52 68		1,434 258	24 34	<b>50</b> 5 182	
Total (other than train accidents)	41	1,095	4	112	45	1,20	7 142	4,626	79	1,817	
Total all classes	143	2,569	12	367	155	2, 98	6 312	5,797	94	2, 116	
Company	men						al em-		al persons eported.		
Causes.	Killed.	Injured.	Killed.		Injured.	Killed.	Injured.	Killed.		Injured.	
Collisions	11 9	161 63		1 B	116 87	103 83	1,004 524			1,926 1,299	
motive-boiler explosions		41	11	В	50	56	460	108		502	
Total train accidents	20	265	3	7	253	242	1,988	352		3,717	
Coupling or uncoupling.  While doing other work about trains or while attending switches.	24 11	411 1,048		3	41 527	57 41	813 4,930			813 4,930	
Coming in contact with overhead bridges, structures at side of track, etc.	4	125		1	14	21	397	ŀ		399	
Falling from cars or engines or while getting on or off	31 34	1,252 191			384 .872	138 446	3,665 6,503			4, 186 7, 187	
	O.F.	121	30	-   -	, 01 4		<u> </u>		<del> </del>	<del></del>	
Total (other than train accidents)	104	3,027	37	8 6	, 838	703	16,308	748	1	17,515	

The total number of casualties to passengers in this quarter is swelled by two great disasters, an avalanche in the State of Washington and a derailment in Iowa, both in the month of March. The circumstances of these accidents are briefly summarized in the following pages (following Table 2A). In other respects the present record shows no remarkable differences as compared with the pre-

ceding quarter or with the corresponding quarter one year ago (Bulletin 31), bearing in mind the fact that Bulletin 31 represents a time when there was still an abnormally low volume of traffic on many roads. The principal comparisons follow:

TABLE No. 1A .- Comparisons of principal items with last bulletin and with one year back.

	Bulletin	Bulletin	Bulletin
	35.	34.	31.
1. Passengers killed in train accidents 2. Passengers killed, all causes 3. Employees killed in train accidents 4. Employees killed in coupling 5. Employees killed, all causes 6. Total passengers and employees killed, all causes	110	39	87
	156	105	80
	242	205	140
	57	66	44
	945	968	863
	1,100	1,073	663

The total number of collisions and derailments in the quarter now under review was 3,163 (1,581 collisions and 1,582 derailments), of which 218 collisions and 185 derailments affected passenger trains. The damage to cars, engines, and roadway by these accidents amounted to \$2,607,553. Given more in detail, these facts appear as below (collisions and derailments which cause no death or personal injury and which cause not over \$150 damage to the property of the railroad are not reported):

TABLE No. 2.—Collisions and derailments.

	Number.	Loss.	Killed.	Injured.
Collisions, rear Collisions, butting Collisions, train separating Collisions, miscellaneous	183	\$470, 488 280, 574 29, 826 377, 818	36 53 2 23	650 630 36 610
Total	1,581	1, 258, 706	114	1,926
Derailments due to defects of roadway, etc.  Derailments due to defects of equipment.  Derailments due to negligence of trainmen, signalmen, etc.  Derailments due to unioreseen obstruction of track, etc.  Derailments due to malicious obstruction of track, etc.  Derailments due to miscellaneous causes.	711 78 126 17	215, 421 509, 500 54, 185 163, 868 31, 531 284, 252	8 15 1 14 1 91	406 204 52 246 22 361
Total	1,582	1, 348, 847	180	1, 289
Total collisions and derailments. Total for same quarter of 1909.  1908.  1907.	2, 284	2, 607, 558 1, 847, 202 1, 977, 419 3, 536, 110	244 163 114 355	8, 215 2, 315 2, 455 4, 459

Following is the usual list of Class A train accidents—all in which the damage is reported at \$10,000 or over, notable cases in which passengers are killed, and those doing damage less than \$10,000 and down to \$2,000, wherever the circumstances or the cause may be of particular interest.

TABLE No. 2A.—Causes of 42 prominent train accidents.

[Norm.—R stands for rear collision; B, butting collision; M, miscellaneous collisions; D, derailment; P, passenger train; F, freight and miscellaneous trains.]

### COLLIBIONS.

					· ·	TULL	OUND.
No.	Class.	Kind of train.	Killed.	Injured.	Damage to engines, cars, s n d road-way.	Reference to record.	Cause.
1	R	F. and F	2	5	\$1,000	7	Failure to heed automatic block signal; also failure of flagman to go back with flag; brakeman's
2	В	P. and F	1	7	2,000	13	experience, 4 months. (Two drovers killed.) Engineman of light engine forgot passenger train. although the dispatcher had had occasion, in conversation with him, to mention this par- ticular train; this engineman ran his engine into that of the opposing train, yet never saw it, although the collision occurred in broad day- light; after the crash the engineman supposed that it was due to the explosion of the boiler of his own engine.
3	В	F. and F	2	3	2,642	74	Operator wrote wrong station name in order; 2 operators at other stations testify that the name was correctly sent by the dispatcher, and that in the repetition of the order also the name was correctly transmitted by the station operator.
4	В	P. and F	0	3	5, 131	11	Misreading of order by engineman. (See note in text below.)
5	R	P. and F	1	16	5, 420	2	Passenger train ran past automatic block signal; engineman and fireman were working on in-
6	В	P. and P	2	8	8,600	9	jector; engineman's experience, 41 years. Collision at meeting point 2 a. m.; westbound train continued on main track contrary to its meeting order, which said it must enter the siding; engineman misread order.
7	В	P and F	3	9	8,671	15	Collision occurred in yard; passenger train moving backward, as is customary; an engine without train moving in the opposite direction was traveling on the wrong track. On the rear car of the passenger train—the leading car as it was moving—a passenger standing on the car platform
8	В	F and F	1	4	9,500	6	was killed Engineman of engine without train forgot an order. This engineman decamped. The fireman was killed.
9	В	F and F	2	4	10, 170	70	Extra train eastbound encroached on time of rec-
10	R	F and F	2	4	10,600	5	der to wait at B till 2:40 a. m.; left before that
11	В	F and F	3	5	10, 921	72	time; did not look at their watches. Operator neglected to deliver order. (See note in text below.)
12	R	F and F	1	2	11,200	64	Excessive speed in fog, 3 a. m.; passed automatic
13	R	P and P	0	2	11,640	1	block signal without seeing it.  Train standing at station not properly protected by flag; following train approached station not
14	В	P and P	0	6	13,040	43	under proper control. Ran past station 1,500 feet; meeting order forgot-
15	В	P and F	0	23	13, 500	12	ten.  Men in charge of freight train waiting on side track failed to identify passing trains. (See note in
16	R	F and F	1	2	14,000	50	text below.) Train approached station not under proper control. Engineman disregarded distant and home fixed signals; also signal given by flagman.
17	R	F and F	0	2	14,000	66	Double-header freight train running on caution card approached station not under proper control. Both engineman and the conductor are held blameworthy.
18	R	F and F	1	3	14, 105	42	Engineman failed to observe signals given by flag- man. Flagman neglected to use torpedoes. Collision occurred on a bridge, causing the bridge
19 20	R B	Pand P Pand P	8	11 30	29, 500 30, 267	40 44	Second train entered yard not under proper control Conductor and engineman both overlooked meeting order; both men experienced. Engineman was killed.
	Total	collisions	30	149	225, 907		

TABLE No. 2A.—Causes of 42 prominent train accidents—Continued.

DERAILMENTS.

					cers, cers, roed-	8	
No.	Class.	Kind of train.	Killed.	Injured.	Damage to gines, can no no way.	Reference record.	Cause.
1	D	P	0	0	\$2,616	- 57	Derailed at night at a derailing switch. The distant signal approaching this derail indicated clear wrongfully, the arm of the signal having been weighted by ice and sleet. The home signal, however, was at stop, and the engineman is
2	D	P	0	24	3, 200	55	held at fault for not heeding this signal.  Metal brake beam of tender dropped on track; had become detached by the breaking of hanger at the eye.
3	D	<b>F</b>	4	2	3, 300	80	Cowcatcher of engine became loose and dropped so as to catch in a switch. A short time before this accident the cowcatcher, having been found loose, had been put in shape by the men in charge of the train, but they did not secure it adequately. The failure to discover the subsequent loosening was due principally to severe cold weather and snow.
4	D	P	0	6	5, 300	56	Arch bar of truck of tender broken. Speed of train 60 miles an hour; engine and all cars derailed, yet all of the personal injuries were slight.
5 6 7	D D D	F F P	0 2 2	0 1 10	5,700 2,500 7,700	89 89a 33	Accidental obstruction. (See note in text below.) Excessive speed. (See note in text below.) Excessive speed (60 miles an hour) through crossover track. Engineman and fireman killed. The cross over was suitably signaled with home
8	D	<b>F</b>	0	0	9, 477	81	and distant signals.  Brake beam fell on track. Wreck partly destroyed by fire from stoves used in freight cars to keep merchandise from freezing.
9	D	<b>F</b>	0	0	9,600	58	Derailing switch approached at excessive speed. (See note in text below.)
10 11	D	F	5	0	9,876 10,000	59 35	Snowdrift.  Excessive speed. Engineman and fireman killed.  Conductor and engineman were men of 15 years' experience.
12	D	<b>F</b>	Ŏ	0	10,053	54	Broken wheel. (See note in text below.)
13 14	B	F.	0	0	10, 200 10, 295	28 83	Broken flange. Broken wheel; chill crack in tread.
15 16	D D D D	F	0 2	0 2	10, 897 12, 000	61 85	Broken rail. Driving-wheel brake rigging caught on stiffener rail at entrance to side track.
17	D	D	0	0	12,000	86	Failure of bridge. The bridge in question was known to have been weakened by a flood and orders had been issued forbidding its use by engines of a certain weight. Disobedience of this order is given as the cause of the accident.
18 19	D D	P	51 3	44 2	12,558 13,000	90 36	Unknown. (See note in text below.) Runaway train on 3 per cent descending grade; supposed bad management of air brakes. Fireman killed; engineman badly injured.
20 21	D D	F	0	0	14, 422 15, 260	27 <b>52</b>	Undiscovered.  Broken rail. Wreck partly destroyed by fire from stove and by explosion of 1 car of powder and 2 cars of oil.
22	D	P	1	51	81,523	87	Rock slide.
	Total	derailments collisions and ailments.	71 101	145 294	221, 477 447, 381		

The worst railroad accident in the present record is classed as neither a collision nor a derailment. A passenger train and a mail train, halted at a station because of snow blockades along the line, were swept down the side of a mountain by an avalanche, and 90 persons were killed and 16 injured. These casualties are classified as follows: Passengers, killed 51, injured 7; mail clerks and persons carried on contract, killed 13, injured 2; trainmen, killed 22, injured 6; other employees, killed 4, injured 1. This disaster occurr d in the State of Washington on March 1 at a point where no serious snow-slides had occurred before since the settlement of that region.

Another disaster, belonging in the same class with this, but without loss of life, occurred in Nevada, January 1, when a freight train of 36 cars, having been stopped because of washouts on the track ahead of it, was swept away by a great flood. This train had been proceeding slowly, all bridges being examined before crossing, on account of high water, when a washout was encountered. The train was stopped and the conductor went ahead afoot to the next telegraph station to report. While the train was standing a flood arose, the force of which was sufficient to turn the engine over on its side and to wash 28 loaded and 2 empty cars down the stream.

The most disastrous derailment in the quarter under review was that entered in the table as No. 18, in which 45 passengers, 5 trainmen, and 1 other employee were killed, and 33 passengers and 3 employees were injured. It is reported by the railroad company as having been due to some cause not discovered. Two trains, No. 19 and 21, of the Chicago, Rock Island and Pacific were being run over the Chicago Great Western because of a blockade on the Rock Island road. The combined train consisted of 2 engines and 10 cars, the engines moving tender first. The derailment occurred between Green Mountain and Gladbrook, Iowa, March 21. It happened in a cut where the ground at the side of the track was soft, so that the tender of the leading engine, when it jumped the rails, was embedded in the earth so as to make an almost impassable obstacle, against which the rest of the train was forced with undiminished momentum, the engineman having had no time to apply the brakes.

The trains in question were run over the Chicago and Northwestern from Cedar Rapids to Marshalltown and were delivered to the Chicago Great Western at Marshalltown. Being headed west, it was necessary to detach the engines from the west end of the train and attach them to the east end to proceed eastward over the Chicago Great Western. The man assigned by the Chicago Great Western as pilot called upon the dispatcher at Des Moines, Iowa, for orders. The Chicago Great Western had no table upon which to turn the engines at Marshalltown, but had a wye there. The pilot, however, reported to the dispatcher that he did not believe he could turn the engines on this wye because, as he believed, the curvature was too sharp. After some minor conversation the dispatcher told him that if he could not turn the engines to move them backward. They were switched around the train and started for Waterloo, running tender first. Between Green Mountain and Gladbrook, while running at a speed of probably 22 miles an hour—witnesses varying in their statements, giving the speed from 20 to 25 miles—the leading engine, without warning, left the track in a cut and plunged into the bank, being followed by the second engine. The engines were both in first-class condition, having been duly inspected before leaving Cedar Rapids, and the cars were all in good condition.

It appears that in this cut the track (roadbed) was somewhat soft and spongy; and it may have been this condition of the track that caused the tender of the leading engine to run off. Next to the engines was a Pullman sleeping car and next to this two Chicago, Burlington and Quincy day coaches. Following these was the baggage car and then the cars from train No. 19—baggage car, mail car, coaches, and sleepers. The Chicago, Burlington and Quincy car next to the Pullman car was completely telescoped and the one next to this was telescoped about one-half to two-thirds of its length. In these cars occurred all the loss of life, except two passengers who were in the sleeper, one end of which was badly damaged. Outside of these cars there was no loss of life and but little injury, except to the men on the engines. Both firemen, one engineer, and the pilot were killed or died from injuries.

The conductors and enginemen of the Rock Island trains were employees of long experience. The pilot of the Chicago Great Western was a freight conductor of that road. He had been in the train service of the road about eight years and a conductor six months.

As before stated, the railroad company reports the cause of this derailment as not ascertained. The case was investigated by the board of railroad commissioners of the State of Iowa, and in a report issued by that board the conclusion is reached that "though the cause of the wreck can never be known with absolute certainty, it is indisputable that the track \* \* \* was in a dangerous condition. It lay upon a bed of clay which was wet and springy on account of improper drainage. \* \* \* If there be a primary cause of this wreck, in our judgment it was the soft track resulting from the season and lack of proper drainage." The commissioners believe that engines should be run backward only in the rarest cases of absolute necessity and "then at a much lower rate of speed than 25 miles an hour." They say also that if the two day coaches (next behind the Pullman car) had been in the rear of the train there would have been no such "When trains are made up the lighter cars appalling loss of life. should be in the rear."

The accident reported as derailment No. 6 was the derailment of an engine running without train, and both engineman and fireman were killed, so that the evidence as to the cause is wholly circumstantial. The superintendent concludes that the engine was running at a dangerous speed, but there was no reason for special haste and no conjecture is offered as to why the engineman was running at an unsafe rate. This engine was ditched, but its tender remained standing on the roadbed, and it was the cause of the derailment of a following train (No. 5 in the table). The engineman of the following train is not held at fault, as the road at the point of derailment is on a sharp curve, and it was impossible for him to see more than a short distance ahead. The track at this point is equipped with track-

circuit automatic block signals, but the derailed tender was wholly off the rails, and, as the track had not been broken by the first derailment, the automatic signal continued to indicate safety. The freight train had been following the light engine at an interval of about twenty minutes.

Derailment No. 12 was due to a fault in a wheel of the tender of the leading engine of a "double-header" freight train, and the damage as reported (\$10,054) includes \$10,000 as the estimated damage to the rails in the track by the pounding of the broken wheel before the train was brought to a stop. The train was running about 20 miles an hour when a piece was broken out of the tread of the wheel, leaving a flat spot, so that it pounded and marked the rails at every revolution, and these violent shocks were sufficient in many cases to cause the rails to crack; and about 800 tons of rails were used to replace those which were found broken or defective, the train having run a considerable distance before the tender jumped the track. The damage to the engine and to the track at the point of derailment was slight. The engineman is held at fault for the damage, because his attention had been called to the noisy pounding of the wheel in ample time to prevent damage, but he continued with unabated speed. This was a cast-iron wheel 33 inches in diameter, made June 20, 1906. The estimated weight of the tender resting on the truck in which this wheel broke was 30 tons.

Derailment No. 9, in which an eastbound freight ran off a derailing switch at considerable speed and fouled the track of another railroad company, is reported as due wholly or mainly to the mistake of an engineman concerning a red light. The derailment occurred about 5 a. m., when there was a dense fog, and the engineman failed to stop the train before passing the signal which guarded the approach to the crossing of the other road, because, on sighting the red light of the stop signal, he assumed that the light was one used by an electric railroad company at a point about one mile back. The engineman had passed the electric crossing without being aware of it, the light at that point being at that time extinguished. This light of the electric road is used by the men in charge of cars on that road when such cars have to cross the track of the steam railroad. Since this accident this light has been made white instead of red. The engineman who thus mistook the location of signals had not worked long on this line. He had made six round trips over the line between December 14 and the date of the accident (February 22), five of them being made eastward at night. He had also worked on a yard engine in this region for eleven days in 1907.

Collision No. 4, between a westbound freight train and an east-bound passenger train, occurred about 4 o'clock in the morning and was due to the mistake of the engineman of the freight in reading an order and to the neglect of the conductor of the freight. The order,

which was on Form 19, stated that the passenger train would wait at Y until 4:35 a.m. for the freight, but the freight engineman, in some way unexplained, got the impression that the passenger train would wait at Z, which was 6 miles farther on. The order had been delivered to the freight train (one copy to the engineman and one to the conductor) at L while the train passed without stopping, so that the conductor and the engineman had not read it in each other's presence. The engineman had neglected to show the order to the fireman, as the rule requires. The conductor was asleep when the train approached and passed Y and therefore took no measures to bring the train to a stop; and he had neglected to show the order to the rear brakeman, as the rule requires.

Collision No. 11, between a northbound and a southbound freight train, was due to the failure of a station telegrapher to deliver a meeting order. The northbound train was running from A to B, C, D, etc., and the meeting point was to be at C. The order for the northbound train was sent to the telegrapher at C, but in some manner he allowed it to be hidden from view by other papers on his desk, and he gave the train a signal that he had no orders for it. The report says that the dispatcher is censured because he might just as well have sent the order to B or to A. Where a meeting order is so sent that it must be delivered to one or both of the trains at the station which is appointed for the meeting, the rule requires special precau-The telegrapher must display a red flag (or light) in addition to the regular train-order signal, and he must put torpedoes on the track. In this case these precautions were not taken, and the dispatcher is censured for not having required the operator to take them. The operator is held at fault for this and also for not keeping the order properly before him, and for failing to use a special lock on the train-order lever in his office, as is required of operators when they have an order for an approaching train. Both dispatcher and operator have had several years' experience and had been on duty only a few hours.

Collision No. 15 was due to the failure of men in charge of a north-bound freight train, while standing on a side track, to identify south-bound passenger trains. The freight arrived at P about 4 a. m. to wait for three southbound passenger trains. The first of these passenger trains was behind time and the second and third preceded it. The freight started north immediately after the passage of the third passenger train, the train which should have been first being still due. It is the opinion of the investigating officers that all of the men on the freight train had been asleep while waiting on the side track (their train having been held there about two hours), and that they assumed that all three of the passenger trains had passed. It was this late passenger train with which the freight a few minutes after leaving P collided. The men in charge of the freight declare

that they had not been asleep. They had been on duty eleven hours and nineteen minutes and off duty before beginning that tour twentynine hours and thirty minutes.

TABLE No. 3.—Causes of accidents to employees in coupling and uncoupling cars.

	Causes.	•	ain- en.	me	ein- n in rds.	tra m (sw	ard ain- ien itch- ng ws).		ber 12- yees.
Subclass.		Killed.	Injured.	Killed.	Injured.	Killed.	Injured.	Killed.	Injured.
1 2 8 4 5 6 7	Adjusting coupler, cars accidentally started Careless manipulation of uncoupling lever Cars not equipped with automatic coupler. Coupler broken, using link and pin or chain Coupling damaged cars Coupling with chain or other emergency appliance on curve too sharp for automatic coupling. Coupling with chain or other emergency appliance because of	2	17 6 5 8 10	2	12 1 2 1 5	1	30 14 11 1 3 21	1	4 2 1 2 1 4
9 10 11 12	Uncoupling without using lever, uncoupling lever not in work-	1	1 43 7	2	1 1 26 6		7 57 17	••••	5
13 14 15	ing order.  Foot caught in frog, switch, or guard rail.  Opening or closing knuckle when cars were near together, miscalculated speed.  Opening knuckle when cars were near together, engine acci-	1	25 7 13		13	2 1	46 4 26	1	1
16 17 18 19 20 21	dentally started Opening kunckle, part of defective coupler fell on foot Opening knuckle, lost footing Riding on car to uncouple, slipped off. Struck by object at side of track Caught by unexpected movement of car, due to slack running in Caught by unexpected movement of car, due to mistake or	3	4 6 7 5 8 19	1 ····	2 4 1 3 14	2 2	5 8 12 10 12 24	1	2
21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28	misunderstanding in giving hand signals.  Uncoupling moving cars and lost footing.  Parts hard to move, causing delay.  Went between cars unnecessarily and contrary to rule.  Hand caught between projecting load and end of next car.  No witness (fatal injury).  Other causes.  Unexplained.	1 2	1 17 6 7 2	2	4 8 1 9	3 4	6 29 1 11 4 16 15		3 2 1
_	Total	21	228	9	133	24	411	3	4

### Details of injuries included in Table 3, subclass 27.

- J. 1. Reaching for lever and ran nail into hand. J. 2. Stepped in hole between tracks.
- J. 3. Hot flue dust came out of car.
- J. 4. Apron of car left.
- J. 5. Stepped in manhole.
- J. 6. Stepped in hole at edge of track. J. 7. Knuckle broke and plece struck knee.
- J. 8. Stepped too close to track; struck by footboard of engine.
- F. 1. Caught hand under coupling pin.
- F. 2. Finger caught in coupler.
- F. 3. Struck by car.
- F. 4. Foot caught under wheel.
- F. 5. Stepped on piece of casting.
  F. 6. Holding lever with one hand and chocking car with other; caught finger.
- F. 7. Lump of coal rolled off tank, striking man on head.
- F. 8. Lock pin dropped on finger.
- M. 1. Pulling out tumbler of coupler and caught finger.
  M. 2. Drawhead broke and fell and caught leg.
- M. 3. Struck by corner of car. M. 4. Had hand resting on bumper and had fingers mashed when cars came together.

- M. 5. Fingers caught between bumpers.
  M. 6. Stepped on lump of coal.
  M. 7. Piece of casting fell off top of car.
  M. 8. Shaker bar fell off tank; toes mashed.
  M. 9. Apron of ballast car fell.
  M. 10. Lump of coal fell from tank, injuring hand.
  M. 11. Lump of coal fell from tank, on foot
- M. 11. Lump of coal fell from car on foot.

TABLE No. 3A.—Nature of injuries to employees in coupling and uncoupling cars.

Injuries.	Trainmen.	Trainmen in yards.	Yard trainmen.	Other employees	
Loss of legs Loss of legs Loss of hands Loss of fingers Loss of toes Fractured akull Fractured leg Fractured or ribs Fractured other bones Contusion of head or body Contusion or laceration of feet Contusion or laceration of toes Contusion or laceration of legs Contusion or laceration of arms Contusion or laceration of hands Contusion or laceration of fingers Dislocation Internal injuries Sprains Miscellaneous	3 2 10 2 2 3 4 7 24 15 5 18 7 22 76	4 1 1 4 1 1 3 5 2 17 10 8 11 8 21 38 1 2 5	\$ 2 2 2 8 1 1 3 6 11 82 36 6 16 41 122 2 3 6	1	
Total injuries	228 21	133	411 24	41	
Total killed and injured	249	142	435	44	

Total killed	57 813
Total killed and injured	870

TABLE No. 4.—Causes of accidents to employees classified (C6 and C7) as falling from and getting on or off cars and engines.

Sub-	Canses		rain- nen.	me	ain- n in rds.	trai (swi	ard inmen tching ws).		<b>n</b> -
class.	Caasas	Killed.	Injured.	Killed.	Injured.	Killed.	Injured.	Killed.	Injured.
C6 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15	Fell from roof of box car by reason of— Defect in car. Ice or snow. Parting of train. Derailment, collision, or shock due to abnormal movements of cars other than those in subclass 3. While setting brakes. Fell from— Coal car Freight car other than box or coal car. Engine or tender. Passenger car. Engines, tenders, or cars (all kinds) not in motion. Miscellaneous causes. Not clearly explained. Slipped getting on moving trains or cars. Jumping off moving trains. Jumping from engines or cars anticipating collision, de-	1 2 6 1 2 3 13 8	8 16 15 58 58 58 52 161 11 113 250 67 133 171	3 1 2 5 2	1 9 2 20 35 5 13 75 1 51 44 18 59	5 1 2 5 	6 27 10 97 80 7 23 65 3 45 319 67 97 135	1 7 3 5 8	1 1 1 1 8 2 4 19 25 4 62 89 31 40 50
C7 16	railment, or other accident.  Fell from engines or cars by reason of defective handholds and sill steps.  Getting on or off moving engine.  Caught in frog, guard rail, or switch.	4	56 41 219 2	5	10 16 146 1	2 31	50 196 3	6	3 1 42

### ACCIDENTS ON ELECTRIC RAILWAYS.

TABLE No. 12.—Casualties to persons—January, February, and March, 1910.

Causes.	ger	886n- rs (a d b).	Person carried under agree men or con tract (bb).	T (a,	otal b, and b).	Trai mer	n-   r	Frain- nen in yards.
•	Killed.	Injured.	Killed.	Killed.	Injured.	Killed.	Injured.	Injured.
Collisions. Derailments Miscellaneous train accidents.	i	279 37 1	1	2 1	281 37 1	8	21	•
Total train accidents	. 1	317	1	2 2	319	3	25	
Coupling or uncoupling. While doing other work about trains or while attending switches. Falling from vehicles or while getting on or off		195		4	195	2 1	2 13	2
Other causes.	4	51		. 4	51	i	ĭ	
Total (other than train accidents)	. 8	246		8	246	4	19	2
Total, all classes	. 9	563	1	2   10	565	7	44	2
Causes.	tra (sw	(ard inmen itching ews).	g emi	ther oloyee	Total employe		pe	otal rsons orted.
	Killed.	Injured.	Killed.	Injured.	Killed.	Injured.	Killed.	Injured.
Collisions				3	3	30	4	311 41 1
Total train accidents		. 6	3	. 3	3	34	5	353
Coupling or uncoupling. While doing other work about trains or while attending switches.	. I <b></b>	. 1	1	. 6		7 21		7 21
Coming in contact with overhead bridges, structures at side of track, etc.  Falling from vehicles or while getting on or off.  Other causes.			2	1 2 28	1	1 12 20	5	207 80
Total (other than train accidents)		. 10	2	39	6	70	14	316
Total, all classes		. 16	2	42	9	104	19	669

TABLE No. 28.—Collisions and derailments.

	Number.	Loss.	Killed.	Injured.
Collisions, rear Collisions, butting Collisions, trains separating Collisions, miscellaneous	12 9 1 13	\$4, 145 18, 300 200 12, 155	1 2	72 59 180
Total	35	34, 800	4	311
Derailments due to defects of roadway, etc	3	12 250		5 7
Derailments due to unforeseen obstruction of track, etc  Derailments due to malicious obstruction of track, etc	4	450		10
Derailments due to miscellaneous causes.	7	1,575	1	19
Total	17	2, 287	1	41
Total collisions and derailments	52	37,087	5	352

### [Public-No. 171.]

AN ACT Requiring common carriers engaged in interstate commerce to make full reports of all accidents to the Interstate Commerce Commission.

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, It shall be the duty of the general manager, superintendent, or other proper officer of every common carrier engaged in interstate commerce by railroad to make to the Interstate Commerce Commission, at its office in Washington, District of Columbia, a monthly report, under oath, of all collisions of trains or where any train or part of a train accidentally leaves the track, and of all accidents which may occur to its passengers or employees while in the service of such common carrier and actually on duty, which report shall state the nature and causes thereof, and the circumstances connected therewith.

- SEC. 2. That any common carrier failing to make such report within thirty days after the end of any month shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor and, upon conviction thereof by a court of competent jurisdiction, shall be punished by a fine of not more than one hundred dollars for each and every offense and for every day during which it shall fail to make such report after the time herein specified for making the same.
- SEC. 3. That neither said report nor any part thereof shall be admitted as evidence or used for any purpose against such railroad so making such report in any suit or action for damages growing out of any matter mentioned in said report.
- SEC. 4. That the Interstate Commerce Commission is authorized to prescribe for such common carriers a method and form for making the reports in the foregoing section provided.

Approved, March 3, 1901.

### SPECIAL INFORMATION CONTAINED IN PRECEDING BULLETINS.

Each accident bulletin contains tables showing the number of passengers an demployees killed and injured, and these figures are classified according to cause (see Table No. 1); also tables showing cost of the different classes of train accidents. The causes of accidents to employees in coupling and uncoupling and in falling from cars, etc., are further classified in Tables No. 3 and No. 4. The most serious collisions and derailments are dealt with in a supplementary table (Class A), showing the cause in some detail. Each bulletin is for three months, and No. 1 was for the quarter ending September 30, 1901. The bulletin for the quarter

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>a</sup> For notes on Bulletins 1–16, see Bulletin No. 17; for notes on Bulletins 17–24, see Bulletin No. 30.

- ending June 30 contains, in addition to the quarterly statistics, tables showing the same information for the whole of the fiscal year ending on that date.
- Bulletin No. 25 shows 110 passengers killed in train accidents, three collisions and one derailment being responsible for 80 deaths in this class. The number of passengers killed from other causes (mostly their own negligence) also shows a large increase. One of the most serious collisions was due to the misreading of a dispatcher's order, and another to a mistake in sending or receiving the order.
- Bulletin No. 26 shows a marked decrease in casualties as compared with preceding quarters, a large falling off in railroad traffic having taken place. The list of "prominent" train accidents includes only three cases which may be classed as notable.
- Bulletin No. 27 shows further marked decreases in casualties incident to the large falling off in railroad traffic. The number of passengers and employees killed in train accidents (125) is the smallest since the monthly records were established. The most fatal accident in this quarter was a collision at a street crossing, where 8 passengers in an electric car were killed.
- Bulletin No. 28 recorded the smallest number of passengers killed in train accidents (13) ever reported in the quarterly records. The total of passengers and employees killed in train accidents (112) was 13 less than the previous low record (125, Bulletin 27). Of the 13 passengers killed in train accidents, 7 were victims of a butting collision on an electric railroad.
- Bulletin No. 29 showed totals far smaller than the corresponding quarter one year previous, but the diminution in the number of casualties, which had continued during the year of depression, seemed to have been checked. The number of passengers killed in train accidents was 53, and there were 8 notable collisions.
- Bulletin No. 30 recorded 34 passengers killed in train accidents (including 15 victims of a forest fire). One collision resulted in 8 deaths of passengers, and two derailments killed 16 employees.
- Bulletin No. 31, in part, continues the favorable showing of the quarter one year previous (Bulletin 27), though it covers a period of considerable revival of business. One collision caused 20 deaths and 28 injuries.
- Bulletin No. 32 shows a total of 99 passengers and employees killed in train accidents—the lowest quarterly record thus far shown. It is to be observed, however, that a butting collision, causing the death of 9 passengers and 1 employee, occurring on an electric road, was not included, the railroad company having failed to make a report of the accident as required by law. The quarter in 1908 with which this one is most naturally compared (Bulletin 28) had one collision on an electric line in which 7 persons were killed.
- Bulletin No. 33 shows considerable increases in most of the casualty items, marking the expansion of traffic on all of the principal railroads. Five accidents—4 collisions and 1 derailment—caused 47 deaths.
- Bulletin No. 34 shows heavy totals in the casualty lists incident to the great expansion in railroad traffic accompanying the general revival in business. There was no very notable passenger-train accident, but a collision between a work train and a freight killed 14 laborers. The list of causes of prominent collisions is unusually varied.

# Collisions and Derailments of Trains

and

# Casualties to Persons

## on the Railroads of the United States

during the months of

April, May, and June, 1910

with

Tables for the year ending June 30, 1910

INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMMISSION WASHINGTON, D. C.



WASHINGTON
GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
1910

## THE INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMMISSION.

MARTIN A. KNAPP, of New York, Chairman.

JUDSON C. CLEMENTS, of Georgia.

CHARLES A. PROUTY, of Vermont.

FRANCIS M. COCKRELL, of Missouri.

FRANKLIN K. LANE, of California.

EDGAR E. CLARK, of Iowa.

JAMES S. HARLAN, of Illinois.

EDWARD A. MOSELEY, Secretary.

### RAILROAD ACCIDENTS

IN THE UNITED STATES DURING THE THREE MONTHS ENDING JUNE 30, 1910.

The number of persons killed in train accidents during the months of April, May, and June, 1910, as shown in reports made by the railroad companies to the Interstate Commerce Commission under the "accident law" of March 3, 1901, was 137, and of injured, 2,641. Accidents of other kinds, including those sustained by employees while at work and by passengers in getting on or off the cars, etc., bring the total number of casualties up to 20,650 (766 killed and 19,884 injured). Accidents to employees resulting in slight injuries, which do not prevent the employee injured from performing his accustomed service for more than three days in the aggregate during the ten days immediately following the accident, are not reported. These reports deal only with employees on duty, and passengers. The casualties to passengers have been divided into three classes. Class a includes all ordinary passengers. Class b includes passengers traveling on freight trains. Class bb includes persons who are customarily carried on trains under special arrangements, such as postal clerks and express messengers, employees on Pullman cars, newsboys, live-stock tenders, and men in charge of freight. reported casualties are classified in Table No. 1, given below.

The statistics here given present the record of the standard rail-roads, for convenience called "steam roads," in distinction from electric railways. The accident statistics of those electric lines on which interstate traffic is carried, and which, therefore, are subject to the federal accident law, are given in a second table, No. 1E, and in Table No. 2E.

TABLE No. 1.—Casualties to persons—April, May, and June, 1910.

Causes.		engers nd b).	car un agi mer coni	sons ried der ree- it or tract b).	Total	al (a, b, d bb).	Tra	inmen.	Train- imen. men in yards.		
	Killed.	Injured.	Killed.	Injured.	Killed.	Injured.	Killed.	Injured.	Killed.	Injured.	
Collisions.  Derailments.  Miscellaneous train accidents, including locomotive-boiler explosions.	5 2	451 560	5	91 100	5 7	542 660	36	334 295 276	. 11	104 30 52	
Total train accidents.	7	1,025	5	194	12	1,219		905	16		
Coupling or uncoupling		1,020					. 15	217 2,276	6 3	118	
Coming in contact with overhead bridges, structures at side of track, etc.  Falling from cars or engines or while getting on or off.	23	2 585	4	1 22	27	3 607	63	173 1,180	5 17	53 501	
Other causes	13	710	3	123	.——	833	43	213	21	100	
Total (other than train accidents)	36	1,297	7	146	43	1,443	= ====	4,059	52 ===	1,43%	
Total all classes	43	2,322	12	340	55	2,662	221	4,964	68	1,624	
Causes.	tra (sw	Yard inmen itching ews).		Othe ploy			otal oyees.		al persons ported.		
	Killed.	Injured.	Killed.		Injured.	Killed.	Injured.	Killed.		Injured.	
Collisions  Derailments  Miscellaneous train accidents, including	8 2			3	84 59	57 54	621 422	62 61	!	1,163 1,062	
locomotive-boiler explosions	1	I	~, ——		21	14	379	14		396	
Total train accidents	<u>11</u>		= ===	)   =====	164	125	1,422	137	=	2,641	
Coupling or uncoupling While doing other work about trains or while	23 8	341 799	1		19 548	45   41	695 4, 289	45		696 4, 249	
attending switches		95	1		18	17	339	1 17		342	
Falling from cars or engines or while getting on or off	35 21	908 133	29	)	368 , 074	144 339	2, 957 7, 520	171 355		3, 564 8, 353	
Total (other than train accidents)	90	2,276	301	8	,027	586	15,800	629		17, 243	
Total all classes.	101	2,443	321	= ==	, 191	711	17, 222	766	===	19,884	

In the quarter ending with June, the lists of killed and injured in collisions and derailments nearly always show decidedly smaller totals than in any other part of the year, because, apparently, of a combination of a moderate volume of traffic with favorable weather conditions. The quarter now reported is no exception to this rule, as will be seen by the comparison, in the table below, between this quarter (Bulletin No. 36) and that ending March 31 (Bulletin No. 35). At the same time, it will be observed that the comparison with the

April-June quarter of 1909 (Bulletin 32) shows considerable increases in every item. The explanation of this, so far as any explanation is available, is to be found in the general expansion of railroad traffic. The importance of giving particular attention to the causes of collisions and derailments is well shown by a comparison of the first item in Table 14 with the item below it. By subtracting item 1 from item 2, it will be seen that the numbers of passengers killed from causes other than train accidents—which means largely from their own fault—are not markedly variable—43, 45, 37; while in the first item—12, 110, 7—the fluctuations are violent; indicating that the measures which have been taken by the railroads to prevent passengers from injuring themselves have been much more successful than those which have been taken to prevent the wrecking of trains.

TABLE No. 1A.—Comparisons of principal items with last quarterly bulletin and with one year back.

	Bulletin 36.	Bulletin 35.	Bulletin 32.
1. Passengers killed in train accidents. 2. Passengers killed, all causes. 3. Employees killed in train accidents. 4. Employees killed in coupling. 5. Employees killed, all causes. 6. Total passengers and employees killed, all causes.	55 125	110 155 242 57 945 1,100	7 44 92 34 544 588

The total number of collisions and derailments in the quarter now under review was 2,609 (1,225 collisions and 1,384 derailments), of which 142 collisions and 135 derailments affected passenger trains. The damage to cars, engines, and roadway by these accidents amounted to \$2,124,506. Given more in detail, these facts appear as below (collisions and derailments which cause no death or personal injury and which cause not over \$150 damage to the property of the railroad are not reported):

TABLE No. 2.—Collisions and derailments.

	Number.	Loss.	Killed.	Injured.
Collisions, rear	206	\$231,825	17	238
Collisions, butting	114	256, 848	24	419
Collisions, train separating	96	34, 437		65
Collisions, miscellaneous	809	341, 491	21	441
Total	1,225	864, 601	62	1,163
Derailments due to defects of roadway, etc	220	162,796	2	288
Derailments due to defect of equipment	663	567, 296	8	146
Derailments due to negligence of trainmen, signalmen, etc	95	70,015	15	87
Derailments due to unforeseen obstruction of track, etc	55	82,946	7	112
Derailments due to malicious obstruction of track, etc		70,770	9	71
Derailments due to miscellaneous causes	333	306,082	20	378
Total	1,384	1, 259, 905	61	1,082
Total collisions and derailments	2,609	2, 124, 506	123	2,245
Total for same quarter of 1909		1,703,642	91	1,842
1908		1,617,398	104	2,008
1907	3,777	3, 232, 673	227	3,685

Following is the usual list of Class A train accidents—all in which the damage is reported at \$10,000 or over, notable cases in which passengers are killed, and those doing damage less than \$10,000 and down to \$2,000, wherever the circumstances or the cause may be of particular interest.

TABLE No. 2A.—Causes of 35 prominent train accidents.

[Note.—R stands for rear collision; B, butting collision; M, miscellaneous collisions; D, derailment; P, passenger train; F, freight and miscellaneous trains.]

#### COLLISIONS.

		٠.			CC	פוחונ	IONS.
No.	Class.	Kind of train.	Killed.	Injured.	Damage to engines, cars, and road-way.	Reference to record.	. Cause.
1	R	P and F	1	1	\$1,364	54	Freight ran into rear of passenger train which had been derailed at a washout. Crew of passenger train all injured in derailment, and a passenger, who went back to signal the freight, was unable to do so. He had a fusee, but rain was falling and he was unable to light the fusee. He had no lantern. This derailment is noted in the
2	В	Fand F	O	. 2	2,100	32	table below, item No. 3. Collision at end of double track, due to a false light in the switch. The lamp man had put the lamp on the switch stand in the wrong position. The station operator is held at fault for not discovering the lamp man's error.
3	В	I and F	2	7	2,300	56	Dispatcher sent eastbound train over westbound track without first clearing the track of other trains. (See note in text below.)
4	It	P and F	O	15	2,400	28	Passenger train (9 p. m.) ran into rear of wrecking train; engineman of passenger acted on a block signal which was cleared for the wrecking train. The signalman was held at fault for not promptly putting the signal in the stop position after the passage of the front end of the wrecking train. The passenger engineman was also at fault for running too fast within yard limits.
5	В	F and F	0	2	3,634	57 	Eastbound freight (2:40 a. m.) approached coaling station not under control; engineman, conductor, and front brakeman asleep.
6	В	P and F	0	43	3,745	2	Operator failed to deliver order. Conductor and engineman also at fault for not reporting at office for orders.
7	В	Fand F	0	3	6, 165	9	
8	R	F and F	1	23	6,775	4	Careless running after passing automatic block signal at "stop."
8	<b>B</b>	F and F	1	3	7,000	59	Engineman of northbound light engine ran past meeting point. (See note in text below.)
10	B	<b>F and F</b>	1	0	7,500	7	Extra train northbound (2:30 a. m.) encroached on time of southbound; should have stopped at a blind siding; men claim to have lost their bearings. The superintendent says it would have
11	;   <b>B</b> 	F. and F		ı		34	order to be delivered to conductor whose train was on siding, having told dispatcher that the conductor was held, but the train started while the operator was busy and he was unable to deliver the order, though he tried to do so. (10 p. m.) Age of operator 21 years; in the service 4 months as station helper and 7 months as operator.
12	В	F. and F	0	6	10,047	37	

TABLE No. 2A.—Causes of 35 prominent train accidents—Continued. COLLISIONS—Continued.

			-		င့် ရှင်	3	
	a.				cara, road-	85	
No.	Class.	Kind of train.	Killed.	Injured.	Damage gines, a n d way.	Reference record.	Cause.
13	В	P. and P	0	34	\$12,500	11	Mistake in observing lights of fixed signals at meeting point. (See note below.)
14 15	B B	F. and F F. and F	0 1	2 2	13,600 13,978	33 8	Nondelivery of orders. (See note below.) Extra freight approached station not under control.
16	R	P. and F	1	5	15, 200	1	(10:50 p. m.) Freight followed passenger train from passing track too closely, disregarding prescribed 5-minute time interval and running at excessive speed. Passenger train ahead had slackened speed because of a cow on track. Freight ran into rear of passenger train.
17	R	F. and F	0	0	16, 975	29	
18	В	F. and F	2	5	17,850	6	
<b>a</b> 19	В	P. and F	2	2	30,000	38e2	Southbound ran past meeting point. (See note in text below.)
<b>420</b>	В	P. and F	3	1	10,000	38e3	
	Total	collisions	15	163	192, 633		1
			_		DE:	RAIL	MENTS.
1	D	P	0	10	\$2,055	24	Switch (at electro-pneumatic interlocking) thrown under moving train. Leverman carelessly moved the switch lever too soon, and the detector har broke, allowing the switch rails to be moved.
<b>2</b> 3	D D	F	3 0	6 43	2,825 3,140	23 65	coming clogged with driftwood during an un- precedented rainfall. This derailment was fol- lowed by a collision. (See coll'n No. 1 above.)
4	D	P	1	1	3,500	63	Excessive speed on curve due to false clear signal at interlocking, where a switch was undergoing repairs. Signalman and signal repairman held
5	D	P	0	24	4.700	43	responsible for display of wrong signal.  Track being repaired; a flagman of three months' experience sent out to warn all trains; omitted to stop an extra passenger train, assuming that, in accordance with custom, the track foreman would have the track in safe condition for a passenger train; that his function was to stop freight trains only. The engineman of the passenger train is held at fault for not obeying the speed-limit rule in force at this place. The passenger was an extra.
6	D	<b>F</b>	0	0	5,850	64	Excessive speed due to error of judgment of en- gineman in handling air brakes on a descending
7	D	P	0	· <b>28</b>	6,000	41	grade of 110 feet to mile: ran off derailing switch.  Defective joint; wreck took fire from stove in baggage car; fire spread by gas which escaped from broken pipes.
8	D	P	0	31	6, 130	42	Track not in good surface. Speed 45 miles an hour. Tender the first vehicle to jump the track.
9	<b>D</b>	<b>F</b>	2	1	9,819	50	Misplaced switch. Agent had neglected to put on lamp as night approached; the crew of the preceding train neglected to report absence of the lamp. The superintendent also holds that in view of the absence of the lamp, the engineman should have slackened speed more than he did.
10	D	F	0	1	9,872	13	Broken rail; fresh break, no fault in manufacture. Wreck took fire from the fire box; oil from the ruptured tender flowed around the fire box, spreading the flames.
11 12	D	P	0		32,100	49 66	Loose engine wheel; speed 40 miles an hour.

collisions 19 and 20 occurred on electric roads and are included in Table 12 and 22 following.

TABLE No.	2A.—Causes of	35	prominent train	accidents-	Continued.

DERAILMENTS-Continued.

No.	Class.	Kind of train.	Killed.	Injured.	Damage to engines, cars, and road-way.	Reference to record.	Cause.
13	D	F	1	2	\$35,800	39	Engineman ran past flagman, who warned him to stop on approaching a point where the track was being repaired. The engineman (who was
14	D	P	3	25	55,000	25	killed) had been using intoxicating liquor.  Rail joint in track maliciously loosened.
15	Ď	F	ŏ	0	3,000	26	Unbalanced load. (See note in text below.)
		   derailments   collisions and	10	201	196,891		
		ailments	25	364	389, 524		

Collision No. 3, between a westbound work train and an eastbound passenger train, was due to lack of care on the part of a dispatcher, a conductor, and a telegrapher. A work train had the right to use both main tracks between B and C. When it was time for an eastbound passenger train to leave B for C, the work train, in order to clear the eastbound track, proceeded to C and from there went back westward on the westbound track. The operator at C omitted to report this movement of the work train to the dispatcher, and the dispatcher, believing the work train to be still on the eastbound track, ordered the passenger train to proceed from B to C on the other track. The flagman of the work train had stopped the passenger train, but had not informed its conductor that the work train had gone to C for the purpose of crossing over to the westbound track, being himself ignorant of this movement. The work train, moving westward, and the passenger train, moving eastward, collided 5 miles east of B. The dispatcher is held blameworthy for not seeing that the westbound track was clear before he allowed any eastbound train to move over it, and the conductor of the work train is blamed for not more fully and carefully instructing his flagman; and the telegrapher at C is blamed for not giving prompt notice to the dispatcher when the work train came to his station. telegrapher at C had been in that position seven weeks. The other persons concerned were men of experience.

Collision No. 9, in which 1 person was killed and 3 were injured, was between an engine, without train, running north, and a freight train running south. The engineman in charge of the engine north-bound, on reaching S, where he was to meet the southbound, according to an order which had been received from the dispatcher, received from the operator at S another copy of the same order, which had been sent to that station to make sure that neither train should go past that point. He did not read this order carefully, or at least not with sufficient care, and assumed that he had received a new

order authorizing him to go forward to the next station. He read the order (incorrectly) to the fireman, but the fireman did not read it for himself. When the engine started from the station, the operator assumed that it was the intention of the engineman to go forward a short distance and then set back into the side track and wait for the southbound train; and, because of this assumption, he took no measures to recall the engine.

Collision No. 13, injuring 34 persons, was due to a mistake in observing a signal at the end of a double track. Train No. 3, westbound, should have stopped before passing from the double track to the single track, to meet train No. 2, eastbound; but No. 3 approached at uncontrollable speed and ran about 75 feet beyond the switch. The eastbound train approached at the same moment, and in the resulting collision the mail car of the eastbound train was knocked off a bridge, falling 50 feet to the street below; and the baggage car, which was next behind the mail car, was lifted in such a way that it telescoped the passenger car next behind it. Most of the victims were in this passenger car. Train No. 3 approached the meeting point on a curve to the left and the fireman of the leading engine of this train (which was a helping engine), seeing the green light of the switch, which indicated that the switch was in position for the eastbound train, mistook it for the green light of the semaphore signal which would indicate all clear for the westbound train; he therefore called to the engineman that the road was clear.

As soon as the train had run far enough to enable the engineman to see the semaphore, he saw that the light was not green and applied the brakes, but not in season to prevent the collision. The fireman of the helping engine was 21 years old, and had been in the service of the road about eight months.

Collision No. 14 was due to the neglect of two telegraphers to deliver orders and to bad judgment on the part of an engineman. Westbound extra 9, running from M to A, B, C, D, E, F, etc., left M at 5:45 a. m.; A at 5:59, and arrived at B at 6:16 a. m. At B this train should have stopped short of the switches to keep out of the way of eastbound train 8, which was running on the westbound track from F to B. The operator at M had neglected to deliver to extra 9 the order authorizing this movement. He had fixed it in a hoop, expecting that the train would pass without stopping; but before the train arrived he had other duties to perform in connection with other trains, and while so engaged the conductor of train 9 came into his office and the operator told him that there were no Shortly after he gave the train a clear block signal and the train proceeded. On arriving at B this train found the signals against it; but the engineman sounded the whistle signal calling for the block signal, and the operator gave him a proceed signal and delivered to him a message telling him to move his train forward so as to clear the cross-over track for eastbound train No. 10. In this message he stated that the eastbound train had left E at 5:55 a. m., but that it could not reach B until after No. 10 was out of the way. He did not say that the eastbound train was on the westbound track, for he assumed that this information had already been given to the westbound train. According to the rules, however, he should have delivered to extra train 9 a copy of the order which was neglected at M. Although he had cleared the block signal to allow extra 9 to pass beyond his cross-over switches, he had not secured the block from D.

The engineman of train 9, a man of long experience, acknowledged that he did not understand the meaning of the message delivered to him by the operator at B, and he is held at fault for not stopping his train and securing an explanation. Having had no orders from the dispatcher, and having received a clear block signal, he proceeded from B westward and met the eastbound train near C. At the time of the collision each train was moving about 25 or 30 miles an hour. After extra train 9 left B the operator there informed the dispatcher, and it was then discovered that the order giving the eastbound train the right to the westbound track had not been delivered. operator at B telephoned to the agent at C, who was at his house, and this agent tried to stop the eastbound train, but was a few seconds too late to do so. The operator at M was 23 years old and had been in the service three months. The operator at B was 22 years old and had been in the service two months. The dispatcher is charged with exercising poor judgment in arranging for the meeting of extra 9 and another westbound train at B with eastbound train No. 10 after having given eastbound train 8 the right to use the wrong track from F to B. This dispatcher is 27 years old and has been an operator about five and one-half years, but he had been employed as dispatcher only about four weeks.

Collision No. 18, occurring about 2 a. m., was due either to the fault of the eastbound train in failing to send forward a flagman when it was found impossible to reach B in season to clear the time of the westbound as given in a telegraphic order, or to carelessness on the part of the westbound train in passing B before the time, as fixed in the order, to which it was required to wait at that station. The conductor and the engineman of the eastbound train were both killed, and the stations at which the time was recorded are so far apart that it is impossible to check with satisfactory accuracy the statements as to the times of the two trains. A flagman of the eastbound train was making his first trip in the service of the company and had no watch. The surviving members of the crew of the eastbound train can give no satisfactory testimony. The preponderance of evidence seems to indicate that the eastbound train was at fault.

Collision No. 19, which occurred at about 3 a. m., and in which two persons were killed, was between a southbound electric car drawing two cars of freight and a northbound electric sleeping car. The wreck took fire from some cause not discovered, and its combustible portions were entirely burnt up. The two freight cars were loaded with whisky, which may have been ignited from one of the trainmen's lanterns. The passengers in the sleeping car, of whom there were five, escaped uninjured. The southbound car had orders to stop at L to meet the northbound, but it ran a short distance past the meeting point. The reason for this disregard of orders can not be determined, as it was the crew of this train—conductor and motorman—who were killed. The conductor had been in the service of the company two and one-half years and the motorman one year.

Collision No. 20 was due to the breakage of a coupling (Master Carbuilders's type). A "trailer" attached to an electric car ascending a steep grade broke away and ran back down the grade a short distance, when it collided violently with a following passenger car. Two passengers were killed. The electric car and the trailer were not equipped with continuous brakes and there was no man on the rear car; and the men on the leading car did not discover that the cars had parted for some little time after the breakage occurred.

Derailment No. 2, caused by a passenger train running at high speed into a turn-out because of a switch having been left misplaced, was due to a misunderstanding between a conductor and a telegraph operator (signalman), and also to misunderstanding and carelessness on the part of two operators.

A westbound freight train left S at about 5 a.m. The conductor, contrary to the regulations, requested the signalman at the station to close the switch after the train should have passed out of the side track. The conductor, after having got some distance away from the station, saw that the switch had not been closed, and so, on arriving at V, he requested the telegrapher there to communicate with S and make sure that his request had been complied with. telegrapher at V, speaking to S, said "Did you close the -," when he was interrupted by S, who said "I certainly did." The telegrapher at V repeated to the conductor this partial question and the reply to it. This reply having been accepted as satisfactory, an eastbound passenger train was allowed to proceed from V to S, and, the switch having been left unchanged, this train ran into the side track and was derailed because of the sharpness of the curve, which was safe only for low speed. The foregoing statement as to the conversation over the wire is that which is given by the telegrapher at V. denied in many details by the signalman (telegrapher) at S. The man at S also disputes some of the statements of the conductor in

regard to what was said when, as reported by the conductor, the original request was made to close the switch.

The derailed engine was overturned and fell against two boarding cars on a sidetrack, killing two and injuring four workmen who were preparing breakfast in the cars.

The signalman at S was 19 years old and had been in the employ of the road eight months; and the signalman at V was 25 years old and had been in the service three years.

Derailment No. 15 was due to the shifting of a load of steel bridge girders. These girders, very long, covered the length of three open cars, and as the train entered a 6 degree curve at a speed of about 15 miles an hour, the load shifted to one side sufficiently to greatly lighten the load on the other side; and in consequence of this one of the wheels on the outside of the curve rode over the rail. The shifting of the girders was made possible by the breakage of one of the bolts which held them in place.

TABLE 3.—Causes of accidents to employees in coupling and uncoupling cars.

	Causes.		ain- en.	me	ain- n in rds.	in (swit		Other em- ployees.	
Subclass.		Killed.	Injured.	Killed.	Injured.	Killed.	Injured.	Killed.	Injured.
1 2 3 4 5	Adjusting coupler with foot.  Adjusting coupler, cars accidentally started.  Careless manipulation of uncoupling lever.  Cars not equipped with automatic coupler.  Coupler broken, using link and pin or chain.  Coupling damaged cars.  Coupling with chain or other emergency appliance on curve	1	22 8 6 1		13 3 4	2	12 5		
6 7	Coupling damaged cars. Coupling with chain or other emergency appliance on curve too sharp for automatic coupling. Coupling with chain or other emergency appliance because of	1	12		4 2	4	16   10	1	. 2
8	UIDEVEN RAKE	1 1							
10	Fingers on hand caught between uncoupling lever and body of car			- (		2	1		
11 12	Uncoupling without using lever (unnecessary)	1		1 1		2 2			. 6 1 1
13 14	Foot caught in frog, switch, or guard rail	2	1	 	2	4	2		
15	Opening knuckle when cars were near together, engine acci-	1	24 1	1		1		i	2
16 17 18	Opening knuckle, part of defective coupler fell on foot Opening knuckle, lost footing	2	4	[]	5	' <sup>1</sup>	47		
19 20	Struck by object at side of track	1	5	1	5	,	7	 	1
21	Cought he amounted monoment of our due to relatable on	1		)		2		 	
22 23 24	misunderstanding in giving hand signals. Uncoupling moving cars and lost footing. Parts hard to move, causing delay. Went between cars unnecessarily and contrary to rule	1	10		· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·	,	4	i <b></b> • •	
25 26	Hand caught between projecting load and end of next car.  No witness (fatal injury)  Other causes.  Unexplained.	1	3	1		ت ا امد مدها	2	• • • • •	
27 28									
•	Total			6	118	23	341	1	19

#### Details of injuries included in Table 3, subclass 27.

A. 1. Drawbar broke, catching hand.

A. 2. Car door fell off, striking head.

A. 3. Struck by lump of coal which fell from car.

A. 4. Stepped on piece of glass.

A. 5. Coat caught on bolt.

A. 6. Opening knuckle and cut hand on sharp piece of iron.

A. 7. Struck by piece of iron which fell from car.

A. 8. Struck by air hose.

A. 9. Stepped on a clinker and turned ankle.

M. 1. Struck arm against end sill of car.

M. 2. Glove caught on knuckle.
M. 3. Foot caught under tender.
M. 4. Leg caught between lever of car and tank of engine.

M. 5. Stepped on a spike.

- M. 6. Placed foot on rail and car ran over toes.
- M. 7. Struck by apron of car which fell. J. 1. Struck by end gate which fell.

J. 2. Struck on knee by lift lever.

J. 3. Air was let into car, causing hose to fly up, injuring head. J. 4. Struck in side by lever.

J. 5. Struck on foot by lump of coal from dump bucket.

J. 6. Struck by lump of coal which fell from car.

J. 7. Air hose flew up, cutting leg.

J. 8. Struck by piece of wood which rolled off car.

J. 9. Stepped on piece of glass.

J. 10. Dump lever fell, bruising head.

J. 11. Arm broken by drawhead falling out.
J. 12. Torpedo exploded, cutting leg.
J. 13. Brakeman shoved off balance by crowd of passengers. In attempting to catch himself, he placed his hand on cog of brake just as air was turned on, causing wheel to turn, injuring hand.

J. 14. Struck by lump of coal which fell from car.

J. 15. Struck by piece of steel which broke off coupler. J. 16. Burnt by hot metal which splashed out of ladle on car.

TABLE 3A.—Nature of injuries to employees in coupling and uncoupling cars.

Injuries.	Trainmen.	Trainmen in yards.	Yard trainmen.	Other employees
Loss of feet	4 2	6	2	
Loss of legs		9	2	
Loss of hands.	•	2	1	
Loss of fingers.	9	1 4	8	
Loss of toes		l il	ĺ	
Fractured leg	$\mathbf{\tilde{2}}$	l il	$\bar{3}$	
Fractured arm	$\bar{1}$	l ī i	4	
Fractured collar bone or ribs	7		5	<i></i>
Fractured other bones	7		9	}
Contusion of head or body		10	53	
Contusion or laceration of feet		11	44	
Contusion or laceration of toes		1	8	
Contusion or laceration of legs		5	24	
Contusion or laceration of arms		5	14	!
Contusion or laceration of hands		17	43	
Contusion or laceration of fingers	61	39	97	i
Dislocation		2	1	
Internal injuries	5	1	2	
Sprains	3	3	9	
Miscellaneous	3	3 1	9	<i>.</i>
Total injuries	217	118	341	1
	15	116	23	ł
Killed				
Total killed and injured	232	124	364	2

#### RECAPITULATION.

Total killed	45 695
Total killed and injured	740

TABLE 4.—Causes of accidents to employees classified (C6 and C7) as falling from and getting on or off cars and engines.

Sub-	Causes.	_	rain- nen.	me	ain- n in rds.	traii (sw	ard- nmen itch- rews).	Oti er ploy	
class.		Killed.	Injured.	Killed.	Injured.	Killed.	Injured.	Killed.	Injured.
1.	Fell from roof of box car by reason of—								
1 2	Defect in car	• • • •	6		1		3	••••	
3	Ice or snow	l'i	10		3		17		2
4	Derailment, collision, or shock due to shnormal	1 *	10	••••	3		•	• • • •	
-	Parting of train.  Derailment, collision, or shock due to abnormal movements of cars other than those in subclass 3	2	56	1	33	3	80	2	17
C6 5	While setting brakes	<b></b> .			33 25	6	80 57	_	ì
l	Fell from—								, 1
6	Coal car.	2	2	1	4	<u>-</u> -	2	1	3
17	Freight car other than box or coal car	4	50	i	16	2	15	7	24
8	Engine or tender	10	115	5	68	_	40	1	19
9	Passenger car.	3	3		3		7	;-	1
11	Engines, tenders, or cars (all kinds) not in motion Miscellaneous causes.	5		i	30 51	9	29 248	4 2 2 5	57 73 23 51
12	Not clearly explained.	20	65	6	17	6	60 50	2	. 93
(13	Slipped getting on moving trains or cars	3	140		47	¦ ĭ]	50 72	5	51
114	Jumping off moving trains	5	166	1	81	3	116	4	54
15	Jumping off moving trains.  Jumping from engines or cars anticipating collision,	•		-				•	•
C7	derailment, or other accident	1	43		9		6		3
U/116	derailment, or other accident.  Fell from engines or cars by reason of defective hand-	1	!			1 4			
	holds and sill steps	   <u>-</u> -	52		14		48		• •
17	Getting on or off moving engine.	7	140	1	99	1	127	1	40
(18	Caught in frog, guard rail, or switch	1			• • • • •	{	• • • • •	••••	• • • •
	Total	62	1 100	17	501	35	906	29	368
	A Utal	· W	1, 100	1 1/	OUI	00	<b>500</b>	29	300

#### ACCIDENTS ON ELECTRIC RAILWAYS.

TABLE No. 1E.—Casualties to persons—April, May, and June, 1910.

Causes.	ger	esen- rs (a d b).	car un agr me or o	sons ried der ree- ent con- ect b).	b,	tal (c, and b).	TI	sin- en.	me	ain- n in rds.
	Killed.	Injured.	Killed.	Injured.	Killed.	Injured.	Killed.	Injured.	Killed.	Injured.
Collisions	2	259 50 2	1	1	3	259 51 2	5	13 6	••••	1
Total train accidents	2	311	1	1	3	312	5	19		1
Coupling or uncoupling. While doing other work about trains or while attending switches. Coming in contact with overhead bridges, structures at side of track, etc. Falling from vehicles or while getting on or off Other causes.	4	9 275 52		<u> </u>	4	9 276 52	1 1 2	2 14 3 11 2		1
Total (other than train accidents)	4	336	` 	1	4	337	4	32		1
Total, all classes	6	347	1	2	7	649	9	51	••••	2

TABLE No. 1E.—Casualties to persons—April, May, and June, 1910—Continued.

Causes.	trai	ard nmen tching (ws).		her oy <b>ees.</b>		otal oyees.	per	otal sons orted.
	Killed.	Injured.	Killed.	Injured.	Küled.	Injured.	Killed.	Injured.
Collisions  Derailments  Miscellaneous train accidents				1 2	5	15 8	8	274 59 2
Total train accidents				3	5	23	8	335
Coupling or uncoupling. While doing other work about trains or while attending switches.		4 2		1		8 22	1	8 22
Coming in contact with overhead bridges, structures at side of track, etc.  Falling from vehicles or while getting on or off Other causes.			2	1 3 28	1 1	6 17 30	1 5	15 293 82
Total (other than train accidents)		11	3	39	7	83	11	420
Total, all classes		11	3	42	12	106	19	755

TABLE No. 2E.—Collisions and derailments.

	Number.	Loss.	Killed.	Injured.
Collisions, rear	11	\$5,839 47,502	1 7	62 202
Collisions, train separating	7	846		10
Total	83	54, 187	8	274
Derailments due to defects of roadway, etc	2		••••••	5
Derailments due to defects of equipment.  Derailments due to negligence of trainmen, signalmen, etc  Derailments due to unforeseen obstruction of track, etc  Derailments due to malicious obstruction of track, etc	1	1,500	·	1
Derailments due to miscellaneous causes	ii	3,860		38
Total	16	5, 360		59
Total collisions and derailments	49	59, 547	8	333

#### YEARLY TABLES.

This bulletin completes the publication of the accident records under the law of March 3, 1901, for nine years, and the large table following, Table A, gives the aggregates, for the year ending June 30, 1910, of the items which appear in Table No. 1 of the quarterly returns. The total number of casualties shown for the year in Table A is 86,178 (3,804 killed and 82,374 injured).

This table includes for 1910 the following statistics which did not appear in the quarterly bulletins, the reports from which they are taken having been received after the bulletins were printed. Two passengers and 11 employees killed and 57 passengers and 111 employees injured.

The totals of these yearly tables are not comparable with those given in the commission's annual statistical reports, for the reason that the monthly reports deal only with accidents to passengers and to employees while on duty. The monthly reports take no account of accidents to "other persons." These appear in the annual reports, and include casualties at highway crossings, to trespassers, to persons walking along the track, accidents to employees in shops remote from the railroad, and all other accidents not occurring to passengers and to employees actually on duty.

The salient facts of the records of casualties for the twelve months are shown in Table B, which is given for the purpose of making available a comparison with any year back to 1903.

The totals in Tables A and B for the year ending June 30, 1910, include the aggregate of the four quarterly bulletins; but bulletins 34, 35, and 36 (the last three) do not include accidents on electric railroads; so that to make comparison with preceding years the figures should be increased as follows:

	Passe	ngers.	Empl	oyees.	To	tal.
	K.	I.	K.	I.	K.	I.
Table A Electric roads, Bulletins 34, 35, and 36	421 29	13,756 1,759	3, 383 35	68, 618 307	3,804 64	82, 374 2, 066
Total	450	15, 515	3, 418	68, 925	3,868	84, 440

. 1910.
8
June 30.
. wear ending
to persons, w
2
v of cornalities
0
-Summan
٠,
TABLE A.

	Pess (a a	Passengers (s and b).	Perso ried agreen	Persons carried under agreement or contract(bb).	Total	Total (a, b, and b b).	Traff	Trainmen.	E Y	Prelumen in yards.	Yard train- men (switch ing crews).	train- witch- ews).	Oth Ploy	Other em- ployees.	Tota	Total em- ployees.	Total persons reported.	ersons rted.
	Kijjeq.	.bemini	Killed.	.berujaI	Killed.	.bemini	Killed.	.benujaī	Killed.	- berm (a)	Killed.	.bemini	Killed.	.bezuļāI	Killed.	-beaulai	Kuled.	·benulai
Collisions	32	3,886	171	22	90 t~ 90 = 10	4.4, 84.9,	216 188	1,765	ħ.o.	667 138	#21	\$5.5 5.5 5.5 5.5 5.5 5.5 5.5 5.5 5.5 5.5	32	\$5 K	255	3,333 1,868	33	4,814
Mocetaneous train accidents, incuming topo-	먾	꾑	*	8	깷	142	75	1,086	£~	232	ro	130	22	133	107	1,500	951	1; 732
Total train socidents	62	6,621	28	883	217	7,516	<del>4</del> 79	4,123	19	1,027	8	98	106	843	715	6,791	932	14, 367
Coupling or uncoupling.	;	::		:	:		8	126	8	230	8	1,426	-	112	8	2,985	306	2,965
Attending switches	:	:		:	*	:	19	9,296	R	3,060	9	3,608	7	2,286	157	18,240	157	18,240
Structures at side of track, etc.	69	Ħ	-	9	49	a	52	2	39	콨	12	23	19	25	8	1,877	8	1,410
Other causes	22	2,748 3,010,6	22	23	F2.2	2,833	1381	5,271	នដ	2,306	<b>8</b> 33	4,061 551	1,282	1,558	25. 25.	13,196 26,029	1,687,1	16,029 20,403
Total (other than train socidents)	183	5,785	21	455	8	6,240	577	17,020	38	6,629	405	4	1,622	28,099	2,668	61,827	2,872	68,067
Total (all classes).	362	12,406	\$3	1,350	2	13.756	1,056	21,152	323	7,656	474	10,858	1,528	28.042	3,383	68,618	3.804	82,374
				1000	SOUTH OF TOTAL	i i	DESCEDING		0.00							•		

TOTALS FOR PRECEDING YEAR.

Collisions	73	2,716	83	317	76	3,033	145	1,286	88	467	8	788	*	365	246	2,362	342	5,395
Missellander to the second and the best from the second to	_	2,450	١-	207	63	2,717	171	8	=	87	7	<u> </u>	25	8	ži	1,448	茅	4, 166
motive boller explosions,	:	8	:	19	•	118	8	727	<b>-</b>	171	64	ž	63	8	*	1,067	Ą	1,162
Total train accidents	20 <u>2</u>	5, 262	84	8	131	5,865	352	2,980	75	77.3	98	203	7.8	613	920	4,877	199	10,742
1140000			:				*	735	8	69	67	1,086	•	8	191	2,353	191	2,343
			:		:		a	7,147	Ħ	2,346	2	2,610	æ	2,212	8	14,315	3	14,315
- CONSTITUTE OF THE PARTY OF TH	69	28	:	•	61	28	75	ig G	٠	200	£=	25	9	z	92	1, 28	200	1,266
on or off	いる	2,820	<b>0</b> 12	26 SE	137	3,076	200	3,947	22	<u>2</u> 2	28	379	258	1,368	登記	10,280	886	13,336
Total (other than train accidents)	183	5,848	ĸ	8	র	6,251	£37	13,247	216	5,430	27.7	7,399	98	20,891	,936	46,927	0\$1,	63, 178
Total (all clustees)	100	11,105	8	1,011	335	12,116	169	16, 236	270	6,202	313	7,962	26	21,504	2, 456	51,804	2, 791	63,920
											!							1

TABLE B.—Casualties to passengers and employees, years ending June 30.

	19	910.	19	909.	19	908.	1:	907.
	Killed.	Injured.	Killed.	Injured.	Killed.	Injured.	Killed.	Injured.
Passengers:		•						·
In train accidents Other causes	217 204	7, 516 6, 240	131 204	5, 865 6, 251	165 241	7, 430 5, 215	410 237	9, 177 4, 527
Total	421	13,756	335	12, 116	406	12, 645	647	13.5
Employees:						<del></del>		
In train accidents In coupling accidents Overhead obstructions,	715 <b>20</b> 6	6, 791 2, 985	520 161	4,877 2,353	642 239	6, 818 3, 121	1,011 302	8, 92 3, 92
etc	96	1,377	76	1, 229	110	1,353	134	1,59
Falling from cars, etc Other causes	586 1,780	13, 196 44, 269	481 1,218	10, 259 33, 086	668	11, 735 33, 317	790 2,116	12, 36 35, 66
Total	3, 383	68, 618	2, 456	51,804	3, 358	56, 344	4, 353	62, (24
Total passengers and employees	3, 804	82, 374	2, 791	63, 920	3, 764	68, 989	5,000	76, 28
	1	906.	1	905.	<u> </u>	 904.	1	903.
	Killed.	Injured.	Killed.	Injured.	Killed.	Injured.	Killed.	Injured.
Passengers:	'   							- <del></del>
In train accidents Other causes	182 236	6, 778 4, 407	350 187	6, 498 3, 542	270 150	4, 945 3, 132	164 157	4, 424 2, 549
Total	418	11, 185	537	10,040	420	8, 077	321	6, 97
Employees:								
In train accidents In coupling accidents Overhead obstructions,		7, 483 3, 503	798 243	7,052 3,110	844 278	6, <b>99</b> 0 3, <b>44</b> 1	896 253	6, 44 2, 78
etc	132	1,497	92	1,185	116	1,210	93	99
Falling from cars, etc Other causes	713 1,772	11,253 31,788	(33 1,495	9, 237 24, 842	700 1, 429	9, 371 22, 254	678	8, (12) <b>2</b> (), 73
Total	3,807	55, 524	3,261	45, 426	3,367	43, 266	3,233	39,00
Total passengers and employees	4, 225	66,709	3,798	55, 466	3,787	51,343	3,554	45,97

Table C, on the next page, shows the totals of the two principal classes of train accidents for six years past. This table includes, for 1910, the following statistics which did not appear in the quarterly bulletins, the reports from which they are taken having been received after the bulletins were printed: Twenty-two collisions; damage, \$12,103; killed, 5; injured, 24. Twenty-eight derailments; damage, \$29,952; killed, 1; injured, 23.

TABLE C.—Collisions and derailments; damage to cars, engines, and roadway, years ending June 30.

		1910.	0,		,	1906	-6			1908.	ant.	
	N. E. E. E. E. E. E. E. E. E. E. E. E. E.	Loss.	Killed.	Injured.	Nom- Der.	Lon.	Killed.	Injured.	Num- ber.	Loss.	Killed.	Injured.
Collisions, rear Collisions, butting Collisions, train separating Collisions, miscellaneous	1,311 695 418 3,437	11, 398, 763 1, 514, 381 164, 383 1, 561, 252	119 194 5 115	3,324 3,008 2,236	850 4655 2,681	\$9023, 375 674, 729 146, 067 1, 154, 520	25,52	1,566 1,878 1,802 1,802	1,307 795 436 3,735	\$1,206,044 1,473,618 106,850 1,697,687	210	3, 143 3, 143 2, 143 2, 613
Total	5,861	4,629,279	£33	7.765	4,411	3, 108, 691	342	5,395	6.363	4,635,199	414	7,712
Derallments due to defects of roadway, etc.  Derallments due to defects of equipment.  Derallments due to negligence of trainmen, algualmen, etc.  Derallments due to unforeseen obstruction of track, etc.  Derallments due to malicious obstruction of track, etc.  Derallments due to malicious causes.	1,12, 27,11, 30,0 30,0 1,2,6	2,227,382 286,282 11,65,183 11,184,283	さき総器設置	128 128 128 128 128 128 128 128 128 128	2,362 307 331 1,217	708, 658 1,875, 646 1180, 768 444, 308 83, 087 1, 063, 006	883838	1, 198 188 188 188 188 188 188 188	2,15 2,756 2,756 381 381 1,572	1,086,281 2,176,194 273,038 362,441 1,46,933	22224	1. 1. 1. 1. 1. 1. 1. 1. 1. 1. 1. 1. 1. 1
Total	5,918	5, 194, 679	340	4,814	5,259	4,371,512	25	4,141	6,671	5, 548, 461	314	6,122
Total collisions and derallments	11,779	9,823,968	753	12,579	9,670	7,480,208	809	9,636	13,084	10, 183, 660	17 89	12,834
		1907.	7.			1006.	2			1906.		<b> </b>
	Num.	Loss.	Killed	Injured.	Num- ber.	Loss.	Killed.	Injured.	Num- ber.	Loss.	Killed.	Injured.
Collisions, rear Collisions, butting Collisions, trains separating Collisions, miscellaneous	1,967 1,065 685 4,309	1, 935, 509 1, 935, 505 259, 466 2, 101, 069	202 172 100 202	24.6. 513.6. 513.6.	1,722 966 901 3,705	11, 720, 365 1, 599, 568 339, 136 1, 640, 669	166 251 9	2, 427 2, 375 375 4, 875	1, 463 707 972 3, 062	\$1.463,012 1,451,906 440,496 1,493,641	25,12	44, 4 88, 48, 4
Total	8,028	6,299 568	776	9,641	7,194	5,319,758	609	7,914	6, 224	4,840,054	909	7,111
Derailments due to ( Derailmen	1,528 3,178 495 485 387 1,785	2,400,028 2,400,028 396,626 656,725 153,694 1,713,947	88 08 130 186 186	1,963 926 756 658 658 2,196	2,611 2,611 391 300 1,407	918,056 2,226,153 318,067 472,653 106,859 1,297,543	22326	1, 606 802 483 456 1, 318	1,007 2,605 341 362 76 1,010	2.068,620 272,254 676,001 142,761 925,633	25 177 188 115	1, 446 798 418 646 196 1, 334
Total	7,432	6, 556, 134	515	5,695	6.261	5,339,431	373	4, 772	5, 371	4,862,602	456	4,838
Total collisions and derailments	15, 458	12, 865, 702	1,291	16, 236	13,455	10, 659, 189	7778	12,686	11,595	9,711,656	1,064	11,949

The following tables are self-explanatory, being consolidations of the quarterly tables giving the same classes of facts:

Table D.—Causes of accidents to employees in coupling and uncoupling cars, year ending June 30, 1910.

1	Causes.		rain- nen.		inmen rards.	tra (sw	ard inmen itching ews).	em	ther ploy-
Subclass.		Killed.	Injured.	Killed.	Injured.	Killed.	Injured.	Killed.	Injured.
1 2 3 4 5	Adjusting coupler with foot  Adjusting coupler, cars accidentally started  Careless manipulation of uncoupling lever  Cars not equipped with automatic coupler  Coupler broken, using link and pin or chain	3	79 20 23 4 10	2	47 11 13	6	126 41 38 4 8	1	7 5 1 7 2
6 7 8	Coupling damaged cars Coupling with chain or other emergency appliance on curve too sharp for automatic coupling Coupling with chain or other emergency appliance be-	1 1	34 24	3	2Ĭ 7	11 3	67 46	1	11 2
9	cause of uneven track. Coupling or uncoupling safety chains. Fingers or hand caught between uncoupling lever and body of car.	••••	1 10 163		1 5 99	1	26 237		6
11 12	Uncoupling without using lever (unnecessary). Uncoupling without using lever, uncoupling lever not in working order	4	26 77	2	28	2 7	65		1
13 14	Foot caught in frog, switch, or guard rail	3 6	11 88	2	52 7 33	8	21 98	1	6
15 16	Opening knuckle when cars were near together, engine accidentally started	2	10 24	1	11 5		10 33	• • • •	8 1
17 18 19	Opening knuckle, lost footing.  Riding on car to uncouple, slipped off.  Struck by object at side of track	4	28 20 21	2 3 1	17 11 16	5 7 1	47 37 36	1 1	3 1 3
20 21	Caught by unexpected movement of car, due to slack running in  Caught by unexpected movement of car, due to mistake	7	77	4	45	7	78 21		2
22 23 24	or misunderstanding in giving hand signals	3713	10 43 21 41	7	10 20 6 22 4	13	72 11 54	 1	4
25 26 27	Hand caught between projecting load and end of next car.  No witness (fatal injury)	6	9 34	4	2 12	8	10	• • • • •	1 6
28	Unexplained	60	927	40	520	99	1,426	7	112

TABLE Dx.—Nature of injuries to employees in coupling and uncoupling cars, year ending June 30, 1910.

Injuries.	Train- men.	Train- men in yards.	Yard train- men.	Other employ- ees.
Loss of feet. Loss of legs. Loss of arms Loss of hands. Loss of fingers. Loss of toes Fractured skull Fractured leg Fractured arm Fractured collar bone or ribs Fractured other bones. Contusion of head or body Contusion or laceration of feet. Contusion or laceration of legs. Contusion or laceration of arms. Contusion or laceration of fingers. Dislocation. Internal injuries. Sprains. Miscellaneous	16 10 9 5 38 9 2 11 7 22 27 98 81 18 49 51 116 275 4 15 41 23	12 7 3 3 16 3 7 10 5 57 39 15 27 30 82 154 6 10 18 13	15 10 9 4 39 4 1 8 21 22 31 243 138 39 97 62 155 418 4 9 72 25	1 1 2 2 2 2 2 17 11 5 14 28 1 3 3
Total injuries.  Killed	927 60	520 40	1,426 99	112
Total killed and injured	987	560	1,525	119

#### RECAPITULATION.

Total killed	. 206 . 2,985
Total killed and injured	3, 191

TABLE Dz.—Causes of accidents to employees classified (C6 and C7) as falling from and getting on or off cars and engines, year ending June 30, 1910.

		Causes.		rain- nen.	m	rain- en in ards.	tra:	ard inmen vitch- erews).	ployees.	
Subclass.			Killed.	Injured.	Killed.	Injured.	Killed.	Injured.	Killed.	Injured.
	1 2 3 4	Fell from roof of box car by reason of— Defect in car	2 2	26 27 50	••••		1	39		2
<b>C</b> 6	5	movements of cars other than those in sub- class 3		227 177	9 6	121 108	19	362 252	5	44 6
	6 7 8 9	Coal car. Freight car other than box or coal car. Engine or tender. Passenger car. Engines, tenders, or cars (all kinds) not in mo-	14	22 189 567 34	3 4 14	1 4	3 8 13 2	70	6 26 8 4	11 93 85 13
ļ	11 12 (13 14 15	Miscellaneous causes.  Not clearly explained.  Slipped getting on moving trains or cars.  Lumping off moving trains	27 60 20	309 958 282 556 683	2 4 17 5 4		2 26 29 6 10	1,078 235	7 6 16 20 16	250 331 102 196 224
	16 17 18	Jumping from engines or cars anticipating collision, derailment, or other accident  Fell from engines or cars by reason of defective handholds and sill steps  Getting on or off moving engine  Caught in frog, guard rail, or switch	Ì	193	12	79	1 10	194	1 1 19 1	14 15 164 2
		Total	231	5, 271	80	2,306	138	4,061	137	1,558

#### [Public-No. 171.]

AN ACT Requiring common carriers engaged in interstate commerce to make full reports of all accidents to the Interstate Commerce Commission.

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, It shall be the duty of the general manager, superintendent, or other proper officer of every common carrier engaged in interstate commerce by railroad to make to the Interstate Commerce Commission, at its office in Washington. District of Columbia, a monthly report, under oath, of all collisions of trains or where any train or part of a train accidentally leaves the track, and of all accidents which may occur to its passengers or employees while in the service of such common carrier and actually on duty, which report shall state the nature and causes thereof and the circumstances connected therewith.

- SEC. 2. That any common carrier failing to make such report within thirty days after the end of any month shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor, and upon conviction thereof by a court of competent jurisdiction shall be punished by a fine of not more than one hundred dollars for each and every offense and for every day during which it shall fail to make such report after the time herein specified for making the same.
- SEC. 3. That neither said report nor any part thereof shall be admitted as evidence or used for any purpose against such railroad so making such report in any suit or action for damages growing out of any matter mentioned in said report.
- SEC. 4. That the Interstate Commerce Commission is authorized to prescribe for such common carriers a method and form for making the reports in the foregoing section provided.

Approved, March 3, 1901.

#### SPECIAL INFORMATION CONTAINED IN PRECEDING BULLETINS.4

Each accident bulletin contains tables showing the number of passengers and employees killed and injured, and these figures are classified according to cause (see Table No. 1); also tables showing cost of the different classes of train accidents. The causes of accidents to employees in coupling and uncoupling and in falling from cars, etc., are further classified in Tables No. 3 and No. 4. The most serious collisions and derailments are dealt with in a supplementary table (Class A:, showing the causes in some detail. Each bulletin is for three months, and No. 1 was for the quarter ending September 30, 1901. The bulletin for the quarter ending June 30, contains, in addition to the quarterly statistics, tables showing the same information for the whole of the fiscal year ending on that date.

Bulletin No. 25 shows 110 passengers killed in train accidents, three collisions and one derailment being responsible for 80 deaths in this class. The number of passengers killed from other causes (mostly their own negligence) also shows a large increase. One of the most serious collisions was due to the misreading of a dispatcher's order, and another to a mistake in sending or receiving the order.

Bulletin No. 26 shows a marked decrease in casualties as compared with preceding quarters, a large falling off in railroad traffic having taken place. The list of "prominent" train accidents includes only three cases which may be classed as notable.

Bulletin No. 27 shows further marked decreases in casualties incident to the large falling off in railroad traffic. The number of passengers and employees killed in train accidents (125) is the smallest since the monthly records were established. The most fatal accident in this quarter was a collision at a street crossing, where 8 passengers in an electric car were killed.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>a</sup> For notes on Bulletins 1-16, see Bulletin No. 17; for notes on Bulletins 17-24, see Bulletin No. 30.

- Bulletin No 28 recorded the smallest number of passengers killed in train accidents (13) ever reported in the quarterly records. The total of passengers and employees killed in train accidents (112) was 13 less than the previous low record (125, Bulletin 27). Of the 13 passengers killed in train accidents, 7 were victims of a butting collision on an electric railroad.
- Bulletin No. 29 showed totals far smaller than the corresponding quarter one year previous, but the diminution in the number of casualties, which had continued during the year of depression, seemed to have been checked. The number of passengers killed in train accidents was 53, and there were 8 notable collisions.
- Bulletin No. 30 recorded 34 passengers killed in train accidents (including 15 victims of a forest fire.) One collision resulted in 8 deaths of passengers, and two derailments killed 16 employees.
- Bulletin No. 31, in part, continues the favorable showing of the quarter one year previous (Bulletin 27), though it covers a period of considerable revival of business. One collision caused 20 deaths and 28 injuries.
- Bulletin No. 32 shows a total of 99 passengers and employees killed in train accidents—the lowest quarterly record thus far shown. It is to be observed, however, that a butting collision, causing the death of 9 passengers and 1 employee, occurring on an electric road, was not included, the railroad company having failed to make a report of the accident as required by law. The quarter in 1908 with which this one is most naturally compared (Bulletin 28) had one collision on an electric line in which 7 persons were killed.
- Bulletin No. 33 shows considerable increases in most of the casualty items, marking the expansion of traffic on all of the principal railroads. Five accidents—4 collisions and 1 derailment—caused 47 deaths.
- Bulletin No. 34 shows heavy totals in the casualty lists incident to the great expansion in railroad traffic accompanying the general revival in business. There was no very notable passenger-train accident, but a collision between a work train and a freight killed 14 laborers. The list of causes of prominent collisions is unusually varied.
- Bulletin No. 35 shows 110 passengers killed in train accidents, the total in this item being swelled by two great disasters, an avalanche in the State of Washington and a derailment in Iowa.

O

		•	
		•	
	•		
		-	
			•
		•	
•			
	•		
•			
		•	
		•	
		•	•
	•	•	•
	•	•	•
		•	•
		•	•
		•	•
		•	•
		•	•
			•

Washington, D. C.

Washington, D. C.

UNIV. OF MICH

# Accident Bulletin


No. 37

# Railroad Accidents in the United States

During July, August, and September 1910



Washington
Government Printing Office
1911



#### ACCIDENT BULLETIN NO. 37

# Collisions, Derailments, and other Accidents to Trains, Accidents to Roadway, and Casualties to Persons

from all causes

# on the Railroads of the United States

during the months of

July, August, and September, 1910

INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMMISSION WASHINGTON, D. C.



WASHINGTON
GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
1911

#### THE INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMMISSION.

JUDSON C. CLEMENTS, of Georgia, Chairman.
CHARLES A. PROUTY, of Vermont.
FRANKLIN K. LANE, of California.
EDGAR E. CLARK, of Iowa.
JAMES S. HARLAN, of Illinois.
CHARLES C. McCHORD, of Kentucky.
BALTHASAR H. MEYER, of Wisconsin.
EDWARD A. MOSELEY, Secretary.

# RAILROAD ACCIDENTS

IN THE UNITED STATES DURING THE THREE MONTHS ENDING SEPTEMBER 80, 1910.

The number of persons killed in train accidents during the months of July, August, and September, 1910, as shown in reports made by the railroad companies to the Interstate Commerce Commission under the "accident law" of May 6, 1910, was 321, and of injured 3,892. Accidents of other kinds, including those sustained by employees while at work, by passengers in getting on or off cars, by travelers at highway crossings, by persons doing business at stations, etc., by trespassers, and others, bring up the total number of casualties, excluding "industrial accidents," to 22,328 (2,948 killed and 19,380 injured). Accidents to employees resulting in slight injuries, which do not prevent the employee injured from performing his accustomed service for more than three days in the aggregate during the 10 days immediately following the accident, are not reported. The casualties to passengers have been divided into three Class a includes all ordinary passengers. Class b includes passengers traveling on freight trains. Class bb includes persons who are customarily carried on trains under special arrangements, such as postal clerks and express messengers, employees on Pullman cars, newsboys, live-stock tenders, and men in charge of freight. The reported casualties are classified in Table No. 1, given below, and more in detail in Table 1B.1

The item "other causes" in the former classification included most or all of the accidents which in the present bulletin are classed as follows:

	Killed.	Injured.
Table 1s, "Other causes," total of employees on duty	20 8	34° 24°
Being struck or run over by engine or car	183 6 172	36: 1( 13:
Fable 1, industrial accidents:  Item No. 6	40	5,54 4,65
Item No. 7		1, 49
Total	471	12,79

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> This bulletin is the first one to be issued under the revised accident law. In previous quarterly bulletins the records have included only four classes of accidents; namely, (1) collisions, (2) derailments, (3) casualties to passengers, and (4) casualties to employees on duty. The statistics of other accidents on railroads previous to July 1, 1910, will be found in the annual statistical reports of the Commission.

The class termed "Industrial accidents," as found in the present bulletin, includes a large part of those injuries to employees, fatal and nonfatal, which in former bulletins have been included in the eighth item ("other causes") of Table No. 1. This item in the present and future Tables 1 and 1s, therefore, will not be comparable with the same item in bulletins 1 to 36, inclusive.

The statistics here given present the record of the standard rail-roads, for convenience called "steam roads," in distinction from electric railways. The accident statistics of those electric lines on which interstate traffic is carried, and which, therefore, are subject to the Federal accident law, are given in a second table, No. 1E, and in Table No. 2E.

TABLE No. 1.—Casualties to persons, July, August, and September, 1910.

Causes.	Number of accidents.	(a,	sengers b, and bb).	includ ploye	loyees, ing em- es not luty.		r per- ns.	Tota soi	l per-
•	Number o	Killed.	Injured.	Killed.	Injured.	Killed.	Injured.	Killed.	Injured.
<ol> <li>Collisions</li> <li>Derailments</li> <li>Miscellaneous train accidents, includ-</li> </ol>	1,387 1,743	47 15	1,014 816	87 114	903 520	22 18	42 57	156 147	1,959 1,393
ing locomotive-boiler explosions	624	1	41	14	472	3	27	18	540
Total train accidents.  4. Accidents to roadway or bridges not	3,754	63	1,871	215	1,895	43	126	321	3,892
causing derailment, such as fires, floods, landslides, explosions, etc.  5. Accidents in connection with rail-road operation other than those to trains or roadway (classes C-3 to C-12, inclusive), not including in-	132		2		6	1	3	1	11
dustrial accidents		72	1,949	733	10, 559	1,821	2,969	2,626	15,477
Total		135	3,822	948	12,460	1,865	3,098	2,948	19,380
Industrial accidents to employees: 6. While working on tracks or bridges. 7. At stations, freight houses, engine houses, coaling stations, water stations, etc., where no moving			• • • • •	40	5, 545		•••••	40	5, 545
railroad car or engine is involved				21 15 35 21	4,654 9,028 283 1,492			21 15 35 21	4.654 9,028 283 1,492
Total casualties in industrial accidents				132	21,002	•••••		132	21.002
Total casualties in all accidents.		135	3,822	1,080	33, 462	1,865	3,098	3,080	40,382

Note.—Accidents occurring in connection with railroad operation or distinctively railroad work are covered in the items numbered 1 to 5, inclusive. The same statistics are given more in detail in the double-page table on pages 12 and 13. "Industrial" accidents (items 6 to 10, inclusive) are those occurring to employees of the railroad on railroad premises in which movements of cars or engines are not involved.

The totals of the items in Table No. 1 are swelled by the inclusion of classes of casualties not heretofore shown in the quarterly bulletins, as already explained, but the lists of casualties are also very large in those items which are made up on the same basis as under the former law, as will be seen by reference to Table 1A, below. In the first, third, and fourth items of that table the increases over the corresponding quarter of 1909 are very large. Except in the first item, it is possible that the increases are in part due to the adoption of more careful methods of keeping records by the railroads, consequent on the change in the law, though there is no conclusive evidence of this. In Table 2A, giving causes in detail, the record of

passengers killed in train accidents (63 in Table 1) is further swelled by the inclusion of 2 disastrous collisions on electric railways in which 40 persons were killed. Table 24 contains 8 collisions, in which 95 persons were killed and 125 were injured, and 1 derailment in which 14 were killed and 22 injured. In the corresponding quarter of the preceding year the 5 most serious accidents caused 47 deaths.

TABLE No. 1A.—Comparison of principal items with last bulletin and with one year back.

	Bulletin 37.	Bulletin 36.	Bulletin 33.
<ol> <li>Passengers killed in train accidents.</li> <li>Passengers killed, all causes.</li> <li>Employees (on duty) killed in train accidents.</li> <li>Employees (on duty) killed in coupling.</li> <li>Employees (on duty) killed, all causes.</li> <li>Total, passengers and employees (items 2 and 5, above).</li> <li>Other persons killed (including trespassers, nontrespassers, and employees not on duty), all causes.</li> <li>Employees killed in industrial accidents.</li> </ol>	135 209 56 869 1,004		56 104 137 38 748 852

The total number of collisions and derailments in the quarter now under review was 3,130 (1,387 collisions and 1,743 derailments), of which 212 collisions and 188 derailments affected passenger trains. The damage to cars, engines, and roadway by these accidents amounted to \$2,871,501. Given more in detail, these facts appear as below (collisions and derailments which cause no death or personal injury and which cause not over \$150 damage to the property of the railroad are not reported):

TABLE No. 2.—Collisions and derailments.

	Number.	Loss.	Killed.	Injured.
Collisions, rear	301	<b>\$342,368</b>	27	413
Collisions, butting	184	424, 846	85	831
Collisions, train separating	97	33, 833	5	46
Collisions, miscellaneous	805	401,600	39	669
Total	1,387	1,202,647	156	1,959
Derailments due to defects of roadway, etc	290	173,875	10	276
Derailments due to defect of equipment	796	713,309	30	242
Derailments due to negligence of trainmen, signalmen, etc	112	134, 365	16	193
Derailments due to unforeseen obstruction of track, etc	93	161, 287	49	210
Derailments due to malicious obstruction of track, etc	35 i	36,526	5	51
Derailments due to miscellaneous causes		449, 492	37	421
Total	1,743	1,668,854	147	1,393
Total collisions and derailments	3, 130	2,871,501	303	3,352
Total for same quarter of 1909		2,316,014	180	3,341
1908	2,567	1,950,408	176	2,729
1907	4,279	3,605,696	309	4,534

Following is the usual list of class A train accidents—all in which the damage is reported at \$10,000 or over, notable cases in which passengers are killed, and those doing damage less than \$10,000 and down to \$2,000, wherever the circumstances or the cause may be of particular interest:

TABLE No. 2A.—Causes of 43 prominent train accidents.

[Note.—R stands for rear collision; B, butting collision M miscellaneous collisions; D, derailment; P, passenger train; F, freight and miscellaneous trains.]

#### COLLISIONS.

		-			4 54	3	
					to en- care, road-	1	
No.	Class.	Kind of train.	7	red.	age d d,		Cause.
		·	Killed.	Injured.	Damage gines, a n d	Reference record.	
1	M	F and F	2	1	\$2,072	11	Freight train ran into side of work train. Dispatcher had allowed work train on main track
							until 10:30 p. m., without sending a copy of the order to other trains. There was only one train in the vicinity and the dispatcher assumed it would be impossible for this train to reach the
2	В	F and F	1	1	3,300	49	work train by 10:30. North-bound train ran past meeting point. (See
3	В	Pand P	2	29	3, 550	86	note in text below.) Confusion of meeting orders and failure in block
4	В	P and F	0	93	3, 625	12	working. (See note in text below.)  Motorman of north-bound electric work car ran past a meeting point fixed by dispatcher's order.
5	В	F and F	0	3	4, 400	54	(See note in text below.) Dispatcher, 27 years old, with three years' experience, issued "lap orders." His conduct in connection with the orders of characterized in the
6	R	P. and P	2	38	4,800	42	nection with these orders is characterized in the report as gross negligence.  Passenger train entered station at excessive speed.  Two passengers killed.
7	В	F. and F	0	0	5,030	8	Operator in receiving order omitted four words. He claims that the words must have been cut off by the sticking of the relay, but another operator at the same time received the same order cor-
8	В	F. and F	4	3	6, 461	94	rectly.  False clear block signal given by signalman who
9	В	P. and F	0	22	6, 481	89	was intoxicated. (See note in text below.) Failure to deliver meeting order. (See note in text
10	В	F. and F	2	5	7,650	52	below.) Agent accepted hold order after train had passed; was confused as to fourth and fifth sections of a
11	M	P. and F	1	14	8,000	10	freight, and made wrong entries on block sheet.  Coal cars ran away from mine. (See note in text below.)
12	В	P. and P	2	20	8,430	88	Error in meeting order. Operator of 10 years' experience wrote "east" in place of "west," but according to dispatcher repeated the order correctly. Conductor and engineman at fault for accepting order, as it bore internal evidence of
13	В	P. and F	0	9	8,950	45	irregularity.  West-bound freight failed to clear east-bound 5 minutes, as required by rule; east-bound ran past train-order signal.
14	В	F. and F	0	6	10,776	84	North-bound train encroached on time of south- bound. South-bound also left station a little ahead or time; dense fog prevailed. (See note
15	R	<b>F.</b> and <b>F</b>	1	1	12,000	81	in text below.)  Brakeman, who was killed, failed to properly protect train by flag; occurred in fog at 1 a. m.; train moving slowly.
16 17	B	P. and P P. and F	2 0	82	13,200 15,000	87 80	Mispiaced switch at crossover. Excessive speed under permissive block signal.
18		F. and F	Ŏ	2	16,792	44	Fast freight train ran too fast under caution sig- nal and disregarded distant signal at entrance of next block section.
19	В	F. and F	. 1	4	17,819	7	Conductor misread name of station in meeting order. Engineman killed. There were two names in the body of the order and the con-
20	R	P. and P	. 9	17	18,000	41	ductor seems to have confused them.  Disregard of red light by engineman of passenger train. (See note in text below.)
21	В	F and F		8		51	Operator of two years' experience and two months in the service at this office, accepted an order after train had passed. This collision occurred at 2:20 a. m. The operator disappeared next morning.
22	В	P and F  F and F	. 12	24	18, 871	46	Conductor and engineman of west-bound work train waiting for two east-bound passenger trains started out after only one of the trains had passed. (See note in text below.)
23	В	F and F	- 6	5	19, 175	47	Operator failed to deliver order. (See note in text
24	В	P and F	. 20	39	27,758	3	Failure to deliver telegraphic order. (See note in text below.)

TABLE No. 2A.—Causes of 43 prominent train accidents—Continued.

#### COLLISIONS—Continued.

					COLUMB	TOVE					
No.	Class.	Kind of train.	Killed.	Injured.	Demage to engineer, and road-	Reference to record.	Campo.				
25 26	B	P and P	34 6	11 18	\$7,090	100	South-bound extra car (on electric railway) en- croached on time of north-bound regular car. (See note in text below.) South-bound extra passenger car encroached on time of regular north-bound car. (Electric Railway).				
	Total	<b></b>	111	457	266,640		Raiway).				
DERAILMENTS.											
	ĺ		<u> </u>			<u> </u>					
1	D	P	0	7	\$2,200 2,675	16	False clear night signal at derailing switch. Red glass had been broken and light showed white. Cause of breakage of glass undiscovered. Unknown. (See note in text below.)				
3	D D D	P	Ö	Ö	3, 295 5, 202	107 116	Loose tire on wheel of tourist alcoping car.				
•		<b>3</b>			0,20	110	Train of 43 empty cars running through a sag; the rear part of train pushed the cars together and				
5	D	P	3	40	5, 700	123	forced one of them off the track. Unexplained. Speed 60 to 65 miles an hour. The				
6	D	<b>P</b>	0	1	6, 600	103	tender was the first vehicle to jump the track. Cars ran off end of track on trestle, because brake				
7	D	P	0	25	7,401	114	chain became knotted.  Switch thrown immediately in front of fast train by apprentice signal man, without instructions. Signal man was engaged at telephone. Train derailed by running at high speed through cross-				
8	D	<b>P.</b>	0	3	10, 360	102	Fault in brake rigging of rear driving wheel. Wreck partly destroyed by fire due to spontaneous combustion.				
9 10	D D	P	14	22	16, 509 16, 700	115 20	Washout 12:25 a. m. (See note in text below.) Broken wheel; seam in flange.				
11	D D D	P	Ŏ	15	12, 124	14	Broken angle bar.				
12 13	Ď	P	Ö	6	12, 147 13, 700	<b>82</b> 67	Accidental obstruction. (See note in text below.) Misplaced switch. Switch had been left wrong by employee of bridge and building department. Engineman and fireman held not blameworthy.				
14	D	<b>P</b>	1	1	14,510	60	Improper handling of air brakes approaching crossing on descending grade of 1 per cent. Engine rea off at derailing switch.				
15	D	<b></b>	0	0	14,600	68	Accidental obstruction (steel brake beam lying on track).				
16	D	P	0	5	15,000	36	Excessive speed on sharp curve; 11 p. m. Engineman of 19 years' experience.				
17	D	P	2	6	15, 290	111	Explosion of locomotive boiler. Fire box failed by weakness due to excessive heat, caused by low				
18	D	P	2	3	15, 700	15	water. Engineman and fireman killed.  Bridge weakened by fire. Engineman and fireman killed. Train approached bridge over curved line and conductor saw fire and applied				
19	D	P	2	8	16,450	39	brakes, but too late. Cause of fire unknown.  Excessive speed (estimated 70 miles an hour) over curve of 10 degrees. Engineman and fireman killed.				
20	D	P	4	36	21,500	28	Misplaced switch. Primary responsibility rests on conductor and brakeman of freight train which had used the switch a short time before, but the engineman and fireman of the passenger train, who were killed, are held to have been partly responsible, as the switch could have been seen in season for slackening speed.				
21	D	<b>F</b>	0	1	21,800	22	Tires of driving wheels of engine slipped and caused rails to spread. (See note in text below.)				
22	D	<b>P</b>	0	•	28, 307	76	Executive speed with ore cars suitable to be run only at low speed.				
23	D	P	2	8	31,700	78	Runeway on steep grade. (See note in text below.)				
	i	•			1	1	1				

223

680

Total collisions and derailments.

297,610

564, 250

Collision No. 2, occurring about 4 a. m., was caused by a north-bound freight running 4 miles past the station at which it should have met a south-bound freight. The conductor of the north-bound train had tried to get the dispatcher to give him an order to run to D, but did not succeed; but the name of this place—D—appears to have stuck in his mind, and in reading his order to the engineman he read that name into it, though the order plainly read E; and E was the station that the train ran past. The report says that the engineman repeated the order to the conductor, but nevertheless the error went undetected. A brakeman of the train had seen the order and had read it correctly, but he was asleep in the caboose when certain south-bound trains were met, and when his train left E he assumed that all south-bound trains, for which his train should wait, had passed.

Collision No. 3, occurring at 6:27 p. m., was due to mistakes and confusion in the delivering of meeting orders on the part of telegraphers, to lack of care on the part of the conductor and engineman of a train, and to failure to carry out manual block signal rules. The trains involved were No. 6, running eastward from A to B, C, D, E, and F, and No. 1, running in the opposite direction, both regular passenger trains. The dispatcher, finding that train No. 1 was a little late, sent order No. 22, requiring these trains to meet at C. This order was sent to the eastbound train at A and to the westbound at F; and it was also sent to C, the station where the trains were to meet. Subsequently, finding that No. 1 was losing time, the dispatcher determined to change the meeting point to D, one station farther east, and prepared order No. 27 to that effect. This order was sent to B for No. 6 and to E for No. 1. The operators at C and D did not answer promptly. As soon as this order was sent, and before it was repeated, the operator at E reported that No. 1 was coming, and the dispatcher then decided to leave in force the original order; so he told the operator at E and operator W at B to destroy This proceeding was proper, as the order had not been order No. 27. repeated. Operator W at B says that he did not understand the dispatcher; and he did not destroy the order. He had written on it, prematurely, the word "complete," which word, when accompanied by a notation of the time, makes an order valid for use. became engaged in other duties (selling tickets) and forgot about this unfinished order. At this time the night operator, S, came on duty and he (S), without consulting the day operator, delivered this unfinished order to train No. 6. He saw that the order bore the word "complete," but failed to notice that it lacked the time indorsement, which was an essential element. The conductor, engineman, fireman, and one brakeman of train No. 6 also accepted and read the order, not noticing this irregularity; and train No. 6 then proceeded from B.

On arrival at C this train should have received a copy of the original order No. 22, fixing the meeting point at C (copies of meeting orders being regularly sent to operators at meeting points), but the operator at this station neglected to deliver this copy, and instead gave the conductor and engineman a clearance card, showing that he had no orders for that train and that the block section (C to D), which the train was to enter, was clear. He claims to have told the conductor by word of mouth that the clearance card would be valid only after ' the arrival of the west-bound train, but this is not substantiated; and besides, oral instructions contrary to written orders are forbidden. Under the block-signal rules this clearance card could not be given until after receipt of word from D that the block section was clear and would be kept clear for train No. 6, nor should the card be used at all unless there were some good reason for not clearing the signal. Moreover, this operator but a few minutes before, as required by the rules, had promised D that he would hold all east-bound trains for the arrival of train No. 1. On this clearance card train No. 6 left C, and the collision occurred about 1 mile east of that place. Both of the men at B and the one at C had been in the employ of this company for several years, and all three were regarded as efficient operators.

The block-signal system in use on this line is the "Controlled manual," but there is no track-circuit control, and the rules permit a clearance card to be given under certain conditions without putting the signal in the position to give a "proceed" indication. A card was thus given in this case, but without any reason or excuse. In consequence of the use of the same outdoor fixed signal for the two functions of a block signal and a train-order signal there is a complication in the rules concerning the use of a clearance card as a substitute for the giving of a proceed indication by the fixed signal, but it does not appear that this conduced to the commission of the error in this particular case.

Collision No. 4, which occurred on an electric road, was due to disobedience of a meeting order by both the conductor and the motorman of a north-bound work train. Each of these men had received a copy of the order about 30 minutes before the collision, and it appears that both of them fully understood it. Neither had any other order in his possession at the time. The report says: "The motorman states that he was writing out certain freight bills and asked the conductor twice whether the south-bound car had passed, and was assured that it had. The conductor states that he supposed the motorman would attend to the orders while he (the conductor) was looking around the cars, his attention being taken by some wires that were loose."

Collision No. 8, occurring at 3:30 a.m., was due to a false clear-block signal. The signalman, disqualified by being under the influence of intoxicating liquor, gave a clear signal to a south-bound extra train to enter a section already occupied by a north-bound regular train. There was a dense fog at the time so that neither engineman had a view of the opposing train in season to slacken his speed. According to the rules the signalman at this point should give a clear signal only after receiving word from the train dispatcher. This signalman had been in the employ of the company as an extra man for about three months. His mental condition after the collision was such that no explanation could be had of his error. He was arrested and held for the grand jury on a criminal charge, but the result of the trial is not yet reported.

Collision No. 9, between a south-bound passenger train and a northbound freight, was due to the failure of an operator to deliver an order to the south-bound train. This train was to meet the northbound at H, and the order for it was sent to the operator at that point. The train made its regular stop there to meet a north-bound passenger train and to take water, but as it approached the station the engineman sounded the regular whistle signal, indicating that he desired a clear train-order signal, and the operator, forgetting the order on his table, at once changed the signal to the "proceed" position. The operator is held negligent for not having reported to the dispatcher that the train was approaching the station, and also for neglecting to use the "telltale" device, an arrangement for covering the lever of the signal in such a way as to remind an operator of the presence of an order in his office in case he should inadvertently attempt to change the signal when it ought to be left in the "stop" position. After the train had left, he discovered the order lying on his telegraph table and immediately notified the dispatcher; but it was then too late to stop the north-bound train. Up to the time of this accident this operator's record had been good. He had been at H two years and had had four years' experience in all.

Collision No. 11 was due to the presence on the main line of five coal cars, which had escaped control at a mine about a mile away from the railroad and had run to the main track before the men in charge could stop them. These cars had run away because of carelessness of men at the loading point in pushing a loaded car against four others which were standing on a grade with the wheels blocked, but with blocks not large enough to withstand the shock which they were given by the moving car. There is a derailing switch below the mines, which ordinarily would have thrown these cars off the track, but it had been closed a few minutes before by a switching crew, to facilitate their switching movements, and the runaway cars came

along just as the engine had cleared the running track. There is no derail near the main line of the railroad, the reason given for not having one at this point being that because of the presence of buildings close to the track there is no suitable place for a derail. The statement of the railroad company says that, to provide against a collision of this kind in the future, it is proposed to install two derailing switches, so connected with each other that when one of them is closed, ahead of the switching engine, another one, in the rear of the engine, must at the same time open.

Collision No. 14, between north-bound and south-bound freight trains, occurred about 6 a.m., in a dense fog. The north-bound train had reached a point about 3,000 feet short of a switch, at a passing station, where it should have cleared the south-bound train. The southbound train appears to have been a few minutes ahead of time. The evidence as to the precise time is conflicting, but the main responsibility is thrown upon the north-bound train, as it was running in violation of the rule which required it to reach the meeting point and be clear of the main track before the leaving time of the south-bound train.

Collision No. 20, killing 9 persons and injuring 17, occurred about 10:43 o'clock in the evening and resulted in the wreck of a sleeping car, which took fire from the locomotive that crushed it, and was completely destroyed. This sleeping car was the rear car in a passenger train which had been stopped for the purpose of making slight repairs, and it was run into by a following passenger train, after having been stopped about 25 minutes. The report says that the flagman of the standing train went back promptly a distance of about 2,400 feet, to a highway crossing, and there placed a torpedo on the rails; and that there was a clear view from the standing train back for 2 miles to the station at D, the switch lights of which were plainly visible. The engineman of the second train appears to have taken no action toward stopping until after he passed over the torpedo, and even then the brakes appear not to have been applied with full force. The brakeman who went back with the red light and torpedoes says that he watched the approaching train from the time it started from D, and that he continued to give the stop-signal motion with his lantern until he was obliged to step off the track to avoid being run over. The train passed him at high speed. The conductor of the standing train saw the motions of the brakeman's lantern and heard the explosion of the torpedo. The sleeping car conductor was on the ground at the rear of the train, and he also saw the stop signals given and heard the explosion of the torpedo. The porter of the sleeping car also watched the brakeman and gives similar testimony. He says that he was

TABLE No. 1B.—Casualties to passengers, employed

	Passengers on freight und agreen or cont (bb)		der ement ntract		sl ( <b>e, b,</b> i bb).		inmen (c).	Trainm in yards (				
	Killed.	Injured.	Killed.	Injured.	Killed.	Injured.	Killed.	Injured.	Killed.	Injured.	Killed.	
Collisions	35	941	2	21	10	52	47	1,014	49	463	15	
Derailments	15	642		44		130	15	816	87	362	5	
Accidents to trains, cars, or engines, except collisions, derailments, and boiler explosions  Bursting of, or defects in, locomo-	•••••	29		2	1	8	1	<b>39</b>	2	101		!         
tive boilers or boiler attach- ments	••••	2		••••			•••••	2	7	201		
Total train accidents	50	1,614	2	67	11	190	63	1,871	145	1,127	20	 1
Accidents to roadway or bridges not causing derailment, such as fires, floods, landslides, explosions, etc		2					• • • • •	2		1	• • • • •	
Coupling or uncoupling cars (does not include accidents with air or steam hose)	• • • • •					••••	••••		20	219	10	
While doing other work about trains (not in shops or engine houses) or while attending switches	• • • • • •				•	1		1	11	2,632	12	
Coming in contact, while riding on cars, with overhead bridges, tunnels, or any signal apparatus, or any fixed structure above or at the side of the track.	4	11				3	4	14	18	210	2	
Falling from cars or engines	19	82		2	3	18	22	102	37	567	26	]
Getting on or off cars or engines	25	650	<b> </b>	14	<b> </b> .	23	25	687	12	788	6	
Other accidents on or around trains not here named	1	808	ļ <b>.</b>	68		112	1	988		37	••••	
Being struck or run over by engine or car at stations or yards.	12	21		1	2	3	14	25	15	<b>3</b> 5	23	
Being struck or run over by engine or car at highway grade crossings	• • • • • •			••••	   	••••		••••		1	••••	
Being struck or run over by engine or car at other places	1	2			2		3	2	18	18		I
Other causes	3	123		1		6	3	130	4	118	1	1
Total, other than train ac- cidents	65	1,699		86	7	166	72	1,951	135	4,626	80	   1
Grand total	115	3,313	2	153	18	356	135	3,822	280	5,753	100	===

a persons; July, August, and September, 1910.

ain-	Swi tend cross tend an wat men	ers, sing lers, id ch-	Tra men brid men	and ige-	Oti emp ees	ner loy- (g).	em et du ec,	otal uploy- s on ty (c, d, e, f, id g).	En ploy not duty	rees	tres	er per- s not pass- g (i).	Tres; ers			tal ons.
Injured.	Killed.	Injured.	Killed.	Injured.	Killed.	Injured.	Killed.	Injured.	Killed.	Injured.	Killed.	Injured.	Killed.	Injured.	Killed.	Injured.
116 <b>4</b> 8	1	1	5 5	<b>39</b> 18	7 8	70 39	85 110	817 514	2 4	86 6	1	27 22	21 18	15 35	156 147	1,959 1,393
<b>3</b> 7			• • • • •	3	•	••••	5	165	••••	2	1	17	2	9	9	232
37				• • • • •		3	9	305				••••		1	9	308
238	1	2	10	60	15	112	209	1,801	6	94	2	66	41	60	321	3, 892
4	• • • •	• • • •			••••	••••	• • • •	6	• • • • •		1	3	• • • • •		1	11
356		1	••••	•••••	2	14	56	722				••••	•••••	•••••	56	722
008	••••	46	2	40	6	187	45	4, 833		3		7	•••••	  •••••• 	45	4,844
120		2	••••	3	1	17	25	443		1	1	3	13	33	43	494
433 527	1 2	6 17	5 6	49 43	10	70 112	103 42	1,397 1,843	3	18 88	4	20 47	111 145	199 481	243 227	1,736 3,146
10		7	2	33	6	139	8	241		21	2	122	5	74	16	1,446
72	9	18	42	74	62	124	183	361	22	24	37	96	251	303	507	809
3	5	3		1	1	8	6	16	5	1	267	<i>5</i> 98	35	31	313	646
4	11	4	106	79	37	31	172	138	30	21	27	35	874		, 1, 106	581
50		10	7	45	7	100	20	347	2	41	8	394	37	141	70	1,053
587	28	114	170	367	140	802	660	10, 347	73	218	351	1,325	1,471	1,647	2,627	15, 488
825	29	116	180	427	155	914	869	12, 148	79	312	353	1,391	1,512	1,707	2,948	19,380

sure that the brakeman went as far as the road crossing, because he saw the light of the brakeman's lantern reflected from the whitewashed wing fence of the crossing.

The engineman of the second train declares that he did not see the red tail lights of the standing train. He says that on hearing the torpedo he made a service application of the brakes. After the collision he went back to see if he could find the remains of the torpedo, using in his search a tail lamp which he found in the rubbish of the wreck. This tail lamp was afterwards picked up by a road foreman of locomotives and proved to be the one which was on the left-hand side of the rear car of the standing train.

The conductor of the second train heard the explosion of the torpedo and says that the air brakes were immediately applied, but only slightly; and that after application, and before the collision, they were released. The baggage man and the train porter in the baggage car of this train heard the explosion of the torpedo and spoke about it. This baggage man, who was entering on his record the pieces of baggage which he had just taken into his car, walked to the end of the car after hearing the explosion, and returned to the center and remarked to the porter that it was strange the engineer did not stop; all of this before the collision occurred.

The rear flagman of the second train did not hear the explosion of the torpedo, but he saw the flagman of the leading train standing at the side of the track as his (the second) train passed him. Immediately after the collision he went back to protect his own train and at the road crossing found the brakeman of the standing train.

The leading train had left its rear car at D and at the inquest held by the coroner testimony was offered to the effect that the tail lights (markers) were not transferred from this car to the car ahead, but besides the circumstantial evidence already noted, the report says that a trainmaster of the road was at D that night and that he noticed particularly that the markers were in place and brightly burning when the train departed.

The engineman of the second train was first employed by this company in 1881. He was dismissed in 1885 and reemployed 4 months later. Nine years later he was out of the service temporarily by reason of a strike. In the 19 years since 1881 his record shows 20 suspensions or reprimands.

The conductor of the standing train was first employed by this road in 1894. Four years later he was dismissed for negligence but was reemployed within a month. Eleven months later he was dismissed again, and was reemployed on July 19 of the present year, or a little over one month prior to the accident. During the 11 years that he was out of the service he was employed on other roads, most

of the time as freight and passenger conductor and as yardmaster, but during the past two years he was a farmer.

The brakeman or flagman of this train had been in the service 24 days. He is 23 years old, and his last work before coming to the railroad was as a carpenter; but he had had railroad experience as a fireman, baggageman, and clerk, aggregating 18 months. He was employed this year by an experienced trainmaster and, according to the report, he not only was found to possess the proper knowledge and intelligence to perform the duties of a passenger brakeman, but also is held by the superintendent to have done, in this particular case, all that could be expected of him.

Collision No. 22 was between a west-bound extra freight train and an east-bound regular passenger train. It occurred on a curve where neither of the enginemen had more than a few seconds' view of the opposing train before striking it; and 12 passengers were killed and 18 injured. The tender of the engine of the passenger train penetrated the baggage car and the rear end of the baggage car penetrated the smoking car, and nearly all of the victims were in the smoking car. The extra freight train, after receiving orders to run from A to B, was moved some distance away from the station to the west end of a sidetrack, there to await the arrival of two regular east-bound passenger trains, the first one of which was 25 minutes late. After this first passenger train arrived and passed, the extra was started out; and it ran about 2 miles before the collision occurred. The conductor of the extra train states that he "entirely overlooked" the second train. The engineman sustained a fractured skull, and was so seriously injured that at the time the report was made he was not able to make any statement concerning his relation to the wrong movement of the train.

Collision No. 23 was due to failure of a telegrapher to stop a train for which he held an order. This operator was 20 years of age and had been in the service of the railroad 3 months. Previous to this he had had 8 months' experience on another road. In sending the order the dispatcher gave the usual signal on the wire and the operator responded with the letters "RD," indicating that he had displayed the red (stop) signal; and afterwards the dispatcher again asked him if the signal was displayed and the operator replied in the affirmative. But after the accident he offered the explanation that the signal, when released by him, did not move to the stop position. The superintendent doubts the truth of this statement, adding that he has never known of a signal of this kind to fail in that way.

Collision No. 24, in which 20 persons were killed and 39 injured, was between a south-bound passenger train and a north-bound freight train. The passenger train was running at high speed. The cause

was the failure to deliver meeting orders. The freight train was running northward from A to B, C, D, etc. An order had been sent to its conductor at A to the effect that the passenger train would wait at C until a certain hour. The dispatcher intended to send the same order to the passenger train at D, but "through oversight" failed to send it in season. Discovering this error, he then tried to send word to B to hold the freight there, but he did not succeed in doing this until after the freight had passed B, and the collision occurred between B and C. This dispatcher was 32 years of age, and had been in the service of the road 7 years; his habits and character were "excellent," and his service "very satisfactory." Of the victims of this accident, 9 (6 killed and 3 injured) were trespassers, riding on the front end of the front car of the passenger train. It is supposed that these trespassers had boarded the train at its last stop, though no one saw them get on.

Collision No. 25, in which 34 passengers were killed and 7 passengers and 4 employees were injured, occurred on an electric interurban railway and was between a south-bound car running as an extra train and a northbound car running as a regular train. The south-bound, which should have kept clear of the time of the north-bound, ran past the sidetrack at which it should have waited and also past the next sidetrack; and the collision occurred at a point on a curve where neither motorman had more than a short distance in which to see the opposing car. The collision occurred about noon. All of the persons killed were on the northbound car, which was completely wrecked. The south-bound car carried no passengers. The motorman running the south-bound car, who is principally at fault, had acted as motorman of the northbound regular train for 60 days previous to this collision, and he had been employed on this division of the road about six months, previous to which he was a motorman on city street railway lines. The report says that no statement has been secured from this motorman and that he is confined in an asylum. He is 35 years old. The conductor of this car, who is equally responsible with the motorman, is 23 years old. He was first employed as conductor on this line about 11 months previous to the collision, but had resigned and was out of the service until about one month before the collision.

Derailment No. 2 was that of a train running about 50 miles an hour, and the first vehicle to leave the track was the tender. All of the cars in the train were derailed, but the injuries to persons were not severe. The officers of the road were unable to reach any positive conclusion as to the cause of this derailment, but they found a probable cause in the extremely tight coupling between the engine and the tender and to the fact the buffer plate on the engine

was worn to a depth of about one-half inch, and the buffer plate of the tender was also worn some. The report says: "Although there were no marks to show that the buffer plate on the engine had tended to raise the tender, it is possible that it acted that way." The accident occurred on a curve of 3° 3'; superelevation of outer rail 8 inches.

Derailment No. 9, which occurred in the middle of the night, was due to a washout caused by a cloudburst. The very unusual volume of water was held back by the embankment of the railroad until it flowed over the top and crossed the tracks, and then a length of track about 350 feet long was washed out, and, for a length of about 20 feet, the earth was washed away to a depth of 7 feet. Of the 14 persons killed, 9 were passengers, 3 were trainmen, 1 was an employee not on duty, and 1 was a trespasser. The report says that this cloudburst was a most extraordinary occurrence. Two residents of the neighborhood, who have lived there for 30 years, say that 7 inches of water fell in about 30 minutes. At the next station east of the point of trouble very little rain fell, while at the next station west, although there was a hard rain, it was not such as to cause alarm. A number of highway bridges were washed away.

Derailment No. 12, in which the engineman, fireman, and baggageman were killed, was due to the displacement of a door on a freight car by the shifting of the goods within the car; this door, falling from the car in an eastbound train, lodged on the rails of the westbound track, and it was struck by a passenger train running at high speed. The engine and baggage car were overturned, and 4 other cars were derailed. This accident occurred about 3 o'clock a. m. The first wheels to jump the track were the trailing wheels of the engine. All the rest of the train remained on the track for over a mile.

Derailment No. 21 was caused by a freight train becoming uncontrollable on a descending grade because of improper handling of air brakes by the engineman. By long-continued application of the brakes on the driving wheels of the engine the tires on these wheels became so hot that they slipped laterally on the wheel centers, and as a result they produced abnormal side pressure on the rails, forcing one rail out of place and derailing the engine and a number of cars. This accident occurred at 2 o'clock in the morning, and the trainmen had been on duty 10 hours and 10 minutes. The testimony concerning the conduct of the engineman in regard to the handling of the air brakes is not clear, but it appears that after finding that the speed of the train was not slackening properly he took a stick (to use as a lever) and went back over the cars to set hand brakes; and all the time that he was away from the engine the driving-wheel brakes, worked by "straight" air, remained set. The engine was in

good condition and the air brakes had been working properly, and at the commencement of the descent there was a sufficient supply of air. The brakemen were held blameworthy for not setting hand brakes. These men claim that they did not hear the brake signal which was given by the engine whistle. The conductor, who was in the caboose making out reports, was held blameworthy for not noticing that the train had passed a certain place where it was usual to stop for the purpose of cooling the wheels.

Derailment No. 23 was caused by a freight train becoming uncontrollable on a descending grade of 78 feet per mile because of improper management of the air brakes. This derailment occurred about 2 a. m. The train consisted of an engine, 62 cars, and a caboose. In consequence of the excessive speed the twenty-third car in the train was derailed at a sharp curve, and, with 33 cars next behind it, was piled up in a very bad wreck. The whole mass took fire and was burned up. The origin of the fire is unknown, but it is conjectured that it started in a car loaded with oil cake. The engine, with 22 cars, ran a half mile farther and was derailed and wrecked at a frog because of the looseness of the tires of the driving wheels, which had become heated by the brakes being kept set for too long a time. It is estimated that the speed of the train rose to 55 miles an hour or higher. The engineman was killed, and the precise nature of the trouble with the air brakes can not be made out. So far as can be discovered the engineman had applied and released the brakes too frequently to admit of recharging the auxiliary cylinders. The testimony of the surviving members of the crew indicates that he did not apply the air brakes until some time after giving the whistle signal for the application of the hand brakes.

The engineman was 66 years old and the company gives him a good record. The air-brake apparatus was connected for operation on all the cars of the train but one. The conductor had noticed the excessive reduction of the air pressure as shown on the air-brake gauge in his caboose, but when he finally opened the conductor's valve it was too late for this to have any effect on the wheels.

TABLE 3.—Causes of accidents to employees in coupling and uncoupling cars.

1	Causes.		ain- en.	me	ain- n in rds.	Yard trainmen (switch- ing crews).		Other employ-	
Subches.		Killed.	Injured.	Killed.	Injured.	Killed.	Injured.	Killed.	Injured.
1 2 3	Adjusting coupler with foot  Adjusting coupler, cars accidentally started  Careless manipulation of uncoupling lever		7	••••	4	1	32 9 3	••••	4
5	Cars not equipped with automatic coupler. Coupler broken, using link and pin or chain.	••••	2		• • • •		5	• • • •	•
6	Coupling damaged cars	1 2	6	i	6	2	16		
7	Coupling with chain or other emergency appliance on curve			<u> </u>		-			
8	too sharp for automatic coupling		3	1	3		7		
١	uneven track	[ <sup> </sup>			1				
9	Coupling or uncoupling safety chains	1	4		2		1		
10	Fingers or hand caught between uncoupling lever and body of car		43				70		
11	Uncoupling without using lever (unnecessary)	••••	3	• • • •	1.		14		ļ····
12	Uncoupling without using lever, uncoupling lever not in				•	••••	14		• • • •
			22		10		37		<b> </b>
13	Foot caught in frog, switch, or guardrail	1	2	1	2	2	4		<b> </b>
14	Opening or closing knuckle when cars were near together,	i	••	ľ					
	miscalculated speed	1	19		15	6	31		· · · •
15	Opening knuckle when cars were near together, engine accidentally started	1	9		6	1	5		
16	Opening knuckle, part of defective coupler fell on foot	_	1				_		i
17	Opening knuckle, lost footing	i	l ī		1	2	4		
18	Trium va va to unvalui suppus va	1		1	_	3	14		
19	Struck by object at side of track		6	<b> </b>	1		. 4		
20	Caught by unexpected movement of car, due to slack running		1	2	9	1 1	10		١.
21	Caught by unexpected movement of car, due to mistake or		15	3	y		18		3
21	misunderstanding in giving hand signals	l	6	<b> </b>	.4	1	2	1	
22	Uncoupling moving cars and lost footing	1	11	3	4	$ \tilde{2} $	16	_	2
23	Parts hard to move, causing delay	!	3		2		5		  ••••
24	went between cars unnecessarily and contrary to rule	3	5	1	8	2	22	١	¦ 2
25 ¦	Hand caught between projecting load and end of next car		4		3	<sup> </sup>	4		••••
26 ' 27	No witness (fatal injury)	5	8		8	2	18		
28	Unexplained	1	8		9	••••	9		2
1	•	<del></del>		<del></del>	<u> </u>				
	Total	20	219	10	132	24	356	2	15

### Details of injuries included in Table 3, subclass 27.

J. 2. Stumbled over tie. J. 3. End gate closed, catching finger. J. 4. Ring on finger caught on chain. J. 5. Apron on gravel car slipped. J. 6. Coupling cinder cars, cinders splashed over. J. 7. Struck by piece of exploding torpedo. J. 8. Piece of coal fell from car. J. 9. Stepped on piece of glass. A. 1. Struck foot against rail. A. 2. Cut hand on splinter of steel

A. 3. Splinter of steel on lever cut finger. A. 4. Fell through bridge. A. 5. Stepped on bolt.
A. 6. Stepped on nail.
A. 7. Plank fell off car.

J. 1. Lump of coal fell from car.

A. 8. Stepped on nail. A. 9. Stepped on lump of coal.

A. 10 Scrap iron fell from car.
A. 11. Air hose flew up.
A. 12. Cut hand on sliver on car.

A. 13. Log fell from car.
A. 14. Coupling car of logs; end of log struck leg.
S. 1. Lump of coal fell from car.
S. 2. Struck by air hose.

8. 3. Caught finger in knuckle.
8. 4. Cut hand on splinter of steel on lever.

8. 4. Cut hand on spinter of steel on lever.
8. 5. Struck hand against nail in car.
8. 6. Glove caught in coupler.
8. 7. Placed hand on drawbar; pinched.
8. 8. Struck knuckle pin with hand, bruising hand.
8. 9. Struck finger with piece of iron in trying to open knuckle.
8. 10. Lump of coal fell from car.
8. 11. Consist foot under wheel

8. 11. Caught foot under wheel.

TABLE 3A.—Nature of injuries to employees in coupling and uncoupling cars.

Injuries.	Train- men.	Train- men in yards.	Yard train- men.	Other employ- ees.
Loss of feet. Loss of legs. Loss of arms. Loss of hands Loss of fingers. Loss of toes. Fractured skuli Fractured leg. Fractured arm Fractured collar bone or ribs Fractured other bones. Contusion of head or body.	10 4 1 2 4 9 22	2 1 1 5 3 3 1	1 13 2 1 2 5 3 12 42	
Contusion or laceration of feet Contusion or laceration of toes Contusion or laceration of legs Contusion or laceration of arms Contusion or laceration of hands Contusion or laceration of fingers Dislocation Internal injuries Sprains Miscellaneous	27 7 7 10 29 70 2 2 6 2	15 2 6 4 26 41 2 1 5	38 9 25 19 43 113 6 9	
Total injuries	219 20	132 10	356 24	1.
Total killed and injured	239	142	380	1

### RECAPITULATION.

Total killed	56	
Total injured	721	
- The state of the		
Total killed and injured.		

TABLE 4.—Causes of accidents to employees classified (C6 and C7) as falling from and getting on or off cars and engines.

	Causes.	Tra	inmen.	Train- men in yards.		Yard trainmen (switch- ing crews).			
Subclass.		Killed.	Injured.	Killed.	Injured.	Killed.	Injured.	Killed.	Injured.
<b>1</b>	Fell from roof of box car by reason of— Defect in car.		7		5		   5		
2	Ice or snow								• • • •
3	Parting of train	1	16		1		2		3
4	Derailment, collision, or shock due to abnormal movements of cars other than those in subclass 3.	4	77	1	35 15	3	96	1	12
C6 5	While setting brakes	5	34	3	15	3	48		· 2
6	Fell from— Coal car		7	1	3	1	8	1	1
7	Freight car other than box or coal car Engine or tender	3	51	2	28	2	24	5	34
8	Engine or tender	10	117 19	6	59 3	5	51 3	3	: 30
9 10	Passenger car. Engines, tenders, or cars (all kinds) not in motion		87	• • • •	47		20	• • • •	
ii	Miscellaneous causes	7	1 272	4	81	2	255 62	5	30
12	Not clearly explained	7		9	25	8	62	ì	30
[13]	Slipped getting on moving trains or cars	5	165 170	2	69 122	2 3	83 110	8	27 39 30 54 55
14 15	Jumping off moving trains.  Jumping from engines or cars anticipating collision,	•	1/0		182	•		3	30
	derallment or other accident	1	48		8	2	7	<b></b> .	4
C7 16	Fell from engines or cars by reason of defective hand-							}	_
	holds and still steps	5	• 60 166	3	15 112	··i·	50 124		1 31
17 18	Getting on of off moving engine		100	•			3	<b>5</b>	ا ا
-	Total	49	1, 355	32	628	32	960	32	297

### ACCIDENTS ON ELECTRIC RAILWAYS.

TABLE No. 1E.—Casualties to persons, July, August, and September, 1910.

	of accidents.	gers	seen- (a, b, l bb).	plo on ( (c, &	m- yees duty c, d, c, nd g).			per not pas	her sons tres- sing	Tr pass (j	ers.	Total persons.	
	Number	Killed.	Injured.	Killed.	Injured.	Killed.	Injured.	Killed.	Injured.	Killed.	Injured.	Killed.	Injured.
Collisions.  Derailments.  Accidents to trains, cars, or engines, except collisions, derailments, and boiler	61 17	40	352 62	4	34 8	• • • •	• • • •	• • • •	2	• • • •	••••	44 2	386 72
explosions  Bursting of or defects in locomotive boilers or boiler attachments	6		8	• • • •	1			• • • •	•••••			• • • • •	9
Total train accidents	85	41	422	5	44				2			46	468
Accidents to roadway or bridges not causing derailment, such as fires, floods, landslides, explosions, etc	1			2	3 20			••••	• • • •		• • • •	2	8
Coming in contact, while riding on cars, with overhead bridges, tunnels, or any signal apparatus, or any fixed structure above or at the side of the track.  Falling from cars or engines		1 2 4	9 17 275	2 3	8 16 13		2	2	1	1	1 4	3 5 7	18 34 298
here named.  Being struck or run over by engines or cars at stations or yards.			46	2	1	1	1	3	2	2	2 2	8	55 4
Being struck or run over by engines or cars at highway-grade crossings Being struck or run over by engine or car at other places	 		6	3	1	1	••••	12 25	44 53	7 24	9 33	1 <del>9</del> 53	60 90
Other causes			8					2	39	î	3.	3	20
Total other than train accidents		7	365	12	67	2	3	44	113	35	54	100	602
Total accidents exclusive of indus- trial accidents	••••	48	787	17 2	111 80	<b>2</b>	3	44	115	35	54	146 2	1,070 80
Grand total		48	787	19	191	2	3	44	115	35	54	148	1,150

<sup>1 &</sup>quot;Industrial" accidents are those occurring to employees of the railroad on railroad premises in which movements of cars or engines are not involved.

TABLE No. 2E.—Collisions and derailments.

	Number.	Loss.	Killed.	Injured.
Collisions, rear	18	\$5,284 17,030	44	105 206
Collisions, miscellaneous		8, 466		75
Total	61	30,780	44	386
Derailments due to defects of roadway, etc	1	150		6
Derailments due to negligence of trainmen, signalmen, etc  Derailments due to unforeseen obstruction of track, etc  Derailments due to malicious obstruction of track, etc	2 3 1	750 1,175 150	1	16 3
Derailments due to miscellaneous causes	8	3,330		47
Total	17	5, 555	2	72
Total collisions and derailments	78	36, 335	46	458

### [Publio-No. 165.]

[H. R. 3649.]

AN ACT Requiring common carriers engaged in interstate and foreign commerce to make full reports of all accidents to the Interstate Commerce Commission, and authorizing investigations thereof by said commission.

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled. That it shall be the duty of the general manager, superintendent, or other proper officer of every common carrier engaged in interstate or foreign commerce by railroad to make to the Interstate Commerce Commission, at its office in Washington, District of Columbia, a monthly report, under oath, of all collisions, derailments, or other accidents resulting in injury to persons, equipment, or roadbed arising from the operation of such railroad under such rules and regulations as may be prescribed by the said commission, which report shall state the nature and causes thereof and the circumstances connected therewith: Provided, That hereafter all said carriers shall be relieved from the duty of reporting accidents in their annual financial and operating reports made to the commission.

- SEC. 2. That any common carrier failing to make such report within thirty days after the end of any month shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor, and upon conviction thereof by a court of competent jurisdiction shall be punished by a fine of not more than one hundred dollars for each and every offense and for every day during which it shall fail to make such report after the time herein specified for making the same.
- Sec. 3. That the Interstate Commerce Commission shall have authority to investigate all collisions, derailments, or other accidents resulting in serious injury to person or to the property of a railroad occurring on the line of any common carrier engaged in interstate or foreign commerce by railroad. The commission, or any impartial investigator thereunto authorized by said commission, shall have authority to investigate such collisions, derailments, or other accidents aforesaid, and all the attending facts, conditions, and circumstances, and for that purpose may subpæna witnesses. administer oaths, take testimony, and require the production of books, papers, orders, memoranda, exhibits, and other evidence, and shall be provided by said carriers with all reasonable facilities: Provided, That when such accident is investigated by a commission of the State in which it occurred, the Interstate Commerce Commission shall, if convenient, make any investigation it may have previously determined upon. at the same time as, and in connection with, the State commission investigation. Said commission shall, when it deems it to the public interest, make reports of such investigations, stating the cause of accident, together with such recommendations as it deems proper. Such reports shall be made public in such manner as the commission deems proper.
- SEC. 4. That neither said report nor any report of said investigation nor any part thereof shall be admitted as evidence or used for any purpose in any suit or action for damages growing out of any matter mentioned in said report or investigation.
- SEC. 5. That the Interstate Commerce Commission is authorized to prescribe for such common carriers a method and form for making the reports hereinbefore provided.
- SEC. 6. That the act entitled "An act requiring common carriers engaged in interstate commerce to make full reports of all accidents to the Interstate Commerce Commission," approved March third, nineteen hundred and one, is hereby repealed.

SEC. 7. That the term "interstate commerce," as used in this act, shall include transportation from any State or Territory or the District of Columbia to any other State or Territory or the District of Columbia, and the term "foreign commerce," as used in this act, shall include transportation from any State or Territory or the District of Columbia to any foreign country and from any foreign country to any State or Territory or the District of Columbia.

SEC. 8. That this act shall take effect sixty days after its passage. Approved, May 6, 1910.

### SPECIAL INFORMATION CONTAINED IN PRECEDING BULLETINS.1

Each accident bulletin previous to No. 37 contains tables showing the number of passengers and employees killed and injured, and these figures are classified according to cause (see Table No. 1); also tables showing cost of the different classes of train accidents. The causes of accidents to employees in coupling and uncoupling and in falling from cars, etc., are further classified in Tables No. 3 and No. 4. The most serious collisions and derailments are dealt with in a supplementary table (Class A), showing the causes in some detail. Each bulletin is for three months, and No. 1 was for the quarter ending September 30, 1901. Beginning with Bulletin No. 37 the statistics include all railroad accidents, instead of being confined to passengers and employees. The bulletin for the quarter ending June 30 contains, in addition to the quarterly statistics, tables showing the same information for the whole of the fiscal year ending on that date.

Bulletin No. 25 shows 110 passengers killed in train accidents, three collisions and one derailment being responsible for 80 deaths in this class. The number of passengers killed from other causes (mostly their own negligence) also shows a large increase. One of the most serious collisions was due to the misreading of a dispatcher's order, and another to a mistake in sending or receiving the order.

Bulletin No. 26 shows a marked decrease in casualties as compared with preceding quarters, a large falling off in railroad traffic having taken place. The list of "prominent" train accidents includes only three cases which may be classed as notable.

Bulletin No. 27 shows further marked decreases in casualties incident to the large falling off in railroad traffic. The number of passengers and employees killed in train accidents (125) is the smallest since the monthly records were established. The most fatal accident in this quarter was a collision at a street crossing, where 8 passengers in an electric car were killed.

Bulletin No. 28 recorded the smallest number of passengers killed in train accidents (13) ever reported in the quarterly records. The total of passengers and employees killed in train accidents (112) was 13 less than the previous low record (125, Bulletin 27). Of the 13 passengers killed in train accidents, 7 were victims of a butting collision on an electric railroad.

Bulletin No. 29 showed totals far smaller than the corresponding quarter one year previous, but the diminution in the number of casualties, which had continued during the year of depression, seemed to have been checked. The number of passengers killed in train accidents was 53, and there were 8 notable collisions.

Bulletin No. 30 recorded 34 passengers killed in train accidents (including 15 victims of a forest fire). One collision resulted in 8 deaths of passengers, and two derailments killed 16 employees.

Bulletin No. 31, in part, continues the favorable showing of the quarter one year previous (Bulletin 27), though it covers a period of considerable revival of business. One collision caused 20 deaths and 28 injuries.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> For notes on Bulletins 1-16, see Bulletin No. 17; for notes on Bulletins 17-24, see Bulletin No. 30.

- Bulletin No. 32 shows a total of 99 passengers and employees killed in train accidentathe lowest quarterly record thus far shown. It is to be observed, however, that a butting collision, causing the death of 9 passengers and 1 employee, occurring on an electric road, was not included, the railroad company having failed to make a report of the accident as required by law. The quarter in 1908 with which this one is most naturally compared (Bulletin 28) had one collision on an electric line in which 7 persons were killed.
- Bulletin No. 33 shows considerable increases in most of the casualty items, marking the expansion of traffic on all of the principal railroads. Five accidents—4 collisions and 1 derailment—caused 47 deaths.
- Bulletin No. 34 shows heavy totals in the casualty lists incident to the great expansion in railroad traffic accompanying the general revival in business. There was no very notable passenger-train accident, but a collision between a work train and a freight killed 14 laborers. The list of causes of prominent collisions is unusually varied.
- Bulletin No. 35 shows 110 passengers killed in train accidents, the total in this item being swelled by two great disasters, an avalanche in the State of Washington and a derailment in Iowa.
- Bulletin No. 36, for the quarter ending June 30, 1910, shows no accident of notable magnitude, but the totals are all larger than for the same quarter of 1909.

U. D. Interstate Commerce Commission Washington, D. C.

### Accident Bulletin

No. 38

## Railroad Accidents in the United States

During October, November, and December
1910



Washington
Government Printing Office
1911

				•	
				_	
			-		
			•		
		·			
		•			
-					
•					
•					
		•			

### ACCIDENT BULLETIN NO. 38

# Collisions, Derailments, and other Accidents to Trains, Accidents to Roadway, and Casualties to Persons

from all causes

### on the Railroads of the United States

during the months of

October, November, and December, 1910

INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMMISSION WASHINGTON, D. C.



WASHINGTON
GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
1911

### THE INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMMISSION.

JUDSON C. CLEMENTS, of Georgia, Chairman.
CHARLES A. PROUTY, of Vermont.
FRANKLIN K. LANE, of California.
EDGAR E. CLARK, of Iowa.
JAMES S. HARLAN, of Illinois.
CHARLES C. McCHORD, of Kentucky.
BALTHASAR H. MEYER, of Wisconsin.
EDWARD A. MOSELEY, Secretary.

### RAILROAD ACCIDENTS

IN THE UNITED STATES DURING THE THREE MONTHS ENDING DECEMBER 31, 1910.

The number of persons killed in train accidents during the months of October, November, and December, 1910, as shown in reports made by the railroad companies to the Interstate Commerce Commission under the "accident law" of May 6, 1910, was 248, and of injured 3,729. Accidents of other kinds, including those sustained by employees while at work, by passengers in getting on or off cars, by travelers at highway crossings, by persons doing business at stations, etc., by trespassers, and others, bring up the total number of casualties, excluding "industrial accidents," to 22,586 (2,659 killed and 19,927 injured). Accidents to employees resulting in slight injuries, which do not prevent the employee injured from performing his accustomed service for more than 3 days in the aggregate during the 10 days immediately following the accident, are not reported. The casualties to passengers have been divided into three classes. Class a includes all ordinary passengers. Class b includes passengers traveling on freight trains. Class bb includes persons who are customarily carried on trains under special arrangements, such as postal clerks and express messengers, employees on Pullman cars, newsboys, livestock tenders, and men in charge of freight. The reported casualties are classified in Table No. 1, given below, and more in detail in Table No. 1B.1

The statistics here given present the record of the standard rail-roads, for convenience called "steam roads," in distinction from electric railways. The accident statistics of those electric lines on which interstate traffic is carried, and which, therefore, are subject to the Federal accident law, are given in a second table, No. 1E, and in Table No. 2E.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> This bulletin is the second to be issued under the revised accident law. The quarterly bulletins previous to No. 37 included only four classes of accidents, namely, (1) collisions, (2) derailments, (3) casualties to passengers, and (4) casualties to employees on duty. The statistics of other accidents on railroads previous to July 1, 1910, will be found in the annual statistical reports of the Commission.

The class termed "Industrial accidents," as found in the present bulletin, includes a large part of those casualties to employees which in former bulletins have been included in the eighth item ("Other causes") of Table No. 1, as explained in Bulletin No. 37.

TABLE No. 1.—Casualties to persons, October, November, and December, 1910.

Causes,	Num- ber of	(clas	engers ses a, d bb).	includ ployee	Employees, including employees not on duty.		Other persons.		Total persons.	
	dents.	Killed.	In- jured.	Killed.	In- jured.	Killed.	In- jured.	Killed.	În- jured.	
<ol> <li>Collisions</li> <li>Derailments</li> <li>Miscellaneous train accidents, in-</li> </ol>	1,834 1,532	18 12	974 588	117 56	1,120 437	9 7	25 31	144 75	2,119 1,066	
cluding locomotive-boiler ex- plosions	550		39	28	497	1	18	29	554	
Total train accidents 4. Accidents to roadway or bridges not causing derailment, such as	3,916	80	1,601	201	2,054	17	74	248	3,729	
fires, floods, landslides, explosions, etc.  5. Accidents in connection with rail-road operation other than those to trains or road way (classes C-3)	85	1	6		27		1	1	34	
to C-12, inclusive), not includ- ing industrial accidents		65	1,739	734	11,801	1,611	2, 624	2, 410	16, 164	
Total		96	3,346	935	13,882	1,628	2, 699	2, 659	19,927	
Industrial accidents to employees: 6. While working on tracks or bridges. 7. At stations, freight houses, engine houses, coaling stations, water stations, etc., where				36	4, 239	• • • • •		36	4, 239	
no moving railroad car or engine is involved.  8. In and around shops.  9. On boats and wharves.  10. At other places.			•••••	26 21 3 21	4,847 9,426 825 1,557	•••••		26 21 3 21	4,847 9,426 225 1,557	
Total casualties in industrial accidents				107	20, 394			107	20, 394	
Total casualties in all accidents		96	3,346	1,042	34, 276	1,628	2, 699	2,766	40, 321	

Note.—Accidents occurring in connection with railroad operation or distinctively railroad work are covered in the items numbered 1 to 5, inclusive. The same statistics are given more in detail in the double-page table on pages 10 and 11. "Industrial accidents" (items 6 to 10, inclusive) are those occurring to employees of the railroad on railroad premises in which the movement of cars or engines is not involved.

In those classes of items in the foregoing table which are made up on the same basis as under the former law, and which therefore may be compared with the records of a year ago, the totals show decreases in every instance, as will be seen by Table No. 1A below; and the comparison with Bulletin 37, for the quarter immediately preceding this, is favorable also, except under the head of coupling accidents. In connection with the first item of Table No. 1A it is to be observed that in this quarter, as in the one last preceding, the figures here shown should be supplemented by those showing passengers killed in collisions on electric railways (Table No. 1E), for in both these quarters the worst disasters in the record occurred on "interurban" lines. These electric-car collisions are included in Table No. 2A.

TABLE No. 1A.—Comparison of principal items with last bulletin and with one year back

	Bulletin 38.	Bulletin 37.	Bulletin 34.
<ol> <li>Passengers killed in train accidents.</li> <li>Passengers killed, all causes.</li> <li>Employees (on duty) killed in train accidents.</li> <li>Employees (on duty) killed in coupling.</li> <li>Employees (on duty) killed, total (Table 1B).</li> <li>Total, passengers and employees (items 2 and 5, above).</li> <li>Other persons killed (including trespassers, nontrespassers, and employees not on duty), all causes.</li> <li>Employees killed in industrial accidents.</li> </ol>	96 199 60 841 937	63 135 209 56 869 1,004 1,944 132	39 105 205 66 968 1,073

The total number of collisions and derailments in the quarter now under review was 3,366 (1,834 collisions and 1,532 derailments), of which 241 collisions and 152 derailments affected passenger trains. The damage to cars, engines, and roadway by these accidents amounted to \$2,831,469. Given more in detail, these facts appear as below (collisions and derailments which cause no death or personal injury and which cause not over \$150 damage to the property of the railroad are not reported):

TABLE No. 2.—Collisions and derailments.

	Number.	Loss.	Killed.	Injured.
Collisions, rear Collisions, butting Collisions, train separating Collisions, miscellaneous	212 102	\$427, 895 462, 246 37, 832 570, 313	47 58	482 663 87 937
Total		1, 498, 286	144	2, 119
Derailments due to defects of roadway, etc.  Derailments due to defect of equipment.  Derailments due to negligence of trainmen, signalmen, etc.  Derailments due to unforeseen obstruction of track, etc.  Derailments due to malicious obstruction of track, etc.  Derailments due to miscellaneous causes.	709 108 58 15	263, 186 599, 532 77, 957 38, 176 24, 376 329, 956	9 10 10 6 7 33	382 146 89 71 32 336
Total	1,532	1, 333, 183	75	1,056
Total collisions and derailments  Total for same quarter of 1909  1908  1907	3, 206 2, 684	2,831,469 2,733,830 1,940,133 2,962,470	219 220 173 197	3, 175 3, 731 2, 616 3, 813

Following is the usual list of class A train accidents—all in which the damage is reported at \$10,000 or over, notable cases in which passengers are killed, and those doing damage less than \$10,000 and down to \$2,000, wherever the circumstances or the cause may be of particular interest.

### TABLE No. 2A.—Causes of 47 prominent train accidents.

[Note.—R stands for rear collision; B, butting collision; M, miscellaneous collisions; D, derailment; P, passenger train; F, freight and miscellaneous trains.]

### COLLISIONS.

					to en- cars, road-	3	
No.	Class.	Kind of train.	ğ.	red.	lage to	Reference record.	Саше.
			Killed.	Injured.	Damage gines, a n d way.	Refe	
1	R	P and P	1	154	\$359	71	Electric car run into by following car by reason of darkness. Leading car had been stopped by some defect and the trolley wheel had been pulled away from the trolley wire, extinguishing
2	R	P and P	1	24	2,008	72	tail lights.  Dispatcher, contrary to rule, authorized the running of the second section of a passenger train on a caution card. Engineman also at fault for not keeping a good lookout; he was flagged but did
3	M	Fand F	2	2	2, 400	46	not heed the signal.  Collision at meeting point (5 a. m.). Enginemen and fireman of westbound train, asleep, had run past two automatic block signals and a fusec.  Men in charge of eastbound train at fault for encroaching on the time of the westbound, 3 minutes.
4	R	Pand P	5	4	2,812	15	Passenger train approached station not under control (6 a. m.). Five drovers in freight caboose killed. Engineman addicted to liquor, but his superiors had not discovered the fact.
5	В	F and F	0	6	2, 961	42	Collision at meeting point (4 a. m.). Engine-
6	В	Fand F	5	25	2,973	1	fog. Men in charge of freight at fault for not pro-
7	В	P and P	6	18	35, 500	81	tecting their train by sending out flagman.  Disregard of block signals. Engineman reported killed; but it is believed that he had been disabled by sudden sickness or death. See note in text below.
8	R	Pand F		0	4,874	77	Passenger train (3 a. m.) ran into rear of extra freight. Clear block signal given when block was not clear, by telegrapher 21 years old, of 2 years' experience.
9 10	BB	Fand F	3	9	5,000 5,200	6 70	Operator failed to deliver order. Engineman of light engine overlooked schedule of regular passenger train. No conductor on light engine; engineman experienced; fireman, 21 years old, was on his first trip outside of yard; had been in service in yard 17 days.
11	В	F and F	1	. 4	5, 660	3	Operator failed to deliver order; conductor and engineman neglected to check clearance card against orders in their possession.
12	В	F and F		4	6, 200	89	Failure to identify train met. See note in text below.
13	B	P and P	<b>3</b> 6	19	7,500	9	Northbound electric car ran past meeting point. See note in text below.
14 15	RB	Fand P	3	21 2	8,600 8,700	13 82	False clear block signal. See note in text below. Westbound extra encroached on time of regular eastbound freight; engineman killed; extra had right over second section, but conductor carlessly assumed had right over both first and second. He did not show order to flagman.
16	В	F and F	1	1	9,000	11	Engineman of light engine misread dispatcher's order; fireman did not read it.
17	M	P and F	ŀ	3	10,000	49	Excessive speed and disregard of stop signal at interlocking. Engineman killed.
18 19	B	P and F P and P	<b>2</b> <b>0</b>	13 29	10,000 10,150	52 14	False clear block signal. See note in text below.  Misplaced switch in yard; low switch stand; en-
20	B	F and F	1	6	10, 475	47	gineman and fireman not blamed. Westbound train ordered to run 2 hours 25 minutes late; ran 2 hours 15 minutes late (3 a. m.). Engineman says he made mistake reading timetable; conductor makes same claim, but superintendent does not admit claim.
21 22	BR	Pand F Pand F	3 0	8	10, 874 14, 600	54 73	Careless running. See note in text below.  Passenger train standing at flag station run into at rear by following freight; operator 6 miles back did not maintain full time interval between trains. Men in charge of both trains also at
23	M	Pand P	0	28	14,700	39	fault. False clear block signal. See note in text below.

TABLE No. 2A.—Causes of 47 prominent train accidents—Continued.

COLLISIONS—Continued.

No.	Class.	Kind of train.	Killed.	Injured.	Damage to engines, cars, and road-	Reference to record.	Cause.
24	M	Pand F	1	18	16,700	87	Passenger train approached station with speed not under proper control; yard engine on main track without protection. Engineman of passenger train killed.
25	В	P and P	6	29	18, 300	7	Operator failed to deliver order. See note in text below.
26	В	F and F	8	1	27,600	53	Conductor and engineman of westbound train overlooked schedule of eastbound (4 a. m.). These 2 men were killed.
27	В	F and F	3	11	50,000	83	Train of 13 dump cars became uncontrollable on steep descending grade. It is believed that an angle cock accidentally became closed.
28	R	Pand F	1	10	15,000	90	Careless running, and failure of flagman to protect standing car. (Electric cars.)
		Total	99	457	318, 146		

#### DERAILMENTS.

					4		
1	D	P	1	1	\$1,000	38	Improper fitting of miter rail joint at drawbridge See note in text below.
2	D	P	8	58	2,500	31	Excessive speed; 60 miles an hour on track where the highest allowable speed was 30 miles an hour;
		<b>,</b>	ļ	i			conductor and engineman both experienced.
3	D	F	3	0	4,919	103	Excessive speed on curve; engineman was making his fourth trip on this division.
4	D	P	0	2	7,200	36	False clear signal. See note in text below.
5	Ď	P	Ŏ	19	8,600	94	Defective side bearing of tender.
6	ัก	F	Ŏ	l ō	10,000	18	Broken flange.
7	D D D	F	ŏ	ŏ	10, 259	61	Broken axle.
8	กั	P	ŏ	Ιĭ	10,700	60	Excessive speed through crossover. Engineman
0		*	"	•	10,100	1	(3 a. m.) failed to observe distant signal.
9	D	F	0	0	10,860	59	Runaway on steep descending grade. See note in
	_		`		,		text below.
10	D	F	0	0	11,100	21	Runaway on steep descending grade. In prepar-
		}	1				ing to move standing cars, the hand brakes were released before the air reservoir was filled.
11	D	P	1	45	11,250	98	Derailed at frog because of absence of guard rail.
- 44	ע	A	•	<b>*</b>	11,200	-	Guard rail had been torn up by some cause un-
			ł		1	1	discovered.
30	D	F	0	_	12,000	01	
12	D D		ŏ	Ŏ		91	Part of brake rigging fell on track.
13	p	F	1	0	12,819	95	Broken arch bar in truck of coal car.
14	ע	P	1	14	14,000	35	Misplaced switch (4 a. m.). Switch had been run through by a freight train traveling in the oppo-
	7	73			15 000		site direction.
15	D	<b>F</b>	0	3	15,000	27	At derailing switch at end of double track; excessive speed on descending grade.
16	D	F	0	0	15,859	25	Broken truck (arch bar).
17	D	P	4	18	19,235	101	Undiscovered; speed 40 miles an hour; curvature
	•			1	'		of track 6 degrees; track in good condition. Four
			!			Ì	mail clerks killed.
18	D	F	2	2	20, 200	26	Undiscovered.
19	D D	P	2	55	36,000	23	Failure of top chord of lattice girder bridge, 76 feet
10	_		1		00,000	_	long. Plan of bridge provided a sufficient factor
			1	1			of safety; "failure of material a mystery."
•		1	l				or serest, minne or mercrise a milesoria.
	Total		15	218	233, 510		
				-10			
	Total	collisions and					
		ailments	114	675	551,656	I	·
	del	######################################	1	0.0	w., w	<b> </b>	
			<u> </u>	! 	'	•	

Collision No. 7 was a butting collision of passenger trains on a double-track railroad; the westbound train having been turned on to the eastbound track for a few miles in consequence of an obstruction on the westbound track. When it had nearly reached the point

where it would be returned to the westbound track and while running at about 25 miles an hour, it was met by an eastbound train running at about 45 miles an hour. The collision occurred at about 2 a. m. The eastbound train had run past one distant and three home signals set against it. The engineman was killed and it is not known how he came to disregard the signals; but the superintendent reaches the conclusion that probably he had been disabled by sudden sickness or by sudden death. He was 55 years old and had been a careful and painstaking engineman for 26 years. About 10 months before the date of the accident he had taken a vacation of considerable length because of ill-health, and at the investigation of the accident it was disclosed that he had recently been taken sick on the street. At one time he had been unconscious for about 40 minutes in a fainting spell, with apparently complete suspension of animation; but there were no indications of sickness when he reported for duty on the trip which ended in the collision.

Collision No. 12 between westbound and eastbound freight trains, about 3 a. m., was due to the failure of the men on the westbound train to identify eastbound trains which they met. The engineman of the westbound train was killed and his neglect is unexplained. This train was ordered to meet two eastbound trains at G, and the conductor and the other surviving members of the crew say that they thought they saw the tail lights of two trains at that station; but they admit that they did not take care to see whether there were two engines. The eastbound train which was met at G sounded a whistle signal to indicate that a second section of the same train was following, and this whistle signal was answered by a whistle signal from the engine of the westbound train; but it is the conclusion of the superintendent that this answer was given by the fireman and that the engineman was asleep.

Collision No. 13 occurred on an electric interurban railway. It was between a northbound and a southbound passenger train, each "train" consisting of a single car. Both were running at a speed of about 35 miles an hour immediately before the collision, and both were badly wrecked. The collision was due to forgetfulness of the men in charge of the northbound train. They ran their car about 2½ miles beyond the point at which they should have met the southbound, this point having been fixed by an order that had been issued to them by the train dispatcher.

The motorman at fault has absolutely no explanation to give as to how he came to forget the order. He had been on duty only 18 minutes, having just begun his trip. He had been in the employ of the road about four years, and is spoken of in the report as a careful and competent employee.

The conductor of this car claims to have observed that the motorman was running past the appointed meeting place, and says that he gave a signal of one stroke on the bell, indicating "stop"; but the motorman denies that he received such a signal, claiming that he received a signal of two strokes, meaning "proceed." The superintendent holds that the conductor, instead of giving the ordinary stop signal, should have given the emergency stop signal provided for in the rules. This was not done. The conductor says that when he noticed that the motorman did not obey the stop signal he assumed that he (the motorman) had received further orders; and the conductor started toward the front of the car to inquire as to this. was stopped, however, by a passenger who asked him a question, and before he had finished talking with the passenger the collision had occurred. The conductor had been employed by the company about three months, and his record up to the time of the collision was clear. He had previously and for several years been employed as night agent at a station on a large railroad and brought recommendations from that road as a capable man, sober, industrious, and honest; and as one whose work had been satisfactory.

Collision No. 14 was due, primarily, to a false clear block signal. A passenger train, standing at a station, was run into at the rear by two engines, coupled together, without train, and the rear car of the passenger train was wrecked, and was destroyed by fire, illuminating gas from its ruptured pipes having been ignited by sparks in the front end of the colliding engine, which was broken. The station at which the passenger train was standing was at about the middle of the block section. The block section (manual) extends from C, 2 miles west of this station, to S, 2 miles east of it. The passenger train had been delayed eight minutes by a defective coupler, and the rear brakeman is held at fault for not having gone back with red signals to stop any following train. The conductor is also held at fault for not having seen that this was done. The rear passenger car of the train was empty at the moment of the collision, and the two persons killed and three of the injured were standing, at the moment of the collision, on the track between the engine of the passenger train and its leading car, the defective coupler having been at this The signalman at C had had four and one-half months' experience, but had been a telegrapher for three years before that.

Collision No. 18 was due to a false clear block signal given by a signalman who was confused. He omitted to examine the block sheet, and also gave misleading information to the dispatcher. He gave a clear block signal and also a clearance card to a westbound work train. This train was delayed and did not start at the time expected, and the signalman, being called upon to admit another

TABLE No. 1B.—Casualties to passengers, emple

			<del></del> -								
-		engers a).	on f	engers reight ains b).	cai ur agre	rsons rried ider ement ntract bb).		ıl (a, b, 1 <b>b</b> b).		inmen (c).	Tra.: il in yardd
	Killed.	Injured.	Killed.	Injured.	Killed.	Injured.	Killed.	Injured.	Killed.	Injared.	K Illed.
Collisions Derailments Accidents to trains, cars, or engines, except collisions, derail-	3 5	815 491	9	31 25	6 6	128 72	18 12	974 588	.40	572 <b>20</b> 9	9 11
ments, and boiler explosions Bursting of, or defects in, locomotive boilers or boiler attachments.	•••••	27	•	2	••••	10		39	1 24	150 215	
Total train accidents	8	1,333	10	58	12	210	30	1.601	147	1,236	10
Accidents to roadway or bridges not causing derailment, such as fires, floods, landslides, explosions, etc	1	5				1	1	6	23	9	
While doing other work about trains (not in shops or engine houses) or while attending switches.  Coming in contact while riding on cars, with overhead bridges, tunnels, or any signal apparatus, or any fixed structure	•••••	;     	<b>.</b>		· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·				8	3,029	•
above or at the side of the track	16 23	5 86 664		3 18	5 1	1 7 15	21 24	6 96 697	17 51 17	220 659 871	3 11 5
Being struck or run over by en- gine or car at stations or yards. Being struck or run over by en-	13	586 37	!	81	2	140	6 13	807 41	16	7 27	<b></b>
gine or car at highway grade crossings.  Being struck or run over by engine or car at other places.  Other causes.	······································	1 86			••••	5	1	1 91	14 4	2 24 89	1 1
Total, other than train accidents.	58	1,470		104	8	171	66	1,745	150		×i
Grand total	66	2,803	10	162	20	381	96	3, 346	297	6, 443	94

other persons; October, November. and December, 1910.

		sing lers, id ich- (e).	men	ige-	Ot) emp ees	her loy- (g)	Total employ- ees on duty (c, cc, d, e, f, and g).		ploy- s on ployees sons not $y(c, not on to n)$ trespass- x(c, e, f, duty(h), ing(i)		Tres ers	pass- (j).	To pers	tal ons.		
Injured.	Killed.	Injured.	Killed.	Injured.	Killed.	Injured.	Killed.	Injured.	Killed.	Injured.	Killed.	Infured.	Killed.	Injured.	Killed.	Injured.
168 50	i	3	7 2	59 20	4 2	97 17	115 56	1,093 422	2	2? 15	<b>2</b>	16 14	7 7	9 17	144 75	2,119 1,056
23	• • • • •	••••	• • • • •	3		7	2	205	• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •		1	14	• • • • • •	 	3	258
41					,	5	26	292				 	, 	4	26	296
282	1	3	9	82	6	126	199	2,012	2	42	3	44	14	30	248	3,729
3 415 1,157	1			18	5	4 14 128	60	27 877 5, 356	••••	1		1			1 60 39	34 877 5,358
128 535 775 7 82	2	1 12 13 2 17	6 5 54	3 23 49 35 70	2 4 10 .1 71	5 102 115 121 136	23 108 50 1 209	429 1,669 2,257 175 400	1 1 8 1 32	3 13 68 21 19	4 6 38	15 45 112 122	99 111 10 266	11 109 319 41 248	28 283 199 18 558	449 1,902 3,386 1,156 830
1	5	8	1	1	4	3	10	15	3	2	233	663	35	32	281	713
4 25	5	3 20	79 3	83 25	29 5	42 66	128 14	157 262	41 5	15 62	18 12	<b>53</b> <b>42</b> 3	746 29	<b>345</b> 85	933 61	570 923
3, 132	24	119	148	311	137	736	642	11,624	92	204	311	1,435	1,300	1,190	2,411	16, 198
3, 414	25	122	157	393	143	862	841	13,636	94	246	314	1,479	1,314	1,220	2,659	19,927

train to the block section, canceled (on his record) the right of the work train to the block, without communicating with the work-train conductor, and then he authorized the station at the other end of the block to give a clear signal to an eastbound train. This signalman had been in the service three months.

Collision No. 21, which occurred at midnight on a cold and stormy night, was due to a lack of caution on the part of the engineman of a passenger train. This engineman was killed. A helping engine, attached to the front of the train, had just been detached and run forward about 1,500 feet to be backed into a sidetrack, so as to allow the passenger train to proceed on its way. On account of the switch of the sidetrack being frozen, the helping engine was run forward some distance to another sidetrack, and just as it was backing into this track it was struck by the passenger train. The engineman of the helping engine says that he sounded two blasts of the whistle to indicate to the engineman of the passenger train what was being done. It is supposed that the engineman of the passenger train misinterpreted this whistle signal, assumed that it meant that the helping engine was clear of the main track, and did not notice that it had gone forward to the second switch. It appears that he ran his engine into the helping engine without seeing it. An eastbound train, passing at the time, was damaged by the engines which were derailed in the collision.

Collision No. 23, which occurred about 2 a. m., was between eastbound and westbound passenger trains, and was due principally to the error of a telegrapher in giving a clear block signal wrongfully. The westbound train was entering the sidetrack at a point about 750 feet east of the station, and it was struck in the side by the eastbound, which had been started from the station in consequence of the clear block signal erroneously given. It was the duty of the telegrapher in the station to know positively from his own observation that the westbound train was in the sidetrack, clear of the main line, before giving the clear signal to the eastbound train engineman and fireman of the eastbound knew that they were to meet the westbound at this station, and are also held blameworthy for proceeding without knowing that the main track was clear. engineman said that he was deceived by an "all right" hand signal given by some person standing on the main track in the vicinity of the westbound train. The superintendent finds that no such hand signal was given, but thinks it possible that the engineman saw a signal which was given by a brakeman of the westbound train to the engineman of his own train.

Collision No. 25 was due to failure on the part of a telegraph operator to deliver an order to an eastbound train. This order, sent to the operator at M and requiring the eastbound train to wait at

### ACCIDENTS ON ELECTRIC RAILWAYS.

TABLE No. 1E.—Casualties to persons, October, November, and December, 1910.

	Namber of accidents.		55011- Ars.	plo	m- yees luty.	plo not	m- yees on ty.	per	ther sons tres- sing.	Tipas	es-		otal sons.
	Namber	Killed.	Injured.	Killed.	Injured.	Killed.	Infured.	Killed.	Injured.	Killed.	Injured.	Killed.	Injured.
Collisions.  Derailments.  Accidents to trains, cars, or engines, except collisions, derailments, and boiler explosions.	46 21 2	34	345 60 2	6	31 13	- • • •	4	1	1	<i>!</i>	••••	40	381 74
Bursting of or defects in locomotive boilers or boiler attachments.									• • • • •				
Total train accidents	69	34	407	6	44		4	1	2			41	457
Accidents to road way or bridges not causing derailment, such as fires, floods, landslides, explosions, etc	1			• • • •	5 25		•			••••			5 25
above or at the side of the track	• • • •	3	19 197	4	2 14 12	••••	2 2		1	• • • •	3	4 3	37 218
here named Being struck or run over by engines or			32	2	••••	••••		• • • •	1 5	1		3	38
Being struck or run over by engines or cars at highway-grade crossings.	••••	1	1	1	3	1		1 16	43	4	3 2	21	13 46
Being struck or run over by engines or cars at other places. Other causes.	••••	3	15	2	1	• • • •		8	59 3	21	7 2	34	67 20
Total other than train accidents		8	266	9	63	1	4	25	116	26	19	69	468
Total accidents exclusive of industrial accidents.  Industrial accidents to employees 1	• • • •	42	673	15 4	107 106	1	8	26	118	26	19	110	925 106
Grand total	••••	42	673	19	213	1	8	26	118	26	19	114	1,031

<sup>&</sup>quot;Industrial" accidents are those occurring to employees of the railroad on railroad premises in which movements of cars or engines are not involved.

TABLE No. 2E.—Collisions and derailments.

OCTOBER, NOVEMBER, AND DECEMBER, 1910.

	Number.	Loss.	Killed.	Injured.
Collisions, rear	25	\$32,983	2	272
Collisions, butting	10	11,320	38	88
Collisions, miscellaneous.	11	4,275		21
Total	46	48,578	40	381
Derailments due to defects of roadway, etc		50		17
Derailments due to delects of equipment.  Derailments due to negligence of trainmen, signalmen, etc  Derailments due to unforeseen obstruction of track, etc  Derailments due to malicious obstruction of track, etc	5 2	104	1	6 13
Derailments due to miscellaneous causes		945		36
Total	21	1,099	1	74
Total collisions and derailments	67	49,677	41	455